Would appear that the Governor and Incident Commander were incompetent in their duty to insure that every legtmate participant was involved in making decisions. To not actively seek out the manufacturer of the commodity whose safety was being questioned is failure of their responsibilities.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I'd like to know who barred them from the conference.
Backshop I'd like to know who barred them from the conference.
The vinyl-chloride providers weren't really 'banned from the conference'; their opinion was downplayed and perhaps even discredited as somehow self-serving by the special 'trusted' consultants that were brought in to manage the accident response. It was their advice, in part, to use controlled burn as an option, and as I recall (and some of the testimony indicates) they sort of 'buffaloed themselves' into considering it when the car relief valve blew off so dramatically next to one of their guys in the field.
I notice that the usual careful dancing around some of the facts is taking place, again, in the news coverage, always in the same general direction. You will note that nowhere is it indicated that the NS roadmaster or whoever who was dispatched to set up incident cammand was removed, at the explicit threat of arrest, from the actual incident command that ordered the controlled burn and set its parameters. Certainly no one with even rudimentary knowledge about how vinyl chloride is handled and shipped would have ordered all five cars, in distinct locations, to be blown up together -- in fact, that makes me suspicious that this was a consequence of selective perception of the advice given by the hazmat consultants, based on grounds quite different from some putative expression of desire from NS to get the cleanup done in minimum time to reopen service.
I have said before, and won't be tiresome repeating in detail, that I think there is more than just selective memory, desperate passing the buck, and CYA involved in this testimony circus: there are higher-level political reasons in play, and a certain amount of expedient scapegoating. (I don't know what the current status of building up Buttegieg as the 2028 Presidential candidate is, but mercifully I think he's shown definitively in the interval just how unfortunate a choice he'd prove to be.)
I think we need to tread carefully to stay within permissible TOS for a discussion so entwined with sensitive politics as this is -- but by the same token, we have to be careful that as full and objectively truthful an explanation of this unnecessary catastrophe is elicited as possible.
Overmod The vinyl-chloride providers weren't really 'banned from the conference'; their opinion was downplayed and perhaps even discredited as somehow self-serving by the special 'trusted' consultants that were brought in to manage the accident response. It was their advice, in part, to use controlled burn as an option, ...
The vinyl-chloride providers weren't really 'banned from the conference'; their opinion was downplayed and perhaps even discredited as somehow self-serving by the special 'trusted' consultants that were brought in to manage the accident response. It was their advice, in part, to use controlled burn as an option, ...
Overmod recent comment = dead-on. Who could argue details regarding this incident does NOT involve Railroading. It could cause one Class 1 RR to go belly up.
Euclid might be right, but it doesn't get to "the bottom line". Which is a repeat of the Challenger Disaster. Thycol engineers (who should know best about their fuel/gasket interaction) begged the launch to be delayed due to cold weather. Richard Feynmann proved with his minority report and demonstration with a glass of ice water. Minority reports can point to the embarassment the majority wants to avoid. A wise leader will welcome ALL views and weight "opinions" to determine the best action to take. Who better than Thycol or O.V. should be checked with regarding safe action. Incident commander: List ALL actors in the senario and start inquiries. Again who best to seek advise about the chemical, the manufactor (O.V.) endmrw0308241217
The Challenger disaster doesn't even go that far. The flight documentation for the STS plainly indicates that the launch temperature for the SRBs had to be above 41 degrees F. The soaked-in temperature at launch was... 19.
I will say that Thiokol supervised a really good redesign of the joint system after the accident. What's galling is to look at the redesign in parallel with the original, and wonder why the original was ever approved in the first place -- I guess it's better that 20/15 technical hindsight, same as with the Comet airframe windows.
The people NS called for hazmat incident response were mentioned in some of the initial coverage -- as I recall, the 'disconnect' between Oxy Vinyls was with them, not with NS (the railroad had no particular need to know about inhibitor chemistry, but hazmat specialists certainly would -- especially those who were scared by common discussions of the risks of vinyl chloride, and who had experienced that 'unexplained' pressure relief. (I can see them shaking their collective heads and saying "SUUUURE, it's inhibited" after that happening...)
It would be very simple to establish whether NS told their cleanup people to prioritize clearing the debris in minimum time, or even to expedite things to create a government-sanctified presumption of 'safety' as quickly as possible to clear the debris in minimum time. I have found it striking that no such thing has been disclosed in terms other than innuendo and secondhand hearsay. We're an awfully long way into fact-finding and report generating for that not to have been established.
MP104 Euclid might be right, but it doesn't get to "the bottom line".
Euclid might be right, but it doesn't get to "the bottom line".
OvermodThe Challenger disaster doesn't even go that far. The flight documentation for the STS plainly indicates that the launch temperature for the SRBs had to be above 41 degrees F. The soaked-in temperature at launch was... 19. I will say that Thiokol supervised a really good redesign of the joint system after the accident. What's galling is to look at the redesign in parallel with the original, and wonder why the original was ever approved in the first place -- I guess it's better that 20/15 technical hindsight, same as with the Comet airframe windows. The people NS called for hazmat incident response were mentioned in some of the initial coverage -- as I recall, the 'disconnect' between Oxy Vinyls was with them, not with NS (the railroad had no particular need to know about inhibitor chemistry, but hazmat specialists certainly would -- especially those who were scared by common discussions of the risks of vinyl chloride, and who had experienced that 'unexplained' pressure relief. (I can see them shaking their collective heads and saying "SUUUURE, it's inhibited" after that happening...) It would be very simple to establish whether NS told their cleanup people to prioritize clearing the debris in minimum time, or even to expedite things to create a government-sanctified presumption of 'safety' as quickly as possible to clear the debris in minimum time. I have found it striking that no such thing has been disclosed in terms other than innuendo and secondhand hearsay. We're an awfully long way into fact-finding and report generating for that not to have been established.
Redesigns in the Space Program go back much further than the Challenger incident. Think the Mercury program where the capsule atmosphere was oxygen - and a spark incenerated the capsule occupants that included Gus Grissom - son of the B&O Signal Maintainer at Mitchell, IN.
Bad decisions get baked into organization until a disaster happens that causes the organization to reengineer its existence.
Grissom died during the Apollo program, not Mercury.
BackshopGrissom died during the Apollo program, not Mercury.
Damn - I am getting old confusing the two.
Exactly who was the incident commander at the time?
The initial incident commander would have been the fire chief.
What should have developed as the incident went on would have been "unified command," which involves any parties with a piece of the pie. Fire, police, local government, the railroad, speciallized responders (hazmat for one) - all should have had a seat at the table.
Odds are, the local fire chief had no specific training for the event - I, myself, have had training in hazmat incident command. But I'm not qualified to make those sort of decisions without involving subject matter experts.
So I'd probably pass off the moniker to someone more qualified, if they were there.
For the situation herein described, it sounds pretty much like NS didn't want to have to pump off the cars, deciding instead to take an expedient (to them) route instead.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I'm on my carriers hazmat incident team to make sure that my drivers are taken care of also their family's needs if needed also if their loved one is injured. So I'm well aware of hazmat responses and handling responsibilities as part of my training requirement. I literally can be my carriers incident contact for any reason on a hazmat incident. Here's my question about this report. Just why were 4 tank cars no were near the freaking fire zone. The people that pushed this need to be named publicly. NS better pray that one of them wasn't someone pushing to get those tracks reopened. If so then what we call a nuclear lawsuit result against an OTR carrier for 100 million will look like pocket change in comparison. This is going to cost them billions in lawsuit damages and they literally have no clue how badly they are going to get destroyed.
tree68 For the situation herein described, [the controlled burn] it sounds pretty much like NS didn't want to have to pump off the cars, deciding instead to take an expedient (to them) route instead.
For the situation herein described, [the controlled burn] it sounds pretty much like NS didn't want to have to pump off the cars, deciding instead to take an expedient (to them) route instead.
Shadow the Cats owner I'm on my carriers hazmat incident team to make sure that my drivers are taken care of also their family's needs if needed also if their loved one is injured. So I'm well aware of hazmat responses and handling responsibilities as part of my training requirement. I literally can be my carriers incident contact for any reason on a hazmat incident. Here's my question about this report. Just why were 4 tank cars no were near the freaking fire zone. The people that pushed this need to be named publicly. NS better pray that one of them wasn't someone pushing to get those tracks reopened. If so then what we call a nuclear lawsuit result against an OTR carrier for 100 million will look like pocket change in comparison. This is going to cost them billions in lawsuit damages and they literally have no clue how badly they are going to get destroyed.
Tree we deal with stuff like this and worse on a daily basis. If someone who was worried about the time and costs of doing a hot tap offloading in order to reopen a highway demanded we blow a tanker trailer or tank car to do it quicker here's my questions for this person if I'm a hazmat person. 1 your name spelled out for me. 2 what freaking company you're representing and reporting to and lastly the name of you're insurance company and legal representation of record for your company. Then I'm going to say sign this paperwork stating that this person works for this company ordered me to violate several safe handling and removal procedures in the name of time and money management. Then pull my company team out and let my insurance company and legal team know just why. Then when the crap hits the fan my rear end along with my company's liability issues are covered.
A great deal of the official pravda appeared to be to find various ways to pin this on unsafe NS organizational practices -- in fact, I had the clear impression, although it may have been part paranoiac, that an official narrative was being cobbled together that the controlled-burn decision was entirely NS's, and was done explicitly to speed reopening of the line to traffic. The problem with this narrative is that there are too many reported details that don't support it other than in a very vague 'I thought they meant...' sort of sense.
We had reports that the assigned NS person intended to serve as incident command for the response (with subcontractors, that would more correspond to a 'site engineer' than a wreckmaster with respect to hazmat abatement) was excluded from initial incident command with the threat of arrest if they did not comply.
NS hired a firm, supposedly with distinct competence to handle hazardous material in railroad crashes. There was testimony from people from that entity about how they were concerned with that unexpected pressure release. I believe that entity would have been the influencing force on incident command to burn, rather than tap, and as I recall the testimony at least part of this was concern for the entity's personnel safety -- NOT expedience in getting to be able to start fixing track.
Until I see the actual reports, I won't know how much of these things actually get sorted out on the merits; it will be interesting to see just what the NTSB puts into their final report, and their recommendations. In the meantime, as usual, I recommend anyone following this read the material in the docket so far (which is something I haven't had time to do properly).
OvermodA great deal of the official pravda appeared to be to find various ways to pin this on unsafe NS organizational practices -- in fact, I had the clear impression, although it may have been part paranoiac, that an official narrative was being cobbled together that the controlled-burn decision was entirely NS's, and was done explicitly to speed reopening of the line to traffic. The problem with this narrative is that there are too many reported details that don't support it other than in a very vague 'I thought they meant...' sort of sense. We had reports that the assigned NS person intended to serve as incident command for the response (with subcontractors, that would more correspond to a 'site engineer' than a wreckmaster with respect to hazmat abatement) was excluded from initial incident command with the threat of arrest if they did not comply. NS hired a firm, supposedly with distinct competence to handle hazardous material in railroad crashes. There was testimony from people from that entity about how they were concerned with that unexpected pressure release. I believe that entity would have been the influencing force on incident command to burn, rather than tap, and as I recall the testimony at least part of this was concern for the entity's personnel safety -- NOT expedience in getting to be able to start fixing track. Until I see the actual reports, I won't know how much of these things actually get sorted out on the merits; it will be interesting to see just what the NTSB puts into their final report, and their recommendations. In the meantime, as usual, I recommend anyone following this read the material in the docket so far (which is something I haven't had time to do properly).
Success has thousands of Fathers. Failure has but one Scapegoat,
Balt said:"Success has thousands of Fathers. Failure has but one Scapegoat..."
A statement of more truth than poetry, kudos to him!
As have many here; I have foillowed the East Palestine story with some interest. See linked here an earlier TRAINS Forum Thread
@ https://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/p/296072/3470808.aspx#3470808
It contains a couple of interesting linked stories,IMHO. And of course, the lame stream media, continues to whip the tale of East Palestine and the travails of NS at every seeming opportunity...
A recent news item mentioned that NS has spent somewhere around a Billion $$$(+?) as their efforts move ahead; most likely, that's the genesis of their recent bout with the " wolves lof wall street", and their efforts to change NS's Board (& Management(?).
Unfortunately, in the railroad business, there are costs, (costly?) incidents, by their very nature,are expensive, to make right. Which is why their Insurance Costs are very necessary, and a part of their business models. incidents can also be compounded by governemntal ineptness, at whatever level on chooses to pck(?)
Just my random thoughts... BALT was sure right.
The problem is that here in East Palestine is that all of the warts so to speak of modern railroad industry activities were laid bare for the world to see. The reliance on technology to detect issues but then the failure of the railroad when given the data of an axle getting hotter that others not checking it. The rushed system of inspections on cars the rushed to reopen lines damaged by derailment. The failure to communicate with local authorities what the dangerous situation could be. Then they made the situation worse for themselves as instead of following standard treatment procedures they decided to blow up 5 cars. This accident is going to be one like Gunpow Interlocking or LaMagnetic and studied for years afterwards.
Success has many fathers, but failure is a mother.
Why do I get the feeling that at 'Incident Command Headquarters' no one wanted to make a decision until one party did? At this point in time - we are only surmising that NS made the decision because all the others are blamestorming, and trying to say they had a better idea. Hindsight is 20/10 - Foresight is 20/400 or worse, with cowards running for cover.
BaltACD Why do I get the feeling that at 'Incident Command Headquarters' no one wanted to make a decision until one party did? At this point in time - we are only surmising that NS made the decision because all the others are blamestorming, and trying to say they had a better idea. Hindsight is 20/10 - Foresight is 20/400 or worse, with cowards running for cover.
One could only surmise that That conversaton started with the followiing statement: (?) "....We are here from the GOVERNMENT...and we're here to help...."
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