The BNSF derailment at Doon, Iowa

[tree68]

charlie hebdo

There seems to be a tendency to say the neither the railroad nor engineer should have slowed down in the impacted area (exercised caution) because no one knew that the subgrade was weakened. 

I took the liberty of slightly modifying your post.  

Because that seems to be one of the assumptions being made - that the roadbed was in some way weakened, and we don't know that anyone considered that a possibility.

Hindsight being 20-20, it does appear that said weakened roadbed was a factor.  But even the quotes in the media are presented as opinion.

Given the nature of rivers on the plains, I'm guessing that this was hardly the first time such conditions have existed.  Which leads one to the possibility that even if the railroad knew the water was high, they may not have considered it a problem.  If the engineer was an old head, he may well have gone over the same track under similar conditions many times before, without incident.

So far, there's been no indication that there were any communications indicating a known problem, written or radio.

[Euclid]

tree68

 

charlie hebdo

There seems to be a tendency to say the neither the railroad nor engineer should have slowed down in the impacted area (exercised caution) because no one knew that the subgrade was weakened. 

 

 

I took the liberty of slightly modifying your post.  

Because that seems to be one of the assumptions being made - that the roadbed was in some way weakened, and we don't know that anyone considered that a possibility.

Hindsight being 20-20, it does appear that said weakened roadbed was a factor.  But even the quotes in the media are presented as opinion.

Given the nature of rivers on the plains, I'm guessing that this was hardly the first time such conditions have existed.  Which leads one to the possibility that even if the railroad knew the water was high, they may not have considered it a problem.  If the engineer was an old head, he may well have gone over the same track under similar conditions many times before, without incident.

So far, there's been no indication that there were any communications indicating a known problem, written or radio.

 

GCOR

6.21 Precautions Against Unusual Conditions Protect trains and engines against any known condition that may interfere with their safety. When conditions restrict visibility, regulate speed to ensure that crew members can observe and comply with signal indications. In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. Advise the train dispatcher of such conditions by the first available means of communication.

****************************************************

 

Notice that it does not require anyone to know about a problem as a condition of complying with the instructions to be prepared to stop.  All it requires is to see unusually high water.  

[tree68]

Euclid

All if requires is to see unusually high water. 

Was this unusually high water for this area?

[Euclid]

tree68

 

Euclid

All if requires is to see unusually high water. 

 

 

Was this unusually high water for this area?

 

The rule does not say that the unusually high water has to be unusually high for the area that it occurs.  Rivers rise and fall every year.  Often times they rise high enough to be called a flood.  Nobody would say a high water flood is not a flood because the water rises every year to some extent.  The rule does not split hairs over the general understanding of what unusually high water means. 

[tree68]

Further - we do not know that the engineer wasn't trying to bring his speed down.  He would have had virtually no visual warning of the high water, especially in the dark.  You can't reduce the speed of a loaded oil train from 45 MPH to walking speed in the quarter mile range his headlight would have provided.

As I noted before, the hydrological charts (which do not include a guage on the Little Rock River, where the derailment occurred) show a very rapid rise and fall - three to four feet over less than 12 hours both up and down.  A track inspector travelling the line the previous day very possibly would not have seen any reason for special measures.

[Euclid]

One news article mentions that some officials have speculated that floodwaters eroded soil beneath the track.  That might produce a hazard that would not be visible upon approach at first in its very early stage.  So even approaching at speed low enough to stop short would not prevent encountering the hazard.  But as this type of erosion continues somewhat, it will quickly grow large enough to be felt by the crew as the engine passes over it.  With the likely continuing flow, the erosion would have soon been able to derail the engine as it crossed the erosion. We don’t know whether the crew felt any indication of a soft spot in the track.     

However, there is another, more stealthy form of roadbed failure that would be probable and it is called, Liquefaction. With this problem, the track could have offered 100% of its intended support as the engine loaded it, but then lost 100% of support at that same point when a number of tank cars passed over it.  So there would be no possible way to spot the problem upon approach. 

Soil liquefaction is defined by soil saturation and then the introduction of vibration to trigger the saturation to quickly change the solid nature of the soil over to the nature of a liquid.  There is no erosion involved with liquefaction.  

If liquefaction caused the Doon derailment, it was produced by a combination of the river flood and the train.  The rising river would have caused the soil saturation and the train would have introduced the vibration needed to cause the soil to suddenly lose its compressive strength.

Here is a good video showing soil liquefaction:     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rd6W2aP2dkA

Here is some reference to liquefaction and other soil mechanics: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soil_liquefaction 

[zugmann]

Unfortunately, there aren't soil liquification gauges on the engine.

[SD70Dude]

Or in the track.

[zugmann]

And if you're a long haul crew - you may travel 200+ miles in a trip.  You're not always up to the current weather status of an area.  It can be hard to tell if an area just had a 0.35" Tstorm of 5 inches of rain in the past hour.  No doppler radars in the train, either.  Although I wish there was. (or is that I wish there were?)

[Euclid]

zugmann

Unfortunately, there aren't soil liquification gauges on the engine.

 

Well fortunately there is a speedometer on the engine and liquefaction only happens during unusually high water which usually only happens when large amounts of rain are predicted. 

[zugmann]

Euclid

Well fortunately there is a speedometer on the engine and liquefaction only happens during unusually high water which usually only happens when large amounts of rain are predicted.

I guess if you're running next to a predicatable water source that you can see, maybe?  Otherwise, someone needs to tell somebody.

We're really getting into this hindsight business.

WE had a storm locally last month.  Got 6" of rain in a span of 4 hours.  There were cars stuck on flooded roads that don't flood unless there's a hurricane.  But it was an exteremley local event.  If the water suddenly washed out the tracks - what then?  5 miles away they got 1".   Wx is crazy, yo.

[greyhounds]

zugmann

No doppler radars in the train, either. Although I wish there was. (or is that I wish there were?)

Since you used the plural "radars" I believe it should be "I wish there were".  But I ain't no English teacher.

[charlie hebdo]

greyhounds

 

 

zugmann

No doppler radars in the train, either. Although I wish there was. (or is that I wish there were?)

 

 

Since you used the plural "radars" I believe it should be "I wish there were".  But I ain't no English teacher.

 

The correct grammar is "I wish there were" third person, subjunctuve.  The radars have nothing to do with it.

[Euclid]

zugmann

I guess if you're running next to a predicatable water source that you can see, maybe?  Otherwise, someone needs to tell somebody.

We're really getting into this hindsight business.

I am not sure what you mean by “predictable water source.”  Nobody knows years ahead of time when floods will occur, but imminent floods are almost always predicted based on predictions of, or actual occurrence of heavy rain. 

The hindsight premise is that nobody could have known about the risk of derailing if high water posed that threat.  And so it could only have been discovered to have been a risk after the derailment happened.  So in hindsight, there is 20/20 vision so to speak. 

So yes, if nobody on the train saw the unusually high water, nobody else had seen it, nobody checked for it based on reports of heavy rain, nobody was aware of the weather service warnings (if there were any), no other train had seen it rising previous to the train that had derailed—if all that is so, there was no way to take defensive action in operating the train through the flood zone.  The company simply did not know of the risk and so it was an Act of God. 

I just went through a big rain here about two weeks ago.  We got 5-7” of rain in just an hour or two.  Several hours prior, there was a big weather alert bulletin by the National Weather Service.  It warned of everything that actually happened such as flash floods.  It advised no travel.  A few hours later, the rain came and washed out and caused closure of 85 roads in this area.  In cities, it took out lots of city streets, heavily damaged several houses and cars, tore out a lot of sewer and water mains, and washed out lots of residential landscape.  Nobody could have stopped it, but we all knew it was coming, and so most people took precautions.   

[Deggesty]

charlie hebdo

 

 

greyhounds

 

 

zugmann

No doppler radars in the train, either. Although I wish there was. (or is that I wish there were?)

 

 

Since you used the plural "radars" I believe it should be "I wish there were".  But I ain't no English teacher.

 

 

 

 

The correct grammar is "I wish there were" third person, subjunctuve.  The radars have nothing to do with it.

 

Right on, Charlie. The subjunctive is used when you refer to a conditon contrary to fact (that's what I was taught in grammar school several years back).

[tree68]

Euclid

So yes, if nobody on the train saw the unusually high water,

And this is very likely - the crew probably didn't see high water until they were at the Little Rock River.

Euclid

nobody else had seen it,

As noted earlier, the two nearby river guages recorded as much as a four foot rise in just 12 hours.  We don't know what other traffic there was on the line.

Euclid

nobody checked for it based on reports of heavy rain,

That falls on the railroad and whatever service they use for weather - as well as a realization that wherever the rain fell would impact the rivers downstream as it did.

Euclid

nobody was aware of the weather service warnings (if there were any) no other train had seen it rising previous to the train that had derailed—if all that is so, there was no way to take defensive action in operating the train through the flood zone.  The company simply did not know of the risk and so it was an Act of God. 

That pretty much sums it up.

For your localized storm -

Euclid

... Nobody could have stopped it, but we all knew it was coming, and so most people took precautions.   

It's important to note that you're talking about a localized event - the heavy rain overwhelmed the available drainage - the question that applies to this discussion, is - where was all that water 12, or even 24 hours later.

[zugmann]

Deggesty

Right on, Charlie. The subjunctive is used when you refer to a conditon contrary to fact (that's what I was taught in grammar school several years back).

Thanks.  Grammar isn't my strongest suit.

[Paul of Covington]

Deggesty

 

 

charlie hebdo

 

 

greyhounds

 

 

zugmann

No doppler radars in the train, either. Although I wish there was. (or is that I wish there were?)

 

 

Since you used the plural "radars" I believe it should be "I wish there were".  But I ain't no English teacher.

 

 

 

 

The correct grammar is "I wish there were" third person, subjunctuve.  The radars have nothing to do with it.

 

 

 

 

Right on, Charlie. The subjunctive is used when you refer to a conditon contrary to fact (that's what I was taught in grammar school several years back).

   That's the way I remember being taught, but I never did like it.   I wish that WAS not the case.

[dehusman]

Euclid

Nobody knows years ahead of time when floods will occur, but imminent floods are almost always predicted based on predictions of, or actual occurrence of heavy rain.

Very true, the problem is your faith in the ability of the weather services to predict things greatly exceeds their ability to pinpoint a risk in real time.

The hindsight premise is that nobody could have known about the risk of derailing if high water posed that threat.

And that is the crux of your arguement.  The problem is what threat was.  As far as has been reported and from the pictures taken within a couple hours of the incident, it does not appear that there was water over the tracks.  The railroad DID NOT FLOOD.  It remained above water the entire time.

There is absolutely NO weather service that alerts on the possibility of subsidence.  NONE.  ZERO.  ZIPPO.   Not the US weather service, not any contract service.  There is limited ability to forecast flash floods and high water, that's about it.

Forecasting water levels is waaaaaaaay more art than science.  Water could  rise 1 ft at one point in a stream, only 6" a mile away and 4 feet a mile from that.  The water level depends on the cross section of the area you are measuring and flow rates above and below the area.  Change something and the water levels change.  If one tree falls over and gets jammed in a bridge or culvert under a county road a mile from the railroad tracks it could cause the water to rise unexpectedly around the railroad tracks.  There is NO software on the planet sophisticated enough to figure that out.  Several universities have research projects working on it , but there isn't anything deployed. 

I just went through a big rain here about two weeks ago. We got 5-7” of rain in just an hour or two. Several hours prior, there was a big weather alert bulletin by the National Weather Service.

The NWS alerts on a county wide basis.  Railroads generally do not directly follow NWS alerts because they are so broad and generic that they aren't useful for protecting specific areas.

It warned of everything that actually happened such as flash floods. It advised no travel. A few hours later, the rain came and washed out and caused closure of 85 roads in this area.

In cities, it took out lots of city streets, heavily damaged several houses and cars, tore out a lot of sewer and water mains, and washed out lots of residential landscape. Nobody could have stopped it, but we all knew it was coming, and so most people took precautions.

The question is, did they alert those specific cities and the specific roads and the specific areas on the roads?  Did the NWS say there is a flash flood warning for Douglas county, or did the the NWS say in Douglas County 144 St will flood between mp 45 and 46, Blondo St will flood between 69th St and 71st St, the 800 block of the Deer Creek Subdivision on 124th St will flood?  The answer, of course is that they weren't specific, they just said you were going to get heavy rains and SOMEPLACE in the county it COULD flood.  There were heavy rains and SOMEPLACE in the county it flooded.

Railroad weather services are more specific, they forecast threats to the railroad, not the county and most will tailor threats to specific subdivisions and mile posts.  So what was the threat to the railroad.  Remember the RAILROAD did NOT flood.  It does not appear to have been under water, it was not reported to have been underwater at the time of the incident and from the pictures was several feet above water.  They had heavy rains over a several hundred square mile area covering 2 or 3 states for several days.  NO weather service tries to forecast subgrade failures.  It doesn't appear it was raining at the time of the incident.  How would the weather service know the water level at the area where the incident occurred?  It was not at a bridge over a major watercourse.  Its not a navigable waterway.  There isn't a water guage there.  Even if there was a water guage there, it would have reported that the water level was well below the track level.  The roads in your area were shut down because there was water OVER the road.  How many roads in your area were shut down because the water was 2 ft below the road?  My guess :  ZERO.  

The problem is that the probable cause, subgrade failure is not easily detectible.  Even patrolling ahead of the oil train would not have revealed anything.

We don't have the sophistication to measure or detect those types of failures  Maybe in some future state there will be sensors on the engines that will measure the track's reaction to loading and be able to identify areas that are getting soft (the problem would have been detected by the train or trains ahead of the oil train).  There are systems on some engines right now that provide limited near real time track geometry data, but it is no where near sophisticated enough to forecast a subgrade failure like this and the number of engines equipped is a relatively small fleet.

[Euclid]

tree68

 

 

 

Euclid

[So yes, if] nobody was aware of the weather service warnings (if there were any) no other train had seen it rising previous to the train that had derailed—if all that is so, there was no way to take defensive action in operating the train through the flood zone.  The company simply did not know of the risk and so it was an Act of God. 

 

That pretty much sums it up.

 

What you quoted from me is just my hypothetical set of conditions for the hypothetical premise that nobody had any way to know about the high water.  I am not stating those conditions as fact because I don’t know if they are facts. I have not jumped to any conclusions.  

But you seem to have selected my quotes to make it sound like I have stated those hypothetical conditions as true fact.  So, in red text, I added back in the part that changes the quote back to what I actually said.  

You and several others have been warning that it is unfair to jump to any conclusions without knowing all the facts.  And yet you are perfectly willing to jump to the conclusion that nobody associated with the railroad was aware of the flood hazard along the railroad at Doon.

 

[Murphy Siding]

     I drove down to Doon Friday after work to see how close I could get to the cleanup sight. The answer is not very. What I could see coming in from the north is that there is standing water everywhere. There is also mudand collections of corn stalks to mark where the water had been quite higher in the fields.

     The area, like most all of Iowa, is rolling hills. The rail lines run near creeks, ponds and rivers constantly. It looks to me like the train crew in question would have seen high water, trees,black dirt and corn everywhere they looked. Coming through at night, I would think everything not illuminated by the headlights would  blend together into one dark landscape.

      Nowhere along the line did I see any signs that said "Caution- rain may have caused 100 year old railroad bed to suddenly turn to silly putty after all these years of use. You better creep along at 10 m.p.h. just in case".

[zugmann]

Murphy Siding

Nowhere along the line did I see any signs that said "Caution- rain may have caused 100 year old railroad bed to suddenly turn to silly putty after all these years of use. You better creep along at 10 m.p.h. just in case".

Maybe it floated away?

[Euclid]

Dave,

It is really quite simple.

There is no way to predict or detect liquefaction.  The best you can do if liquefaction is possible is to slow down so any derailment does minor damage.  The best indicator of possible liquefaction is high water along the track.  The water does not have to be over the tops of the rails in order to produce liquefaction.

GCOR

Part of rule 6.21

In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. ****************************************************

Notice that it does not require anyone to know about a problem as a condition of complying with the instructions to be prepared to stop.  All it requires is to see high water.  Notice that it does not require the water to be over the tops of the rails.

Actually, the rule does not even require the water to unusually high.  It only refers to unusually heavy rain.  For the water to trigger a need for compliance with the rule, all the water needs to be is high.   

[Murphy Siding]

zugmann

 

 

Murphy Siding

Nowhere along the line did I see any signs that said "Caution- rain may have caused 100 year old railroad bed to suddenly turn to silly putty after all these years of use. You better creep along at 10 m.p.h. just in case".

 

 

Maybe it floated away?

 

More likely they liquefacted (sp?) away. The engineer should have known to approach the areas where the signs might have/should have been slowly and be prepared to stop if they were there.

      I believe this line sees a lot of grain, ethanol,coal and apparantly oil unit trains. Given the lay of the land and the climate, I'd bet 100's of heavy trains have passed over that line with liquefacting(sp?) anything. Maybe it was just an accident?

[Murphy Siding]

dehusman

There are systems on some engines right now that provide limited near real time track geometry data, but it is no where near sophisticated enough to forecast a subgrade failure like this and the number of engines equipped is a relatively small fleet.

     Has it been determined that there was subgrade failure?

[Euclid]

Murphy Siding

It looks to me like the train crew in question would have seen high water, trees,black dirt and corn everywhere they looked. Coming through at night, I would think everything not illuminated by the headlights would  blend together into one dark landscape.

Nowhere along the line did I see any signs that said "Caution- rain may have caused 100 year old railroad bed to suddenly turn to silly putty after all these years of use. You better creep along at 10 m.p.h. just in case".

 

I would think water up to the bottom of the ballast would have been perfectly evident in the headlights.  They do cover a fairly wide swath in powerful illumination. 

 

The sign you mention is in the rulebook just as you descibe it:

 

GCOR

Part of rule 6.21

In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement. ****************************************************

[dehusman]

Euclid

In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement.

Invoking this rule boils down to what is considered "potentially hazardous".  

By your interpretation, you are defining it as anyplace that has standing water within 2 or 3 feet from the track and requiring the crew to know where these locations are 1-2 miles before they get to them (because those are the conditions that the crew would have observed when they got to the location and how far away they would have had to take action to be at whatever speed you see to think they should have been operating).

The railroad is considering "potentially hazardous" differently.  Under your interpretation the midwest rail network would have been shut down someplace, sometime for most of the last couple weeks, because its summer and there are thunderstorms with flash flood warnings every day or two someplace in the upper midwest.  

[Euclid]

dehusman

 

Euclid

In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop. If they cannot proceed safely, they must stop until it is safe to resume movement.

 

 

Invoking this rule boils down to what is considered "potentially hazardous".  

 

Water submerging a ten-foot-high fill up to the bottom of the ballast is potentially hazardous.  High water alone is potentially hazardous.  The rule says so. 

 

[Murphy Siding]

dehusman

Invoking this rule boils down to what is considered "potentially hazardous".   By your interpretation, you are defining it as anyplace that has standing water within 2 or 3 feet from the track and requiring the crew to know where these locations are 1-2 miles before they get to them (because those are the conditions that the crew would have observed when they got to the location and how far away they would have had to take action to be at whatever speed you see to think they should have been operating). The railroad is considering "potentially hazardous" differently.  Under your interpretation the midwest rail network would have been shut down someplace, sometime for most of the last couple weeks, because its summer and there are thunderstorms with flash flood warnings every day or two someplace in the upper midwest.  

     In addition, the topography in that area doesn't have any raging rivers and cascading streams. It's not like Niagra Falls suddenly menacing the rail line. It's more like your basement backing up with water when the sump pump can't keep up. With no history of problems with washouts and landslides on the line in the past 100+ years, it's hard to believe that somehow changed overnight.

[BaltACD]

Murphy Siding

 

dehusman

Invoking this rule boils down to what is considered "potentially hazardous".   By your interpretation, you are defining it as anyplace that has standing water within 2 or 3 feet from the track and requiring the crew to know where these locations are 1-2 miles before they get to them (because those are the conditions that the crew would have observed when they got to the location and how far away they would have had to take action to be at whatever speed you see to think they should have been operating). The railroad is considering "potentially hazardous" differently.  Under your interpretation the midwest rail network would have been shut down someplace, sometime for most of the last couple weeks, because its summer and there are thunderstorms with flash flood warnings every day or two someplace in the upper midwest.  

     In addition, the topography in that area doesn't have any raging rivers and cascading streams. It's not like Niagra Falls suddenly menacing the rail line. It's more like your basement backing up with water when the sump pump can't keep up. With no history of problems with washouts and landslides on the line in the past 100+ years, it's hard to believe that somehow changed overnight.

Ellicott City, MD over the years has had flooding issues from the Patapsco River, which the B&O Railroad followed from Baltimore to near Mount Airy, MD.

Two times within the past two years the downtown area along Main Street has been effectively destroyed by flash flooding - and guess what - the Patapsco River did not cause the flooding.  The development that has taken place in Howard County at elevations higher than Ellicott City have effectively made the overflow water drainage route Main Street.

I live 10 miles from Ellicott City.  During the original flooding incident, we barely got any rain.  In the most recent flooding incident the storm cell was larger and did washout a segment of River Road that caused road crews to shut the road for about a month while they installed a new and larger culvert for run off to reach the river.  The Patapsco River did not get to flood stage in either of these incidents.  The Old Main Line Sub which occupies the opposite bank of the river from River Road did not experience any damage beyond a couple of trees down.

Can't speak to current CSX procedure, when I was working - When Flash Flood Warnings are issued MofW and Operations are notified at the same time by the contract weather service that CSX uses.  Dispatchers notify trains that will operate in the affected territory of the flood warnings.  MofW calls out Track Inspectors to patrol the affected area.  Track inspectors communicate their findings to the Train Dispatcher - the Track Inspectors will continually patrol the track until the expiration time of the Flast Flood Warning.  Track Inspectors will communicate any conditions they find and what if any operating restrictions need to be place on trains.  The railroad DOES NOT STOP just because Flash Flood Warnings are issued.  It WILL STOP if the Track Inspectors find conditions that warrant it.