Goodbye Montana Rail Link… 1987-2023

[SD60MAC9500]

What a excellent 36 year run for the regional! Over the years MRL, played a vital role in moving BN, later BNSF bridge traffic across Montana. 

Some may be saddened by the demise of the regional.

This was a much needed move to terminate the agreement with MRL. 60 years would be far too long... Looking back, a 25 year lease would have been more sound.. Traffic patterns change as do labor agreements.

I imagine BNSF looked at the cost to increase capacity, alongside the constraints in some portions of Kootenai River. Versus early lease termination. The latter would be cheaper and expedited. Compared to a lengthy and environmentally contested expansion of the fromer.

All in all, BNSF will benefit greatly from taking back the former NP ..

By the way. Of the beaten track here. What are BNSF's chances of starting IPI (Inland Point Intact) stack service, from a future expanded container terminal at DeltaPort, BC?..

[kgbw49]

Here is a link to the BNSF network map.

https://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/ship-with-bnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/bnsf-network-map.pdf 

In the bottom left corner there is a small area map of trackage in the Pacific Northwest.

It clearly shows BNSF track to Roberts Bank, which right now is primarily coal.

To head east, any doublestack intermodal would have to take a left turn at PA Junction near Everett and head over Stevens Pass through the former Great Northern Cascade Tunnel which is single track.

The daily train capacity of that tunnel could be a potential bottleneck.

The next route east at Auburn -  Stampede Pass through Stampede Tunnel - would not yet work for doublestacks because Stampede Tunnel is not yet cleared for double stacks. (Maybe someday?)

The only other alternative for doublestacks would be to continue to head south to Vancouver, WA across from Portland, and make the left turn there and head east to Spokane on the former Spokane, Portland & Seattle.

That route would be substantially longer both mileage-wise and time-wise to Chicago.

But BNSF is most assuredly "war-gaming" all scenarios to see if they can compete from the expanded Roberts Bank comex and make a buck.

 

[kgbw49]

Here is a link to the BNSF network map.

https://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/ship-with-bnsf/maps-and-shipping-locations/bnsf-network-map.pdf 

In the bottom left corner there is a small area map of trackage in the Pacific Northwest.

It clearly shows BNSF track access to Roberts Bank, which right now is used by BNSF primarily for coal export. (I am not aware of any current doublestack traffic on BNSF from Roberts Bank but perhaps others might have some "intel".)

To head east, any doublestack intermodal would have to take a left turn at PA Junction near Everett and head over Stevens Pass through the former Great Northern Cascade Tunnel which is single track.

The daily train capacity of that tunnel could be a potential bottleneck.

The next route east at Auburn - Stampede Pass through Stampede Tunnel on the former Northern Pacific - would not yet work for doublestacks because Stampede Tunnel is not yet cleared for double stacks. (Maybe someday?)

The only other alternative for doublestacks would be to continue to head south to Vancouver, WA across the Columbia River from Portland, and make the left turn there to head east to Spokane on the former Spokane, Portland & Seattle.

That route would be substantially longer both mileage-wise and time-wise to Chicago.

But BNSF is most assuredly "war-gaming" all scenarios to see if they can compete from the expanded Roberts Bank complex and make a buck.

 

[Vermontanan2]

SD60MAC9500

This was a much needed move to terminate the agreement with MRL. 60 years would be far too long... Looking back, a 25 year lease would have been more sound.. Traffic patterns change as do labor agreements.

But, as I understand it, some of the pre-MRL labor agreements again are applicable.

SD60MAC9500

I imagine BNSF looked at the cost to increase capacity, alongside the constraints in some portions of Kootenai River. Versus early lease termination. The latter would be cheaper and expedited. Compared to a lengthy and environmentally contested expansion of the former.

The “constraints” along the Kootenai River is a myth.  I know Bill Stephens erroneously stated it in one of his TRAINS articles, but past history does not bear this out.  During the MRL Mullan tunnel collapse in 2009, the route routinely handled 50 or more trains daily for days at a time.  The canyon is 19 miles of 30 MPH track (35 for passenger) at river grade.  In that 19 miles, the elevation change is only 62 feet and there are two sidings, which means that the maximum length of any section with only one track is 5.5 miles.  Siding turnouts are at track speed and allow relatively quick return to maximum speed.  (In other words, this ain’t eastbound on Tehachapi with single track sections and grades over 2%.) 

Rob Krebs (BNSF CEO after BN purchased the ATSF) was one who believed the route could clearly handle more traffic.  Under his watch, the siding at Katka was added, as was 7 miles of 2 MT CTC at the west end of the canyon at Crossport (Bonners Ferry).  The intent was to do the same thing at the east end of the canyon tying the lengthy sidings at Yakt and Troy together, and though the grading was done, pressure from stockholders and the realization that the MRL car quota was iron clad stopped the project.  (Numerous other upgrades were completed including new sidings between Great Falls and Laurel.).  The intent was to provide sections of two main tracks to allow for staging of non-priority traffic to allow the sidings at Leonia and Katka to be used for the most-efficient meets between higher-priority trains.  This additional main track could easily be done, including at other locations east of Troy.  Considering the reported $2 billion “buy-back” cost of breaking the MRL lease, the aforementioned upgrades would be inexpensive in comparison, so I would suggest there’s another reason for returning the railroad to the fold.

The other consideration is the higher cost of the ex-NP route.  It’s about 100 miles further, has two manned helper districts, and takes longer than the BNSF “Northern Transcontinental” route.  Running trains an extra 100 miles (or much more) is not a big deal – it happens lots of places, but usually it’s to avoid a severe operating headache, such as BNSF routing loaded coal trains to Roberts Bank, BC via Vancouver, WA between Spokane and Seattle to avoid the 2.2% climb over the Cascades, or routing trains via Amarillo instead of tackling the ridiculous 3.5% climb of Raton Pass.  In this case, the longer route means more stiff grades, in North Dakota as well as Montana.  (A westward unit train operating west from Fargo uses 17% more fuel than the ex-GN routing to get to Spokane, and that excludes helper fuel on the ex-NP route.) For priority traffic, BNSF’s route from Chicago to Portland via Havre is a scant 3 miles shorter than UP; routing these trains through Southern Montana would make competing with UP all the more challenging.  From Chicago to Tacoma, BNSF’s route advantage vs. UP is cut to only 60 miles, leveling the playing field by adding two or three steep grades in Montana to match UP’s demanding profile between Glenns Ferry and Pendleton.

So, there’s much to consider.  Infrastructure upgrades can be expensive, but the cost to eliminate steep grades are even more so, or the added costs continue in perpetuity.

SD60MAC9500

By the way. Of the beaten track here. What are BNSF's chances of starting IPI (Inland Point Intact) stack service, from a future expanded container terminal at DeltaPort, BC?..

BNSF has indeed raised the tunnel clearances on is route between Everett and BC’s Deltaport.  But I don’t see where it can be sufficiently competitive with CN and CP for a destination such as Chicago.  The BNSF route is on par with the operating profile of CP, but it’s hard to beat CN’s less-than-1% grades of Yellowhead Pass.  And containers are just the box cars of today – not necessarily priority traffic, so the cheapest route wins.

[SD60MAC9500]

Thanks for chiming in Mark,

Which makes one wonder since BNSF guaranteed MRL, a certain amount of overhead traffic. I can only ponder if that was the reason to term the lease?

Also if BNSF were to restart the capacity expansion along the Kootenai.. This I'm assuming could wipe out most traffic from the NP west of Laurel, especially with PRB coal in the doldrums. Boeing loads would continue, but from what I understand. There's a tunnel on the Shelby-Laurel route, that would need to be improved in order to route 737 cabins across Marias Pass.

BNSF while at a small mileage disadvantage compared to CPKC, would provide CPKC competiton. While both routes do have similar operating profiles. CPKC's terminals for IPI traffic are on the "wrong" side of the Chicago area. The vast majority of IPI traffic lands in and around Joliet. Everyone except CPKC can serve this area.

Boxes from both CPKC terminals need to be drayed ~40 miles south. While not a deal breaker, certainly not optimal when dealing with traffic, especially on I-55..

Then again, container terminals at the ports of Delta, Vancouver-Fraser and Prince Rupert have lost business to NWSA (North West Sea Allaince Seattle/Tacoma). With BNSF grabbing the lions share. So maybe they don't need to check their radar as of now.

[Vermontanan2]

SD60MAC9500

Which makes one wonder since BNSF guaranteed MRL, a certain amount of overhead traffic. I can only ponder if that was the reason to term the lease?

As they say on the game show: “All this can be yours IF The Price Is Right!”

SD60MAC9500

Also if BNSF were to restart the capacity expansion along the Kootenai.. This I'm assuming could wipe out most traffic from the NP west of Laurel, especially with PRB coal in the doldrums. Boeing loads would continue, but from what I understand. There's a tunnel on the Shelby-Laurel route, that would need to be improved in order to route 737 cabins across Marias Pass.

No, it wouldn’t and shouldn’t “wipe out” traffic on the ex-NP.  That would require too much capacity upgrade on the ex-GN route and leave, as BNSF’s Matt Rose once categorized it was “stranded assets.”  The legacy of the MRL operationally is that a good amount of traffic will always be routed that way because the infrastructure is available, and that the infrastructure was added is, in a good part, because a 60-year lease and guaranteed traffic is pretty good collateral.

As a former BN Rocky Mountain Division (headquartered in Missoula) told me about the formation of the MRL:  BN just wanted to get rid of something (these were the days of Winona Bridge and “Our Whole Railroad’s For Sale.”)  They actually looked at just shortlining the ex-NP route and run the traffic through Great Falls (because there was less traffic back then – no foresight), but they didn’t want to spend any money.  The Shelby-Laurel route is dark, and would need CTC and more sidings.  And the FIVE tunnels between Laurel and Great Falls would need their clearances raised.  The MRL was a lower-cost (in their minds) at the time way to go.

Having said that, the route that is the MRL is a vital part of BNSF and is the shortest route to compete with the UP (to the extent possible, the UP is far superior) between the Pacific Northwest and Denver and Kansas City.  And eastward especially, the route is not bad as far as profile.  Eastward over Mullan Pass is only 1.4% (less than Marias), and only 1.9% (just a bit more than Marias) over Bozeman Pass.  Most eastbounds don’t need a helper over Mullan (even those which are not empties trains).  The main focus is westbound and the 1.8% of Bozeman Pass and the 2.2% of Mullan Pass.  At current unit train lengths, westbound coal trains (the heaviest) get a rear end push out of Livingston, but have to get helpers cut in at Helena.  Cutting in and out is the most time-consuming procedure, and becomes more complex if heavier trains are operated.  Case in point, the “Trough Train” of the 1990s.  When on its route across Montana, it was routed via Great Falls and Whitefish because it was about 21,000 tons and would require multiple helpers midtrain via the MRL.  But for non-unit trains, the current ex-MRL route is best from a capacity and speed standpoint.  Still, maintaining 20+ locomotives and helper crews is a significant expense.

SD60MAC9500

BNSF while at a small mileage disadvantage compared to CPKC, would provide CPKC competition. While both routes do have similar operating profiles. CPKC's terminals for IPI traffic are on the "wrong" side of the Chicago area. The vast majority of IPI traffic lands in and around Joliet. Everyone except CPKC can serve this area.

Boxes from both CPKC terminals need to be drayed ~40 miles south. While not a deal breaker, certainly not optimal when dealing with traffic, especially on I-55..

This is true.  And for anything to/from east of Chicago on CPKC’s wonderful maze of trackage rights on NS and CSX, crossing Chicago is a similar disadvantage.  And when it comes to the best scenario, that would be CN due to its acquisition (and upgrading) of the EJ&E.