In the July issue of Trains, there is an excellent article by Bill Stephens about PSR.
Therein it is stated that PSR requires far fewer cars and engines. Now, I get why it requires fewer employees, but not cars and engines.
I don't get why. A car still holds X amount only; and X amount of power is still required to move Y weight from A to B.
Still in training.
One of the principals of PSR is to keep cars moving, not standing in yards. So that should reduce the number of cars needed. Another thing that has happened, though, is that PSR has apparently cut the number of rail customers and/or carloads as the railroad reduces available service. This also reduces the number of cars needed.
I believe that what is really happening is that railroads are in the process of beginning to phase out traditional carload service in favor of intermodal service. Where once they ran two networks of trains (carload and intermodal) in the future there will be only one. That means less trains, fewer yards, fewer employees. Eventually, I think it will mean less track mileage and fewer railroads.
Dwell is a number that can be manipulated in a myriad of ways to display whatever level of 'efficiency' the powers that be want to display to the world and thus 'prove' their contention - whatever they decide it needs to be for their story.
When you reduce the number of customers you are servicing you also reduce the number of cars on line and the number of engines and crew members necessary to move those cars.
The numbers produced by PSR are the crowning touch of railroad fiction.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The most telling aspect of Bill's article was the comparison between psr railroads and BNSF. Despite all the slash and burn at UP, NS and KCS, their average OR in 2020 was 60.6 versus 61.6 for BNSF.
CW
Reducing the number of times the car is handled and decreasing the amount of time each handling takes.
Here's an example. Let's say you have a car going from Millville NJ to the UP in Chicago. Traditionally, Millville would send it's cars to Camden to be classified, one at a time. The train taking cars west went to Allentown, so the car would be humped and built into the Allentown train. At Allentown, it would be humped again and to Conway to be humped again, then Elkhart, humped again, and finally on a train to UP in Chicago.
So, that's four intermediate handlings, each 12-36 hours (assuming daily service between points)
Actually, railroaders were smarter than this, and have been for quite a while. Places make more blocks for more places than the next yard along the way in the right direction. Allentown would make a Conway block and an Elkhart block, and our car would ride to Elkhart directly.
Planners determine how many and which blocks to make where based on volume to try to minimize handlings.
Another trick is the block swap. Camden could make a Conway block and our car could ride the Allentown train to Abrams where the car would be set off and picked up by the train from Morrisville to Conway. Block swap connections are tighter since there is a lot less work to do - but are generally reliant on you running trains on plan and on time.
Yet another trick is pre-blocking. Say Millville sorts their cars out into Conways, Allentowns and Camdens instead of just sending the whole thing to Camden to sort out. Lets say there is 8 hours from the arrival of the train at Camden to departure of the train to Allentown. This is too short to hump and make the outbound train. But, if you pre-block, you can just block swap those Allentowns and Conways and only have to classify the Camdens.
Similarly, Conway makes a UP Chicago block and there is a train that can take it there directly.
So, in the end, you have a block swap at Camden, a block swap at Abrams, a hump at Conway and you're done. Much less dwell.
As you might suspect, planners have a host of tools and data to try to optimize the merchandise traffic. The whole network rises and falls on the number and duration of handlings. Before RRs went to scheduled operation (NS did in 2002), you couldn't count on block swaps because you never knew if you were going to run a train, or what schedule it would run. NS ran a "tonnage" RR where you wouldn't run the Camden to Allentown train until you reached the max tonnage for the power. (Conrail ran quasi-scheduled. They would often annul small trains, but generally tried to stick to the schedule.)
All the RRs were doing scheduled railroading before EHH's "branding" of PSR.
The sort of "second wave" of PSR which is currently in vogue actully revolves around a few things. One is eliminating or blurring the lines being service types and blending traffic on one train. You used to see more "pure" unit trains, multilevel trains, stack trains. Now traffic is being combined on to fewer, longer trains where commercial demads allow. Some of this is possible because DPU technology is mature. There is also a push to increase pre-blocking and block swaps and do less work at classification yards.
Another piece is trying to rationalize local train service so traffic comes into the network smoothly and not in chunks. It's better to get 35 cars a week, 5 a day, than 10 on Tuesday, 10 and Thursday and 15 on Saturday.
Running really long, DPU, combined service trains can really save on crews. The pre-blocking and block swaps help reduce the number of cars and locomotives needed to run the network.
It's not all wine and roses, though. Doing these things has it's costs. There is probably a happy medium between standard "scheduled railroading" and extreme PSR. The RRs are still seaching for it.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Juniata ManThe most telling aspect of Bill's article was the comparison between psr railroads and BNSF. Despite all the slash and burn at UP, NS and KCS, their average OR in 2020 was 60.6 versus 61.6 for BNSF.
oltmanndReducing the number of times the car is handled and decreasing the amount of time each handling takes. Here's an example. Let's say you have a car going from Millville NJ to the UP in Chicago. Traditionally, Millville would send it's cars to Camden to be classified, one at a time. The train taking cars west went to Allentown, so the car would be humped and built into the Allentown train. At Allentown, it would be humped again and to Conway to be humped again, then Elkhart, humped again, and finally on a train to UP in Chicago. So, that's four intermediate handlings, each 12-36 hours (assuming daily service between points) Actually, railroaders were smarter than this, and have been for quite a while. Places make more blocks for more places than the next yard along the way in the right direction. Allentown would make a Conway block and an Elkhart block, and our car would ride to Elkhart directly. Planners determine how many and which blocks to make where based on volume to try to minimize handlings. Another trick is the block swap. Camden could make a Conway block and our car could ride the Allentown train to Abrams where the car would be set off and picked up by the train from Morrisville to Conway. Block swap connections are tighter since there is a lot less work to do - but are generally reliant on you running trains on plan and on time. Yet another trick is pre-blocking. Say Millville sorts their cars out into Conways, Allentowns and Camdens instead of just sending the whole thing to Camden to sort out. Lets say there is 8 hours from the arrival of the train at Camden to departure of the train to Allentown. This is too short to hump and make the outbound train. But, if you pre-block, you can just block swap those Allentowns and Conways and only have to classify the Camdens. Similarly, Conway makes a UP Chicago block and there is a train that can take it there directly. So, in the end, you have a block swap at Camden, a block swap at Abrams, a hump at Conway and you're done. Much less dwell. As you might suspect, planners have a host of tools and data to try to optimize the merchandise traffic. The whole network rises and falls on the number and duration of handlings. Before RRs went to scheduled operation (NS did in 2002), you couldn't count on block swaps because you never knew if you were going to run a train, or what schedule it would run. NS ran a "tonnage" RR where you wouldn't run the Camden to Allentown train until you reached the max tonnage for the power. (Conrail ran quasi-scheduled. They would often annul small trains, but generally tried to stick to the schedule.) All the RRs were doing scheduled railroading before EHH's "branding" of PSR. The sort of "second wave" of PSR which is currently in vogue actully revolves around a few things. One is eliminating or blurring the lines being service types and blending traffic on one train. You used to see more "pure" unit trains, multilevel trains, stack trains. Now traffic is being combined on to fewer, longer trains where commercial demads allow. Some of this is possible because DPU technology is mature. There is also a push to increase pre-blocking and block swaps and do less work at classification yards. Another piece is trying to rationalize local train service so traffic comes into the network smoothly and not in chunks. It's better to get 35 cars a week, 5 a day, than 10 on Tuesday, 10 and Thursday and 15 on Saturday. Running really long, DPU, combined service trains can really save on crews. The pre-blocking and block swaps help reduce the number of cars and locomotives needed to run the network. It's not all wine and roses, though. Doing these things has it's costs. There is probably a happy medium between standard "scheduled railroading" and extreme PSR. The RRs are still seaching for it.
Operating plans are what management make them out to be. Do you want to switch at origin? Do you even HAVE THE ABILITY and track space to switch at orign? Do you want to increase the manpower and motive power necessary to perform the switching at origin? How many blocks are possible to be switched at origin? Is it more effective to take EVERYTHING from the origin to a wayside yard (hump or flat) to switch into blocks for furtherance. Once switched, will those blocks be accumulated into a single multi-block train? Will be blocks be picked up by through trains that were originated at other locations? Will the blocks be set off at some wayside point for pick up by another through train? How long will the blocks wait at the wayside point waiting for pick up - 1 hour, 12 hours, 24 hours, 36 hours, 48 hours? Will the through train 'scheduled' to pick up the block have sufficient room and/or power to actually accomplish the pick up? At the wayside point will the set out block(s) be on yard air so that a Class 1 brake test won't have to be performed by the pick up crew if to block has been 'off air' in excess of the time permitted by regulations.
There are a multitude of ways a operating plan can be configured. What is right is in the way the powers the be want to 'play with the metrics' (and they do play with them). Figures and Liars come to mind.
Seen it too many times over a 51 year career.
Greyhounds; I agree BNSF has adopted the long train / blended train aspect of psr and was using this approach last year. It's likely what resulted in them having the most improved OR among the Class 1's. Bill's article contained a comparison chart however, that is fodder for discussion as it relates to railroad employment levels at BNSF versus CSX, UP and NS. The chart lists the percentage reduction in personnel in various job classifications from 2017 through December 2020 and, the only category in which BNSF is comparable to the other three is MOW and Structures, with BNSF cutting 19% as opposed to the other three cutting an average of 20%. For T&E, BNSF was down 15% compared to an average of 21% for CSX, UP and NS.
The two most shocking disparities involved professional & administrative which, presumably would include sales and customer service positions. BNSF was down only 15% compared to -30% for the other three. Given BNSF's "bias for growth" noted in the Newswire article, this makes sense. The second large disparity was in Maintenance of Equipment & Stores with BNSF down 13% versus an average of -43% for the other carriers. This again might be attributed to BNSF seeking new business that keeps assets in use moving profitable business as opposed to storing locomotives and furloughing shop personnel all while triaging your customer base as appears to be what CSX, UP and NS have done.
I guess the overall point here is that BNSF seems to be looking at this from a more balanced perspective than the other three.
greyhounds Juniata Man The most telling aspect of Bill's article was the comparison between psr railroads and BNSF. Despite all the slash and burn at UP, NS and KCS, their average OR in 2020 was 60.6 versus 61.6 for BNSF. BNSF is doing “PSR Like” things. See the Trains News Wire: Pandemic accelerates operational changes at BNSF Railway - Trains I know the unions and employees don’t like the reduction in force. Handling 7% more volume with 11% less T&E employees is wonderful for efficiency, but it reduces employment and union dues. The railroad’s purpose is not to provide employment or create union dues. The railroad’s purpose is to move freight efficiently. A goal of PSR is to use assets more efficiently. Using fewer freight cars and fewer employees to produce more ton miles, which is what is happening, improves efficiency. This benefits our overall population. But it sure sucks if you’re a furloughed railroad employee.
Juniata Man The most telling aspect of Bill's article was the comparison between psr railroads and BNSF. Despite all the slash and burn at UP, NS and KCS, their average OR in 2020 was 60.6 versus 61.6 for BNSF.
Yep. Wouldn't argue thing you say. I'd add, you can't run an fast, efficient scheduled RR with 19th century technology. Mgt wants the benefits without the investment and they seem to get caught short every time.
I'll also add, back in 2002 when NS started scheduled railroading for merchandise traffic, the plan was partially optimized to make the right blocks at the right places to minimize the number handlings per trip, on average.
We measured connections (based on when the car arrived, what train should it go out on) and train on time performance. So, if you get those two things right, the railroad's velocity should be close to plan. We even measured early train arrivals so that you couldn't "win" the game by padding schedules.
Despite the big turmoil around the 2008 recession, by 2013 the RR was handing more traffic than 2007 with the fastest network velocity since we started measuring it.
The PSR guys came in and made a big splash. With traffic way down, they finally just nicked the velocity achieved in 2013. They since have been shown the door.
railroads are the only business that I know of that tell its customers to go pound dirt and still stay in buisness....however there was that bartender that adopted a PSR model of business that would serve the high rollers first with their Hennsay 10 doller shots before serving me with my 1.75 dollar Hamms..After a half hour of being ignored I left for the bar down the street..with railroads customers may not have the same option.
oltmannd Reducing the number of times the car is handled and decreasing the amount of time each handling takes. Here's an example. Let's say you have a car going from Millville NJ to the UP in Chicago. Traditionally, Millville would send it's cars to Camden to be classified, one at a time. The train taking cars west went to Allentown, so the car would be humped and built into the Allentown train. At Allentown, it would be humped again and to Conway to be humped again, then Elkhart, humped again, and finally on a train to UP in Chicago. So, that's four intermediate handlings, each 12-36 hours (assuming daily service between points) Actually, railroaders were smarter than this, and have been for quite a while. Places make more blocks for more places than the next yard along the way in the right direction. Allentown would make a Conway block and an Elkhart block, and our car would ride to Elkhart directly. Planners determine how many and which blocks to make where based on volume to try to minimize handlings. Another trick is the block swap. Camden could make a Conway block and our car could ride the Allentown train to Abrams where the car would be set off and picked up by the train from Morrisville to Conway. Block swap connections are tighter since there is a lot less work to do - but are generally reliant on you running trains on plan and on time. Yet another trick is pre-blocking. Say Millville sorts their cars out into Conways, Allentowns and Camdens instead of just sending the whole thing to Camden to sort out. Lets say there is 8 hours from the arrival of the train at Camden to departure of the train to Allentown. This is too short to hump and make the outbound train. But, if you pre-block, you can just block swap those Allentowns and Conways and only have to classify the Camdens. Similarly, Conway makes a UP Chicago block and there is a train that can take it there directly. So, in the end, you have a block swap at Camden, a block swap at Abrams, a hump at Conway and you're done. Much less dwell. Using North Platte has an example, we used to build entire trains going to NS or CSX. These trains didn't do intermediate work and generally ran once a day. Now we still build trains, one train is primarily NS, one is primarily CSX. They run generally run once a day. They now handle blocks for other destinations, including an NS block on the CSX train and vice versa. The CSX train will set out that NS block at one yard. The NS train will set out the CSX block at a yard. The CSX train will pick up CSX cars (from the NS train), as will the NS train pick up NS cars, etc. This in effect is moving some of the dwell time from North Platte to the intermediate yards. Inaddition, both trains carry blocks for other destinations and often all these "short" blocks will require some switching at the intermediate yard. All this extra intermediate work is why some say PSR stands for "Pickup - Setout - Recrew" because it causes many trains to not make it over their crew district in 12 hours. It also backs up trains at the intermediate points because, and this happened before PSR, all the trains that need to work seem to show up at the same time. It's also put a lot of pressure on some of the smaller yards that now originate or terminate some manifests. They close a hump and expect the smaller yards to be able to do the work as efficiently as the hump did. Some can't. One yard a few times has stated that the reason they had to kill off crews on 2 or 3 trains was because one train came in and filled up 3/4 of the yard. The others had to be held out until they were able to make some room. As you might suspect, planners have a host of tools and data to try to optimize the merchandise traffic. The whole network rises and falls on the number and duration of handlings. Before RRs went to scheduled operation (NS did in 2002), you couldn't count on block swaps because you never knew if you were going to run a train, or what schedule it would run. NS ran a "tonnage" RR where you wouldn't run the Camden to Allentown train until you reached the max tonnage for the power. (Conrail ran quasi-scheduled. They would often annul small trains, but generally tried to stick to the schedule.) All the RRs were doing scheduled railroading before EHH's "branding" of PSR. The sort of "second wave" of PSR which is currently in vogue actully revolves around a few things. One is eliminating or blurring the lines being service types and blending traffic on one train. You used to see more "pure" unit trains, multilevel trains, stack trains. Now traffic is being combined on to fewer, longer trains where commercial demads allow. Some of this is possible because DPU technology is mature. There is also a push to increase pre-blocking and block swaps and do less work at classification yards. Another piece is trying to rationalize local train service so traffic comes into the network smoothly and not in chunks. It's better to get 35 cars a week, 5 a day, than 10 on Tuesday, 10 and Thursday and 15 on Saturday. That's not how it's done, for us anyway. They have done the exact opposite. Reduced many customers from 5 or 6 day service to 2 or 3 day service. They want those 35 cars in larger chunks. That's also why some former unit train commodities, where possible, have moved into the manifest network. Instead of running a 100 car train every one or two weeks, service the industry every few days and put the smaller blocks into the manifest network. Running really long, DPU, combined service trains can really save on crews. The pre-blocking and block swaps help reduce the number of cars and locomotives needed to run the network. It's not all wine and roses, though. Doing these things has it's costs. There is probably a happy medium between standard "scheduled railroading" and extreme PSR. The RRs are still seaching for it. I agree, they are trying to find the happy medium. They have made some changes to the plans, one train has had one intermediate event eliminated. The extreme PSR may be coming to an end. The extreme part isn't customer friendly and end the end, they need customers. You can't keep squeezing pennies out dwindling dollars. There comes a point when you need to bring in more dollars. Jeff
Using North Platte has an example, we used to build entire trains going to NS or CSX. These trains didn't do intermediate work and generally ran once a day. Now we still build trains, one train is primarily NS, one is primarily CSX. They run generally run once a day. They now handle blocks for other destinations, including an NS block on the CSX train and vice versa.
The CSX train will set out that NS block at one yard. The NS train will set out the CSX block at a yard. The CSX train will pick up CSX cars (from the NS train), as will the NS train pick up NS cars, etc. This in effect is moving some of the dwell time from North Platte to the intermediate yards. Inaddition, both trains carry blocks for other destinations and often all these "short" blocks will require some switching at the intermediate yard.
All this extra intermediate work is why some say PSR stands for "Pickup - Setout - Recrew" because it causes many trains to not make it over their crew district in 12 hours. It also backs up trains at the intermediate points because, and this happened before PSR, all the trains that need to work seem to show up at the same time.
It's also put a lot of pressure on some of the smaller yards that now originate or terminate some manifests. They close a hump and expect the smaller yards to be able to do the work as efficiently as the hump did. Some can't. One yard a few times has stated that the reason they had to kill off crews on 2 or 3 trains was because one train came in and filled up 3/4 of the yard. The others had to be held out until they were able to make some room.
That's not how it's done, for us anyway. They have done the exact opposite. Reduced many customers from 5 or 6 day service to 2 or 3 day service. They want those 35 cars in larger chunks. That's also why some former unit train commodities, where possible, have moved into the manifest network. Instead of running a 100 car train every one or two weeks, service the industry every few days and put the smaller blocks into the manifest network.
I get the feeling - the metrics that were in effect prior to PSR were the kind of mathmatics us silver haired devils were taught was we went through school in the 50's-60's-70s.
PSR is the 'new math' being taught these days that makes no sense to us silver haired devils. They say all the buzz words but they get linked together in different orders.
PSR decreases Terminal Dwell by having the dwell happen during line of road 'block swapping'. End to end transit time is nominally the same. They crow about the decreased Terminal Dwell and hide the line of road dwell.
I have appreciated all of these replies. I came to the RR late in life, but felt that RR Training didn't bother teaching anything about RR business and operational philosophy. However, we did get tested on all of the rules and know the word for word definition of medium approach. Even though I'm retired, I still want to learn about these things. I spent my career evenly between a major terminal with a big hump yard and a separate flat switching yard with road trains going in 5 different directions, many locals and yard jobs as well as remotes. The other half was at the end of the line where it seemed more like a short line than a Class 1. I was glad to see many aspects of railroad operation. Reading these posts let me know what was going on.
I am not a railroader but sure enjoy wathcing and listening in...remotely these days. Berea, Oh is my favorite location as both NS and CSX pass thru with block swapping at NS at Rockwell Yard and Fairlane Yard.
Both seem to be adjusting. Just today NS switch plans with 10N (auto rack train) now bypassing Rockwell to pickup a Conway block. Now it is 16G a heavy manifest Elkhart to Conway. Why? Who knows, but someone decided to make the switch. The 16G crew advised they will outlaw frequently now. The 10n was previously setting out at Fairlane (auto racks?) for someone else to pickup.
Another example is 23K (intermodal - Albany - Chicago) setting out usually 20 - 30 autorack for 11N - Conway to Detroit. Makes sense. Not the volume out of Albany or Buffalo to run a direct train.
All kinds of block swapping at Rockwell with Bellevue and Elkhart trains for Buffalo and Conway making the swaps...sort of like the "X" which Conrail used to use.
CSX is picking up about 30 stone cars daily somewhere west (Fostoria perhaps) with a Chicago - Cleveland train (Q566) and dropping off at Marcy Yard in Cleveland. This as I have been told by a CSX employee replaced a unit train which could not be run profitable. Stone, it might be recalled is very freight sensitive. This seems like a good use of resources. Meanwhile NS runs frequent unit trains of stone east into Cleveland.
Interesting operations...including a mix of intermodal and autorack trains (Philadelpha via Selkirk to North Baltimore)and autoracks and general freight (New Jersey to Detroit).
One of the more interesting movements is Q192 an intermodal from UP (Rochelle perhaps) to North Baltimore which has about 30 - 60 general freights plus intermodals. This train is then broken apart in NWO with the general freight plus intermodal (both UP and BNSF) combined into Q162 for Selkirk or Syracuse. Lots of lumber and refer cars...probably the former apple trains from Pacific Northwest.
These operations are interesting to try and figure out.
Again, I am not a railroader (investor)...very similar to Southwest Airlines and their flight ops versus the American or United hub and spoke.
Keep comments coming on this.
Ed
Does the efficiency really "benefit our overall population" if it comes at the cost of terrible customer service and railroads effectively shirking their role as common carriers? Seems to me it benefits Wall Street much more than it does the economy writ large.
Psychot Does the efficiency really "benefit our overall population" if it comes at the cost of terrible customer service and railroads effectively shirking their role as common carriers? Seems to me it benefits Wall Street much more than it does the economy writ large.
Somewhere in there is a happy medium where the customers get the service they need and the investors get their dividends.
Unfortunately, right now it appears that there is more interest in the investors getting their dividends than in the customers getting service.
Sometimes I wonder if the investors are seeing the customers as being a drain on their dividends...
While there are long term investors, I wonder if the short-term investors, who can't seem to see much past the end of the next quarter, aren't running the show.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Psychot Does the efficiency really "benefit our overall population" if it comes at the cost of terrible customer service and railroads effectively shirking their role as common carriers? Seems to me it benefits Wall Street much more than it does the economy writ large. Somewhere in there is a happy medium where the customers get the service they need and the investors get their dividends. Unfortunately, right now it appears that there is more interest in the investors getting their dividends than in the customers getting service. Sometimes I wonder if the investors are seeing the customers as being a drain on their dividends... While there are long term investors, I wonder if the short-term investors, who can't seem to see much past the end of the next quarter, aren't running the show.
Short term investors have been wagging the tale of Wall Street for decades. As computerization has made more metrics available to more investors - EVERYBODY wants each quarters results to be better than the previous quarter. With Hedge Funds having leveraged buy ins - if more money isn't siphoned into the investors pockets - heads will roll.
In the view of Hedge Funds - long term is for losers. Remember, hedge funds will buy into a company for several years and then sell of and move on the the next target. Yes several years is longer than 'next quarter' , bu that next quarter pressure gets amped up every quarter.
BaltACD tree68 Psychot Does the efficiency really "benefit our overall population" if it comes at the cost of terrible customer service and railroads effectively shirking their role as common carriers? Seems to me it benefits Wall Street much more than it does the economy writ large. Somewhere in there is a happy medium where the customers get the service they need and the investors get their dividends. Unfortunately, right now it appears that there is more interest in the investors getting their dividends than in the customers getting service. Sometimes I wonder if the investors are seeing the customers as being a drain on their dividends... While there are long term investors, I wonder if the short-term investors, who can't seem to see much past the end of the next quarter, aren't running the show. Short term investors have been wagging the tale of Wall Street for decades. As computerization has made more metrics available to more investors - EVERYBODY wants each quarters results to be better than the previous quarter. With Hedge Funds having leveraged buy ins - if more money isn't siphoned into the investors pockets - heads will roll. In the view of Hedge Funds - long term is for losers. Remember, hedge funds will buy into a company for several years and then sell of and move on the the next target. Yes several years is longer than 'next quarter' , bu that next quarter pressure gets amped up every quarter.
It's very useful to have a privately-owned Class 1 like BNSF around because it provides a measuring stick to compare long-term vs. short-term investing mentalities. While BNSF is certainly using some PSR principles, it also seems to be focusing more on marketing and customer service.
Short-term investors are not the only problem. It's pretty well known that PRR paid dividends it couldn't justify or afford to keep the stock price high for the benefit of the wealthy investors on the Main Line.
We at this site talk about investors as individuals. Actually individual investors, I am one as are several of us here, do not have any substantial affect on the price of a stock when we trade. The large funds, including labor union funds, are what drive changes in stock prices when they sell or buy 1000's of shares in one trading day.
CSSHEGEWISCHShort-term investors are not the only problem. It's pretty well known that PRR paid dividends it couldn't justify or afford to keep the stock price high for the benefit of the wealthy investors on the Main Line.
Financial chicanery is as old as time. Someone is always looking to tip the scales in their favor to the exclusion of others.
In playing the financial numbers game and the flawed short term logic that the Wall Street trash continue to push, the railroad's stewardship obligations are being ignored (an unwanted expense). With congress now investigating the evils of PSR and the howls from small government (some justified, most not), the failed stewardship issues and public obligations may be the reformation trigger needed with the threat of re-regulation being the big stick that gets the industry off the financial kool-aid and makes the coffee kick-in.
Remember - The Recession/Depression/Financial Panic of 2007-09 was not caused by a increase in the Minimum Wage.
Ron Baron, who used to manage Baron Asset Fund, used to brag that he invested for the long term. After he retired, the focus started changing and I sold my shares.
Nationalization just throwing that out there been done twice ww1 and Conrail..Amtrak
PsychotIt's very useful to have a privately-owned Class 1 like BNSF around because it provides a measuring stick to compare long-term vs. short-term investing mentalities. While BNSF is certainly using some PSR principles, it also seems to be focusing more on marketing and customer service.
BNSF is owned by Berkshare-Hathaway, which has stockholders. The largest stockholder, Warren Buffett, is easing into retirement, and his hand picked replacement is asking BNSF why they aren't more like the other PSR railroads.
MidlandMike Psychot It's very useful to have a privately-owned Class 1 like BNSF around because it provides a measuring stick to compare long-term vs. short-term investing mentalities. While BNSF is certainly using some PSR principles, it also seems to be focusing more on marketing and customer service. BNSF is owned by Berkshare-Hathaway, which has stockholders. The largest stockholder, Warren Buffett, is easing into retirement, and his hand picked replacement is asking BNSF why they aren't more like the other PSR railroads.
Psychot It's very useful to have a privately-owned Class 1 like BNSF around because it provides a measuring stick to compare long-term vs. short-term investing mentalities. While BNSF is certainly using some PSR principles, it also seems to be focusing more on marketing and customer service.
Yep! Berkshire-Hathaway A shares closed at $417,000 today. Think I'll buy 1K shares. [/sarcasm]
Yes, I know Berkshire Hathaway has shareholders, but the ownership dynamic with BH is quite different than that of the other Class 1's. You may recall that Buffett told Matt Rose to manage BNSF like BH would own it for the next 100 years. That's quite a bit different than Wall Street short-termism.
Having said that, I wasn't aware that Buffet's successor is pushing PSR.
Psychat: I'm certain BNSF's managemenyt has some very good answers to that question.
Again, judging by results, including shipper evalluations, not just stock prices, PSR isn't PSR. All good railroading should be Precision Scheduled. Every car should have a specific trip plan, and modern computer technology makes that feasible and doable.
What people call PSR is really Assett Utilization Railroading. I believe BNSF is still trying to be Customer Responsive Railroading. I hope they continue. With every car having a trip plan.
Dave; unless something has changed in the two years since I retired, each of the Class 1's create trip plans for every shipment. Keeping a shipment moving according to that plan is where the railroads generally tend to fall short. And psr has done nothing to improve that if one accepts the adherence to plan metrics the railroads themselves make public.
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