With most of the train, the entire rear portion, going downhill, and the head-end going uphill. was there any l,ogicdal reason forc cdynamic braking to be applied only at the head-end?
daveklepper With most of the train, the entire rear portion, going downhill, and the head-end going uphill. was there any l,ogicdal reason forc cdynamic braking to be applied only at the head-end?
From several people I know in the area that helped recover the derailment the cars where extremely overloaded. The part of the train that derailed according to the shipper was only 100 tons per car but the springs on each car were fully collasped on the ones that stayed on the tracks. They think each car had over 150 tons in them. The lead locomotive pinged at 140 right before it derailed and landed over 100 feet from the rails after flying off a 60 MPH curve.
I doubt we will get the complete details since the NTSB isn't investigating the accident. My understanding is the following;
The leading two locomotives and the first 55 cars had crested the hill (mountain). The coupler knuckle between the 55th and 56th car failed resulting in a train separation triggering an emergency brake application which stopped the train. The Conductor walked the train tying down hand brakes, then replaced the knuckle. At this point things are unclear. I have heard conflicting stories saying the train brakes were recharged and a reduction made on the train brakes followed by the release of the hand brakes. With the locomotives in power pushing against the cut of 55 cars the train brakes were released to try and put the train back together. When the train brakes were released the two locomotives and 55 cars rapidly started down the hill even though the locomotives were full throttle trying to push the train uphill. The Engineer immediately bailed off the locomotives and survived, the Conductor was waiting on the ground near where they expected to couple the train back together and so wasn't injured.
Once the situation was inspected and the cause of the UDE was discovered, the mistake the crew made was in trying to recouple the train with the condition and location it was at. The head 55 cars should have been pulled down grade - with hand brakes and/or retainers set in addition to the available dynamic braking that was available in the locomotives. After securing those 55 cars at some location OFF the grade, the locomotives could then return to get the remainder of the train so that it could also be brought down the grade with whatever braking power required in the form of air brakes w/retainers or hand brakes to the point where the head end of the train had been secured. Then, off the grade, recouple the two parts of the train.
When pumping air on a train, the point at which the brakes will release is well beneath the pressure required to have the brakes reapply with sufficient power to stop anything.
From my view this was a Man Failure derailment.
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If the 55 cars were loaded to 143 ton gross car weight, that portion would weigh around 7865 tons. The handbrake securement chart, used when it's not practicable to release the air brakes after setting handbrakes to check for movement, shows on a 2.2% grade that 7000 to 7999 tons requires 48 hand brakes to be set. It should be noted that the chart is going to err on the side of setting more than necessary handbrakes. Even so, it was going to take a lot of handbrakes to hold that cut.
So much is at this time unknown. That the engineer bailed off at relatively slow speed (I think I've heard 15mph) before it was too late makes me think he was aware of circumstances that haven't been made public, other than through rumor, that made regaining control unlikely.
Jeff
Jeff the people I have talked to say it was routine for this train to end up so overloaded that it was a matter of time before something like this happened. This one makes the accident SP had over Cajon in 1987 come to the forefront again. The shippers overloading cars to the point that even with fully functional dynamics and airbrakes there wasn't enough braking power to stop it if they lost the air pressure.
Shadow the Cats ownerJeff the people I have talked to say it was routine for this train to end up so overloaded that it was a matter of time before something like this happened. This one makes the accident SP had over Cajon in 1987 come to the forefront again. The shippers overloading cars to the point that even with fully functional dynamics and airbrakes there wasn't enough braking power to stop it if they lost the air pressure.
I haven't heard what kind of cars were in use in this incident. If it was coal cars, they can very easily be overloaded as their cubic capacity exceeds that required for iron ore by a margin in the neighborhood of 2 or 3 to one. Designed ore 'jennies' are difficult to overload as they are designed for the weight of their normal contents.
As info - containers in freight traffic come in the standard sizes of 20 foot, 40 foot, 48 foot and 53 foot. Despite their different cubic capacities they all have, nominally, the same maximum weight capacity.
Railroads don't INTEND to haul anything for free. Shipments get billed on weight - either Shippers weight - certified by the shipper, Consignees weight - certified by the consignee at time of unloading or by the Railroad weighing the cars on certified railroad scale - either balance typ scales or weighing in motion scales.
When shipments are weighed on Railroad weigh in motion sclales there can be several hundred miles between the origin location and the scale location.
There are Weighing Bureau's whose sole purpose is to certify the accuracy of all the various weighing methods used for billing the transportation of product so that all parties - Shipper, Railroad, Consignee are sure that they are getting or receiving what they are paying for.
Some new rule changes coming out. Some of the changes deal with securement when recharging the air brake system.
Shadow the Cats owner Jeff the people I have talked to say it was routine for this train to end up so overloaded that it was a matter of time before something like this happened. This one makes the accident SP had over Cajon in 1987 come to the forefront again. The shippers overloading cars to the point that even with fully functional dynamics and airbrakes there wasn't enough braking power to stop it if they lost the air pressure.
If you mean the 1989 runaway. the cars weren't overloaded. A clerk had to input weights for the cars into the computer to generate train documents. The clerk didn't know the actual weights so used an estimated weights that were too low. At least one of the engines had inoperative dynamic brakes.
The cars used were rapid-discharge aluminum coal hoppers.
BaltACDI haven't heard what kind of cars were in use in this incident. If it was coal cars, they can very easily be overloaded as their cubic capacity exceeds that required for iron ore by a margin in the neighborhood of 2 or 3 to one. Designed ore 'jennies' are difficult to overload as they are designed for the weight of their normal contents.
This has been well illustrated by the "taco" trains through Deshler enroute from Toledo to Middletown. For a long time they were using standard hoppers. Oftimes you couldn't see the taconite in the cars even from the cams, which are mounted well above the rails.
The train now uses jennies, and the load is quite obvious, at least from above.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 BaltACD I haven't heard what kind of cars were in use in this incident. If it was coal cars, they can very easily be overloaded as their cubic capacity exceeds that required for iron ore by a margin in the neighborhood of 2 or 3 to one. Designed ore 'jennies' are difficult to overload as they are designed for the weight of their normal contents. This has been well illustrated by the "taco" trains through Deshler enroute from Toledo to Middletown. For a long time they were using standard hoppers. Oftimes you couldn't see the taconite in the cars even from the cams, which are mounted well above the rails. The train now uses jennies, and the load is quite obvious, at least from above.
BaltACD I haven't heard what kind of cars were in use in this incident. If it was coal cars, they can very easily be overloaded as their cubic capacity exceeds that required for iron ore by a margin in the neighborhood of 2 or 3 to one. Designed ore 'jennies' are difficult to overload as they are designed for the weight of their normal contents.
At one time, Port of Baltimore imported iron ore, much went directly to Bethlehem Steel at Sparrows Point, but a lot also went to the B&O Ore Pier at Curtis Bay.
The Curtis Bay Ore Pier would forward the ore in two ways from the pier. Sometimes the ore would be loaded directly into freight cars (at Curtis Bay empty coal hoppers were used after they were inspected and found 'tight enough' for ore loading), other times the ore would be loaded into dump trucks to be taken to ground storage areas that at some point in the future would then get loaded in rail cars for shipment to the ultimate consignee.
The unloading mechinsm for the ships would place the ore on a conveyor system that would move it up to the 'weigh house' where the Weighmaster controlled the mechanism to release the weighed mass into either railcars or trucks. The shipping weight of each railcar was known and billed.
When Ground Storage ore was moved, front end loaders were used to dig into the ore pile and the operators were instructed to place 'X' number of bucket loads into each end of the railcar. Once a cut of cars was loaded a yard crew would pull the loads and place more empties; the loads would get weighed on a track scale at Curtis Bay before being billed and forwarded.
When the ore was being loaded into trucks, the truck drivers would sound their horn to indicate to the Weighmaster that the truck was in position to receive the load. One time a crew van brought a new yard crew to support the operation and mad the mistake of honking its horn when it was under the loading chute - scratch one crew van, fortunately no one was injured.
jeffhergertIf you mean the 1989 runaway. the cars weren't overloaded.
As soon as I heard 'estimating weight by truck spring depression' I knew this was second verse, same as the first. No real point in a NTSB or any other 'safety investigation', really.
jeffhergertIf you mean the 1989 [Cajon] runaway, the cars weren't overloaded.
Wonder if they're going to weigh the un-derailed cars from the Kelso runaway train.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR9002.pdf
There were a lot of assumptions that day. Start at page 9.
So, far as anyone knows, all the cars in the 1989 Cajon runaway were legal loads -- 263,000 pounds or less. It was the tonnage report to the crew that was all wrong; if they had known the true tonnage, they would have known the rules required five units of dynamic brake, minimum.
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