I have no intent of being dismissive; my point was that it seemed to me unlikely that Gould's transcontinental, built as it was, would be physically able to take large amounts of traffic away from more heavily capitalized and built-out railroads. I do confess that I wish he'd been able to succeed, but I also think that the Reading Combine shouldn't have been quashed (and the B&O not subsequently stuck under PRR control and relatively impoverished, and Morgan's railroad guy not die early, and the Hampden Railroad allowed to operate) so I am not precisely a poster child for the immutability of historic railroad evolution...
Tell me in detail why you think Gould's transcon was pointed at a Canadian system (I presume CP). Would they have been primary competitors for 'land bridge' service from Pacific ports going to Europe? Interesting to consider where things might have gone if ownership of production hadn't been illegalize S for railroads in 1906 and then economic activity depressed in 1907...
Was there ever any real opportunity for the Panhandle to end up as anything other than it did? Looking back through it's history, it seems (with few exceptions) as though the PRR has been the straw that stirred the drink from very early on.
Sure there were myriad entities that started up by building connecting segments, but to my view its hard to envison most of them becoming anything other than what eventually became of them.
BackshopSo WM's Connellsville Extension was the final piece.
It was intended to be - however the construction costs along with the 1907 financial Panic did Gould in.
I might note, that since the B&O and P&LE had the water level grades from Pittsburgh to Connellsville, one on each side of the river - the P&WV had to construct its route on the ridge line. they were forced to build long, high and expensive bridges that ran from ridge top to ridge top spaning the multitudinous streams that made their way to the river.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
So WM's Connellsville Extension was the final piece.
OvermodWhat I remember is that they were considerably further west and south -- not in the Pittsburgh area at all. I would certainly defer to anyone with better memory of that era.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gould_transcontinental_system
SD70DudeWeren't those few miles in the Pittsburgh area?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wabash_Pittsburgh_Terminal_Railway#History
Overmod and that, in fact, he came within a very close number of miles of actually pasting such a line together under his control. I will have to look in sources I no longer have copies of to confirm this, but at least some of the lines in what became the 1931 'incarnation' of the Alphabet Route were a significant Eastern part of that exercise
FWIW, I think that you and I agree on most of the relevant points here, we just have a different perspective on his motive(s).
In addition to what has already been mentioned, I often wonder if this southern routing was part of a strategy intended to replace the Canadian route?
OvermodI didn't think then, and don't think now, that Gould would have had all that much success in 'bleeding' large amounts of regulated traffic from other combinations of carriers with his 'true transcontinental'.
Ever consider that the "transcontinental" could have been used as leverage to distinguish Gould's line from the other trunks running East coast to Chicago? (compared to his competitors who could only offer a "friendly connection")
The PRR went to great lengths to thwart Gould's challenge, personally I doubt they would have gone to the extent that they did if they felt comfortable being as dismissive as you appear to be.
Interesting commparison, both the PRR and NYC routes to St. Louis were not directly owned by the parent company. The Pan Handle route to St. Louis was leased to and operated by PRR and the Big Four route was leased to and operated by NYC.
If the Van Sweringens were able to borrow enough cash to buy the Pan Handle, the collapse of their system after the crash would have probably wound up in court until who knows when.
What I remember is that they were considerably further west and south -- not in the Pittsburgh area at all. I would certainly defer to anyone with better memory of that era.
Keep in mind that the formal 'Alphabet Route' that ran the Alpha Jets is a very different thing.
Overmod ...he wanted a transcontinental route, from the East Coast to the West Coast (not much caring how the line came to be routed across middle America) and that, in fact, he came within a very close number of miles of actually pasting such a line together under his control.
...he wanted a transcontinental route, from the East Coast to the West Coast (not much caring how the line came to be routed across middle America) and that, in fact, he came within a very close number of miles of actually pasting such a line together under his control.
Weren't those few miles in the Pittsburgh area?
The Western Pacific was the perfect example of the inefficiency of Gould's transcontinental ambitions. A new mainline railroad built across largely barren territory at great expense, and it closely paralleled another competing line for much of its distance.
Not so different from the Grand Trunk Pacific, and they both ended up in the same financial abyss.
Greetings from Alberta
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Convicted OneI think it's unmistakable what his primary goal was....he wanted a route from the East coast to Chicago...same as everybody else. He wanted his own trunk.
I've never heard anything in this respect but that he wanted a transcontinental route, from the East Coast to the West Coast (not much caring how the line came to be routed across middle America) and that, in fact, he came within a very close number of miles of actually pasting such a line together under his control.
I will have to look in sources I no longer have copies of to confirm this, but at least some of the lines in what became the 1931 'incarnation' of the Alphabet Route were a significant Eastern part of that exercise.
I didn't think then, and don't think now, that Gould would have had all that much success in 'bleeding' large amounts of regulated traffic from other combinations of carriers with his 'true transcontinental'. If anything it would have accelerated the push toward an 'imperial ICC'. What I suspect he would have accomplished, though, would have been to get other carriers to formalize good full-transcontinental working arrangements to accomplish similar or greater efficiency in through-line operations. Perhaps even facilitate the prospective era of mergers that was supposed to happen in the years after termination of Federal Control in the early '20s...
Backshop I've never understood the Wabash Pittsburgh Terminal name. The Wabash didn't come anywhere close to connecting with it.
I've never understood the Wabash Pittsburgh Terminal name. The Wabash didn't come anywhere close to connecting with it.
Gould acquired control of the W&LE may 1 1901 through a construct called "The Pittsburgh-Toledo Syndicate". Then he bought an unbuilt charter for a Railroad named "The Pittsburgh and Mansfield Railroad" that extended into downtown Pittsburgh...he built it.
Then through a series of wiggles and churns connected the two via an extension to Wheeling at "Pittsburgh junction" Ohio.
BackshopI'm sure the Alpha Route stole some traffic off the NYC and PRR, but a lot more from the B&O. Thoughts?
There is an indepth article about the Alphabet route in the November 1956 issue of Trains magazine, written by Gus Welty. Well written, comprehensive..,. I would reprint it here but we all know where that would get me...
I think the key to understanding the utility of the Alphabet route is to understand what George Gould was trying to accomplish with the WPT.
You hardly ever hear them mentioned in the same context, But Gould, at about the same time built the Wabash 4th district. , combined with the W&LE and the work being done around and beyond Pittsburgh (he also owned Wild Mary at the time)....and I think it's unmistakable what his primary goal was....he wanted a route from the East coast to Chicago...same as everybody else. He wanted his own trunk.
That would have allowed him to bleed traffic from all the extant major players. The fact that he also owned a patchwork of lines extending to the west coast just makes it that much more interesting.
Had not the PRR succeeded in getting Carnegie to reneg on his promises of traffic to Gould's empire, he likely would have succeeded where dear old dad failed. And the Panic of 1907 just compounded those woes.
I think that the Alphabet alliance was more or less an attempt to salvage smoldering embers from that wreckage. YMMV
** edit add: The Trains magazine article referenced above was primarily focused upon the Pittsurgh and West Virginia segment of the Alphabet alliance, but included a wealth of backgound on the bigger picture of which it was a part**
Convicted One BaltACD If the WM route had been superior, Chessie System would have kept it operational Connellsville-Cumberland. It likely would have required some route improvements, I won't argue that. Keep in mind that my POV comes from the frustrated George Gould aspiration to defeat the borg by clawing a competing route out of the landscape from right under their noses......so speed would (acceptably) have to come later
BaltACD If the WM route had been superior, Chessie System would have kept it operational Connellsville-Cumberland.
It likely would have required some route improvements, I won't argue that.
Keep in mind that my POV comes from the frustrated George Gould aspiration to defeat the borg by clawing a competing route out of the landscape from right under their noses......so speed would (acceptably) have to come later
Gould overextended his finances in building the extension from Cumberland to Connellsville and hastened his financial demise because of it. Grand plans take grand monetary footing.
Which brings up another thought...was the Alphabet Route really meant to seriously compete with the NYC and PRR, or mostly just with the B&O? Think about it. The NYC came into the east on the northern end and a mostly flat route. The PRR came in the middle and used brute force to conquer its challenges. The B&O came from the southern edge and had severe grades in WV/MD and a twisting route in the Pittsburgh area. It seems (in hindsight) to have been the low hanging fruit. It never had the money it really needed to overcome its challenges completely. I'm sure the Alpha Route stole some traffic off the NYC and PRR, but a lot more from the B&O. Thoughts?
PS--I always thought that Connellsville was a cool town. I wish that I had seen it in its railroad prime. You had P&LE, B&O, P&WV, WM and even a PRR branch in a very small area.
Convicted One Overmod Can you guys explain in more detail what made acquiring these lines so good for NKP's model of fast bridge freight? My understanding was that neither of these was a particularly fast or well-graded railroad, and that most of the traffic on them would be speed-limited due to coal handling I've always had a closeted fetish for the Wabash Pittsburgh Terminal railroad, so....giving NKP an expanded role in controlling a larger share of what became the Alphabet route has a certain appeal to me. Connellsville is an intriguing gateway. Plus, the Cloverleaf route had a number of operational challenges built into it that the Panhandle route to St Louis would have remedied nicely. All sentimenal reasons, I guess.
Overmod Can you guys explain in more detail what made acquiring these lines so good for NKP's model of fast bridge freight? My understanding was that neither of these was a particularly fast or well-graded railroad, and that most of the traffic on them would be speed-limited due to coal handling
I've always had a closeted fetish for the Wabash Pittsburgh Terminal railroad, so....giving NKP an expanded role in controlling a larger share of what became the Alphabet route has a certain appeal to me. Connellsville is an intriguing gateway.
Plus, the Cloverleaf route had a number of operational challenges built into it that the Panhandle route to St Louis would have remedied nicely.
All sentimenal reasons, I guess.
WM had its own operating issues East of Connellsville, upholding its part of the Alphabet Route. If the WM route had been superior, Chessie System would have kept it operational Connellsville-Cumberland.
OvermodCan you guys explain in more detail what made acquiring these lines so good for NKP's model of fast bridge freight? My understanding was that neither of these was a particularly fast or well-graded railroad, and that most of the traffic on them would be speed-limited due to coal handling
BackshopMy original post was in response to CSSHegewisch's post. Being a Chicago native, he mainly mentioned the "Panhandle" line that came up to Chicago. I was merely pointing out that the main part of the Panhandle continued west to St Louis.
I, too, was much more concerned with the part of the Panhandle that went via Columbus to St. Louis. Although if I remember correctly the 'upper' part to Chicago was one of the better lines servicing Indianapolis, which for many years now hasn't had a good passenger route to Chicago.
He also said that Pittsburgh wasn't a friendly eastern interchange point. I replied that if it was available that the NKP might have absorbed the W&LE and P&WV sooner to move the interchange further east.
That is certainly true, but I suspect that in a practical sense the slow traffic on those roads would still contribute the same 'lack of friendliness' involved in transiting the actual Pittsburgh bottlenecks. The P&WV is notorious for building perhaps the last 'slow' Berk-and-a-half 2-6-6-4s following the old Super-Power conventions; to my knowledge they never went to a more modern design. This could of course quite easily have been addressed under van Sweringen control, in ways that would Quite Definitively Use Six-Coupled Articulated Power Better Than C&O (ahem, ahem) if the physical plant and operations of the route permitted that. The only real thing I'm questioning is the extent to which that could cost-effectively have been done...
And so we come to
they weren't all Van Sweringen roads but they were all Alphabet Route ones.
which is almost as important a qualifier as you'd need to establish that, at least at some point, they were 'as fast as they needed to be' for precisely the kind of bridge service I had in mind (which in my understanding was something the Alphabet Route could provide, even if on a somewhat traffic-limited basis), and at least technically if operated with AMC steam power on an "AMC-compliant" part of that route, long before pooled diesel power could produce significant run-through timings and efficiency...
My original post was in response to CSSHegewisch's post. Being a Chicago native, he mainly mentioned the "Panhandle" line that came up to Chicago. I was merely pointing out that the main part of the Panhandle continued west to St Louis. He also said that Pittsburgh wasn't a friendly eastern interchange point. I replied that if it was available that the NKP might have absorbed the W&LE and P&WV sooner to move the interchange further east. They weren't all Van Swearingen roads but they were all Alphabet Route ones.
Convicted One Backshop It would give them a better line to St Louis and maybe give the NKP impetus to buy the W&LE/P&WV sooner to provide interchange at Connellsville, PA. That's the best proposal I've read here yet.
Backshop It would give them a better line to St Louis and maybe give the NKP impetus to buy the W&LE/P&WV sooner to provide interchange at Connellsville, PA.
That's the best proposal I've read here yet.
Can you guys explain in more detail what made acquiring these lines so good for NKP's model of fast bridge freight? My understanding was that neither of these was a particularly fast or well-graded railroad, and that most of the traffic on them would be speed-limited due to coal handling.
Now, what WOULD be interesting would be the sequel if the van Sweringens were to acquire the Panhandle going to St. Louis in connection with the 'fifth system' proposal that would have linked Truesdale's improved DL&W with the Nickel Plate. Would connection through Connellsville then have been desirable to facilitate high-speed bridge service from the St. Louis gateway through to New Jersey?
Convicted OneSounds like it might be worth a "think". But I've become very weary of the traditional hustle ... Perhaps tear a page from the professional sports arena playbook? Let the taxpayers commit to building the "stadiums" (stations in this instance) only after hard commitment from the private end of the partnership to build the track, install and staff the trains, and run the business?
In a sense this is precisely what the Sam Rea line project would have required (from Philadelphia and Pittsburgh for a start) as it would have dramatically bypassed the existing stations in those cities.
I don't think PRR considered this a 'response' to the Chicago-New York Air Line Railway sort of proposal, but in more than a few ways it could be considered comparable.
I don't know if the overall "New York to Chicago" improvement project at PRR ever acquired a formal name -- I first came across it as the 'New Main Line' project as a priority during the New Era that began in the middle Twenties and ended, fairly conclusively as it turned out, after the stock-market crash turned into the Depression. (There was plenty of Federal money for political electrification, but little for better speed west of Harrisburg, as things developed...)
Up to about WW1 I have the impression PRR's heroic development of civil engineering, culminating in the famous 6-track main across New Jersey, was more directed at coexistence of freight and passenger, with freight being 50mph operated on as low a grade profile as possible. We might take the Atglen and Susquehanna as a model: this cost enormous amounts for a relatively low-speed railroad that would have been hellishly expensive to run with non-tilting passenger equipment.
You'd have seen a fairly dramatic cutoff 'somewhere' north and east of Philadelphia, possibly even above Trenton station (just west/south of which was where the A&S formally separated at Morrisville, with the station being too close to the Delaware to admit of an easy leaving curve after the station), and then heavy grading and grade separation to meet the existing ROW for the circa 1923 'Sam Rea' projected line across central Pennsylvania considerably north of the existing main. Think of this as facilitating both New York and Philadelphia trains but not Philadelphia as a 'way station' in the sense that North Philadelphia was for long-distance trains; it might be interesting to see how some high-speed service to Washington could be routed if not over the old Northern Central or (electrified) via Havre de Grace on the irretrievably curving river route down from Harrisburg. Perhaps the upcoming book about the PRR-B&O rivalry that ended so poorly for the PRR may explain what would have been needed for 'better competition' in the latter Fifties...
Not only did the 1923 line run considerably north of 'anything regarding Pittsburgh', it's not immediately clear to me there was any prospective high-speed connecting line route in the general vicinity of Pittsburgh or its higher-end suburbs that would permit connection. This doesn't imply there would be no connections from Pittsburgh to the west using the then-existing older PRR, or that routing north and west from Pittsburgh explicitly for high speed couldn't be developed ... only that no compensation either for the delays of the old Middle Division etc. or traffic congestion in the general Pittsburgh area would be necessary for true high-speed long-distance trains, either passenger or manifest/containerized freight. (In this connection we might gainfully note that providing post-TrucTrain stack clearance in the Sam Rea Line tunnels and their prospective equivalents to east and west might be a highly interesting exercise, probably involving full undercutting and perhaps, by that time, something like Class 9 slab track with top-down surfacing in them ... but seriously orders of magnitude less cost than building new "HSR" of even limited 110mph speed)
There was some discussion, but I'm not sure in how much detail, of the prospective lines and connections west of the Pennsylvania/Ohio line. Heavy grading would probably have to continue for some distance into Ohio, and the route taken would have to thread carefully between industrial areas and cross other railroads at reasonably good skew angles. I leave it entirely up to the west-end experts to decide what arrangements would have been best from Indiana up to the Chicago terminal area, both for passenger and the upgraded container/trailer equivalent of M&E.
To the extent either Philadelphia or Pittsburgh wanted high-speed connections, they'd have to arrange for a satellite station, probably with at least some kind of high-speed regional service that could meet the high-speed trains (and possibly interchange Pullmans or other cars with them on an expedited basis). Whether there was that kind of money or demand running around then, or later, is a question PRR would not have been in the position of answering directly...
Overmod Isn't at least some part of the Panhandle essential in reaching St. Louis with high-speed passenger traffic? I'd have to wonder how greatly a continuation of the prospective Sam Rea line for true high-speed passenger traffic would likely have directly followed the Fort Wayne line route, and might have become more 'thinkable' as a priority in the absence of an established alternative.
Isn't at least some part of the Panhandle essential in reaching St. Louis with high-speed passenger traffic?
I'd have to wonder how greatly a continuation of the prospective Sam Rea line for true high-speed passenger traffic would likely have directly followed the Fort Wayne line route, and might have become more 'thinkable' as a priority in the absence of an established alternative.
Some of these RoWs still exist in various forms. They could be revived for Northeast to Midwest HSR. Which is the Sam Rea route?
BackshopIt would give them a better line to St Louis and maybe give the NKP impetous to buy the W&LE/P&WV sooner to provide interchange at Connellsville, PA.
Flintlock76Wouldn't work. Taxpayers, most of them anyway, aren't train-crazed in the same way they're sports-crazed. Train stations are a hard sell compared to a stadium.
Awe c'mon Flintlock!
How about if we throw in a few buzzwords such as "catalytic" and "transformative"? Maybe even concoct projections of what "could" happen to property values all around these stations that are so insanely optimistic that even Pinocchio wouldn't touch them?
Then we drag out the heavy artillery, and propose that they create a TIF to harvest these "pie in the sky" possibilities? Once the town councils start mulling over all that future revenue waiting for them to spend, I'm sure they will jump on board.
This is happening all around me right now on several fronts to the extent that I'm starting to suspect even our local newspaper has a vested interest.
CSSHEGEWISCH From a geographical point of view, I'm not sure how the Pan Handle would have fit with the rest of the Van Sweringen lines (C&O, PM, NKP, Erie). The Pittsburgh-St. Louis line would have an awkward eastern terminal at Pittsburgh and C&O already had a Chicago-Cincinnati line.
From a geographical point of view, I'm not sure how the Pan Handle would have fit with the rest of the Van Sweringen lines (C&O, PM, NKP, Erie). The Pittsburgh-St. Louis line would have an awkward eastern terminal at Pittsburgh and C&O already had a Chicago-Cincinnati line.
Wouldn't work. Taxpayers, most of them anyway, aren't train-crazed in the same way they're sports-crazed. Train stations are a hard sell compared to a stadium.
I'm not one of the sports crazies by the way. I could care less, most of the time.
OvermodI'd have to wonder how greatly a continuation of the prospective Sam Rea line for true high-speed passenger traffic would likely have directly followed the Fort Wayne line route, and might have become more 'thinkable' as a priority in the absence of an established alternative.
Sounds like it might be worth a "think". But I've become very weary of the traditional hustle, where private equity advances a few tens of thousands of dollars to produce artist renderings depicting inspiring but economically unrealistic ideas that likely will never be built, but offered in exchange for taxpayer commitments in the tens and hundreds of millions of dollars.
Why don't we take an alternate approach? Perhaps tear a page from the professional sports arena playbook? Let the taxpayers commit to building the "stadiums" (stations in this instance) only after hard commitment from the private end of the partnership to build the track, install and staff the trains, and run the business?
Of course operating space at the stations themselves would be leased to the operators as tenants, thus assuring the local bond holders their due return.
I might go for something like that.
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