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Rail consolidation through bankruptcy

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Rail consolidation through bankruptcy
Posted by gabe on Thursday, May 5, 2005 2:37 PM
As some of you may know, I posted another question concerning which railroads would have survived had the last 20+ years of rail mergers not have happened.

In a related question: might we have been better off if we just allowed consolidation through bankruptcy--kind of like the Rock Island? Instead of having railroads conglomerating with some of the conglomerate lines really working well with one another and some not--resulting in a management structure that is really not designed to work with some of the lines--wouldn't it be easier just to allow the railroad to be liquidated and surviving railroads cherry pick the liquidated parts according to what suits them.

Then--like the Rock--the lines that are more valuable will go to other Class 1s, the lines that should go to regionals end up going to regionals, the lines that should go to short lines end up as short lines, and the lines that should be abandoned end up abandoned. The Rock is a perfect example. Some of its lines still belong to Class 1s, some belong to regionals, some to short lines, and some abandoned--although you can argue the Memphis sub should have been kept.

Also, the cost for covering the consolidation would likely be less via bankruptcy.

I think both the path that we did take (mega mergers) and my above-set path would lead to the same result. 2-4 final mega railroads. However, I think my path would result in much more homogenous railroads that are slightly smaller and easier to manage.

I am not claiming to be an expert, so please, tell me what you think.

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Posted by kenneo on Thursday, May 5, 2005 2:50 PM
The main reason that consolodations are not now done via bankruptcy is that there are some very powerful stockholders (see pension funds, mutual funds and such like organizations) that won't stand for their investment to go to $Zero. The Rock was the last road to go "the old way" if I remember correctly. I think the Milwaukee Road was a combination of both methods starting with partial abandonment.

As an example of how bankruptcy can creat an empire, see the early history of the Great Northern. J J Hill bought for almost nothing the Red River of the North line (can't remember the name of it) that ran from the Twin Cities to Winapeg. If you had Hill's skills and vision, you could create an empire out of the net worth of a General Store, just as Hill did.
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Posted by gabe on Thursday, May 5, 2005 2:57 PM
QUOTE: Originally posted by kenneo

The main reason that consolodations are not now done via bankruptcy is that there are some very powerful stockholders (see pension funds, mutual funds and such like organizations) that won't stand for their investment to go to $Zero. The Rock was the last road to go "the old way" if I remember correctly. I think the Milwaukee Road was a combination of both methods starting with partial abandonment.

As an example of how bankruptcy can creat an empire, see the early history of the Great Northern. J J Hill bought for almost nothing the Red River of the North line (can't remember the name of it) that ran from the Twin Cities to Winapeg. If you had Hill's skills and vision, you could create an empire out of the net worth of a General Store, just as Hill did.


Exactly.

Hill saw the efficiencies of doing it that way. I think the part of the problem facing the consolidated industry now is the surviving conglomerate railroad not only has the burden of spending money to fix the problems/effectively merge the fallen flag AND pay for the merger cost. Do you think UP would be able to solve its problems more quickly had it not had to put forth substantial merger costs?

Thanks for responding.

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Posted by sansouci on Thursday, May 5, 2005 3:13 PM
The big impediments to bankruptcy resolution were the ICC, a slow, cumbersome federal organization and the labor unions. With the ICC gone, rate flexibility in hand and unions realistic about manning levels (no more firemen for example) the bankruptcy process could have been streamlined 50 years ago along this model. As the class 1's rationalized their networks, excess trackmiles have been abondoned and where economic, short lines created. Physical capacity is swapped with runthrough, trackage and haulage agreements without having to sell the underlying infrastructure. Despite the massive infrastructure downsizing, the industry with its high costs still does not earn its cost of capital, but must invest about $8bn/year to keep everything running.
The other way to view this is from the Mexican example which broke up the FNM into several (4?) super-regional carriers much like the US. Some have better traffic characteristics such as the one serving Monterrey with heavy industry. Had the US been a single road monopoly, the breakup could look much like what we have today.
An interesting analysis says that the minimum length of haul is 800miles so that O&D traffice that begins near the Mississippi (the east/west divide) is not terribly profitable if there is an interchange. However, more traffic than ever before is flowing North/South which is why CN and IC hooked up and they have among the lowest operating ratio of any class 1. So will we have 2 or 3 major RR's? Probably not until the merger integration problems can be solved that plagued UNP, CSX and NSC. Rob Krebs did a much better job with ATSF & BN perhaps because both were in better shape and had a better attitude. Remeber, SP was power short and run down and UP had a "my way or the highway" attitude about practices & proceedures that just proved disasterous. Most tried to ru***he layoffs to maximize merger savings and lost a lot of institutional knowledge and flexibility.
In closing, you don't want a bankruptcy trustee running a railroad--better off having railroad managers making rational decisions balancing shareholder and customer needs.
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Posted by gabe on Thursday, May 5, 2005 3:20 PM
I completely agree with you, sansouci, but only under the ICC model. Part of my premise is to allow the bankruptcy to go forth under the STB model.

As for UP, that is the model for my proposal. The SP had mega problems. Had UP been able to not have to by the whole kit n' kabutle (sp?) and been able to get it through bankruptcy, maybe they could dig out of this hole they are in faster?

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Posted by sansouci on Thursday, May 5, 2005 4:31 PM
Gabe-- I think that had the UP waited a year or two, SP could have fallen into bankruptcy, but the ATSF/BN merger forced their hand. They worried that SP could be acquired by another competitor (creating the infamous Transcon). I also think there was much that UP didn't want of the ROW. With the growth of the Asian import traffic to a level unexpected at that time, most of the west coast ports have proven valuable.
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Posted by sansouci on Thursday, May 5, 2005 4:33 PM
GABE- I meant to say that the UP wanted virtually all of the ROW of SP. Rolling stock and locos is another story
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Posted by kenneo on Thursday, May 5, 2005 11:42 PM
Gabe and Sansouci

The SP was sold because the stockholder(s) would have lost litterly everything had there not been a sale. The Santa Fe - BN deal just moved things along faster.

Actually, if you look at the documents and who ended up running the UP, what you will see is that, leagally, the UP purchased the SP. But the SP has ended up owning the UP in that the major stockholder of the SP now owns 1/3 of the UP stock.

The DRGW had purchased the SP after the UP took over the WP, but kept the SP name for marketing reasons. So, in reality, the SP became a fallen flag in the mid 1980's.

Go figure.
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Posted by CSSHEGEWISCH on Friday, May 6, 2005 7:57 AM
Bankruptcy would be a slow way of effecting consolidation. The Rock Island entered bankruptcy in 1974 and finally suspended operations in March, 1980. Admittedly, the Golden State Route was sold to SP/SSW during this period, but much of the remaining trackage that remained wasn't taken over by new operators for a while after service was suspended. A prime example of this situation is the Chicago-Omaha main, which didn't get picked up by Iowa Interstate until after a short period of dormancy and minimal operation by the Iowa Railroad, which didn't operate east of Bureau. Imagine how long a bankruptcy proceeding for Southern Pacific would have taken.
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Posted by gabe on Friday, May 6, 2005 8:52 AM
QUOTE: Originally posted by kenneo

Gabe and Sansouci

The SP was sold because the stockholder(s) would have lost litterly everything had there not been a sale. The Santa Fe - BN deal just moved things along faster.

Actually, if you look at the documents and who ended up running the UP, what you will see is that, leagally, the UP purchased the SP. But the SP has ended up owning the UP in that the major stockholder of the SP now owns 1/3 of the UP stock.

The DRGW had purchased the SP after the UP took over the WP, but kept the SP name for marketing reasons. So, in reality, the SP became a fallen flag in the mid 1980's.

Go figure.


Yes, the stockholders sold because for your reasons stated. But, UP didn't have to buy, they could have just let bankruptcy run its natural course.

You might counter with, another railroad might have bought it out from under the UP and that was what the UP was trying to avoid. I doubt it. BNSF wasn't in a position to, and I doubt any of the major line sales would have got STB approval. CSX couldn't afford to and was too consumed with NS/Conrail. Finally, I don't know how good of a match NS would have made and NS was also focused on Conrail at the time.

Gabe
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Posted by gabe on Friday, May 6, 2005 8:56 AM
QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

Bankruptcy would be a slow way of effecting consolidation. The Rock Island entered bankruptcy in 1974 and finally suspended operations in March, 1980. Admittedly, the Golden State Route was sold to SP/SSW during this period, but much of the remaining trackage that remained wasn't taken over by new operators for a while after service was suspended. A prime example of this situation is the Chicago-Omaha main, which didn't get picked up by Iowa Interstate until after a short period of dormancy and minimal operation by the Iowa Railroad, which didn't operate east of Bureau. Imagine how long a bankruptcy proceeding for Southern Pacific would have taken.


Point taken, but during bankruptcy a trustee is appointed to run the company--I think it was the Colorado Southern in the case of the Rock. It is not as if all of the lines are forced to sit dormant during bankruptcy.

Part of the Reason the Bureau line took so long to the IAIS is what class 1 was interested in the saturated Chicago-Council Bluffs corridor? Although, I often wonder why UP didn't jump in immediately.

There are many factors affecting the timing of the sale of bankruptcy assets. I am not sure that a good portion of viable trackage would ever go dormant because of a bankruptcy.

Gabe
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Posted by CSSHEGEWISCH on Friday, May 6, 2005 9:04 AM
Gabe
The trustee and the directed service operator are not synonymous. Kansas City Terminal was the directed service operator for Rock Island for one year after the trustee (whose name escapes me at the moment) determined that continued operation would not be in the best interest of the creditors. If I recall correctly, the Crown family was a major holder of Rock Island bonds and was pushing for liquidation almost from the outset of bankruptcy.

Paul
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Posted by jeaton on Friday, May 6, 2005 3:00 PM
I have been looking at this topic and the Who Would Have Survived topic.

I would suggest this on the wait until they go bankrupt idea.

The only possible benefit that I see is the remote prospect that an acquiring railroad would get the assets purchased at a bargain price. However, consider the stages of a railroad bankruptcy. It usually starts with the inability of the carrier to make payment on the debt, and the filing stops the creditors from demanding payment out of any cash on hand, including working capital cash. At that point, operations continue and the initial goal of the judge and trustee would be to reorganize. With reorganization as the goal, maybe some of the assets would go up for sale, but I don't think they would be offered at bargain prices. Suppose the carrier interested in the property offered to buy up the whole thing. I really doubt that the creditors would stand still to be cut out of the deal.

Now suppose that time goes by and the judge and trustee come to the conclusion that reorganization is not feasible and move to liquidate. Obviously this might be an oppurtunity for the carrier initially interested in the property to get it cheap, but on the other hand, there could well be others who want all or part of the property. Maybe that produces aggressive bidding, and the best of the assets get expensive. In the current legal environment, the Surface Transportation Board gets involved and could well make decisions unfavorable to the railroad that was interested in the first place. All the time, the property is probably deteriorating very rapidly.

It seems to me that this all adds up to a situation where our acquiring railroad has lost a lot of control over the shape of the deal. If I was a company chairman, and found an interesting acquisition candidate, I don't think I would push my luck and wait for a bankruptcy.

Jay

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Posted by bobwilcox on Friday, May 6, 2005 3:18 PM
QUOTE: Originally posted by gabe

QUOTE: Originally posted by kenneo

Gabe and Sansouci

The SP was sold because the stockholder(s) would have lost litterly everything had there not been a sale. The Santa Fe - BN deal just moved things along faster.

Actually, if you look at the documents and who ended up running the UP, what you will see is that, leagally, the UP purchased the SP. But the SP has ended up owning the UP in that the major stockholder of the SP now owns 1/3 of the UP stock.

The DRGW had purchased the SP after the UP took over the WP, but kept the SP name for marketing reasons. So, in reality, the SP became a fallen flag in the mid 1980's.

Go figure.


Yes, the stockholders sold because for your reasons stated. But, UP didn't have to buy, they could have just let bankruptcy run its natural course.

You might counter with, another railroad might have bought it out from under the UP and that was what the UP was trying to avoid. I doubt it. BNSF wasn't in a position to, and I doubt any of the major line sales would have got STB approval. CSX couldn't afford to and was too consumed with NS/Conrail. Finally, I don't know how good of a match NS would have made and NS was also focused on Conrail at the time.

Gabe


Phil A. had at least two options. Sell to CR. CR's upper management was eager to stay in the railroad business. He also could have left the road haul business and set up a batch of switching lines.
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Posted by gabe on Friday, May 6, 2005 3:23 PM
Jay,

You raise good points, and I am certainly not saying you are wrong—I just think the topic is worthy of further exploration.

(1) Typically assets go much cheaper in Bankruptcy than in normal merger acquisitions. As stated above, this has been true in the past when railroads were split up via bankruptcy.

(2) To me, the biggest benefit of acquisition via bankruptcy is the liquidated railroad is not purchased en masse. For instance, take the UP's purchase of the SP. There were obviously some lines there that the UP would want very badly and for which it would pay top dollar. If UP had to buy various lines as individual entities, I am not sure it buys all of them.

Take SP's St. Louis - Joliet IL line for instance. I don't think UP would have spent the money on this line had it purchased SP's lines individually. Had SP been liquidated, UP could have spent the money that it otherwise paid for the line for much needed system rehabilitation. Better yet, a regional railroad or a Class 1, who the line might fit in their system could have purchased the St. Louis-Joliet line and had a philosophy and system cohesion that would give the line the attention it deserved.

(3) I think your best point is the fear that certain lines might deteriorate during bankruptcy proceedings. I am not too worried about this. The goal of the trustee is paying off creditors so that reorganization would be feasible. If the trustee knows that the West side of the overland route is getting all kinds of traffic and is worth a lot to the UP, are they going to allow it to deteriorate? If a line is worth $x, securing small loans to maintain that worth for liquidation purposes is not at all unusual in bankruptcy.

(4) Finally, I think smaller railroads come out of bankruptcy consolidation. The “superrailroads” would still exist; but I don’t think all of the smaller feeder lines go to the conglomerated railroad and instead end up as short lines or regional railroads. I think part of the problem with today’s railroads is they are too big and top heavy for effective management. Shedding some of this weight wouldn’t be a bad thing.

Nonetheless, you make good points. I am not contending I am right. I just think it is a theory worth exploring.

Thanks for responding,

Gabe
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Posted by gabe on Friday, May 6, 2005 3:25 PM
Bob,

I didn't realize Conrail was in a position to purchase--I thought they were in a position to be purchased.

Nonetheless, if your premise is correct, you have partially defeated my point.

Gabe
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Posted by fuzzybroken on Friday, May 6, 2005 11:28 PM
QUOTE: Originally posted by gabe

Part of the Reason the Bureau line took so long to the IAIS is what class 1 was interested in the saturated Chicago-Council Bluffs corridor? Although, I often wonder why UP didn't jump in immediately.

Gabe
Funny you mention that... UP and Rock were involved in an excruciatingly lengthy merger proceeding, which the ICC completely mucked up, which was finally approved way too late for the Rock to survive, and they tumbled into bankruptcy.

The "other" MWH also mentioned the Milwaukee Road seeking merger way too late. I don't find this to be the case. MILW always had a steep uphill battle against the Northern Lines -- GN and NP -- because they were basically the last ones to the Pacific party, and ended up as an "also-ran". The steps leading to MILW's bankruptcy and demise were a series of gross missteps. They actually did seek merger, with completely the wrong merger partner -- mostly parallel Chicago & North Western! Probably partly a result of their merger never coming to fruition, they let the Northern Lines get away with murder in the BN merger, with very little conditions in favor of MILW, and one of these conditions was never even enforced -- MILW had the option to be included in BN, but BN said NO. Furthermore, throughout merger talk with C&NW, Milwaukee deferred maintenance on its track and equipment, which led to more derailments, which led to less $$$$, which led to less $ available to fix the track and equipment, which led to still more derailments and other problems -- it was a continual downward spiral, the effects of which are still felt today, 20 or more years later!

Which brings me to another conclusion. Both Rock and Milwaukee, during their merger talks, deferred maintenance on their property -- why??? To pad their books, of course! More "profits", though actually money that should have been used to fix the tracks and equipment, was supposed to make their respective company look better to the acquirer. Unfortunately, the slogging ICC drew out the proceedings long enough to expose the cracks in the iron. (And you thought the problems with Enron and other companies is a new phenomenon. Ha!)

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Posted by jeaton on Saturday, May 7, 2005 7:54 AM
Mark

I you are correct that the physical assets went in the tank for both the Rock Island and the Milwaukee, but unlike the situation at Enron, the railroad management did not do anything illegal. Management on the Rock was trying to catch up the maintenance, but there was not enough cash being generated to do the job. The long forum thread on the Milwaukee Road noted that Leo Crowley did boost the stock dividend paid with ca***hat might have been better spent on maintenance. That proved to be not smart, but it wasn't illegal.

Given the regulatory oversight of the day and the very large number of people in top management positions at all the railroads, it was not likley that everybody in the business would be fooled by the "profit" number. Whatever they did, it certainly did not rise to the criminal activity of Enron.

Jay

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Posted by gabe on Saturday, May 7, 2005 10:09 AM
QUOTE: Originally posted by Mark_W._Hemphill

Gabe: The only "assets" that typically obtain to a bankrupted railroad company are the right of way and a hypothetical strategic position. The employees are beaten down or gone, the track is junk, the rolling stock is junk, and the customers have moved on or been beaten down or have become disgusted with rail service. Equipment can be leased and quickly moved into place, and employees will self-relocate rapidly in search of opportunity (though the institutional history is lost), but track and customers are neither quick nor inexpensive to restore. It's not as if there are on-line factories just waiting for a white knight to throw the railroad light switch and they start pushing out product again -- they're gone, or have made other arrangements. This is exactly what happened with the UP-SP-RI fiasco: by the time the ICC approved the acquisition, it was moot; there was nothing left worthy of acquisition. And the cost to rehabilitate the wreckage was so stiff that only two large pieces (Cotton Rock and Spine Line) were picked up by Class Is. The SP never could fully pay for its incomplete rehabilitation of the Cotton Rock, and the financial burden of the Cotton Rock meant that SP couldn't spend money on things it desperately needed such as CTC on the Sunset east of El Paso, more and longer sidings west of El Paso, etc.

In my experience, once a large, complex installation such as a railroad, generating station, etc., has gone without programmed maintenance for a long period (5-10 years), you'll generally find that the cost of rehabilitation is greater than demolishing and buying new. There's ample evidence of that where I work now.

The short answer to your question is that it's a false economy to wait until a property enters bankruptcy before making the move to acquire. In retrospect, I think a lot of roads waited too long to seek a purchaser, and a lot of roads waited too long to purchase. I suggest the MoPac and the Frisco as two managements who were notably on top of their game and sought merger promptly, doing a great service to their equity holders, their employees, and their customers. I suggest SP, MILW, and RI as roads that waited far too late, doing a great disservice to their employees, equity holders, and customers. RI and MILW should have been seeking merger immediately after WWII -- any merger, almost, would have been better than doing nothing. SP should have sought merger with a better in the mid-60s, instead of thinking it was the better, and seeking inferiors such as WP. If you look back at the people involved, I would hold out Downing Jenks as the best western railroad CEO of the 60s and 70s. (And people wonder why MoPac management became disproportionately represented in UP-MP-WP ... .)


Mark,

You do a good job of explaining why my theory is impractical, and I am now convinced it is infeasible. However, one of the backstops to my theory is that I know pre-1940 rail bankruptcies were more common and did not have the deleterious consequences to which you attribute to today’s rail bankruptcies. Do you know why it is the case that bankruptcies/continued functioning of the line was feasible in the past but is not feasible now?

Thanks,

Gabe
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Posted by fuzzybroken on Saturday, May 7, 2005 11:06 AM
Jay,

Thank you for clarifying and adding additional insight to my points. Enron was certainly the pinnacle of pinnacles of money-shifting, and not only was what it did illegal, it was just plain wrong. But Enron was certainly not the first company to do what they did!

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Posted by MP173 on Sunday, May 8, 2005 8:41 AM

Gabe:

Thanks for bringing an economic topic to the forum. Lately, without any discussion of Montana wheat and the Milwaukee Road PCE, I havent had much to do and actually went upstairs and cleaned.

In the process of cleaning I discovered I have almost an entire collection of Trains Magazines from 1960 thru to today. I dont recall where the 60's magazines came from as I began reading in 1972...I must have purchased a collection from someone.

It is fascinating to try and sort out the current situation. I would highly recommend two volumes by Richard Saunders on railroad mergers. Volume one discusses from 1900 thru 1970 and volume two addresses post Penn Central. It is great reading.

I have jumped in rather late but a few points come to mind, most of which have been discussed...
1. Your bankruptcy model can work if conditions are right, but most companies cannot wait the period of time for the proceedings. Time is essential in business. Strong franchises can be put in place with good reliable service.
2. MWH has stated something to the effect that the best geographic route usually dominates. That leaves secondary routes to pickup the pieces. There are usually strong compelling reasons bankruptcies occur. Generally it is do to not enough good traffic. For a cherry picking to be successful, it has to be a great line and there were very few of those in bankrupt railroads.
3. Railroading changed significantly in the past 40 years. Looking at my old Trains reinforced that. Boxcar freight is not what it used to be. That freight now moves in 48/53 boxes. A speedway such as the Transcon line or the ex Conrail Chicago line with capacity to run trains at frequent intervals is critical. Obviously that requires HUGE investment, if the lines are not up to par. That is what CSX is finding now. The investment to compete with NS toe to toe was huge and is a burden they will be paying for years down the road. Meanwhile, NS just keeps running their trains.
4. I have been studying the MoPac/SP situation a little recently. Fred Frailey's excellent book on the Blue Streak Merchandise is required reading. So is the article back in the 80's in Trains on the River Wars, covering the joint operations from East St. Louis south to Illmo. The MoPac's purchase of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois line jump started the entire merger situation, in my opinion. Suddenly Chicago was in play. MoPac didnt have to depend on anyone to get there. Not only that...they were able to sell part of the line to L&N. The route seemed almost too good to be true, they crossed the Mississippi without going thru St. Louis. Imagine if SP/Cotton Belt would have picked up the CEI. True, the Chicago - LA routing would have been a long one, but the Texas freight would have been a great routing. SP never recovered. Their routes to Chicago were inferior and never really a factor.
5. So, taking point #4 one step further, what if the Rock split could have occurred as planned with the northern route to UP and the southern route to SP, with joint operations to Chicago?
6. My beloved Illinois Central was a bankrupcty waiting to happen, except for incredible management in the 80's that sold or gave everything away except for the core route. Perhaps they gave too much away (the Meridian route), but they survived...and according to some now run the CN.

If the next big merger wave reduces the systems to 2, with the NS, BNSF, and CN combining it will be quite a railroad. But, that is a topic for another thread.

ed
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Posted by MichaelSol on Sunday, May 8, 2005 11:34 AM
QUOTE: Originally posted by Mark_W._Hemphill
[
The short answer to your question is that it's a false economy to wait until a property enters bankruptcy before making the move to acquire. ... I suggest SP, MILW, and RI as roads that waited far too late, doing a great disservice to their employees, equity holders, and customers. RI and MILW should have been seeking merger immediately after WWII -- any merger, almost, would have been better than doing nothing.


Milwaukee Road and Chicago and North Western Railway discussed merger and/or line consoldiation at an informal level during the early 1950s. By 1954, both railroads had reach the conclusion that they needed to move forward. These discussions were part of the basis for the UP/MILW passenger operating agreement and the upgrade of the MILW's Omaha line. The results of the line upgrade were so favorable from an operating standpoint that MILW/CNW formalized their "agreement to make an agreement" through the joint funding of a line consolidation study by Wm Wyer & Associates which quickly matured into a formal merger study.

Ben Heineman's takeover at the North Western terminated those studies at an unfortunate point in time. Milwaukee then turned to discussions with the Rock Island until such time as Heineman realized his mistake, and reopened discussions with the Milwaukee in the early 1960s, resulting in a formal merger agreement in 1965 and a favorable recommendation to the ICC in 1968 by the Admiinistrative Law Judge reviewing the agrement proposal.

From 1953 forward, Milwaukee Road was engaged in serious merger discussions on an almost continuous basis through 1970. There exists a belief among some senior company executives that it was not the lack of merger efforts on the part of the Milwaukee Road that led to its eventual difficulties, but the exact opposite: a continual emphasis and ongoing budgeting process that was merger-focused to the degree that certain maintenance functions were on a temporary hiatus. Unfortunately, the temporary hiati that ensued became a strategic policy rather than a short term tactic, and by the time Milwaukee realized that an ongoing merger policy perhaps did not represent a useful operating strategy, small ongoing deficiencies had snowballed into genuine structural problems. This occured, ironically, at a point in time when, from a revenue and profitability perspective, Milwaukee had finally matured as a successful transcontinental carrier even as it joined, inevitably, the ranks of failing midwestern carriers. Best regards, Michael Sol

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Posted by kenneo on Sunday, May 8, 2005 12:47 PM
QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

QUOTE: Originally posted by gabe

QUOTE: Originally posted by kenneo

Gabe and Sansouci

The SP was sold because the stockholder(s) would have lost litterly everything had there not been a sale. The Santa Fe - BN deal just moved things along faster.

Actually, if you look at the documents and who ended up running the UP, what you will see is that, leagally, the UP purchased the SP. But the SP has ended up owning the UP in that the major stockholder of the SP now owns 1/3 of the UP stock.

The DRGW had purchased the SP after the UP took over the WP, but kept the SP name for marketing reasons. So, in reality, the SP became a fallen flag in the mid 1980's.

Go figure.


Yes, the stockholders sold because for your reasons stated. But, UP didn't have to buy, they could have just let bankruptcy run its natural course.

You might counter with, another railroad might have bought it out from under the UP and that was what the UP was trying to avoid. I doubt it. BNSF wasn't in a position to, and I doubt any of the major line sales would have got STB approval. CSX couldn't afford to and was too consumed with NS/Conrail. Finally, I don't know how good of a match NS would have made and NS was also focused on Conrail at the time.

Gabe


Phil A. had at least two options. Sell to CR. CR's upper management was eager to stay in the railroad business. He also could have left the road haul business and set up a batch of switching lines.


IMHO, Conrail would have been better. But the UP knew that should CR have taken over, a true Transcontinental would have been created and the UP (as well as the ATSF and BN) would quickly have found themselves in the financial soup and served up as the main course. Perhaps (probably?) CSX would have gotten one and NS the other and neither would have tried to split up CR.

The STB would (almost) assuredly have granted NS and CSX access into the New York area in some manner and perhaps other CR served areas as well. My personal opinion would have been "end-to-end" mergers rather than the "parallel" type that we got which would have put multiple (3 is multiple) into most markets.
Eric
  • Member since
    March 2004
  • From: Indianapolis, Indiana
  • 2,434 posts
Posted by gabe on Monday, May 9, 2005 9:13 AM
QUOTE: Originally posted by fuzzybroken

Jay,

Thank you for clarifying and adding additional insight to my points. Enron was certainly the pinnacle of pinnacles of money-shifting, and not only was what it did illegal, it was just plain wrong. But Enron was certainly not the first company to do what they did!

-MH
http://www.geocities.com/fuzzybroken



What they did is also murder, and until someone charges Enron with Murder, I am going to doubt the viability of our nation's criminal justice system.

Enron is in charge of electricity. As such they know the consequences of power outages--air conditioners for the elderly do not work, stop lights don't work, rail crossings don't work and people die.

When they rigged the Californial energy market, people did die (41 deaths).

When some inter-city kid kills someone for $100 in their wallet, we throw them in a real prison for the rest fo their life. Why should Enron execs be any different. The way I read both California death penalty statutes and California Murder statutes, any Enron Exec who had their hands in this oprobrium is death penalty eligible.

Growl . . .

Gabe

P.S. I am not pro-death penalty--but if we are going to give to inter-city youths who never had a proper chance to know right from wrong, we should also give it to board execs who had life handed to them on a silver spoon.

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