Just remember Lithonia - a lot of the comments here and elsewhere are being made by people that never held a locomotive engineer's license. Keep that in mind.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Before there was service planned on this segment who was qualified on the route ? Understood no freight on the line ? Did BNSF ever detour on the route if the the other route was blocked ? Or Amtrak ? Sounds like the blind leading the blind ?
blue streak 1Before there was service planned on this segment who was qualified on the route ? Understood no freight on the line ? Did BNSF ever detour on the route if the the other route was blocked ? Or Amtrak ? Sounds like the blind leading the blind ?
My understanding
Washington DOT had the track upgraded to 79 MPH where possible for their passenger operation. Except for 'training trips' no other trains had been operating at 79 MPH on the line (and I am not so sure that the training trips were done at 79 MPH). Washington DOT also resttriced the times when training trips could be made as the contractors were still working on the line during the same period of time.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Euclid, I was referring to the engineer's comments in his interview with the NTSB panel. Overmod linked it on Pg. 1 of this thread. Perhaps I'll listen to that audio also, and maybe comment on it later.
I agree with Balt that a guy has to be willing to say he's not qualified. But I also feel strongly that Amtrak had no business calling him for that job.
And as I posted, I feel there should be strict FRA rules about what constitutes "qualified." I don't feel anyone with that engineer's level of familiarization should be anywhere near being deemed qualified: on any train, much less a passenger train. Plus, they sent him out with an engine he was unfamiliar with! The whole thing was a disgraceful fiasco.
If the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS.
I'm wondering how much of this all goes back to politicians, rail officials, etc., having promoted a specific start date (complete with ribbon cuttings, media coverage, etc.) they were then resistant to delaying startup.
Wait til the track is done. Wait for PTC. Wait for engineers to be properly trained. So often, because of time pressures, the tail begins to wag the dog.
Wasn't Boeing hot to get their plane on the market? And now I'm reading that the new Acela may not be ready when it's "due." That's backwards: let it be due when it's ready. It's only ready when it's ready.
Lithonia OperatorIf the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS.
The FRA does not have the staffing to do as you suggest - with government being what it is as the present time, the FRA will be lucky to retain the staffing they currently have.
HOS deals with the clock. Qualifications don't.
Questions in trial or at least depositions
1. Who was qualified on the new part of the route at the time of the accident ? That should include any BNSF engineers.
2. Depose all on that list asking them how many times over the route and how long before the accident ?
4. Have any Sound transit engineers gone over the whole route or just to Lakewood ? If so then they disposed also.
5, All === awareness of curve and any other significant problems ?
This is a bit of a difficult topic for me to write about, but after two years of watching people here type in circles, I think it's time I break my silence. I do this with the understanding that some here are going to twist my words to suit their agendas or otherwise split hairs in the meaningless semantics debates that these threads tend to spiral into, but I hope that everyone reading this keeps in mind that this incident has ruined dozens of lives and deeply affected a lot of people. Mistakes were made, and efforts should be made to make sure these errors are never made again. I have a problem with people spinning the incident around for their own entertainment value, though.
I read the transcript, having met the engineer in question before the accident, differently than people seem to do here. In the context of an NTSB report I understand why, but these comments are self-deprecating jokes, rather than admission of incompetence. Most people in the Pacific Northwest are humble spirits, who care but try to keep things light. He was a respected engineer that was trusted with the opening of the new route.
He certainly made a mistake, and owns that in the interview. From the NTSB report, it seems like he knew where he was until he was distracted by a new style of message appearing on the console of a locomotive type he'd never operated, a little over a mile away from the curve on a straight section of track that is largely identical for more than a mile along I-5.
Travelling a mile at 80MPH takes 45 seconds. That's not a lot of time. Figure a few seconds to realize you're not where you thought, then a few more to look for a couple landmarks in the low light of near sunrise, and then... you're at the curve.
Amtrak set him up to fail. Ideally, there were things he could have done to avoid this, but the mistakes are understandable. Human. It's very hard to hire people who never make mistakes, despite the attitudes of some here.
I think this lawsuit is in no way about money. It's about establishing a legal precedent in the case surrounding the accident, pending further suits in what's likely to be a long, drawn-out legal battle.
The railfan community in the Pacific Northwest is very tight. Steve almost certainly knew Jim and Zach, as well as many of the injured on the train. That, I think, should be punishment enough for someone who got into the industry for the love of trains.
We exchanged waves along the Seattle Sub on December 17, 2018, as a large group of us gathered in the greater Steilacoom area to witness what was to be the last runs on the old route.
The train derailed at 7:33 the next morning. I got the first phone call at 7:54.
A very tight community. That was not an easy day.
BaltACD Lithonia Operator Man, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard. It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve? When you are lost - you are lost. The internal fog the engineer was operating in would not permit him to recognize any of the landmarks on the route. Historically, Permanent Slow Signs are place at the start of the restriction. On CSX Temporary Speed Restrictions do have a 'advance warning sign' that is placed 2 miles in advance of the restriction, WHEN SIGNS ARE USED. Not all Temporary Speed Restrictions will have signs displayed. The Train Message that the slow order is issued on will indicate if signs are dispalyed or not. Qualifications, Qualifications, Qualifications - Engineers need to be 'intimately' qualified on the territory they operate over. The Engineer in this instance was not. Being a Engineer you can't 'fake it until you make it', the downside is much too steep as this incident demonstrates.
Lithonia Operator Man, it's painful reading the interview with that poor engineer. I feel bad for the guy. But it does seem like after a certain amount of time looking for MP 18 and not finding it, he should have concluded he might have missed it and begun braking hard. It also seems like the markers were woefully inadequate. What's the point of having a 30 mph sign if it's not positioned such that a train can get from 79 down to 30 before the curve?
When you are lost - you are lost. The internal fog the engineer was operating in would not permit him to recognize any of the landmarks on the route.
Historically, Permanent Slow Signs are place at the start of the restriction. On CSX Temporary Speed Restrictions do have a 'advance warning sign' that is placed 2 miles in advance of the restriction, WHEN SIGNS ARE USED. Not all Temporary Speed Restrictions will have signs displayed. The Train Message that the slow order is issued on will indicate if signs are dispalyed or not.
Qualifications, Qualifications, Qualifications - Engineers need to be 'intimately' qualified on the territory they operate over. The Engineer in this instance was not. Being a Engineer you can't 'fake it until you make it', the downside is much too steep as this incident demonstrates.
I believe the BNSF was using an advance board and a second board at or closer to the restriction. This was also a permanent speed restriction. Although on my territory there are a couple places that don't have permanent boards, it's locations where speeds are under 30 mph to begin with.
The distance between the speed boards and beginning of the restriction vary by railroad. UP standard is 2500 feet. SP was 2 miles and I don't know if all former SP territories have been updated. The speed board design was also different between the two companies.
As to "full service" application. That happens when the equalization is reached between the brake pipe, auxilary reservoir and brake cylinder pressures. Any more reduction at a service rate does not increase braking effort . That point at which equalization happens depends on the intial pressure of the brake pipe. For freight service with the usual 90 psi pressure, that point is about 64 psi. Passenger service is (I believe) usually 110 psi brake pipe pressure. So yes, there is still air in the brake pipe and an emergency application is still possible with a full service application in effect.
Blended braking is a system used on some passenger engines that 'blends' the automatic brake application with a dynamic brake application. I don't know that much about it, but I think when you increase the automatic (air) application, it also increases the dynamic brake effort. I've heard it improves train handling a lot.
Reading the linked Trainwire article and another Trainwire article linked within it, I think that part of the reason of the lawsuit may be for injuries received under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Railroad workers are not covered by Workman's Compensation laws. To recover damages for injuries received, the employee must sue the railroad. To do this, one must show where the railroad was negligent. Damages received would be at what percentage Amtrak was found (if at all) to be negligent. For example, if a jury was to say fault for the incident that caused the injury was 50-50, he might be awarded half of what was asked for.
Jeff
BaltACD Lithonia Operator If the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS. The FRA does not have the staffing to do as you suggest - with government being what it is as the present time, the FRA will be lucky to retain the staffing they currently have. HOS deals with the clock. Qualifications don't.
Lithonia Operator If the FRA specified, and enforced, training standards, then railroads could not pressure employees into making unwise conditions. It would be like HOS.
Here's what the law says about qualifications.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/49/240.231
In the past we have detoured at times over both the Iowa Interstate and Canadian National (exIllinois Central) trackage. We used our own pilots who were qualified over the trackage used. At least once, maybe a couple times, those pilots were qualified after a ride over the line in a high-rail vehicle.
We've used the CN more often. I know a couple of times after you made two trips over the CN, individual engineers and conductors were said to be qualified over the line and didn't need a pilot. In defence of that, the CN trackage used is mostly within view of our own line and the only real grades are to go up and over our own tracks.
NorthWest, thanks for your perspective.
Jeff, thanks for the info.
For those windering about FRA governance, just remember the FRA is headed by a guy that spent his life working in progressively higher levels of railroad management. Form your own conclusions.
NorthWest This is a bit of a difficult topic for me to write about, but after two years of watching people here type in circles, I think it's time I break my silence. I do this with the understanding that some here are going to twist my words to suit their agendas or otherwise split hairs in the meaningless semantics debates that these threads tend to spiral into, but I hope that everyone reading this keeps in mind that this incident has ruined dozens of lives and deeply affected a lot of people. Mistakes were made, and efforts should be made to make sure these errors are never made again. I have a problem with people spinning the incident around for their own entertainment value, though. I read the transcript, having met the engineer in question before the accident, differently than people seem to do here. In the context of an NTSB report I understand why, but these comments are self-deprecating jokes, rather than admission of incompetence. Most people in the Pacific Northwest are humble spirits, who care but try to keep things light. He was a respected engineer that was trusted with the opening of the new route. He certainly made a mistake, and owns that in the interview. From the NTSB report, it seems like he knew where he was until he was distracted by a new style of message appearing on the console of a locomotive type he'd never operated, a little over a mile away from the curve on a straight section of track that is largely identical for more than a mile along I-5. Travelling a mile at 80MPH takes 45 seconds. That's not a lot of time. Figure a few seconds to realize you're not where you thought, then a few more to look for a couple landmarks in the low light of near sunrise, and then... you're at the curve. Amtrak set him up to fail. Ideally, there were things he could have done to avoid this, but the mistakes are understandable. Human. It's very hard to hire people who never make mistakes, despite the attitudes of some here. I think this lawsuit is in no way about money. It's about establishing a legal precedent in the case surrounding the accident, pending further suits in what's likely to be a long, drawn-out legal battle. The railfan community in the Pacific Northwest is very tight. Steve almost certainly knew Jim and Zach, as well as many of the injured on the train. That, I think, should be punishment enough for someone who got into the industry for the love of trains. We exchanged waves along the Seattle Sub on December 17, 2018, as a large group of us gathered in the greater Steilacoom area to witness what was to be the last runs on the old route. The train derailed at 7:33 the next morning. I got the first phone call at 7:54. A very tight community. That was not an easy day.
Well said.
Thank you very much for writing this. It is never easy to talk about the death of friends.
While I am located somewhat northeast of the Pacific Northwest, I too use humour as a way to cope with difficult situations. As do my friends and co-workers. I don't see anything malicious in his answers.
I agree with your views on punishment. Deserved or not, Steve Brown will carry this guilt for the rest of his life.
One small bit to add about braking, on some locomotives when you place the air brakes into emergency the dynamics stop working. Most freight units have been modified to keep (hold) DB when in emergency. I don't know how Amtrak's units are set up, but this could have been the source of the information Steve Brown received about full service blended braking providing the same braking effort as an emergency application.
Zug is spot-on about Batory's background.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Zug, are you suggesting that because Batory has a background in railroad management that he might tend to lean more toward facilitating the railroads' wishes to save money (and thus maximize profits) than he would toward protecting the employees and the public?
That may well be the case. I know very little about the FRA or Mr. Batory. I brought up the FRA only because it seemed to me they that their overseeing training would beat the railroads' policing themselves. Because this accident, and comments Joe has made, make it seem like the roads are grossly deficient in this regard, particularly Amtrak.
However, if Batory is in the pocket of the railroads and the AAR, then clearly I'm barking up the wrong tree.
The NTSB can only make recommendations, right? Am I correct that they have no enforcement powers?
(I am foggy on where the STB fits into all of this.)
Northwest, deep thanks for your comment.
NorthWest I read the transcript, having met the engineer in question before the accident, differently than people seem to do here. In the context of an NTSB report I understand why, but these comments are self-deprecating jokes, rather than admission of incompetence. Most people in the Pacific Northwest are humble spirits, who care but try to keep things light. He was a respected engineer that was trusted with the opening of the new route. He certainly made a mistake, and owns that in the interview. From the NTSB report, it seems like he knew where he was until he was distracted by a new style of message appearing on the console of a locomotive type he'd never operated, a little over a mile away from the curve on a straight section of track that is largely identical for more than a mile along I-5.
I do not interpret the engineer’s comments about, on previous occasions, being sent into areas where he was lost, as being self-deprecating humor. While it is humor, there is nothing self-deprecating about it. He is not mocking himself for not knowing that territory. He is mocking Amtrak for sending him there. And as such, he is dismissing that he had the responsibility to stop when he realized he was lost in those previous situations. But he did not stop. Instead he just soldiered on until the track led him back into familiar territory. He was doing exactly the same thing as he approached the deadly curve with the 30 mph speed restriction.
Lithonia Operator Zug, are you suggesting that because Batory has a background in railroad management that he might tend to lean more toward facilitating the railroads' wishes to save money (and thus maximize profits) than he would toward protecting the employees and the public? That may well be the case. I know very little about the FRA or Mr. Batory. I brought up the FRA only because it seemed to me they that their overseeing training would beat the railroads' policing themselves. Because this accident, and comments Joe has made, make it seem like the roads are grossly deficient in this regard, particularly Amtrak. However, if Batory is in the pocket of the railroads and the AAR, then clearly I'm barking up the wrong tree. The NTSB can only make recommendations, right? Am I correct that they have no enforcement powers? (I am foggy on where the STB fits into all of this.)
The FRA interprets and administers the law. Many things are delegated to the railroads. For example, my Locomotive Engineer's license. It says it's an FRA Certificate, but it's issued by the railroad pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations.
I know of 3 incidents within the last year or two that the FRA seemed to go out of their way to try to relieve the company of as much responsibility as possible. (One involved a weakness in PTC that allowed a train to go through an open switch and derail. It seems everyone with an interest in PTC wants to sweep that one under the rug.) However, I still read our recrew report where a FRA mechanical inspector shows up and starts bad-ordering cars.
So maybe the FRA isn't totally the railroads' lap dog they sometimes seem to be.
Woof
jeffhergertI know of 3 incidents within the last year or two that the FRA seemed to go out of their way to try to relieve the company of as much responsibility as possible. (One involved a weakness in PTC that allowed a train to go through an open switch and derail. It seems everyone with an interest in PTC wants to sweep that one under the rug.) However, I still read our recrew report where a FRA mechanical inspector shows up and starts bad-ordering cars. So maybe the FRA isn't totally the railroads' lap dog they sometimes seem to be. Jeff Woof
The low level inspectors that the FRA sends and State inspectors of the same cast are EXPECTED to create havoc in shopping this and that - the same applies to the FRA track inspection vehicles. That is the window dressing to the 'public' to show that the FRA is doing their job. There is a much different FRA personality at the level of the Board Room,.
I have now read the complete, verbatim interviews with the engineer, the conductor, the conductor-trainee, and two different Amtrak RFEs.
First, I'd like to say that I disagree with Euc that the brief dark-humor remarks by engineer Brown reveal some sort of state of mind, or level of "right/wrong stuff," or undue concern, or incompetence, or lack of confidence. To me it's just dark humor, with a whiff of roll-the-eyes mild frustration with Amtrak. Mainly, to me, it's just wise-cracking. But YMMV.
Several things jumped out at me from those interviews:
The whole process of qualifying an engineer on a territory was/is Keystone Coppish. No set standards. "Qualify" at night, but never once run in the daytime until you're on a revenue run with hundreds of passengers. Familiarization runs wth too many people in the cab. Some qualifying engineers riding the trailing unit, assumedly looking backwards for their "familiarization." And the Final Exam basically consists of this: "Frank, do you feel quailified?" "Yep." (meaning, have I had enough of being up all night in a crowded cab looking backwards?) "Yep, Joe. I feel good." "Excellent, Frank; you're qualified. Congratulations!" If this is typical "familiarization," including on freight roads, God help us all.
The signal awareness form for the Lakewood sub was an "unofficial" one, cobbled together through cut-and-paste using a BNSF one and something inserted by an Amtrak employee. Meaning it could be wrong, and no single entity is taking ownership of it.
A single, unlit, warning about the curve, two miles beforehand, is woefully inadequate.
Poor engineer Brown made a mistake, and will have to live with that. But the NTSB man is correct: Brown was set up for failure. I feel awful for the victims' families; but also for the trainmen involved, particularly Brown.
* * * *
Now let's talk about the NTSB interviews. Yikes. They are characterized by a ton of sentence fragments, pauses, re-phrasing, interruptions, confusion, questions that never really get answered at all, some incorrect uses of railroad terms and English words in general, and in some cases piss-poor overall communications skills (on both sides).
One segment really left me scratching my head. It seems that the interviewee contradicts himself within seconds, and that the interviewer actually (through his own poor communications skills) facilitates there being a misunderstanding. Read the following section. The person being interviewed is the conductor-trainee. To the non-railroaders here; tell me whether you think the question about markers (or not) on intermediate signals gets answered, and thus documented, in a coherent way.
Q. Okay. Now in terms of signals, we have different types of
5 signals out there. And the question I guess is, can you tell me
6 what the difference is between an intermediate signal and an
7 absolute signal or a CP signal, if you're looking at it?
8 A. The intermediate signal, basically it's just a prep. It's
9 kind of giving you -- it's forewarning you what the next signal is
10 going to be. The next signal, as you mentioned, the absolute, is
11 going to be the signal for that block of territory and that's
12 going to be your next governing signal that you have to comply
13 with.
14 Q. Okay. Can you define what the actual physical
15 characteristics are different between an intermediate signal and
16 an absolute signal? How do you determine --
17 A. Repeat your question again.
18 Q. How do you determine if this is an absolutely signal I'm
19 looking at or an intermediate signal I'm looking at?
20 A. Well, the intermediate is -- it typically doesn't have like a
21 -- what's the word I'm looking for -- like a plate or dedicated
22 mile number associated with it.
23 Q. Okay. So did -- are you saying then that the intermediate
24 does not have the number plate, or are you saying it does have the
25 number plate?
Free State Reporting, Inc. (410) 974-0947
1 A. I'm saying typically it does not have one.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. But the governing signal is going to have like the actual
4 mile marker or the adjacent track number to it so you know this is
5 my signal; I got to abide by this.
6 Q. Okay. So the absolute in your -- you're stating then that
7 the absolute signal has the number plate on it; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
Got that? ?????
Finally, I found it really odd that out of all the interviews, this is the one in which the questioners are most adversarial in tone. And this is the one guy (who, although he was potentially a good witness, but really was not) who had absolutely nothing to do with the crash or the factors leading up to up.
IMO, the resulting recommendations of the investigation were probably compromised by poor interviewing and interview-moderating.
Next time I think about riding Amtrak ... aww heck ... I'll just drive. And hope no Amtrak locomotive leaps off of an overpass onto my car.
My view of the qualification procedures used for this new line is that those procedures were a joke.
When Keolis took over the operation of VRE's commuter operations from Amtrak half a decade or more ago. Familiarization trips were done with Keolis engineers for a period of approximately 3 months with one or at most two engineers participating in each trip and those engineers were at the controls of equipment like they would be operating in revenue service. Most of the familiarization was done at nights - after the normal evening VRE runs and before the morning VRE runs. Some familarization runs were coducted on Weekends and Holidays when VRE did not provide service so that the engineers could view the territory in both daylight and dark.
VRE's normal operations have the Engineer operating from a Cab Car on the trips from Fredericksbug/Manassas to DC and operating the locomotive when departing DC to the end terminals. Equipment lays over and is serviced at Fredericksburg and Manassas. Once in DC the equipment lays over at Ivy City between their morning and evening uses, so operating from Union Station to Ivy City and return was also a part of the qualification procedure.
Lithonia Operator First, I'd like to say that I disagree with Euc that the brief dark-humor remarks by engineer Brown reveal some sort of state of mind, or level of "right/wrong stuff," or undue concern, or incompetence, or lack of confidence. To me it's just dark humor, with a whiff of roll-the-eyes mild frustration with Amtrak. Mainly, to me, it's just wise-cracking. But YMMV. A single, unlit, warning about the curve, two miles beforehand, is woefully inadequate.
It is real stretch to dismiss the engineer’s remarks as merely “dark humor,” or “black humor.” It is not even dark humor at all according to the definitions of dark humor because it is not anywhere close to being as strong as the definitions.
Definition of black humor
: humor marked by the use of usually morbid, ironic, grotesquely comic episodes
noun
a form of humor that regards human suffering as absurd rather than pitiable, or that considers human existence as ironic and pointless but somehow comic.
What the engineer was doing was mocking-humor. He was laughing at the stupidity of Amtrak for sending him into territories that he was not familiar with. What that indicates to me is that it never occurs to him that he is responsible for knowing where he is when running a train. He puts that responsibility entirely on his employer. And then he just runs blind and laughs about how stupid Amtrak is for sending him there.
But, in any case, his remarks are merely instructive and not essential to making the case that he did not know the territory on much of the fatal first run. What I posted was not an interview. It was an in-cab recording of his conversation with the conductor. That conversation continued through much of the trip, and much of it was about him not being entirely sure of where he was. In other interviews, he said that everyone, including him, knew about and dreaded that deadly curve. He said they all regarded it as being of the utmost importance because you cannot take it at track speed.
Also, you seem to misunderstand this point:
The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph. He immediately complied with that warning and then headed right into the curve at 79 mph. He never even made an emergency application in the final approach to the curve where any truly qualified person would have visually recognized the actual curve let alone the 30 mph limit sign just ahead of the curve.
There is probably at least 2,000 feet there where anyone knowing the route would have recognized they were approaching the curve, even if they had missed the 2-mile advance warning sign. Besides the visual appearance of the curve itself, there are the distinctive retaining walls and other details. How much speed could he have taken off of that train with 2000 feet of emergency braking?
Euclid 1) It is real stretch to dismiss the engineer’s remarks as merely “dark humor,” or “black humor.” 2) What I posted was not an interview. It was an in-cab recording of his conversation with the conductor. 3) Also, you seem to misunderstand this point: The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph.
1) It is real stretch to dismiss the engineer’s remarks as merely “dark humor,” or “black humor.”
2) What I posted was not an interview. It was an in-cab recording of his conversation with the conductor.
3) Also, you seem to misunderstand this point:
The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph.
1) And I think your interpretation of the conversation is a stretch.
2) I knew that. I never said it was an interview. (I did however, btw, read that audio transcript; but I never referred to it in my post. I also read the notes on the inward-facing camera footage, and saw the freeze-frames accompanying them.)
3) I did not misunderstand that "point." I made no reference whatsoever to the overspeed warning. I agree with you 100% when you state this: "The speed warning the engineer got just before the curve had absolutely nothing to do with the curve and its speed limit. The warning was system generated because he was exceeding the track speed limit of 79 mph by 2 mph." When it comes to the overspeed warning, there is no "point."
The crash happened because Mr. Brown was lost. Not because he briefly went 81 in a 79 zone. Any discussion regarding the overspeed alarm, including by the media and the investigators, falls under the heading of Red Herrings.
I have no idea why Steve Brown got lost. Maybe he had a mini-stroke or something. Maybe he lied about having gotten good rest, but I doubt that. It was a tragic mistake that probably Mr. Brown himself will never understand, much less the rest of us.
Lithonia Operator,
Okay, I see that I misunderstood your reference to the unlit warning. Now I understand that you were referring to the 2-mile warning sign and not the overspeed warning. I agree that something stronger than the 2-mile warning would have maybe saved the day. But the industry tends to draw the line at enough is enough. They expect you to read every sign that comes your way, and no excuses will do. Also, the requirement to "know the territory" should not be underestimated. It does not mean to just be familiar enough to recognise various landmarks and have a feel for the distances, etc. It means to know every inch of it like the back of your hand.
The engineer was watching for the curve and checking mileposts, but got confused in the process. I would tend to conclude that he did not know he was lost until the engine started to tip over. However, I think he was also not competely certain of his location over the last few miles.
I only mentioned that the transcript I refer to was a recorded conversation as a matter of clarification, not to take issure with anything you said about your source of the trip information.
Generally, I think the engineer should have make a stronger effort prior to the trip to learn exactly how to pinpoint the curve, using reliable landmarks. If I were in his position, I would have driven out there a day or two earlier and followed the line, spotting landmarks, etc. I would have taken notes. I still may have not got to perfectly knowing the territory, but I would have been certain to know where that curve was and how to recognize it as I approched it.
I also would not completely absolve Amtrak from blame. They had a duty to train to the point where the engineer did know the territory.
Don't absolve WSDOT - they defined the limited time that Amtrak was allowed for training and set the date for the inaugural trip that ended in tragedy. Amtrak should have fought the limited training time made available to them, but politics is politics and the opening of this line was nothing if not political. WSDOT started the chain of failures that ended in the incident, neither Amtrak nor Engineer Brown performed their duities to prevent the accident from happening.
BaltACD Don't absolve WSDOT - they defined the limited time that Amtrak was allowed for training and set the date for the inaugural trip that ended in tragedy. Amtrak should have fought the limited training time made available to them, but politics is politics and the opening of this line was nothing if not political. WSDOT started the chain of failures that ended in the incident, neither Amtrak nor Engineer Brown performed their duities to prevent the accident from happening.
Totally agree.
Electroliner 1935 BaltACD Don't absolve WSDOT - they defined the limited time that Amtrak was allowed for training and set the date for the inaugural trip that ended in tragedy. Amtrak should have fought the limited training time made available to them, but politics is politics and the opening of this line was nothing if not political. WSDOT started the chain of failures that ended in the incident, neither Amtrak nor Engineer Brown performed their duities to prevent the accident from happening. Totally agree.
Someone refresh our memories. After the MNRR overturn and the Amtrak one did the FRA come up with some rule that if speed reduced by more than a certain value there would need to be additional warnings ?
I would suspect that one rule might be if present speed would cause an overturn at next speed reduction ? ?
Buy four more marker signs: two for northbound, two for southbound. At 1 mile out, and at 1/2 mile out. Maybe go wild and put train-triggered flashing lights on them. Stick them in the ground. Connect a few wires. Done. Then you don't have this accident.
How much would that have cost? How hard would that have been?
How much did being frugal cost?
This was a new stretch for passenger trains and their crews. It's one with the unusual feature of having a high-speed tangent end abruptly at a 30-mph curve.
The Washington DOT and Sound Transit must have been too busy scheduling press conferences and photo-ops with politicians to actually go out and look at their much-ballyhooed new line. Total incompetence. If you don't have a railroad expert, hire one. And wait for the PTC to get done.
It's mind-boggling and maddening that this could happen. A terrible, needless tragedy.
Lithonia OperatorBuy four more marker signs: two for northbound, two for southbound. At 1 mile out, and at 1/2 mile out. Maybe go wild and put train-triggered flashing lights on them. Stick them in the ground. Connect a few wires. Done. Then you don't have this accident. How much would that have cost? How hard would that have been? How much did being frugal cost? This was a new stretch for passenger trains and their crews. It's one with the unusual feature of having a high-speed tangent end abruptly at a 30-mph curve. The Washington DOT and Sound Transit must have been too busy scheduling press conferences and photo-ops with politicians to actually go out and look at their much-ballyhooed new line. Total incompetence. If you don't have a railroad expert, hire one. And wait for the PTC to get done. It's mind-boggling and maddening that this could happen. A terrible, needless tragedy.
In today's railroad world - all signs such as permanent speed restriction signs as well as any advance boards are all made with highly reflectorized materials, that show up as bright as most things that are lit with incandescent light bulbs.
High intensity LED, as used on Emergency Vehicles, from my highway vantage point are MUCH TOO BRIGHT AT NIGHT - they are fine for the day but overkill at night.
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