If the Wall St. Jourtnal is tobe believed, there is a serious problem with street drug use among Amtrak employees. In the case of these fatalities, small amounts of cocaine were found on one and cocaine plus meth on the other--not enough to be high but enough to impair judgement and reaction time. In any case, it's still a tragedy to have serious injury or loss of life.
Lithonia OperatorAnyone who would make such an unwise decision is not going to be dissuaded by a rule. No one was watching. This is about safety and common sense, not rules compliance.
It is the rules that define the unwise decision. Sure rules are often broken, but to conclude that a person will not follow a rule because he basically a bad person is way too judgmental. Railroads have rules about everything. The rules define the behavior. The rules in this case did not prohibit them from walking on the track. You say it was too dangerous and should have been guided by common sense. What about walking across a track? Is that too dangerous? Common sense would say of course it is. People get killed all the time when crossing tracks.
There are rules that govern walking on live track. The one rule is to always expect a train, look for trains, etc. I believe those rules have been proven by a lot of past experience to not work in the odd type of distraction that played out in this accident. So yes, you can say the conductors violated a rule. But when you have a rule like this that seems to not work in a long pattern of a particular type of accident, it is time to look for a better rule. The real rule that is needed is the rule requiring formal protection for people working on the ground in close proximity to live track. That is exactly what the NTSB concluded.
I don’t see any HARM in such a rule, but I think it would be meaningless.
It is not against the law to go out on I-95 and step into the path of a speeding Mack truck. But most people realize that’s a bad idea.
And understand this. I am not a knee-jerk anti-regulations kind of guy. Politically I am a pretty hard-core liberal. I think a LOT of things ought to be regulated more.
I am not opposed to such a rule. But do I think it would have made a difference in this case? No.
Was lack of said rule a “cause” of the accident? No.
It was a terrible, sad tragedy.
Just because other employees routinely did this same unsafe thing doesn’t make it anything other than unsafe.
Anyone who would make such an unwise decision is not going to be dissuaded by a rule. No one was watching. This is about safety and common sense, not rules compliance.
Sure, they can enact such a rule. And next time this happens they can fire the dead guys ...
Lithonia OperatorThey were not required to walk on Amtrak’s track.
They were not required not to. They walked up from a long ways back, and we don't know where they walked or what guided their decisions. We only know they were on the Amtrak track when then were hit. The NTSB said people have told them they prefer to walk on track rather than on ballast. In this case, I wonder why the sloped concrete ties would be preferable to walking on ballast. I would think the sloped ties would be very annoying to walk on.
In any case, what ultimately caused their deaths was hearing the horns of #66 and #175 which blended together and sounded like the horn of just one train. They were watching #66 approaching from their front, and they assumed the horn sound they were hearing was coming only from #66. So while, they obviously had to hear the horn of #175, they thought it was from #66. If they had their head on a swivel, as they say, the swivel was facing the wrong direction during the 10 seconds they had to turn and spot #175 behind them.
It was definitely dangerous. For this very reason of two trains approaching, a double track is not just twice as dangerous as a single track. A double track is probably 1000 times more dangerous than a single track.
They were required to inspect their train. They were not required to walk on Amtrak’s track. And they could have minimized their time on the bad side. If they had returned on the safe side, nothing bad would have happened.
I also don’t understand why they didn’t ask Amtrak what was due by soon. They probably could have determined what was a safe window of time to be on the bad side.
BaltACD 243129 BaltACD To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not. You are wrong. Those rules are most certainly taught to T&E personnel on Amtrak. I have no knowledge of what Amtrak teaches - and don't claim to have. How many CSX Rules classes have you attended?
243129 BaltACD To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not. You are wrong. Those rules are most certainly taught to T&E personnel on Amtrak.
BaltACD To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not.
You are wrong. Those rules are most certainly taught to T&E personnel on Amtrak.
I have no knowledge of what Amtrak teaches - and don't claim to have. How many CSX Rules classes have you attended?
Interesting, but not suprising, that he didn't answer your question. Using Mr numbers "logic" in another thread, he has never taken a CSX rules class.
An "expensive model collector"
From the rules:
140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher.
I don't see anything in the rules that says foul time was required. Without that requirement, the procedure used by the employees was entirely approved and made necessary by CSX.
Inexperience, poor vetting, poor training and poorer supervision are the root causes of this avoidable tragedy.
BaltACD 243129 It is quite obvious that you have no knowledge of what Amtrak teaches and you did claim to have said knowledge as is evidenced in your reply to tree 68 which I shall post below. You are reading things that were never stated - I am stating my experience - experience dating from the B&O in 1965 and the successor corporate identities of the same. Amtrak has never been a B&O descendent organization, despite haing selected some B&O equipment when they formed and equipped Amtrak. From Amtrak's accident record it appears that a number of Amtrak employee showed up for their 'Rules Classes' in body only, their mind was somewhere else.
243129 It is quite obvious that you have no knowledge of what Amtrak teaches and you did claim to have said knowledge as is evidenced in your reply to tree 68 which I shall post below.
It is quite obvious that you have no knowledge of what Amtrak teaches and you did claim to have said knowledge as is evidenced in your reply to tree 68 which I shall post below.
You are reading things that were never stated - I am stating my experience - experience dating from the B&O in 1965 and the successor corporate identities of the same. Amtrak has never been a B&O descendent organization, despite haing selected some B&O equipment when they formed and equipped Amtrak. From Amtrak's accident record it appears that a number of Amtrak employee showed up for their 'Rules Classes' in body only, their mind was somewhere else.
"I have no knowledge of what Amtrak teaches - and don't claim to have. How many CSX Rules classes have you attended?"
For easy reference.
243129 BaltACD tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not. "Just that it is not" seems to indicate that you purport to have knowledge of Amtrak rules. You do not and you have disappointed your cheerleader.
BaltACD tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not.
tree68 NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation: V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track. Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition. I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC. In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track: 140. Foul Time Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher. A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track. B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information: 1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time 2. Track designation 3. Track limits (between/at) 4. Time limits The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective. C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed. NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018
V. Fouling Tracks Fouling a track may be necessary in the performance of railroad work. Employees must expect the movement of trains, locomotives, or other on-track equipment at any time, on any track, in either direction. Employees must maintain a vigilant lookout for and detect the approach of a train, locomotive or other railroad equipment moving in either direction. Proper safeguards for the job classification needing protection must be in place before fouling any track.
Direct copy and paste from NORAC, 11th Edition.
I have no reason to doubt that CSX has the same, or a very similar, rule. Amtrak uses NORAC.
In addition, there are specific rules about fouling track:
A. Action Required Prior to Issuance Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track.
B. Permission to Foul Permission to foul the track must include the following information:
1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time
2. Track designation
3. Track limits (between/at)
4. Time limits
The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective.
C. Releasing Foul Time Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The employee who was granted Foul Time must not release the Foul Time until they have ensured that all fouling activity under their authority has been cleared. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed.
NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018
To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not.
"Just that it is not" seems to indicate that you purport to have knowledge of Amtrak rules. You do not and you have disappointed your cheerleader.
You say "those rules" which are in direct reference tree 68's post which contains the NORAC 11th Edition – February 1, 2018 rules and you are now trying to say that you are referring to B&O rules??? Nice try at damage control.
Lithonia OperatorNo rule could have prevented this.
Why not?
Lithonia Operator I don’t understand why both employees were in the “Amtrak side” of their train. Assumedly, one would have been on the safe side, as the train needs to inspected from both sides.
I don’t understand why both employees were in the “Amtrak side” of their train. Assumedly, one would have been on the safe side, as the train needs to inspected from both sides.
They should have been looking back often enough to spot a train from behind. We don't know how often they looked back, but they only had about 10 seconds to spot a train from behind. They first spotted a train from ahead, and likely became distracted by it and forgot to look back. Both trains blew their horns continuously, which rendered their warnings meaningless.
I don’t understand why both employees were on the “Amtrak side” of their train. Assumedly, one would have been on the safe side, as the train needs to inspected from both sides. When I worked on GARR, all cars, IIRC, could be crossed using a small end platform and a grab rail. (I did this even on moving cuts in the yard, even though, as a clerk, I’m sure I was not supposed to ... ) The men were killed after inspecting the train. I don’t get why the danger-side guy didn’t cross over to the safe side for the walk back to the engine. Instead, it seems the opposite happened, with the safe-side man coming over to the danger side. ??? Maybe the conductor was on the bad side, but asked the trainee to cross over so he could show him something. Then they inexplicably headed forward on the bad side. They could have crossed back over.
No rule could have prevented this. Two knowledgeable railroaders chose to walk on the track of a foreign road. Facing AWAY from the direction of potential arriving trains. On a road with the fastest and quietest trains in the US. If at least the safe-side guy had chosen to stay there, we‘d have one less death. And maybe two, because being on the same side, they were likely talking to each other, yet another distraction.
Two men who made this blatantly unsafe choice would not have done differently because there was a rule against it! Come on.
I feel bad for their family and friends. But this was a tragic accident borne of a really poor, unsafe decision, by people who had to know better. Sadly, they were careless.
God rest their souls.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
.
DeggestyA good response, Balt.
No it wasn't.....johnny.
Johnny
BaltACDTo my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not.
There is NO significant space between the CSX tracks and the Amtrak tracks. If you look at Google maps, the distance beween the four tracks is almost like one single ROW.
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ivy+City,+Washington,+DC/@38.9156411,-76.9867391,138m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x89b7b8126c07cae5:0x711b522293746c5c!8m2!3d38.9147513!4d-76.9859077
There is NO safe space between the CSX equipment and a train on Amtrak. The men were sent into harms way and should have been asked to do so without protection which CSX did not arrange. On the old spacing of double tracks, does any railroad expect employees to be between train tracks that are in service? I don't think so.
Overmod tree68 ... anything within four feet of the field side of the rail is the "kill zone." Stay out of those areas and you won't have any problems. With respect, on a high-speed main line like this, that's inadequate.
tree68 ... anything within four feet of the field side of the rail is the "kill zone." Stay out of those areas and you won't have any problems.
With respect, on a high-speed main line like this, that's inadequate.
Oh, absolutely! I've see stuff hanging off the sides of freight trains that reached out further than that, and I agree about the "breeze."
The four feet is a sort of rule of thumb - applicable at low speeds as well. For a quick check, reach your arm straight out toward the rail. If your fingertips are over the rail, you're too close.
The point is that you have about a 12+ foot window within which you are fouling the track...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I do think there is something to the 'enhanced clearance of all tracks upon detection of a train', although not quite in the sense I think Euclid means it (which would be applicable to MOW personnel, but not necessarily to the two conductors in the present example who would have had to go all the way to the outside of their train, and beyond, to comply). I'd suggest, as a kind of 'first cut', that the rule be strict use of vigilance in all directions when any train is seen to be approaching, no matter how tired or distracted or irritated the people in question might be.
I think a number of us are familiar with the video taken at Harpers Ferry of a very, very near miss where fans were watching a train coming one way, I believe through the tunnel, while another was fast approaching them from behind.
Are there formal approaches in other fields, perhaps aerial gunnery, to recognize and avoid 'target fixation' when it crops up? Those might be useful to railroad employees and fans alike...
In my opinion, the mechanics of requesting and enforcing 'foul time' in the Ivy City accident wouldn't have worked well. Either the enforcement would have to be requested at the time the conductors started to walk the train ... with the conductors waiting until their dispatcher had confirmed with Amtrak not only that trains were being diverted but that any existing trains would be allowed to pass first ... or they would have had to implement the procedure when close to the head end, and wait the whole time instead of just walking the few cars to get to the visible head end -- which would in part have required them to stop and wait for both 175 and 66 as those were beyond 'diversion' at that point. That might be justified as the 'safe course' to follow ... but proper vigilance, and perhaps 'crossing over' when fouling a suspected live track became expedient, is a better still safe course and requires no multistep procedure that might not be fully effective at preventing a lethal surprise.
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EuclidI don’t follow you.
And you probably never will, no matter how I try to explain things. You have your mind made up.
What I believe I am seeing here is a repeat of something you've done many times before - believing that anyone but the parties whose actions resulted in an incident is guilty of something.
We've established without question that the crew was walking on Amtrak's ROW. There may be nothing prohibiting same, but they weren't walking on a little-used siding, they were walking on a mainline with likely train speeds in excess of 80 MPH.
We've established that they were not paying attention to their surroundings based on statements by the engineers that they never looked toward the oncoming train.
We'll never know why they were walking on the Amtrak ROW. I believe I've seen it opined that the footing was better. However, it appears to me via satellite images that there is sufficient room for a person to walk alongside a train on the CSX ROW without fouling the Amtrak ROW.
EuclidThe point of that rule is that if a person is walking on one of those tracks, and sees a train approaching on another one of the tracks, he must stand clear of the track he walking on even though he may assume that no trains are approaching on it.
An even more effective rule would be to not walk on an active track unless you have some form of protection. In practice, it's bad form to walk within the guage. And anything within four feet of the field side of the rail is the "kill zone." Stay out of those areas and you won't have any problems. Most railroaders know this. Occasionally, a lapse of memory occurs, and this type of incident results.
This is why Chicago area commuter stations have signs that light up to tell passengers on the platforms that there is another train coming.
tree68 Euclid Any time a train passes on a multiple track main line, employees on the ground must stand clear of all tracks of the main line track group. That's pretty much covered by the rule that says employees must inspect passing trains.
Euclid Any time a train passes on a multiple track main line, employees on the ground must stand clear of all tracks of the main line track group.
That's pretty much covered by the rule that says employees must inspect passing trains.
I don’t follow you. How does the roll-by train inspection rule provide the same protection as the rule I am suggesting? Just to be clear, the rule I am suggesting is not intended to require a person to stand clear of the train he sees approaching. It is intended to require a person to stand clear of all tracks of a multiple track mainline any time a train approaches on any of them.
The point of that rule is that if a person is walking on one of those tracks, and sees a train approaching on another one of the tracks, he must stand clear of the track he walking on even though he may assume that no trains are approaching on it.
The nature of this type of accident is that a person sees one train approaching, focuses attention on it, and does hear a second train approaching from behind on the track he is walking on. The reason he does not hear the second train is that his hearing has been rendered useless by the sound of the first train.
So the person loses the benefit of hearing at the last moments, and can easily overlook the fact that he has lost the benefit of hearing. This is especially the case since he has not actually lost hearing. Anyone would instantly recognize that problem. But in this case, the person loses the audio ability to distinguish one train from a second train. This is very likely to go unnoticed, and there are only seconds available to notice it.
Head on a swivel and expecting trains are likely to be completely effective for spotting the first train, but they tend to be rendered much less effective for spotting the second train due to the distraction of the first train. Therefore, it is always the second train that poses the main danger.
So it is not so much a matter of following rules to expect trains as it is a matter of falling into a very unique trap. And understanding or anticipating that trap has not been very effective. So the rule I am suggesting gets completely around the trap. It is easy to remember and to enforce a rule to stand clear of all tracks in the mainline group on approach of a train on any of those tracks. And if you do that, you will avoid the trap even if you are not aware of it.
EuclidAny time a train passes on a multiple track main line, employees on the ground must stand clear of all tracks of the main line track group.
That's pretty much covered by the rule that says employees must inspect passing trains. That gets grey when it's not your railroad, but the concept remains.
But you've left out the "and then a miracle occurs" step - how does a crew member know to step aside and stand clear of the tracks?
Simple answer - always expect a train, from either direction. Keep your head on a swivel. MOW crews have at least one person for whom that is their sole job.
I have little doubt that the crew in question was very aware of the speeds on the Amtrak line - which should have had their "spidey senses" on high alert. Based on what the engineers said, they did not.
tree68NORAC already has a rule in place that would apply in this situation:
The point is that an employee can have the responsible attention to “always” expect trains and be watching for them, but “head on a swivel” means that a person watching for an expected train is not humanly able to watch “always.” There are thousands of little things that can intrude on a person’s attention and thought process, and distract them.
In this case, a momentary distraction of just 5-10 seconds made the difference between life and death. I think that is way too much risk to rely on head swivels and expecting trains. History is full of accidents involving double track and persons watching one train while getting struck by the other. It is more than just failing to see a train in time. It is a complex drama involving audio illusion and the first train distracting from the second train. And it only strikes on rare occasions when the timing is just right, so many are unprepared for it. That danger would be directly nullified by this rule:
Any time a train passes on a multiple track main line, employees on the ground must stand clear of all tracks of the main line track group.
In this type of accident, it is the first train to be seen that distracts a person from the second train. So a person needs to be indoctrinated with the practice of clearing all of the tracks instantly upon seeing the first train.
The crew could have asked for protection, but it was only their option to do so. Nothing required them to do so. This is different than foul time in which MoW workers must have protection. Even the NTSB called for a new rule requiring train crews to be granted protection for work such as that being done at Ivy City.
I believe that a new rule making protection mandatory instead of optional would eliminate the danger of getting struck, but it would require a company organization capable of efficiently executing the protection. In the meantime, the rule I suggest above only has to be added to the list of rules to save lives while the system of formal protection is being developed.
tree68 BaltACD To my knowledge - those rules are taught to MofW personnel, not T&E personnel. Not saying that it shouldn't be taught to T&E - just that it is not. There's nothing in the rule or any surrounding text that indicates it's for MOW only. Regardless, operating personnel would need to be aware of the rule so they can comply from their standpoint. And Rule V (vee) clearly applies to ALL personnel.
There's nothing in the rule or any surrounding text that indicates it's for MOW only. Regardless, operating personnel would need to be aware of the rule so they can comply from their standpoint. And Rule V (vee) clearly applies to ALL personnel.
Yes all rules in the book apply to everybody. However, there are yearly 'Rules Classes' where certain rules are emphasized for each craft of employee. The Rules Classes are held by craft, not for combined crafts. Dispatcher Rules Classes are attended by Dispatchers. T&E Rules classes are attended ty T&E employees. MofW Rules classes are attended by MofW employees. Employees are most observant of rules that are emphasized in Rules Classes; those rules are emphasized because they have been documented as the ones that 'most severly' affect the employees in their normal duties.
For several years on CSX the T&E Rules Classes were not 'face to face' affairs. The Rules Classes were done 'On the Pod'. The Pod was a 'classroom' set up with a number of computers. There were a number of 'show, tell and test' computer applications that were developed to cover the rules and actions that the company wanted to 'emphasize' to the employees. T&E employees could go to the 'Pod' when it was conviente for themselves to discharge the 'Rules Test Requirement. I believe, but don't know, the FRA stepped in because the Pod 'requirements' set up a murkey Hours of Service situations.
With face to face Rules Classes, employees are required to be FRA 'rested' to attend and must be FRA 'rested' to return to service after the Rules Classes. Rules Classes are normally 8 hour affairs. Employees are compensated for attending Rules Classes.
When this incident happend the Dispatchers had been relocated to Jacksonville. In reading through the documentation of the incident the Dispatchers names were mentioned - they were the same Dispatchers that held those positions when the office was in Baltimore.
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