Illinois Central Gulf Marketing Efforts

[ns145]

MP173

Really enjoying this discussion on the IC(G).  Those flickr photos are entertaining and informative.  Those look like fairly healthy trains...not huge but most appear to be in the 25-30 trailer range.

Is it just me, but I miss the TOFC trains.  The double stacks seem a bit boring.  Yes, much more efficient.  I still see the trailers, quite a few UPS units, but seldom in a solid train block.  

The Flickr photo of Bloomington (NS crossing).  Back in early 90s I had a customer adjacent to that overpass - Nestle -Beich a candy manufacturer and I was always on the lookout for trains.

One day I ventured over to the cabin...no one there so I looked inside.  There were a few Record of Station Movements lying on the floor and I helped clean up the abandoned cabin just a bit.  I believe they are downstair in my basement.

 

Ed

 

BN Target was an odd little operation.  It controlled the CTC between Normal and Market Street just north of the N&W and P&E crossings.   Despite all of the signals surrounding the Chicago-St. Louis mainline and Jack Line diamonds, nothing was interlocked.  All trains had to come to a stop before proceeding, regardless of the signal aspect displayed.  The N&W signals lit up green in both directions when the operator gave a train permission to cross the ICG tracks.  Definitely took me by surprise during my first visit in college.

Now everything is gone, except the diamonds and the name: https://www.flickr.com/photos/ns145/25825114001/

 

[MP173]

Really enjoying this discussion on the IC(G).  Those flickr photos are entertaining and informative.  Those look like fairly healthy trains...not huge but most appear to be in the 25-30 trailer range.

Is it just me, but I miss the TOFC trains.  The double stacks seem a bit boring.  Yes, much more efficient.  I still see the trailers, quite a few UPS units, but seldom in a solid train block.  

The Flickr photo of Bloomington (NS crossing).  Back in early 90s I had a customer adjacent to that overpass - Nestle -Beich a candy manufacturer and I was always on the lookout for trains.

One day I ventured over to the cabin...no one there so I looked inside.  There were a few Record of Station Movements lying on the floor and I helped clean up the abandoned cabin just a bit.  I believe they are downstair in my basement.

 

Ed

[ns145]

Here are some photos of ICG Slingshot trains: https://www.flickr.com/search/?text=Icg%20slingshot&view_all=1

[greyhounds]

Gramp

Were there ever second sections of near 30 additional trailers run? So sad when people cut off their noses to spite their faces.  How did you weather so many "could've worked/brick wall" disappointments?

No second sections while I was still at the ICG.  To be fair they didn't have the power or crews in position to do that.  But...

After I left the Slingshot concept was expanded to include all former Chicago and Alton main lines.  They even included carload trains subject to the same 15-car limit.  These trains did sometimes operate in multiple sections.

This led to a disaster.  Crews were no longer accustomed to the whole “Section Following” thing.  So, one day a train in multiple sections was moving along in Missouri with the lead train(s) displaying the green lights and/or flags indicating a following section.

The crew on an opposing movement apparently didn’t know or understand the significance of the green lights/flags.  The result was a bad head on wreck.  IIRC there were some fatalities. 

Yes, it is sad when people don't accept the fact that change is a constantly needed thing.

There were enough successes to keep our spirits up.  For example, in the face of some really stupid opposition I got some banana business back on the railroad.  We flat out beat a truck line on a large volume 500 rail mile movement of beer from Memphis to Chicago and Milwaukee.  (Milwaukee went by truck from our Chicago ramp.)

There were other successes, and they were enjoyable. Beer is tricky to haul.  Those aluminum cans aren’t very sturdy and a small dent in one can will make any six pack unfit for sale.  And it will freeze.  That also makes it unfit for sale. We moved it just fine.

It’s amazing what can be accomplished if you can get people to just try.

  

[Gramp]

greyhounds

 

 

SFbrkmn

ICG began an isolated rebranded piggyback service labeled 'Slingshots" between Chicago-St. Louis in 1975. Limit of 15 cars, no caboose and no brakemen positions--C&E only. For whatever reason, the service did not live to expectations and quickly failed financially. Story goes the service was a failure account of the routing being too short. Anyone have insight on this? As a retro ICG fan, I find this segment of company history interestin

Sam from Wichita 

 

 

 

 

1) The Slingshot service did not fail quickly.  It lasted 10 years.  It ended in 1985 when the entire railroad was being sold off piecemeal.  There had been a determination that the ICG could not be made profitable in any way, shape, or form.  The route of the Slingshots, the old Chicago and Alton between Chicago and St. Louis, was one line sold off.  The buyer was the newly formed  Chicago, Missouri and Western.  They didn’t last a year before going broke.   

2) The Slingshots were not “Isolated.”  They operated as part of the US intermodal network.  Of particular importance was Chicago to Dallas business interchanged to the Frisco at St. Louis.  The ICG-SLSF routing was the best rail service from Chicago to Dallas.  It beat the Santa Fe and the UP.  We had to rubber tire the St. Louis interchange, but we could receive trailers in Chicago as late as 10:30 PM and the Frisco would have them in Dallas by 7:00 AM 2^nd morning.  That was fully truck competitive.  We also received UPS at Chicago from eastern origins destined to St. Louis.  Those are just two examples.    

3) The 15-car union agreement limit on train length (30 trailers) was a killer.  It precluded growth.  What happened if there were 31 trailers for the train?  Some customer’s freight had to be left behind.  And then we had an upset customer who was likely to go back to using trucks.

4)      The impetus for the Slingshot service actually came from the union (then UTU) honcho for the old C&A. (The railroads merged but the unions didn’t).  He was tired of loosing jobs and thought the whole “Short, Fast, and Frequent” concept operated on intermodal trains would add jobs. The company was receptive, and the Slingshots were created. Of great importance was the fact that on the old C&A lines the UTU represented all members of the train crew.  Engineers, conductors, and brakemen were all UTU members.  So, the union could give up the brakeman jobs in exchange for more conductor jobs. On other lines the brakemen and conductors were in separate unions and the brakemen’s union wasn’t about to lose members to the conductor’s union.

5)      The whole “Short, Fast, and Frequent” concept kinda sorta fell flat in reality.  The vast majority of shippers wanted overnight service.  i.e., They’d ship it on Monday afternoon and want it delivered Tuesday morning.    Freight didn’t become available throughout the day as SF&F proponents thought it would.  And we were stuck with that 15-car limit. So, freight for the overnight trains got left behind while the day trains ran with a lot of unsold capacity.  With deregulation we established a price differential offering lower charges on the day trains. It helped somewhat.

6)      The short length of haul was an issue.  Drayage costs ate up most of the available revenue.

7)      By God, we tried.

The “Slingshot” name was chosen by the ICG’s then A.V.P. of intermodal, George Stern.  He chose the name because it symbolized something inexpensive and simple, but effective.  He had an oversized slingshot hanging on his office wall.  He was replaced but the slingshot stayed on the wall. (Stern went on to head up, and save, the C&IM.  He then became President of the DT&I.) I last talked to him about 20 years ago.  He was working for GM as a consultant overseeing their rail use.

 

I took that slingshot off the office wall with me when I jumped off the sinking ship.  I have no idea where it’s at after all these years.

 

 

 

Were there ever second sections of near 30 additional trailers run?

So sad when people cut off their noses to spite their faces. 

How did you weather so many "could've worked/brick wall" disappointments?

[jeffhergert]

greyhounds

 

 

 

 

4)      The impetus for the Slingshot service actually came from the union (then UTU) honcho for the old C&A. (The railroads merged but the unions didn’t).  He was tired of loosing jobs and thought the whole “Short, Fast, and Frequent” concept operated on intermodal trains would add jobs. The company was receptive, and the Slingshots were created. Of great importance was the fact that on the old C&A lines the UTU represented all members of the train crew.  Engineers, conductors, and brakemen were all UTU members.  So, the union could give up the brakeman jobs in exchange for more conductor jobs. On other lines the brakemen and conductors were in separate unions and the brakemen’s union wasn’t about to lose members to the conductor’s union.

 

 

 

 

The United Transportation Union was formed in 1969. It was created by a merger of the Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and a couple of other unions.

After the creation, the UTU would have represented conductors,  brakemen and switch men on the class ones.  

Jeff

 

[greyhounds]

SFbrkmn

ICG began an isolated rebranded piggyback service labeled 'Slingshots" between Chicago-St. Louis in 1975. Limit of 15 cars, no caboose and no brakemen positions--C&E only. For whatever reason, the service did not live to expectations and quickly failed financially. Story goes the service was a failure account of the routing being too short. Anyone have insight on this? As a retro ICG fan, I find this segment of company history interestin

Sam from Wichita 

 

1) The Slingshot service did not fail quickly.  It lasted 10 years.  It ended in 1985 when the entire railroad was being sold off piecemeal.  There had been a determination that the ICG could not be made profitable in any way, shape, or form.  The route of the Slingshots, the old Chicago and Alton between Chicago and St. Louis, was one line sold off.  The buyer was the newly formed  Chicago, Missouri and Western.  They didn’t last a year before going broke.   

2) The Slingshots were not “Isolated.”  They operated as part of the US intermodal network.  Of particular importance was Chicago to Dallas business interchanged to the Frisco at St. Louis.  The ICG-SLSF routing was the best rail service from Chicago to Dallas.  It beat the Santa Fe and the UP.  We had to rubber tire the St. Louis interchange, but we could receive trailers in Chicago as late as 10:30 PM and the Frisco would have them in Dallas by 7:00 AM 2^nd morning.  That was fully truck competitive.  We also received UPS at Chicago from eastern origins destined to St. Louis.  Those are just two examples.    

3) The 15-car union agreement limit on train length (30 trailers) was a killer.  It precluded growth.  What happened if there were 31 trailers for the train?  Some customer’s freight had to be left behind.  And then we had an upset customer who was likely to go back to using trucks.

4)      The impetus for the Slingshot service actually came from the union (then UTU) honcho for the old C&A. (The railroads merged but the unions didn’t).  He was tired of loosing jobs and thought the whole “Short, Fast, and Frequent” concept operated on intermodal trains would add jobs. The company was receptive, and the Slingshots were created. Of great importance was the fact that on the old C&A lines the UTU represented all members of the train crew.  Engineers, conductors, and brakemen were all UTU members.  So, the union could give up the brakeman jobs in exchange for more conductor jobs. On other lines the brakemen and conductors were in separate unions and the brakemen’s union wasn’t about to lose members to the conductor’s union.

5)      The whole “Short, Fast, and Frequent” concept kinda sorta fell flat in reality.  The vast majority of shippers wanted overnight service.  i.e., They’d ship it on Monday afternoon and want it delivered Tuesday morning.    Freight didn’t become available throughout the day as SF&F proponents thought it would.  And we were stuck with that 15-car limit. So, freight for the overnight trains got left behind while the day trains ran with a lot of unsold capacity.  With deregulation we established a price differential offering lower charges on the day trains. It helped somewhat.

6)      The short length of haul was an issue.  Drayage costs ate up most of the available revenue.

7)      By God, we tried.

The “Slingshot” name was chosen by the ICG’s then A.V.P. of intermodal, George Stern.  He chose the name because it symbolized something inexpensive and simple, but effective.  He had an oversized slingshot hanging on his office wall.  He was replaced but the slingshot stayed on the wall. (Stern went on to head up, and save, the C&IM.  He then became President of the DT&I.) I last talked to him about 20 years ago.  He was working for GM as a consultant overseeing their rail use.

 

I took that slingshot off the office wall with me when I jumped off the sinking ship.  I have no idea where it’s at after all these years.

 

 

[Gramp]

SFbrkmn

ICG began an isolated rebranded piggyback service labeled 'Slingshots" between Chicago-St. Louis in 1975. Limit of 15 cars, no caboose and no brakemen positions--C&E only. For whatever reason, the service did not live to expectations and quickly failed financially. Story goes the service was a failure account of the routing being too short. Anyone have insight on this? As a retro ICG fan, I find this segment of company history interestin

Sam from Wichita 

 

Maybe greyhounds would help with this. 

[SFbrkmn]

ICG began an isolated rebranded piggyback service labeled 'Slingshots" between Chicago-St. Louis in 1975. Limit of 15 cars, no caboose and no brakemen positions--C&E only. For whatever reason, the service did not live to expectations and quickly failed financially. Story goes the service was a failure account of the routing being too short. Anyone have insight on this? As a retro ICG fan, I find this segment of company history interestin

Sam from Wichita 

[nanaimo73]

Michael Vomvolakis

 

The second is a brochure advertising "The Dixie Connection." This appears to be the ICG's attempt to compete for east-west traffic via its Kansas City, Missouri, and Montgomery, Alabama gateways. At the Kansas City end, trains would use the Santa Fe's Argentine Yard, while on the Montgomery end, trains would use the Seaboard Cost Line's yard. These connections would be run-thoughts. There was also intermodal service offered to and from East St. Louis. 

 

Norfolk Southern bought the Illinois Central line from Alabama to Fulton KY and trackage rights north to their St Louis/Kansas City line at Centralia during 1988 and then sold the line to the West Tennessee Railroad several years later. That likes like NS tried to do the same thing, but could not make it work?

 

[SFbrkmn]

Morning Sun Books has already released the first two volumns of I believe a five part series of the ICG. I have the first two. Marketing formats, with info submitted by ICG marketing officials, are included in one of the early volumns. 

Good reads with a way to become connected to ICG history and a carrier I have found to be quite interesting from that 1972-1988 period.

Hope a history on the Gateway Western will be published by a qualified author in the future. There is a story worth tellng there. In my self published book of the Santa Fe concerning Newton, KS., I do lightly cover the GWWR in terms of when the line was activated and the impact it had on Newton traffic, but nothing of a heavy nuts-bolts total start-finish company history. That will be left to the experts     Sam (from Wichita)                                               

[greyhounds]

MP173

My guess on Centralia rather than direct drop at Effingham was the lack of blocking ability downstream.  The loads from the south could be consolidated and dropped at Centralia then blocked into Avon, Selkirk, and Conway at the fairly large Centralia yard.  Then shuttle the cars to Effingham and PC/Conrail would simply pickup the blocks for the intended train. At some point the cars would need to be sorted.  It was going to be difficult to do so at Effingham, but Centralia offered the yard infrastructure.

Ed nailed it.

The blocks from the southern origins were for "Conrail-Effingham."  The cars for the three eastern destination yards were mixed up in those blocks.  (A block, similar to a train, has to be of a certain size to make economic sense.)  

The cars arrived in Centralia on various trains from various origins.  They needed to be sorted and aggregated into blocks for the three destinations.  Centralia had the capacity and resouces to do this.  Effingham did not.

[MP173]

My guess on Centralia rather than direct drop at Effingham was the lack of blocking ability downstream.  The loads from the south could be consolidated and dropped at Centralia then blocked into Avon, Selkirk, and Conway at the fairly large Centralia yard.  Then shuttle the cars to Effingham and PC/Conrail would simply pickup the blocks for the intended train.

At some point the cars would need to be sorted.  It was going to be difficult to do so at Effingham, but Centralia offered the yard infrastructure.

Not sure how much interchange occurs at Effingham between CN and CSX.  CSX doesnt run nearly the number of trains for destinations out of EStL...rather the trains are built in Avon (Indy).  

MoPac (UP) had a similar arrangement with NW at Sidney, Il (south of Champaign)...not sure if IC did same with NW at Tolono.

 

Ed

[charlie hebdo]

Thanks Ken for "the rest of the story" and hope you are doing better. 

I did wonder why not drop the blocks at Effingham for CR rather than switching move from Centralia. Operating intransigence?

[Michael Vomvolakis]

Thank You, Greyhounds. Hope everything is alright. My question is now answered.

[samfp1943]

Thanks,  greyhounds,

                                  Your insights and 'inside' infprmation is always welcome.  My own look was a collateral envolvement as a customer's rep in Memphis with a  truck carrier that attemted to get into the Intermodal market pon the IC. Sonce we were at the "Midpoint" of the ICRR; our Marketing 'brain trust(?)' had surmised, nop problem! Just have the railroad load 'our' trailers on their trains, and deliver them 'toots-suite' to either NOLA or Chicago....  Then 'our' drivers could pick them up; drop their empty off, and unload the loaded trailer...reload the seond trailer and eturn to their dispatch with a 'better' paying load...Sounds like a gfood plan!(?) Yeah, Rigfht!~   

Then the problems started! 'OUR' trailers  were not 'strengthened'for piggy-back, service.. The manufacturer had added 4-5 quarter oak planks on the trailer side-rails, (to make them fork-liftable).... Then 'our'trailers started breaking in half, due to problems in loading the cargo in them!,  while the operational calamties continued....drayage in Chicago, same ion NOLA, and  in less than 60 days the 'expenses' way- outweighed the benefits;  those drivers were a heck olf a lot cheaper OTR than 'miselaneous' expenses of equipment repair and recovery in the big cities; so our marketing geniuses deciding that piggy-backing was too much of a pain in their pocketbooks .... That is one tale of one truck line's foray into  the world of railroad operating bubbas, and their pitfalls 

[greyhounds]

Gramp

Too bad greyhounds hasn't posted. I imagine he'd be able to provide you with terrific insight. 

OK, I’ll try.  But I don't know how "Terrific" this will be.

 

The “Central Link”, or whatever we called it, was a largely successful effort to capture a greater share of the freight revenue moving between the south and the northeast.  It focused primarily on forest products (paper) and petrochemicals moving to the northeast.  We’d take any southbound we could get. 

 

This freight was originating on the ICG, then handed off to the Southern or L&N for line haul to the northeast, then given to Conrail for delivery.  This stuck the ICG and Conrail with a disproportionate share of the expenses, as in terminal handling, while the line haul carriers got a disproportionate share of the revenue.  We aimed to fix that by designing a system that kept the revenue on the ICG and Conrail.

 

It was one of the first things I worked on after being hired out of grad school.  I was initially hired to work on the carload side.  I got over to intermodal as soon as I could.

 

The idea was to have the origin terminals make a Centralia block.  Centralia would then switch the traffic into three blocks for Conrail to pick up at Effingham.  Blocks for Avon (Indianapolis), Enola, and Selkirk were created at Centralia.  A Centralia-Effingham turn was established to get the traffic to Effingham. 

 

At that time Conrail operated trains from E. St. Louis to each of those yards.  The CR trains would simply pick up their block at Effingham.  It worked because both the ICG and CR benefitted. 

 

Of course, the operating department kicked and screamed.  We had a small yard at Geismar (SP?), LA with eight classification tracks.  Geismar served the petrochemical plants between New Orleans and Baton Rouge.  So, they made eight blocks.  A Centralia block from Geismar would require them to make nine blocks on eight tracks.

 

This is easy enough to do, but it does require extra switching.  The operating guys did not like that at all.  So, they just quit making the Birmingham block at Geismar.  This put the Birmingham loads into the yard at Memphis and added around two days transit to the Birmingham business.  The extra car hire was on a different budget, so they didn’t worry about it. 

 

We complained and got the Birmingham block restored.  The operating guys really hadn’t saved any switching costs.  They just moved the costs to another budget.

 

I didn’t work on the KC-Montgomery trains.  In hindsight, they were a bad idea.  1) The KC line was in terrible shape.  It had 90-pound rail and was being beaten into the ground by the heavy carloads; 2) the Southern and L&N were not about to short haul themselves by cutting the ICG in on the revenue.  They could interchange at Memphis, E. St. Louis, or elsewhere.  They had no discernible reason to work with the ICG on this.

 

But if you never fail, you’re not trying hard enough.  It may have been a bad idea in hindsight, but at least they tried.

 

My delay in commenting was due to a hospitalization that lasted a while.  I’m fine now, for a geezer.

     

  

[Gramp]

Too bad greyhounds hasn't posted. I imagine he'd be able to provide you with terrific insight. 

[Michael Vomvolakis]

Thanks, everyone for their responses.

 

Interesting how there were westbound PC-ICG schedules and not any eastbound ones. Perhaps there simply wasn't enough traffic to justify a dedicated eastbound train? No direct reference to the "Central Link" either. (Maybe it was something that didn't get much beyond the drawing board. Or maybe we are just looking in the wrong place?)

 

"The Dixie Connection" appeared to be a much more solid effort on behalf of the ICG. Comparing the schedules that MP173 posted, I'm surprised how the ICG could closely match the SLSF schedules considering the roundabout route they took.

My brochure shows westbound train ICG-WLX departing Montgomery at 3:00 pm Thursday and arriving at Kansas City at 8:00 am Saturday. Its eastbound counterpart ICG-SLX departs Kansas City at 12:01 am Thursday and arrives at Montgomery at 5:00 pm Saturday. Layover times with connecting trains vary between 12 and 24 hours which is quite standard for the time and even today.

 

It clearly didn't last into the Conrail era. My guess is that even though the ICG and SLSF schedules were closely matched on paper, the ICG had a very difficult job keeping said schedule due to the conditions on the Kansas City line. Whatever traffic was there was eventually switched to a lower-priority Kansas City-Jackson train with SCL-bound traffic being shifted to Birmingham via a blockswap with CB-1 at Carbondale and local Montgomery traffic being shifted to local freights out of Jackson.

[OWTX]

The geography is not good. The online grain traffic is solid enough, but the grades, curves and bridges are costly and crimp capacity. Major re-alignment work would require cubic loonies for land, and there just isn't the overhead traffic (real or potential) to justify that spend.

 

 

[MidlandMike]

MP173

Interestingly the Official Guides of 1973/74 do not show eastbound PC schedules, only westbound.  Wonder why?

Maybe the connection times from the west were too variable, and the time needed to then build a train too unpredictable.

[MP173]

I stand corrected...May June 1974 Official Guide shows "The Dixie Connection"

Lv KC Argentine Yard 1201pm (Mon)

Ar. Montgomery 900pm (Wed)

Obviously this didnt pan out as it was changed in 1976.

 

Ed

[MP173]

I recall the Effingham connection as I lived nearby and went to Effingham a few times to take photos.  I do not have any records of interchange, but it was a scheduled pickup by Conrail.  I do not have access to PennCentral freight schedules but the Conrail freight schedule on day 1 (April 1, 1976) lists:

Train NY-6 pickup at Effingham for Selkirk

Train SW-6 pickup at Effingham for Enola

Train SO-8 pickup at Effingham for Avon/Indianapolis and Columbus

Interestingly the Official Guides of 1973/74 do not show eastbound PC schedules, only westbound.  Wonder why?

ICG ran train SLX between Kansas City and Jackson, Tn on the following schedule (effective 11/1/76):

Lv KC UP Armstong Yard 5:00pm  - MONDAY

LV KC Lydia Yard 7:00pm

Ar.  EStL Venice Yd 930/Depart 1015am

Ar. EStL Hump Yd 1130am, Depart 2:00am (14:30 yard and sort)

Arr Carbondale, Il 5Am.  WEDNESDAY

Block swap/sort into train CB-1 Carbondale - Birmingham

Dept Carbondale 10:00pm  WEDNESDAY

Arr Jackson, Tn 1130am/Depart 1130pm (12 hours)

Arr Birmingham 1130Am  FRIDAY

Meanwhile Frisco offered the following service:

Lv Kansas City Train 135 - 10am Monday

Ar Memphis Train 135 - 2am Tuesday

Lv Memphis Train 231 10pm Tuesday

Ar Birmingham Train 231 10AM Wednesday

Only a guess, but Frisco probably handled the majority of the KC - Birmingham (and beyond) freight in the mid to late 1970s!

Ed

 

[Jackflash]

It was Gulfport MS not Mobile, I got my start railroading in Gulfport as a switchman on the IC in June 1967.  Back then there was four switch jobs working in Gulfport,  we pulled the port twice a day, mostly reefers with bananas.  Dont know what went down in Mobile at that time but it would probably been GM&O, maybe Southern, L&N, or Frisco got some too.   At that time I know the port of New Orleans also received bananas and pineapples for shipment north.

 

 

[diningcar]

Santa Fe was rejected by the Interstate Commerce Omission (oops Commission).

[samfp1943]

To compliment the history of the ICRR, and then the 1972 IC+ICG  edition:

see linked article from CLASSIC TRAINS:

"Illinois Central Railroad: A history"

By George Drury | July 5, 2021

 

"The IC is Classic Trains’ fallen flag railroad of the month for July 2021"

 

@ https://www.trains.com/ctr/railroads/fallen-flags/illinois-central-railroad-a-history/

It is the lower map included in the linked article that may interest readers in this Thread.  Particlarly, the  railroad connections to the SE from Jackson,Tn. area.   

Many readers will not remember; that at one time a particular piece of 'traffic' that the ICRR forewarded to the Upper Midwest and beyond: was the banana. 

Off the Gulf Coast(Mobile?) were solid reefer trains of iced reefers (*re-iced at Fulton,Ky) to take their fruit to distributors all over the upper midwest.  Strawberries, as well, were rushed north (out of Hammond,La. areas) via fast passenger trains(* via their baggage cars), as well.  It was then, truly, the railroad that bragged, " The Mainline of Mid-America."

[SD60MAC9500]

 

The GWWR-ATSF I remember that being Santa Fe wanting to reach the St. Louis market. Now in the hands of KCS. It will be interesting seeing how CPKC upgrades the KC route. 

 

[nanaimo73]

That KC line has had quite the history. First it was the Alton, then B&O, and then GM&O, and they tried to sell it to the CB&Q in 1947. Santa Fe tried to buy it in 1948 to reach St. Louis. After that it was ICG, CM&W, GWWR, KCS and now CP. Looks like it CN will own it next.

 

[Backshop]

Overmod

Oh, is this going to be interesting!  I believe at least one regular poster here has firsthand experience...

 

Maybe he is the one who suggested the KC route without knowing the operational difficulties...