zugmann Guys - just let it go. You can't win. He enjoys the battle too much. Just smile, nod, and move on.
Guys - just let it go. You can't win. He enjoys the battle too much. Just smile, nod, and move on.
Amen.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Euclid The train was heading into a restricted speed zone at excessive speed with a good possibility of the zone containing fouling equipment.
The train was heading into a restricted speed zone at excessive speed with a good possibility of the zone containing fouling equipment.
My last comment on this thread. Please show me the stats that show a UDE results in a "good possibility" of fouling equipment. As a railroader I have trains suffer a UDE just about every day. I can count on one hand how many times they have resulted in a derailment. I take it that you have had different informantion that I do. Can you share them? After all, if you can speak with such authority on this matter, you should share how you came about such knowledge.
Or do you again refuse that request?
An "expensive model collector"
tree68Well, there you go folks. Ol' Bucky has taken everything we've told him and regurgitated it back like he's the one who's the expert.
It sounds like you are now saying that my position is what you have been trying to tell me all along. I don’t how you arrive at that conclusion. What I said in my post that you have quoted above is not at all what you have been saying all along. Our positions on this are diametrically opposed and have been from the start.
You have said all along that the rule called for a service application of the oil train unless the fouling object could be seen. And only then would an emergency application have been proper. I have consistently disagreed with that, and plainly said so above.
You have also said that the situation called for reducing to restricted speed for passing the disabled train. Then you modified that, saying that the situation called for execution of the unplanned stop rule. I don’t know why you changed to favor the unplanned stop procedure because either that or restricted speed would have called for a service application to slow the train down, as you prefer. But there was not time to slow the train down, so I called for an emergency application. That is the difference in our positions.
The train was heading into a restricted speed zone at excessive speed with a possibility of the zone containing fouling equipment. So there was a critical need slow it down. A service application would not have fulfilled that need, so I said I would have preferred an emergency application. But you said that the risk of an emergency application was too high because it might derail the train. I believe the risk and consequences of striking fouling equipment from a derailment would have been worse than the risk of an emergency application derailing the oil train.
The conductor of the oil train said that the approaching grain train was enveloped in a cloud of blowing snow, and he said that he did not like heading into that snow cloud without the ability to see what was in front of him. Yet they did head into the blinding snow cloud, and as soon as it cleared a little, they saw the hopper car laying on the track in front of them with no hope of stopping short of hitting it. They both lay down on the cab floor and waited for what was sure to come.
My basic point about this has always been that the UDE of the grain train on double track called for the immediate protection for the oil train against the possibility that the grain train had derailed and fouled the other track. Your first position was that no protective action should be taken until it was known that there was a fouling. I disagree with that because it defies the whole point of the rule calling for “immediate” protective action just on the basis that the other track might be fouled.
In this type of situation, another train may be only minutes or seconds away. Protecting that train must be the first priority because time is of the essence. The point of the rule is to prevent another train from passing the disabled train at track speed without knowing whether the disabled train has derailed and fouled the track of the passing train.
Obviously, the status of the disabled train will eventually be discovered, but until it is, you don’t want to risk passing it with another train that is moving too fast to stop short of any suddenly discovered fouling condition. The outcome of the Casselton incident is exactly what GCOR rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action is intended to prevent.
Considering these dangerous circumstances of being unable to reduce to a safe speed as quickly as required with the prospect of not being able to stop short of a possible collision due to excessive speed—it is my opinion that this constituted a real emergency that called for an emergency application to reduce the speed as quickly as possible. I base that on this rule:
103.8 Emergency Brake Applications
When conditions warrant, use an emergency brake application without hesitation if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed and anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more.
At Casselton, you have an urgent requirement to reduce to a speed at which you can stop short of a possible obstruction in a blinding snow cloud. Certainly there is doubt that a service application can control the speed by adequately reducing it in the short time available before entering that blinding snow cloud. So what do you do? You “use an emergency brake application without hesitation,” just as the rule says.
schlimm dehusman schlimm Then why do you keep playing his game? I know. My concern is that somebody will read his misinformation and, not knowing any better, actually think he knows what he is talking about. Euclid is pretty hopeless, he'll never change. I just hate to see so much gobbledy gook spewed out across the internet. He starts with reasonably factual information, such as the NTSB report, but belabors points to death, whether with one of you or with himself. He's not evil or badly intentioned, such as some litigation lawyer looking for free tutorials as one member surmised. Rather, he cannot help himself, as it is a deeply rooted personality style that he is compelled to follow. Leave it alone and the thread will die on its own.
dehusman schlimm Then why do you keep playing his game? I know. My concern is that somebody will read his misinformation and, not knowing any better, actually think he knows what he is talking about. Euclid is pretty hopeless, he'll never change. I just hate to see so much gobbledy gook spewed out across the internet.
schlimm Then why do you keep playing his game?
Then why do you keep playing his game?
I know. My concern is that somebody will read his misinformation and, not knowing any better, actually think he knows what he is talking about. Euclid is pretty hopeless, he'll never change. I just hate to see so much gobbledy gook spewed out across the internet.
He starts with reasonably factual information, such as the NTSB report, but belabors points to death, whether with one of you or with himself. He's not evil or badly intentioned, such as some litigation lawyer looking for free tutorials as one member surmised. Rather, he cannot help himself, as it is a deeply rooted personality style that he is compelled to follow. Leave it alone and the thread will die on its own.
23 17 46 11
The problem with Bucky is that he makes the same mistake that many armchair railroaders, admirals, military tacticians, etc. have made over the years. He looks at a situation with the 20-20 vision of hindsight and wonders why the situation occurred the way it did while he is blissfully unaware that the people on the scene AT THAT TIME did not have all the information at hand that he (months or years later) has.
edblysard schlimm dehusman schlimm Then why do you keep playing his game? I know. My concern is that somebody will read his misinformation and, not knowing any better, actually think he knows what he is talking about. Euclid is pretty hopeless, he'll never change. I just hate to see so much gobbledy gook spewed out across the internet. He starts with reasonably factual information, such as the NTSB report, but belabors points to death, whether with one of you or with himself. He's not evil or badly intentioned, such as some litigation lawyer looking for free tutorials as one member surmised. Rather, he cannot help himself, as it is a deeply rooted personality style that he is compelled to follow. Leave it alone and the thread will die on its own. Ya know, at the risk of scaring myself, I think this is one thing we agree on across the board!
Ya know, at the risk of scaring myself, I think this is one thing we agree on across the board!
Thank you, Ed. BTW, no hard feelings re: some past kertuffles.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
The personification of a little knowledge being dangerous.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Here is an interview segment form the traveling engineer who was riding the grain train during the Casselton derailment:
TRAVELING ENGINEER:
But as that's happening, we've got a train [oil train] coming at us, and I believe we're still moving. I look up. I see their engine numbers. I call them up and warn them that our train is in emergency. I don't remember the verbiage I used. I told them they better protect themselves, slow down, stop, or whatever it was. I don't recall what I told them. And then I immediately -- or momentarily after that, I told the conductor get on the radio, announce your "emergency, emergency, emergency." And he did. And that train didn't appear to be slowing down at all.
QUESTIONER:
What are your emergency procedures? What governs your emergency procedures when a train crew declares an emergency?
You would expect that a train approaching you to immediately reduce their speed, protect themselves, maybe even stop, as conditions might require. I don't know that there's anything absolutely written in stone other than you'll get your train speed down, control, and you'll -- if I was on the train, we'd proceed looking out for hazards in front of us.
The traveling engineer is making the same point I have been making. That is that the emergency application of the grain train instantly created an emergency condition for the oil train. He calls for immediately reducing speed in anticipation of colliding with fouling objects. That also happens to be the same point that is addressed by Rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action. That rule calls for IMMEDIATE action. The word “immediately” means without any intervening time or space. Certainly this action would rule out the use of a service application.
And notice too, that the traveling engineer did not say that there was no time to do anything, as some have said in this thread. He also did not say that the oil train crew should have waited until they saw hazards in front of them before taking defensive action, as some have said here.
Also when the TE says “You would expect that a train approaching you to immediately reduce their speed, protect themselves, maybe even stop, as conditions require,” just like me, he is making that assessment in hindsight. Yet it does not invalidate his point like some are saying here about me making the same point.
The TE refers to the retroactive assessment as what would be expected by anyone with the knowledge of how to deal with the situation facing the oil train. In other words, the TE does not agree with some in this thread who contend that the crew of the oil train could not be expected to react to the fouling before they knew that one existed. They were expected to anticipate a fouling, and react accordingly.
Bucky: Before you go any further done this rabbit hole and embarass yourself any more you ought to actually read the GCOR rule. It doesn't say what you think it does.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Euclid:
First of all, the BNSF uses the term "Road Foreman of Engines" not "Traveling Engineer". The NP also used the term RFE, but the GN did use the term TE.
Secondly, how did you obtain the information about the Traveling Engineer's statement to a BNSF reconstruction of the accident?
Thirdly, you are violating GCOR Rule 1.27 regarding the divulging of information.
Fourthly, is any of the information on your latest post correct, as nothing has been released that an RFE was on the grain train?
Ed Burns
Happily retired NP-BN-BNSF from Northtown.
Ed,
The information I posted about the interview with the RFE on the grain train is public information in the NTSB report.
There are also interviews with the student engineer and conductor of the grain train as well as the engineer and conductor of the oil train. Open this link and it takes you to the page called Docket and Docket Items: http://go.usa.gov/x9FUy
There are at least 7 pages to that list, and the interviews start about half way down page 2. If you click on one of them, it opens a page where you can download the PDF file, and then open the PDF to see the interview.
I believe this link will take you directly to the page where you can download the PDF file of the interview with the RFE on the grain train: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=425455&docketID=55926&mkey=88606
I have waited one day to reply to your last post.
Always include sources of information in any post. That clears up where are getting the information from.
And this will be last comment to you.
NP EddieFourthly, is any of the information on your latest post correct, as nothing has been released that an RFE was on the grain train? Ed Burns Happily retired NP-BN-BNSF from Northtown.
I am not quite sure what you are asking me. This is my main point: In the NTSB interview with the Road Foreman of Engines, he stated that the oil train should have immediately reduced their speed, protected themselves, and maybe even stopped, as conditions require.
He said the oil train crew should have been looking for hazards in front of them. One of the “conditions” they faced was that they were too close to the blinding snow to slow down quickly enough by the use of a service application to “protect” themselves.
Others here have insisted that an emergency application without actually seeing a hazard would have been reckless and inconsistent with good train handling.
I think it is obvious that, to address the situation as outlined by the RFE, the proper thing to do would have been to put the oil train into emergency as soon as they got the warning. It would have been silly to worry about good train handling under those circumstances.
Others have said that I claimed that the using an emergency application was prohibited. I never said that. It was taken out of context where was I asked if an emergency application was prohibited. It was then turned around and made to look like I asserted that an emergency application was prohibited. Fortunately, a thread is a perfect transcript of who said what, so the record is clear to see.
From the start, I have advocated the use of an emergency application. In fact, that is the point that attracted such vehement criticism here. I have never wavered from my original contention that an emergency application was the proper response to this developing catastrophe. Others have insisted that I was giving incorrect information that might endanger others.
Others have also insisted that the proper thing to do was one of the following:
Stop under the service application of brakes procedure specified by the Unplanned Stop Rule because it would have provided good train handling.
Pass the grain train at restricted speed; that is a speed slow enough to stop short of any obstruction or hazard once it has been seen.
Yet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required.
^
You overlook the one unwritten requirement of a RFE (being a company official) in this type of proceeding - THROW THE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE BUS.
The company's stance is ALWAYS, the rules we have in place would have prevented the occurence. Irrespective of any facts, that the incident happened is prima facia evicence that the rules were not complied with.
EuclidYet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required.
Please quote the rule that says the oil train was required to "immediately reduce" speed.
Norm
Sorry. My bad.
dehusman Euclid Yet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required. Please quote the rule that says the oil train was required to "immediately reduce" speed.
Euclid Yet, there was not time to slow down to meet either one of those two options, so an emergency application was the only option left that would have “immediately reduced” the speed of the oil train, as the RFE says was required.
Dave,
Here are the two rules (in blue text) that say that the oil train was required to immediately reduce speed:
Rule 6.23 Emergency Stop or Severe Slack Action.
When a train or engine is stopped by an emergency application of the brakes or severe slack action occurs while stopping, take the following actions:
Obstruction of Main Track or Controlled Siding
•If an adjacent main track or controlled siding may be obstructed, immediately warn other trains by radio, stating the exact location and status of the train. Provide flag protection in both directions on these tracks. Provide flag protection for other affected railroads by going at least 2 miles in each direction if flagging distance is not known.
When only one flagman is available, provide protection immediately in the direction the first train is expected. After necessary protection is provided, provide protection in the opposite direction. Recall the flagman:
•When adjacent tracks are not obstructed. or •When the train dispatcher or control operator advises the crew that protection is provided on adjacent tracks.
Inspection of Cars and Units
•All cars, units, equipment, and track must be inspected as outlined in the:
â—¦Special instructions
â—¦ Air brake and train handling rules
Train on Adjacent Track
A train on an adjacent track that receives radio notification must approach the location at restricted speed. The train must stop short of any obstruction or flagman unless advised that the track is clear and it is safe to proceed.
Since there was not time to display fusees, the response of the oil train would have been only based on the radio warning by the grain train. The requirement for the oil train to immediately slow down is covered in the last part of the rule called: Train on Adjacent Track.
That section of the rule says the oil train should have approached the location at restricted speed, thus able to stop short of any obstructions. Restricted speed would have been very low, considering the report of near zero visibility in the cloud of snow alongside of the grain train. The oil train did not have enough space available to slow down to restricted speed by using a service application of brakes, so they should have used an emergency application according to this rule:
Euclid 103.8 Emergency Brake Applications When conditions warrant, use an emergency brake application without hesitation if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed and anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more.
Your really don't understand that rule.
n012944 Euclid 103.8 Emergency Brake Applications When conditions warrant, use an emergency brake application without hesitation if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed and anytime maximum authorized speed is exceeded by 5 MPH or more.
Euclid....if any condition occurs in which there is doubt that service applications can control train speed....
Please explain at what point the engineer of the oil train had a condition where the train would not slow down if he made a service application. This doesn't say "if you want to slow down real fast", it says that when there is doubt a service application won't control the train speed. If the oil train engineer made a service application and the train slows down then the service application can control the speed. What this is talking about is a situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph. Neither of these conditions existed for the oil train in the Casselton incident. This rule is not applicable to the situation.
dehusmanPlease explain at what point the engineer of the oil train had a condition where the train would not slow down if he made a service application. This doesn't say "if you want to slow down real fast", it says that when there is doubt a service application won't control the train speed. If the oil train engineer made a service application and the train slows down then the service application can control the speed. What this is talking about is a situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph. Neither of these conditions existed for the oil train in the Casselton incident. This rule is not applicable to the situation.
This doesn't say "if you want to slow down real fast", it says that when there is doubt a service application won't control the train speed.
If the oil train engineer made a service application and the train slows down then the service application can control the speed.
What this is talking about is a situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph.
Neither of these conditions existed for the oil train in the Casselton incident.
This rule is not applicable to the situation.
The point where the oil train engineer heard the radio announcement that that the grain train had experienced an emergency application is the point where he had a condition where his train would not slow down in time if he made a service application.
However, the requirement was not just to slow down, as your question implies. The requirement was to slow down to restricted speed before passing the disabled grain train. A service application would not have accomplished that requirement.
Slowing down before reaching the requirement for restricted speed is a matter of controlling the speed, as mentioned in Rule 103.8 Emergency Brake Applications. So, if a service application will not slow down in time, an emergency application is called for.
As you say, the rule covers the situation where coming down a grade and a service application isn't slowing the train or situations where the train is exceeding the authorized speed by more than 5 mph. But nothing in the rule limits its applications to only those two situations. So, what is the basis of your conclusion that the rule does not apply to the situation of not being able to slow the oil train to restricted speed as required?
I know I'm taking the risk of getting the *** flying again on this thread, but here's two pertinent facts from page 3 of the NTSB report under the heading 'Accident Narrative':
1. "After the grain train's emergency brake application, the crew began to implement the safety protocols required after an emergency brake application: a crew member immediately broadcast an emergency announcement to other trains in the area, using radio channel 70" <my stop.>
2. In the next paragraph, it reads "However, the oil train did not hear the emergency announcement from the grain train, because they were releasing track warrant authority to the train dispatcher on radio channel 39 assigned to the Jamestown Subdivision. This was in accordance with BNSF operating rules, which state that a train must release a track warrant after it leaves the limits of the warrant. After the train crew made the emergency announcement, the road foreman of engines (on the grain train) attempted to contact the oil train crew by radio to alert them to the emergency brake application. "
So, the overlay we heard on the video didn't tell the entire story......
BaltACD
derailing?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
I'm sure engineer Bucky would have plugged it at every tree.
dehusmanI'm sure engineer Bucky would have plugged it at every tree.
And after the Conductor inspected the train - on foot - after about the 3rd tree Bucky and crew would have been HOS - middle of nowhere with no hopes of getting to a point wherer the crew could be relieved, and if they were on any degree of grade - hand brakes would have to be applied until trainline air pressure was restored to normal and a 'releasable' service brake application could hold the train until it was able to restart.
Couldn't just chock the wheels with freshly cut tree trunks?
That reminds me of going out my driveway through the front yard after a snowstorm.
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