https://youtu.be/olnVwQzQZRs
Documentary by the More Perfect Union channel on why they think North America suffers from 1700 derail events a year.
The majority of which involve industrial trackage and/or a pair of trucks slipping off the rails. How many auto/truck accidents per year? How many are fender benders?
Every person/group with a youtube or twitter thinks they are the next Ken Burns.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
Can't verify their data and where they got it, but if they are looking at "everything" including the mentioned fender bender types over the past 30 years, that would still be a lot in percentage terms.
Elements of fact, elements of fiction. Propaganda
A bigger indictment of current business ethics in the entirety of the country.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Using 2018 numbers (they popped up first), the railroads have about 1 reportable derailment per billion ton-miles (if I did the math right - 1.7 trillion ton miles, 1700 derailments).
From another direction, that's one reportable derailment per 82 miles of track.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Almost breathtaking how much they don't comprehend, or miss entirely.
Why in tarnation do they invoke the SD&AE as if it's a good thing, increasing competition with the Octopus and all that, when it was such an unparalleled operational disaster ... including if you tried to run any modern consist on it, ignoring the disasters of climate change on maintaining it, ignoring the fun of diving through Mexico, ignoring all the curves... a much, much better approach would be to get hold of Michael Sol and take up the 'superiority' of the Pacific Coast Extension against the hedge-fund monopolists -- but they have no comprehension of what that was, or who Sol is, or really, what makes rail lines distinctively competitive. The big thing they ought to be complaining about is removing multiple tracks suitable for directional running (to get rid of facing train derailment issues) but, again, they are clueless about what that would imply.
They need to use an index of reportable derailments involving hazmat release, which is something easily defined within limits and far short of the 'reported cases'. For all I know, there is indeed a trend in serious derailments associated with various flavors of PSR, hedge cost-cutting, SLSF-style consolidation without common sense... etc. But it ought to be substantiated scientifically, not with at best half-truths.
It's gonna be funny to see the NAS revisit the old chestnut about 2-man crews being 'safer' -- there's been no real change in the logic since it got thrown out definitively the last time. Even funnier will be just how the additional inspections called for in the legislation will actually find catastrophic bearing failures like the one in East Palestine -- ask their whistleblower how you can detect it in a typical pretrip inspection, even if you roll back the abbreviated pretrip inspection that's such a hot-button topic to certain legislators with agendas.
Of course the actual point to be made here involves PSR and OR-optimizing management at a very fundamental level... they don't WANT to transport hazmat that comes with these increased 'safety' concerns. They want, very simply, to embargo it until insurers and shippers pay the added costs associated with whatever level of "safety" the mayors, and Congresspeople, and FRA staffers want to see. And let's face it, only the Government unfunded mandate that is the obsolete 'common-carrier obligation' stands in the way of that very effective safety. No hazmat to drop in the Fox River at all is just like the talking point about 'no handguns means no gun crime' ... and it's even more justifiable as there isn't the proscription in Article 1 section 8 that there is in the Second Amendment...
As I noted earlier, there's a case to be made for a detector suite every 15 miles... or every 10 miles as the proposed legislation indicates... or even at each signal block point. But if the Government thinks that's vital, let them subsidize it, or arrange tax setasides, or remove the need to impose it on what under PSR is getting to be slower and slower traffic.
Funny, too, how there is no call whatsoever to go after 'community organizing' the single biggest thing controlling these hedge-fund 'optimizations' -- the STB and its supporting bureaucracy. Master that, and you can re-introduce all the competition and reciprocal-switching rights and intermodal fairness you want.
Ovemod: Perhaps you can volunteer to give that speech to the residents of East Palestine to set them straight? Perhaps condense it for those with short attention spans?
With respect to SD&AE, one reason for keeping the line open is a back-up for the Surf Line. A major bluff failure in San Clemente or Del Mar could cause a very long shutdown of rail service to San Diego. The "all American" route of the San Diego, Cuyamaca and Eastern would have had a longer route. The branch to the Julian gold mines would have been interesting.
One significant derailment per billion ton miles - wonder how the trucking industry compares?
Since we're promoting propaganda, here's some from the other side.
Rail News - AAR: Rail safety data shows progress, areas to improve. For Railroad Career Professionals (progressiverailroading.com)
Jeff
I think the SD&AE railroad is served in the video as an example of the amount of cost cutting modern railroad operators perform. Even though that rail ROW cost millions and was done with considerable risk and engineering, it was abandoned quickly and left behind without a whimper.
At least that is what I was gleaning from their short story.
OvermodEven funnier will be just how the additional inspections called for in the legislation will actually find catastrophic bearing failures like the one in East Palestine -- ask their whistleblower how you can detect it in a typical pretrip inspection, even if you roll back the abbreviated pretrip inspection that's such a hot-button topic to certain legislators with agendas.
EuclidI was wondering how bearing failure could be avoided by routine inspections; or specifically how an inspection could determine the health of a railcar bearing.
I came to the conclusion long ago that the only suitable technology was one physically mounted on the sideframe, communicating with other systems on the car, that continually tracks bearing temperature, truck alignment, acoustic signature, and some other associated things including center and side-bearing binding. This would use a carrier on the PTC SDR equipment to transmit both telemetry and proposed reactions to developing conditions. Anything short of that is at best a political boondoggle.
The next 'best' solution is to have detectors spaced sufficiently closely to determine a failure trend, and this would jibe with the proposed 10-mile spacing (and extension to WILD and acoustic detection at all the detectors, which ought to be in the proposed legislation if there were anyone actually familiar with railroad practice writing it). This might still not be sufficient to recognize derailment conditions before dangerous damage or misalignment occurs... no noncontinuous system can do that effectively.
Since the East Palestine accident really qualifies as more of a black swan than a "derailment", we're left in a disturbingly familiar replay of politics post-Glendale, where we can expect political feel-good (and some other stacking of decks at unwilling people's expense) instead of intelligent response that gets the best response over time.
JOHN RICEEven though that rail ROW cost millions and was done with considerable risk and engineering, it was abandoned quickly and left behind without a whimper.
charlie hebdoOvemod: Perhaps you can volunteer to give that speech to the residents of East Palestine to set them straight? Perhaps condense it for those with short attention spans?
I note in particular the organized pile-on to try to make NS safety culture look lacking or negligent. Perhaps there are indeed aspects where it is, and I would fully expect NTSB to bring this up in specific recommendations when the report comes out. On the other hand, equating Springfield with East Palestine is almost an embarrassing stretch at this point in the investigation, and Buttegieg's gratuitously-insulting, grandstanding letter would be appalling if it were not so sadly business-as-usual for how solution-making is conducted in this relatively truth-free age of politics.
Would you propose to remove any hazmat trains through East Palestine, as the documentary indicates Elgin and those other communities along the Fox would like to do? Then let's push for elimination of the common-carrier requirement so these railroads can embargo specific categories of PIH and other material legally. Anything short of that would be missing an important point that in my opinion needs to be clearly and openly discussed: whether railroads should be compelled to take dangerous material through cities at all.
That hazardous material will still need to move...more than likely in trucks-lots of trucks, which have their own hazmat issues.
azrailThat hazardous material will still need to move...
It will be amusing to see if the Department of Transportation attempts to compel railroads to continue transporting dangerous material through city centers. Their likely approach will be the one applied to lead-acid battery plants when the issue of pregnant employees arose -- no, they couldn't discriminate against women; no, they couldn't require employees 'not to get pregnant'; no, they were still on the hook for unlimited damages for any health issues involving lead. Their "recourse" was to eliminate lead exposure as a working condition...
Overmodthe East Palestine accident was an unfortunate combination of circumstances as regards the actual derailment,
Are you actually employed now as a Spinmeister? And then sailing on into the usual distraction of blaming Big Brother and their employees.
Great job, OM!!
Overmod...the East Palestine accident was an unfortunate combination of circumstances as regards the actual derailment...
All the holes in the Swiss cheese lined up. Or, for the tech minded, all the holes in the Hollerith cards lined up. As with any incident, remove one piece of the puzzle and the derailment would not have happened. We've been over that.
What happened afterwards is a different story. We'll have to wait for an authoritative account of what did happen, and when.
I would submit that there was a certain amount of "the fog of war" involved. Or, as the old saw goes, when you're up to your derriere in alligators, it's hard to remember that your mission is to drain the swamp...
charlie hebdoAre you actually employed now as a Spinmeister? And then sailing on into the usual distraction of blaming Big Brother and their employees.
You conveniently forget that I've been advocating for effective technological action to prevent accidents like this from recurring, specifically including my approval of closer detector spacing and more effective sensor fusion and tracking. I've also gone on record with the only type of technology that would actually catch this type of problem before catastrophe... much more of the time than existing detectors... but it remains to be seen if this gets mandated successfully as a legitimately safety-improving action.
No one but an idiot thinks any bearing-related problem short of existing massive failure could be detected by the most rigorous standing car inspection. But that's one of the things both houses of Big Brother's legislature seem to be pushing as a talking point.
If it is proven that NS "safety culture" is directly responsible for not satisfying the Government's then-existing detector requirements, then you can expect me to call that spade a shovel. But as far as I can tell, this is an unfortunate (and, if we can believe the AAR, a remarkably rare) catastrophic failure occurring just at the wrong time between Federally-compliant detectors.
People are doing a fine job of spinning this up into a major disaster without any assistance from me... but, as I said, it is going to be highly interesting to learn who had the bright idea of simultaneous breach of all five vinyl-chloride tanks. THAT is the problem that turned this from a severe derailment into an ecological disaster. It appears to me that a concerted effect to pin this on NS was 'in the works' at a point in the investigation too early to objectively determine if that were so. I would submit that that qualifies as much worse spinmeistering than anything I'm discussing here.
Overmod Euclid I was wondering how bearing failure could be avoided by routine inspections; or specifically how an inspection could determine the health of a railcar bearing. The short answer is that it can't. No inspector can gauge anything other than an already-ridiculously-damaged bearing in a static inspection; in fact, unless obvious heat damage at the outer race is already present, a bearing with the catastrophic damage discussed in the 1998 report (which would proceed to detectable overheat failure in 20 miles or less) would show no signs. I suspect that acoustic detectors scanning the train on both sides during a full Class I brake test leaving a yard would find very few issues that even the current spacing of lineside detectors would not have found before or after the yard... I came to the conclusion long ago that the only suitable technology was one physically mounted on the sideframe, communicating with other systems on the car, that continually tracks bearing temperature, truck alignment, acoustic signature, and some other associated things including center and side-bearing binding. This would use a carrier on the PTC SDR equipment to transmit both telemetry and proposed reactions to developing conditions. Anything short of that is at best a political boondoggle. The next 'best' solution is to have detectors spaced sufficiently closely to determine a failure trend, and this would jibe with the proposed 10-mile spacing (and extension to WILD and acoustic detection at all the detectors, which ought to be in the proposed legislation if there were anyone actually familiar with railroad practice writing it). This might still not be sufficient to recognize derailment conditions before dangerous damage or misalignment occurs... no noncontinuous system can do that effectively. Since the East Palestine accident really qualifies as more of a black swan than a "derailment", we're left in a disturbingly familiar replay of politics post-Glendale, where we can expect political feel-good (and some other stacking of decks at unwilling people's expense) instead of intelligent response that gets the best response over time.
Euclid I was wondering how bearing failure could be avoided by routine inspections; or specifically how an inspection could determine the health of a railcar bearing.
The short answer is that it can't. No inspector can gauge anything other than an already-ridiculously-damaged bearing in a static inspection; in fact, unless obvious heat damage at the outer race is already present, a bearing with the catastrophic damage discussed in the 1998 report (which would proceed to detectable overheat failure in 20 miles or less) would show no signs. I suspect that acoustic detectors scanning the train on both sides during a full Class I brake test leaving a yard would find very few issues that even the current spacing of lineside detectors would not have found before or after the yard...
I agree that the car truck-borne detectors checking for bearing vibration would be the best approach. But when I metioned routine inspections, I did not mean to exlude everyting other than a person just looking at the bearings. It would also include the possible use of an inpection tool, and it also could be a periodic indpection with a much longer interval than just a per trip inspection.
Basically, I am wondering why bearings fail. Is it wear that leads to a defect in transmitting the load dthrough the bearing? Is is a seal failure? If a seal failure is the cause of a bearing failure, is there telltale lubricant leakage that could be observed by inspection? Can the bearings be checked for lubricant level and allow more lubricant to be added.
Incidentally, I saw a video describing a recent bearing failure that went form able to pass a dector without any problem noted, to buring off the axle, all within 6 miles. I will see if I can fin't that video.
Let me divide this into sections for my convenience in answering, not for any more objective reason.
EuclidI did not mean to exclude everyting other than a person just looking at the bearings. It would also include the possible use of an inpection tool, and it also could be a periodic inspection with a much longer interval than just a per trip inspection.
Basically, I am wondering why bearings fail. Is it wear that leads to a defect in transmitting the load through the bearing?
Is is a seal failure? If a seal failure is the cause of a bearing failure, is there telltale lubricant leakage that could be observed by inspection?
Can the bearings be checked for lubricant level and allow more lubricant to be added?
Incidentally, I saw a video describing a recent bearing failure that went form able to pass a detector without any problem noted, to burning off the axle, all within 6 miles. I will see if I can find that video.
The 1998 report used a synthetic method of simulating a bearing failure (heavy spalling damage across the width of one of the rollers) but I was not able to determine whether they accounted for progressive damage from 'spalled material' to other rollers, bearing races, or cage/roller interaction. Even in the absence of progressive damage, they were able to document 'critical overheating' of such a bearing within 20 miles on testing at Pueblo.
The only prospective thing that would catch many of the black-swan/perfect-storm failures is proper detector suites at each absolute block, with reasonable tracking between them to catch failure 'trends' of concern. However, to this would have to be added some sort of compensation for all the new 'false positives' -- and I bet there'd be a lot -- that now require stopping the train and conducting an analysis that (as noted above) has to be moving, under load, when conducted, or else promptly cutting out the affected car, on a route that increasingly under PSR has no expedient setout location, with a crew that may well not be capable of performing the setout without assistance, or within HoS.
OvermodPeople are doing a fine job of spinning this up into a major disaster without any assistance from me..
Au contraire, Meister. More of the minimizing the underlying structural problem, i.e., "the big picture." The series of accidents on various railroads, some catastrophic, others less so, suggests that there is something terribly wrong with the way rails are being run. There is simply too much weight placed in maximizing profits, whether by PSR or some other form of cost (corner) cutting, and insufficient emphasis on service and safety.
EuclidBasically, I am wondering why bearings fail.
I have in my possession a single roller from an air search radar. The roller is 2.25" in diameter and 2.25" wide. It has a pretty significant spall on the bearing surface - which is why I have it. The bearing was replaced by another section of the unit I was assigned to at the time. I worked on weather equipment.
Keep in mind that such radars have rather large rotating antennas, and that those antennas generally turn at a single digit RPM. A railcar bearing on an axle with 36" wheels will turn 1760 times per mile. A train doing 60 MPH will result in 1760 RPM.
I never saw any of the other rollers, and I wasn't involved in the changeout.
That said, it appears that it may have been a manufacturing defect that caused the spall.
Bringing that over to railroads, it's not hard to conceive of a roller in a bearing failing, to the point that it comes apart and fouls the rest of the bearing, causing a pretty rapid failure thereof.
Remember - Cumberland Mine cars spend more of their lives moving loaded than do the cars in the US interchangeable fleet. I think the total distance operated is 17 miles - so the cars is loaded, moved 17 miles, emptied, moved 17 miles reloaded - rinse & repeat. I suspect the cars experience multiple load cycles during a calendar day.
Cars in Interchange service among the Class 1 carriers, would be loaded and take 3 days to a week or more to get to the unloading location, get unloaded and then return to a loading location. For a car to average two round trips per month would be considered high utilization. In most cases the distance traveled in the round trip (for Eastern coal hauling) will be on the order of 600+/- miles.
The Cumberland Mine operation is a very high utiliztion operation for its equipment - both locomotives and cars.
Even if they make 4 runs a day - that's only 68 miles a day loaded.
That doesn't seem like a lot. I know coal train sets go from Pittsburgh area to Consol, get unloaded usually within 24 hours, then head back, and return in a day or 2. They probably go a couple hundred miles a day, average.
zugmannEven if they make 4 runs a day - that's only 68 miles a day loaded. That doesn't seem like a lot. I know coal train sets go from Pittsburgh area to Consol, get unloaded usually within 24 hours, then head back, and return in a day or 2. They probably go a couple hundred miles a day, average.
Day after day the mileage ads up. At a 300 mile one way trip, interchange cars would be loaded for 600 miles in the month based on two round trips per month.
68 loaded miles per day is 680 miles each 10 days or 2040 miles on a extrapolated 30 day period.
I might add that the Consol operation at Baltimore, both NS and CSX are delivering carriers - in many cases Consol trains may wait a day or more for a track slot at the Consol facility.
BaltACDI might add that the Consol operation at Baltimore, both NS and CSX are delivering carriers - in many cases Consol trains may wait a day or more for a track slot at the Consol facility.
Not unless they are shut down. They're pretty consistent at unloading within a day. Now they're running double sets there.
And 2 round trips a month? I'm just looking at Pitts to Consol, but some of these trainsets make that in a week, easy.
BaltACD zugmann Even if they make 4 runs a day - that's only 68 miles a day loaded. That doesn't seem like a lot. I know coal train sets go from Pittsburgh area to Consol, get unloaded usually within 24 hours, then head back, and return in a day or 2. They probably go a couple hundred miles a day, average. Day after day the mileage ads up. At a 300 mile one way trip, interchange cars would be loaded for 600 miles in the month based on two round trips per month. 68 loaded miles per day is 680 miles each 10 days or 2040 miles on a extrapolated 30 day period. I might add that the Consol operation at Baltimore, both NS and CSX are delivering carriers - in many cases Consol trains may wait a day or more for a track slot at the Consol facility.
zugmann Even if they make 4 runs a day - that's only 68 miles a day loaded. That doesn't seem like a lot. I know coal train sets go from Pittsburgh area to Consol, get unloaded usually within 24 hours, then head back, and return in a day or 2. They probably go a couple hundred miles a day, average.
Doesn't really matter if a car goes 10 miles a day or 1,000 miles a day, if a bearing can go from "fine" to derailing the car in 6.5 miles, it can do that in either case and is a problem.
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