Fred M CainHow many more lines like this do we have to lose?
Russell
Grafton - Parkersburg was closed because of clearance issues and a lack of on line traffic. While the line did have a clearance project undertaken on its many tunnels in the 1960's those projects cleared the line to approximately 17'6" standards - it was undertaken at a time when double stacked containers as a form of rail transportation was not even a pipedream. CSX came into existance in 1980 and shortly thereafter, visionaries, could see the use of double stacking of containers as well as the enclosing of automobile racks - both of which would seriously exceed the 17'6" clearance plate. It was determined that the necessary clearance project to handle the traffic on the line would not be cost effective and subsequently operational plans were made to allow the route to be abandoned.
I might add that as early as the late 1940's the B&O determined there wasn't sufficient passenger traffic to support a dedicated Baltimore - Cincinnati train (The Cincinnatian). Passengers on a line (at that time) foretold the level of freight traffic the line could generate.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Balt,
Thanks for your response and the information. I now know more than I did before. However, I'm still not understanding how they're shipping double stacks from the Washington D.C. area to St Louis. My guess is they're sending them up Sand Patch to Pittsburgh then on up to the Akron area then west to near Greenwich, OH where the former Conrail line is intersected then back down to Indy and on west from there. That is not a direct route by any means. It's hard for me to understand how competitive that can be with over-the-road trucking.
OR, they could still send trains west through Grafton, Clarksburg, Parkersburg then down to Huntington and then back up to Cinncinati, but that's REALLY winding around and would probably take even longer and I'm not sure they'd have the clearance on those routes anyhow.
It also kinda looks to me like the former B&O mainline has either been abandoned, sold to short line operators or some combination thereof in eastern Ohio east of Cinncy. Is that right? Has all the right of way now been completely obliterated or has most of it been "rail banked"?
Regards,
Fred M. Cain
Fred M CainBalt, Thanks for your response and the information. I now know more than I did before. However, I'm still not understanding how they're shipping double stacks from the Washington D.C. area to St Louis. My guess is they're sending them up Sand Patch to Pittsburgh then on up to the Akron area then west to near Greenwich, OH where the former Conrail line is intersected then back down to Indy and on west from there. That is not a direct route by any means. It's hard for me to understand how competitive that can be with over-the-road trucking. OR, they could still send trains west through Grafton, Clarksburg, Parkersburg then down to Huntington and then back up to Cinncinati, but that's REALLY winding around and would probably take even longer and I'm not sure they'd have the clearance on those routes anyhow. It also kinda looks to me like the former B&O mainline has either been abandoned, sold to short line operators or some combination thereof in eastern Ohio east of Cinncy. Is that right? Has all the right of way now been completely obliterated or has most of it been "rail banked"? Regards, Fred M. Cain
Bean counters and line drawers have very different views of the railroads and how to conduct business.
Industry really doesn't care that route A is a day quicker than route B (especially if railroad cars are being used). What they care about is that their switch happens 'On Time' daily and whatever the transit times for their shipment are - that shipment time is consistent.
I don't necessarily agree with the bean counters, however, at the top levels of the company they are in possession of more hard facts than I am. I have no real knowledge of what has happened to the former B&O trackage from Cincinnati to Grafton. My understanding is the that the former B&O Illinois Sub has had its track severed at Noble and Caseyville, IL with no traffic operating between those points - the rail is still in place and has not been abandoned.
Good thoughts, there. One thing that I have never agreed with is the idea that when a line is deemed unprofitable, the thing to do is to abandon it and pull the tracks up. I think there are a number of cases where railroads have burned their bridges behing them by doing that. I have always believed that a better approach would be to simply mothball the line as the Union Pacific has done with their Wellton line in Arizona (possibly Tennesse Pass as well).
Do property taxes play a roll in this? If so, that would make sense. High taxes discourage investment and if taxes are punitive enough they actually ENCOURAGE disinvestment.
Now, if the Ex-B&O mainline were mothballed, CSX might consider considering taking a second look at higher tunnel clearances. But, with the tracks gone.........
Sad, sad, sad. Who else said that in capital letters?
Fred M CainBalt, Good thoughts, there. One thing that I have never agreed with is the idea that when a line is deemed unprofitable, the thing to do is to abandon it and pull the tracks up. I think there are a number of cases where railroads have burned their bridges behing them by doing that. I have always believed that a better approach would be to simply mothball the line as the Union Pacific has done with their Wellton line in Arizona (possibly Tennesse Pass as well). Do property taxes play a roll in this? If so, that would make sense. High taxes discourage investment and if taxes are punitive enough they actually ENCOURAGE disinvestment. Now, if the Ex-B&O mainline were mothballed, CSX might consider considering taking a second look at higher tunnel clearances. But, with the tracks gone......... Sad, sad, sad. Who else said that in capital letters? Regards, Fred M. Cain
The grades between Cumberland and Grafton are more severe than between Cumberland and Connellsville over Sand Patch.
In some cases, when a right of way is ABANDONED, the railroad no longer retains title to the property the track was constructed upon. Once the rails are gone - they are gone forever.
Most of the line is now a trail.
https://www.onlyinyourstate.com/west-virginia/north-bend-rail-trail-10-tunnels-wv/
Another thing to consider is that with the big downturn in coal mining, there isn't anywhere as much online business and there wouldn't be enough bridge traffic to maintain it.
BackshopAnother thing to consider is that with the big downturn in coal mining, there isn't anywhere as much online business and there wouldn't be enough bridge traffic to maintain it.
CSX kept the lines out of Grafton that supported coal mines. Those that did not support mines were either abandoned or turned over to short line operators.
mvlandsw Most of the line is now a trail. https://www.onlyinyourstate.com/west-virginia/north-bend-rail-trail-10-tunnels-wv/
my last visit to Hunington noted how B&O line there has nostly been obliterated.
blue streak 1 my last visit to Hunington noted how B&O line there has nostly been obliterated.
Fred M Cain blue streak 1 my last visit to Hunington noted how B&O line there has nostly been obliterated. I'm not sure that the Parkersburg to Cincinnatti B&O main ran through Huntington, did it? What I have discovered since I started this thread was that the former B&O mainline across southeastern Ohio is mostly intact as either a rail trail, planned rail trails or shortline railroad operations. The biggest exception to this is in the town of Athens, Ohio. The B&O mainline went right smack dab through downtown Athens and since the rails were removed in the 1980s, much of the town of Athens has been completely redeveloped. This is a sad loss that probably cannot be replaced now. Why do railroads have to abandon and remove once important rail lines? Why can't they just mothball them if they believe they are not longer profitable? Is it that they get so much money from the scrap value of the line? Just wondering. Regards, Fred M. Cain
The CSX Ohio River Subdivision runs from Wheeling through Parkersburg to Guyandotte, a few miles East of Huntington where it connects with the Kanawha Subdivision that does terminate in Huntington. This line was never the Main Line to St. Louis.
Part of the decision process that goes into outright abandonment of trackage is the property tax aspect. In many cases railroads built their tracks on easments granted by the original property owners - in granting the easments part of the provision was that the railroad would pay the property tax on the easment, not the original ower. Abandoning the track and thus the easment, the property taxes eliminate the railroad (and its 'improvements') from the tax rolls and the taxes revert to the orignal property owner.
Railroad real estate and the who actually own what is a entire muddied up subject area that is far beyond my limited understandings. mudchicken has made his career in this area.
Huntington has always been a hotbed of C&O activity. The B&O was a minor player at best.
Fred M CainWhy do railroads have to abandon and remove once important rail lines? Why can't they just mothball them if they believe they are not longer profitable?
Whether they take up or leave the track is probably a matter of opportunity cost, not just whether traffic might pick up in future.
One of the fundamental principles of 'railbanking' was to preserve end-to-end integrity of a given route if track was lifted. There is a very sad cautionary tale in the history of the Lackawanna Cutoff; hopefully there won't soon be another in the Adirondacks.
Fred M CainI'm not sure that the Parkersburg to Cincinnatti B&O main ran through Huntington, did it?
Overmod Principal reason is likely tax. Secondary might be insurance or other potential-liability cost. <SNIP> There is a very sad cautionary tale in the history of the Lackawanna Cutoff; hopefully there won't soon be another in the Adirondacks.
Principal reason is likely tax. Secondary might be insurance or other potential-liability cost.
<SNIP> There is a very sad cautionary tale in the history of the Lackawanna Cutoff; hopefully there won't soon be another in the Adirondacks.
Overmod,
Ah, yeah, tax! That's what I was wondering. What can be done about that? It is generally known that high taxes discourage investment and if those taxes are punitive enough they actually ENCOURAGE disinvestment.
States and counties that do this are their own worst enemy in a way. If the line disappears, they probably lose some if not most of their tax on the rail line and lose ALL of their local rail freight service. That's what you call a lose-lose proposition.
I have long believed that railroads and farmers should be exempt from property tax but that's a political question that depends entirely on your point of view.
And now, to drive off topic here, exactly WHAT is the current status of the Lackawanna cutoff? Rail restoration on this line has been on-again, off-again, on-again, off-again and back on again. Is it now off again?
Fred M CainAh, yeah, tax! That's what I was wondering. What can be done about that?
Methinks the taxing authorities saw/see the railroads as a cash cow - a place they could tax as high as possible with little pushback.
I went through our county tax rolls a while back and figured out what the taxes were on the CSX line through here. Unfortunately, I don't remember what the number was.
I seem to recall that there is a certain amount of regulation of those tax rates, and that the method of collection is a bit convoluted.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Fred M CainAnd now, to drive off topic here, exactly WHAT is the current status of the Lackawanna cutoff? Rail restoration on this line has been on-again, off-again, on-again, off-again and back on again. Is it now off again?
My understanding was that most of what was holding things on the first section up was local: fun with the 'new' station in Andover; fun with repairing Roseville Tunnel; fun with Indiana bat habitat half the year. I suspect some of the problems could be relieved if a higher priority -- for example multi-state, Amtrak-subsidized funding -- were to be secured and somewhat more agile project management initiated.
Since much of the original NJT MOS project hinged on the Andover improvements, the critical path stayed long. As soon as there is support for through operation most of that ceases to be a concern, and work in Roseville Tunnel before 'bat season' starts April Fool's Day then becomes the main concern in that section (I get the impression this was a contract to have been let already but coronavirus concerns temporarily shelved it.)
I have not gone through the economics of using more than one TLS simultaneously; my thought on this being that renovation of the 50-odd miles to Scranton could be handled by different track equipment. One concern is that dual-mode power is really required on these trains; while it might be fun to electrify to Scranton, there's no real economic point even at projectable use figures in doing so when much more interesting alternatives already exist.
It seems like what you're telling me is that it's pretty much a done deal but it's just that we might not live quite long enough to see it.
-FMC
Fred M CainIt seems like what you're telling me is that it's pretty much a done deal but it's just that we might not live quite long enough to see it.
Fred M CainAh, yeah, tax! That's what I was wondering. What can be done about that? It is generally known that high taxes discourage investment and if those taxes are punitive enough they actually ENCOURAGE disinvestment. States and counties that do this are their own worst enemy in a way. If the line disappears, they probably lose some if not most of their tax on the rail line and lose ALL of their local rail freight service. That's what you call a lose-lose proposition.
Property taxes also encourage the land to be used profitably. Localities want the land to produce economic activity. Long abandoned railroads don't do that and probably never will. Localities are looking to somebody else to find a productive use for the ROW.
MidlandMike Property taxes also encourage the land to be used profitably. Localities want the land to produce economic activity. Long abandoned railroads don't do that and probably never will. Localities are looking to somebody else to find a productive use for the ROW.
So Fred, we're (taxpayers) are supposed to prop up failing businesses? I know we sometimes do, but it shouldn't be the norm.
Backshop So Fred, we're (taxpayers) are supposed to prop up failing businesses? I know we sometimes do, but it shouldn't be the norm.
Fred M Cain Backshop So Fred, we're (taxpayers) are supposed to prop up failing businesses? I know we sometimes do, but it shouldn't be the norm. Uh, well, I agree with you on that one. You might be misunderstaning what I'm trying to say. It's simply this: High taxes discourage investment and, if they're high enough they can actually ENCOURAGE disinvestment. So, if a business is profitable but not profitable ENOUGH to pay the property taxes, the owners or investors or whatever take their ball and leave. It seems like everytime taxes do get cut, the business economy responds in a positive way. If you want to keep your marginally profitable rail line that serves your community, the first thing you should try is to get rid of the property tax. I have seen time and again where a community provides a tax abatement when they want to lure a new Meijer store or some other business. Why not do that for the rail line? But abatements, I think, are kinda unfair. I would support getting rid of property taxes and go with a progressive income tax where the more money that gets made, the more able the person or business is to pay it. Regards, Fred M. Cain
CSX is not a marginally profitable enterprise that could not afford its property taxes. It is a fully profitable enterprise that seeks to shed costs by most any means possible. Abandonment of the line from Grafton to Cincinnati into short line owership, rail trails and out right abandonments with removal of the track structure and ownership was a business decision that CSX made.
As a aside, the B&O a CSX predecessor, was property tax exempt in the City of Baltimore as long as the B&O was a viable corporation. CSX bean counters determined that that concession was not worth the price of keeping the B&O as a corporation. B&O was merged into the C&O and then the C&O into CSX, thus ending the B&O tax exemption in Baltimore City that had dated from the formation of the B&O in 1827.
Late to the party but a couple of comments here regarding the B&O St. Louis line. I grew up in Southern Illinois and the line saw about 4 trains each way daily out of St. Louis in the 70s then slowly lost business as carload traffic moved away due to mergers and other factors.
St. Louis to Washington intermodal probably doesnt exist due to government being the big industry in Washington. It does move between St. and Harrisburg, Pa (20T/21T) on NS which are big trains. Today's 21T thru Cleveland was about 13,000ft. I didnt count the containers (all stacks) but probably about 300 both domestic and international. The train is actually a Harrisburg/Kansas City pair but drops St. Louis at Decatur.
CSX operates St. Louis to Northeast via train Q008 which handles hot UPS traffic, TOFC and containers, both international and domestic. It typically has about 200 containers/trailers and works Indianapolis and Syracuse...no doubt splitting there for Boston and NYC.
Carload traffic is handled by Q364 which works Avon Indianapolis to Selkirk. Big train, usually 150 plus cars of general freight and autoracks. There simply is not enough carload traffic moving via St. Louis to the Northeast anymore. Between NS and CSX there seems to be sufficient service to the Northeast...probably not the best service, but sufficient.
Regarding property taxes, I am slowly shifting my view of taxes. I do not care to educate my grandkids in house...been doing it some the past few months and it is tough work. Waste in government? Sure. I for one am not ready to blaze a trail to drive my car...nor am I ready to pay tolls for each and every segment.
Ed
CG Tower of Trainorders.com No greater debate that gets the blood flowing of B&O fans is the decision to abandon the line between Midland City, Ohio and Chillicothe, Ohio and from Red Diamond, Ohio to Parkersburg WVa and beyond. With the 20 year anniversary of the actual abandonment and removal of service key pieces of this line approaching, it's appropriate it's being brought up again.The story, as related to me by a Chessie VP that was at the meeting is as follows:It was the end of the fiscal year, 1985, the President of the Chessie System and the Chairman of the Board for Chessie, called all of the VP's together to discuss where the company was. Well, the numbers weren't very pretty and the operations department was in the red. The VP of Operations, quickly surmised that the Parkersburg "branch" (as it was called), would be a logical way to make up the difference. The operations VP had obviously put some time into this as he then began to spew data, numbers, run times, etc...he came prepared to make a solid argument for this line's demise. Operations plan was to divert the traffic, lay off most train crews, MofW, Signal, clerks, etc...gradually the line would die, and they could rip it out. The not only made up the operation budget deficit, but the operations VP pointed immediately to the fact that they could continue to make a better profit by avoiding the operations nightmare that was the Parkersburg Sub (more on that in a bit).In my research, my first question was, Why was it called a "branch"? By this time, summer 1985, traffic was down to four through trains or so per day via Parkersburg and Chillicothe, (two of course being pig trains), most traffic went via Pittsburgh and across Ohio. The concept of main line seemed to be only used for the primary traffic line that ran up and over Sand Patch. Plus, if one traces back the history of this line, it was indeed just a branch line operation and engineered as such in it's building, it was only after the line was strung together with the Marietta and Cincinnati (B&O Ohio Division) and the Ohio and Mississippi (B&O St. Louis Division), when this line became viable.Back to the meeting, at this point, the Marketing VP, nearly lost his cookies. He had been there a little over a year and was still getting used to the culture. They (marketing folks) were not prepared for this news and had nothing in terms of data to defend keeping the line. The Chessie president looked at marketing VP for the facts... but he could provide none...other then the obvious fact that this move would destroy the St. Louis piggyback traffic (which it did).It's interesting to note that Chessie was really not that big into intermodal, period. Chessie's bread and butter was coal and manifest...particularly auto parts. In fact some at Chessie felt TOFC was less important then general merchandise traffic. It is only after CSX evolved, it was the folks on the Seaboard side that was really driving the intermodal needs. We also had the change in global economy that proved that TOFC/COFC was a viable option.It was auto parts traffic that was the primary reason this part of the former B&O (Parkerburg Sub) was given some TLC in 1963 (after the C&O merger). Clearances were raised accommodate high cubes and some auto racks but not necessarily for TOFC traffic. The tunnels were raised to 17' 2", but not the needed 20' 8" for stacks (again, TOFC was the rage until stacks became more of a rage), this also worked for high cube and most auto racks of the day. However, the tunnel enlargements were about it. Some curves were eased, but these were the real operations issue (not the grades). In fact, Chessie even had problems with some grain trains in high cube hopper cars because of harmonic issues with jointed rail. My research shows that there were several 6 degree curves and one 7 degree curves between Clarksburg and Parkersburg. The Ohio side was a bit better except for the 8 degree curve on the Ohio University campus in Athens. Also the afore mentioned harmonic rocking had several entries in Chessie TT's of the era (i.e. avoid certain speeds at certain locations).In an interesting twist of irony, it was during the 1963's upgrade when people saw that the traffic could be rerouted over longer routes and still have respectable transit times, perhaps the seed was planted early?So, back to the "big table meeting", you have the realists in the operating department in the facts, and the prognosticators in marketing saying that it's our best guess that we'll get clobbered in the St. Louis market. The Chessie president, being the accountant, went with the numbers...no one cared that TOFC would get slaughtered, they wanted a clear bottom line.This was the beginning of the end. With Marketing not given a chance to defend, operations with the numbers, it was a tough line to save. Indeed, the TOFC traffic did get slaughtered, and the route up and over Ohio added, at times, days to this schedule. It was a disaster...but no one cared.What TOFC traffic was there (St Louis Trailer Jet and the Manhattan Trailer Jet), dried up when rerouted up and over Ohio and down the Toledo Subdivision back to Cincinnati. Thus ending St. Louis as a viable gateway for intermodal traffic. Only after CSX spent it's money on Conrail are we seeing this begin to change. Plus, as the 80's moved into the 90's CSX was trying to consolidate gateways to the west, at the early part of the 1990's, CSX had four: Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis and New Orleans. Chicago was the one obvious choice, the other was New Orleans. So again, St. Louis was allowed to fizzle out. Add to all of this the changes in global marketing, the slow down of domestic auto sales in the 1980's and the conditions were ripe for abandonment. Rail banking had not become as "vogue" as it is today.So while it is perceived that the line was axed quickly, the operations numbers tell a tale that the line had declined for years (even perhaps as early as the 1960's when the original reroutes took place for the improvements). I am not letting CSX (actually Chessie System) off the hook for it's abandonment, but the numbers were not in the lines favor. There was little local traffic really any place between Chillicothe and Parkersburg (the exception of the Portsmouth Branch at Hamden, which slowly lost traffic to trucks because Chessie started retreating on service), the tough operating conditions east of Parkersburg and the downturn of the economy all lead us toward the result we see.In retrospect, many CSX operations folks do lament on this lines removal. Was it a mistake? Perhaps it was...it's hard to tell. With the change in the eastern rail scene its likely the line could have survived, at least for a while. CSX gained a far better route to St. Louis when buying Conrail, but, as we know the cost was staggering.There is much speculation what will become of the line from St. Louis to Cincinnati. CSX still owns and operates this line, and while it does see traffic, it is not at the same level as years pasts. Rumors fly...we will wait and see.CG Tower
No greater debate that gets the blood flowing of B&O fans is the decision to abandon the line between Midland City, Ohio and Chillicothe, Ohio and from Red Diamond, Ohio to Parkersburg WVa and beyond. With the 20 year anniversary of the actual abandonment and removal of service key pieces of this line approaching, it's appropriate it's being brought up again.The story, as related to me by a Chessie VP that was at the meeting is as follows:It was the end of the fiscal year, 1985, the President of the Chessie System and the Chairman of the Board for Chessie, called all of the VP's together to discuss where the company was. Well, the numbers weren't very pretty and the operations department was in the red. The VP of Operations, quickly surmised that the Parkersburg "branch" (as it was called), would be a logical way to make up the difference. The operations VP had obviously put some time into this as he then began to spew data, numbers, run times, etc...he came prepared to make a solid argument for this line's demise. Operations plan was to divert the traffic, lay off most train crews, MofW, Signal, clerks, etc...gradually the line would die, and they could rip it out. The not only made up the operation budget deficit, but the operations VP pointed immediately to the fact that they could continue to make a better profit by avoiding the operations nightmare that was the Parkersburg Sub (more on that in a bit).In my research, my first question was, Why was it called a "branch"? By this time, summer 1985, traffic was down to four through trains or so per day via Parkersburg and Chillicothe, (two of course being pig trains), most traffic went via Pittsburgh and across Ohio. The concept of main line seemed to be only used for the primary traffic line that ran up and over Sand Patch. Plus, if one traces back the history of this line, it was indeed just a branch line operation and engineered as such in it's building, it was only after the line was strung together with the Marietta and Cincinnati (B&O Ohio Division) and the Ohio and Mississippi (B&O St. Louis Division), when this line became viable.Back to the meeting, at this point, the Marketing VP, nearly lost his cookies. He had been there a little over a year and was still getting used to the culture. They (marketing folks) were not prepared for this news and had nothing in terms of data to defend keeping the line. The Chessie president looked at marketing VP for the facts... but he could provide none...other then the obvious fact that this move would destroy the St. Louis piggyback traffic (which it did).It's interesting to note that Chessie was really not that big into intermodal, period. Chessie's bread and butter was coal and manifest...particularly auto parts. In fact some at Chessie felt TOFC was less important then general merchandise traffic. It is only after CSX evolved, it was the folks on the Seaboard side that was really driving the intermodal needs. We also had the change in global economy that proved that TOFC/COFC was a viable option.It was auto parts traffic that was the primary reason this part of the former B&O (Parkerburg Sub) was given some TLC in 1963 (after the C&O merger). Clearances were raised accommodate high cubes and some auto racks but not necessarily for TOFC traffic. The tunnels were raised to 17' 2", but not the needed 20' 8" for stacks (again, TOFC was the rage until stacks became more of a rage), this also worked for high cube and most auto racks of the day. However, the tunnel enlargements were about it. Some curves were eased, but these were the real operations issue (not the grades). In fact, Chessie even had problems with some grain trains in high cube hopper cars because of harmonic issues with jointed rail. My research shows that there were several 6 degree curves and one 7 degree curves between Clarksburg and Parkersburg. The Ohio side was a bit better except for the 8 degree curve on the Ohio University campus in Athens. Also the afore mentioned harmonic rocking had several entries in Chessie TT's of the era (i.e. avoid certain speeds at certain locations).In an interesting twist of irony, it was during the 1963's upgrade when people saw that the traffic could be rerouted over longer routes and still have respectable transit times, perhaps the seed was planted early?So, back to the "big table meeting", you have the realists in the operating department in the facts, and the prognosticators in marketing saying that it's our best guess that we'll get clobbered in the St. Louis market. The Chessie president, being the accountant, went with the numbers...no one cared that TOFC would get slaughtered, they wanted a clear bottom line.This was the beginning of the end. With Marketing not given a chance to defend, operations with the numbers, it was a tough line to save. Indeed, the TOFC traffic did get slaughtered, and the route up and over Ohio added, at times, days to this schedule. It was a disaster...but no one cared.What TOFC traffic was there (St Louis Trailer Jet and the Manhattan Trailer Jet), dried up when rerouted up and over Ohio and down the Toledo Subdivision back to Cincinnati. Thus ending St. Louis as a viable gateway for intermodal traffic. Only after CSX spent it's money on Conrail are we seeing this begin to change. Plus, as the 80's moved into the 90's CSX was trying to consolidate gateways to the west, at the early part of the 1990's, CSX had four: Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis and New Orleans. Chicago was the one obvious choice, the other was New Orleans. So again, St. Louis was allowed to fizzle out. Add to all of this the changes in global marketing, the slow down of domestic auto sales in the 1980's and the conditions were ripe for abandonment. Rail banking had not become as "vogue" as it is today.So while it is perceived that the line was axed quickly, the operations numbers tell a tale that the line had declined for years (even perhaps as early as the 1960's when the original reroutes took place for the improvements). I am not letting CSX (actually Chessie System) off the hook for it's abandonment, but the numbers were not in the lines favor. There was little local traffic really any place between Chillicothe and Parkersburg (the exception of the Portsmouth Branch at Hamden, which slowly lost traffic to trucks because Chessie started retreating on service), the tough operating conditions east of Parkersburg and the downturn of the economy all lead us toward the result we see.In retrospect, many CSX operations folks do lament on this lines removal. Was it a mistake? Perhaps it was...it's hard to tell. With the change in the eastern rail scene its likely the line could have survived, at least for a while. CSX gained a far better route to St. Louis when buying Conrail, but, as we know the cost was staggering.There is much speculation what will become of the line from St. Louis to Cincinnati. CSX still owns and operates this line, and while it does see traffic, it is not at the same level as years pasts. Rumors fly...we will wait and see.CG Tower
Note - CSX was formed in 1980. At the time this narrative describes Chessie and Seaboard were operating as semi independent entities. I have no doubt the CSX in Richmond had a big say in what took place, despite it being attributed to Chessie.
Thanks for forwarding that piece. That was a good run down and history. As I said before, when planning for the future, a lot of planners and officials base their decisions on what is happening right now. They have a hard time seeing further into the future than 5 or ten years. I think I can answer "CG Tower's" question: "Was it a mistake?" YES! I think it was.
The trouble with these kinds of "mistakes" is they are not fixable. The line is gone.
Two other examples that I can cite are the losses of the Milwaukee Road's line to Puget Sound (a very sad tale) and that of the Rock Island's Golden State line across southeastern Iowa.
I can sympathize with a railroad manager who might want to abandon a long branch serving a few lumber yards of an LP Gas facility that produces at most a couple of loads a week. But unfortunately, that is not the case with these once all-important lines.
FMC
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