Train hits Fedex truck 1-24-2017

[Euclid]

I have been told by Operation Lifesaver that it is the driver’s responsibility to look for trains and yield to them even on crossings equipped with flashing lights and gates.  So, if a driver fails to look and yield to a train approaching when the signals have failed to activate; and if the driver is struck by the train; then it is the driver’s fault.  At an un-activated signalized grade crossing, the crossbuck alone has the meaning of a yield sign. 

I believe that very few drivers realize this, because it is counterintuitive, and drivers are habituated to expecting relatively few train encounters; plus a perception of robust signals and gates which they naturally assume are sufficient for their protection.

This duty to look for trains at signalized crossings may require a driver to slow way down on a high speed road in order to visually confirm a train is not approaching if sight lines happen to be limited by obstructions.  After all, the duty to yield to trains may include trains running at extremely high speeds, so it may require a driver on a 65 mph road to slow down to say 20 mph in order to see far enough down the track to make sure a high speed train is not approaching.

I once asked our State Patrol about this requirement to slow down for such crossings.  They denied that such a requirement exists, and said that a driver should not slow down at all because it would risk causing a rear end collision.  They said there was no reason to slow down because the automatic crossing signals will tell you if a train is coming.   

 

Here is a reference to the law in Utah:

Utah Code 41-6a-1203. Railroad grade crossing -- Duty to stop

(2) Whenever a person operating a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the operator of the vehicle shall stop within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of the railroad track and may not proceed if:

(c) a railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500 feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible and the train by reason of its speed or nearness to the crossing is an immediate hazard;
 
(d) an approaching train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to the crossing; 

[K. P. Harrier]

Euclid (1-25):

No, it would hardly be the truck driver’s fault.  Some grade crossings, and it looks like the one in question is one of them, one cannot see what is coming because of the angle behind the vehicle driver.

It is similar to, but not as severe as, a “High Desert” grade crossing here in Southern California as seen from this October 13, 2008 view:

 

The above eastward (vehicle traveling implied) view has a rather severe angle between the track and the road.  The Utah situation was opposite that in angle.  It is easy to see a train coming in the above view, but in Utah nearly impossible to see a train coming from behind the vehicle.

A number of times over the years this forum contributor has been westbound at that above grade crossing.  A helpful aspect at that grade crossing (when traveling westbound) is that the next grade crossing about a quarter of a mile west has a block signal thereat.

That similar to Utah “High Desert” grade crossing now has flashers and gates, so is much safer.  But when westbound on that desert now paved road if that signal is off it solidifies that no train is coming from behind.  In Utah, it is unknown if ‘knowledgeable’ people have any signals that can be used as a confirmation that no train is coming at the angled grade crossing.  But the average person has no knowledge of such possible second conformation railroad signals and thus has NO backup confirmation that no train is coming at a ‘blind’ grade crossing.  Since that is the case, signal maintainers must absolutely know their jobs.  People lives are on the line, as we as railroaders and railfans very much know.

While the commuter railroad officials presently may be puzzled at what happened, as such usually are, K.P. believes someone at the commuter railroad now needs tranquilizers, and they will need them for months to come.  The governing board may need some tranquilizers too if (“if”) someone points out to them that the signal system (green, yellow, and red) apparently wasn’t interlocked with the grade crossing devices either.

Now pondering getting into tranquilizer sales,

K.P.

[Euclid]

Would it be the truck driver's fault for relying on the signals rather than looking first to make sure the crossing was clear?

[BaltACD]

CShaveRR

Even if this is what happened, the UTA crew should have been aware that work was beng done at this crossing.  They should have been approaching it prepared to stop unless they had communication that the crossing was protected.  And, the crew should have seen that the gates had not lowered and the signals were not activated.  Yes, even in the bad weather.  So I think that there's plenty of blame to go around--and probably all around the UTA.

For the train and engine crew to know that crossing protection is not properly working they have to be NOTIFIED of it. 

'IF' the signalman was 'intending' to raise the gates and make the protection inoperative - BEFORE doing so he SHOULD have notified the control operator of his intended action so that trains that would be operating through the area could be notified to supply necessary protection at the crossing.

Whoever made the mistakes - the liability is purely UTA's.

[CShaveRR]

Electroliner 1935

There are two FED EX trucks in the video, Does any one know if the truck that the officer was following was struck in addition to the double bottom truck coming toward the camera? I would love to know what the driver said when he got out of his truck. 

 

The article I read said that the truck starring in this show was the only vehicle involved.  (But that other truck had to have been awfully close to flying debris!)

From the statement in some preceding posts about the maintainer's movements during the time, I suspect he's going to be implicated (and properly, in my opinion) on this.  It reminds me an awful lot of the incident here in Illinois where an Amtrak train struck a car with fatal results--the cause was a shunt inadvertently left in the bungalow by the signal maintainer, causing the crossing to fail to work.

Even if this is what happened, the UTA crew should have been aware that work was beng done at this crossing.  They should have been approaching it prepared to stop unless they had communication that the crossing was protected.  And, the crew should have seen that the gates had not lowered and the signals were not activated.  Yes, even in the bad weather.  So I think that there's plenty of blame to go around--and probably all around the UTA.

[tree68]

We'll know for sure when the appropriate authorities issue their reports.

[Euclid]

Here is some interesting information that may not be in all versions of the video. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2aUzFhHqBM

The video begins with the signals un-activated.

At 0:19, the train strikes the truck.

At 0:30, the train passes out of the video to the right.

At 0:49, the signals begin activation just as a person is seen opening the door the signal bungalow on the right and exiting the bungalow. The person immediately re-enters the bungalow, and within a few more seconds, the person emerges again.  

At about 1:35, the person re-enters the bungalow, and the video shortly ends. 

Therefore, it appears that the signal maintainer was in the signal bungalow with the door closed, and the signal un-activated, prior to, and during the collision. 

All of this does not prove what caused the failure to activate, but it does lend a bit of context to the scenario.  It seems to place the signal maintainer inside of the signal bungalow precisely when the failure to activate occurred.  Then the maintainer exited the bungalow, saw the wreckage, and immediately went back into the bungalow, and immediately thereafter, the signals activated for the first time. 

[samfp1943]

Electroliner 1935

There are two FED EX trucks in the video, Does any one know if the truck that the officer was following was struck in addition to the double bottom truck coming toward the camera? I would love to know what the driver said when he got out of his truck. 

 

First: I do not think you could reproduce those words here.

Second: I would guess the next step would be to find his/her suitcase with some clean clothes to change into.

Had a co-worker/driver who was hit on the rear corner of his empty trailer in south Memphis by the City of N.O. at a crossing [ that had just activated as he was going over it ].  {Train was moving faster than the speed the crossing was set for}... His truck and trailer performed 3 flat spins in the road.  WE (several of the driver's co-workers) had to tell the cops what happened...The driver was normally tongue-tied, and after this it took him hours to regain his  composure.

[Electroliner 1935]

There are two FED EX trucks in the video, Does any one know if the truck that the officer was following was struck in addition to the double bottom truck coming toward the camera? I would love to know what the driver said when he got out of his truck. 

[K. P. Harrier]

For those having trouble viewing the video of the incident, this link works on my computer and might work on yours.

 

https://www.theguardian.com/global/video/2017/jan/25/passenger-train-in-utah-slams-into-truck-at-high-speed-video

[mudchicken]

I share in your frustrations Balt. (my skin was crawling when I saw the video)

I have to wonder if some of the problem is also the difference between the common carrier railroad culture and the transit culture (rank amateurs IMHO). NO RAILROADER worth his or her salt would walk away from a defect like that until there was well defined protection against a known defect. FRA and RTD have collided here in Denver well before it got that tragic. 

 

 

 

[BaltACD]

Euclid

But we won't know for sure until the investigation conclusion is released.

No deaths, no injuries - no publiclly disclosed investigation results.

[CandOforprogress2]

Of all the snow here in Buffalo NY this has never happned that the crossing gates malfuntioned due to the snow

[richg1998]

I was quite surprised to see this video pop up on The Weather Channel about three hours after it happened. They are also a news channel at times. It hit the news quite fast. They showed it a number of times during the day and evening.

Rich

[ChuckCobleigh]

Further information:

http://fox13now.com/2017/01/24/uta-frontrunner-crashes-into-fedex-truck/

[Euclid]

I am pretty sure that that the signal maintainer received a report that the signals were false activating.  So he went to the crossing to check, and found them to be false activated, but then they became unactivated as they should be with no train present.  So he left the site.  Then when the train arrived, the signals failed to activate. 

The article seems to state this scenario.  But we won't know for sure until the investigation conclusion is released.

[samfp1943]

It seems that some Posters are 'out in the weeds' on this one. IMHO

To Balt's credit; Having recently retired and still pretty aware of the policies of his railroad's territory [ and most probably, generally, applicable across the board in the Industry].   I think his point was that the only railroad workers allowed to make adjustment or alteration in the operation of 'Crossing Protections' are those whose designated jobs are Signal Maintainers. (?)  Therefore his point is it was a Signal Maintainer who made the changes in the non-performing highway-rail crossing in question that was involved in the collision of the truck and the UTA Train.

 The morning news contained a video of the scene that was different from the onboard camera reported in the posted video. That video was taken from a point away from the crossing and clearly showed both autos and trucks moving across the UTA tracks.  In fact, that same video showed another FedEx truck had just cleared the track[going away from the crossing] moments before the other FedEx truck was hit.  It seemed fairly obvious there was an operatonal malfunction at the time of the collision with the train; based on that video.

 I still stand by my first post: You can bet this one will wind up in some legal action for remedy. Seems as if UTA was sort of "hung out to dry" by the statement quoted in the OP's posted article.

{ Generally, Most companies, will try to avoid having an un attributed statement made at the seen of an accident; They have professional accident investigators who will go to the scene of an incident to investigate, and make sure 'RULES' will be followed, and also be their 'spokesperson' to make media statements for attribution. Which does not seem to be the case at this scene?}

[schlimm]

The bottom line is that the crossing signal failed to do its job, whoever was at fault.  Fortunately no one was hurt.

[Euclid]

To clarify: When I said, “I don’t understand the point you [Balt] made about the employee taking the signals out of service,” I meant I do not understand how he infers that from the article.  I do understand how taking the signals out of service is done, if that was done.   

The issue here is claiming what the article “seems to state” versus what would have merely been possible in the incident.

 

Quote from the link:

“According to UTA, a preliminary investigation shows the crossing gates were up and the flashing lights and bells that normally indicate a train is approaching were not active.

"In the event of a power outage or lack of signal, crossing gates are programmed to default to the “down and active” position as a safety precaution. Preliminary information indicates the gates were affected by the severe ice and snow conditions at the time and were in the default “down and active” position, as they are programmed. After an employee responded to the location, the gates moved to the up position. The agency has never had an accident like this before, and UTA is investigating why and how it happened to ensure it doesn’t occur again," UTA wrote in a statement released Tuesday.”

 

In the second paragraph, “Preliminary information” is ambiguous.  Perhaps it means prior to the train arrival.  But “Preliminary investigation” is used in the preceding paragraph, and it apparently refers to prior to knowing the full story.

In any case, the phrase, “After an employee responded to the location” says nothing about what the employee did while at the location.” 

So when Balt says, “Article seems to state that the crossing protection had been taken out of service by a UTA signalman,” I don’t see anything in the article that seems to state that.   It is just one possibility that is apparently allowed by the article. 

Also there is nothing in the article that says or seems to say that the signalman deactivated the crossing protection, let alone doing so without coordinating it with the dispatcher; or that the dispatcher may have failed to pass it along to the crew; or that the crew may have ignored the information.  

[tree68]

Euclid

I don’t understand the point you made about the employee taking the signals out of service. 

It's simple - a signal maintainer can easily shut off the crossing protection from within the "hut."  This was at issue a few years back when a car (full of kids, I think) went through a crossing and go hit by an oncoming train.  The maintainer had allegedly de-activated the crossing and had forgotten to re-activate it.

If the misbehaving crossing was tying up traffic badly, he may have been trying to clear that.

What seems to have happened here is that a maintainer deactivated the crossing protection without coordinating it with the dispatcher, who would have issued alternative instructions (stop and flag, etc) to any trains that would be using the crossing.  Or the DS didn't pass along the information, or the crew ignored it.  

The maintainer may not have been aware of the imminent arrival of a train, so did not plan accordingly.

We don't know, and won't until we're told.

 

[K. P. Harrier]

Euclid (1-24):

The article said, “After an employee responded to the location, the gates moved to the up position.”  BaltACD said, the “Article SEEMS to state that the crossing protection had been taken out of service” …I personally interpret what the article said just as BaltACD did.  In that light, my assessment of the situation is that someone didn’t do their job correctly or got mixed up.

To All:

It is unknown how everybody’s experience with the top, first post's link has been, but it acts (at least for me) as a dangerous website.

Best,

K.P.

[Euclid]

BaltACD

Article seems to state that the crossing protection had been taken out of service by a UTA signalman account of continuous activation account of an ice storm.

How does the article seem to state that?

Quote from the link:

“According to UTA, a preliminary investigation shows the crossing gates were up and the flashing lights and bells that normally indicate a train is approaching were not active.

"In the event of a power outage or lack of signal, crossing gates are programmed to default to the “down and active” position as a safety precaution. Preliminary information indicates the gates were affected by the severe ice and snow conditions at the time and were in the default “down and active” position, as they are programmed. After an employee responded to the location, the gates moved to the up position. The agency has never had an accident like this before, and UTA is investigating why and how it happened to ensure it doesn’t occur again," UTA wrote in a statement released Tuesday.”

 

Whatever this report is trying to say, according to the video, the gates were up when the crash happened, then came down afterward, and then went up again before the video ended.  I don’t understand the point you made about the employee taking the signals out of service. 

[Euclid]

I read it.  I was looking for what you said about it. 

[BaltACD]

Euclid

tree68

Euclid

I would think those problems would short the circuit and cause false activation, which is mainly a nuisance.

And you'd be right.  The flip side is adjusting the sensitivity to account for the reduced resistance between the rails and not detecting trains when things dry out.

Maybe that is what happened.  That sounds like rather risky business.

Didn't anybody READ the article?

[Euclid]

tree68

 

Euclid

I would think those problems would short the circuit and cause false activation, which is mainly a nuisance. 

 

 

And you'd be right.  The flip side is adjusting the sensitivity to account for the reduced resistance between the rails and not detecting trains when things dry out.

 

 

Maybe that is what happened.  That sounds like rather risky business. 

[tree68]

Euclid

I would think those problems would short the circuit and cause false activation, which is mainly a nuisance. 

And you'd be right.  The flip side is adjusting the sensitivity to account for the reduced resistance between the rails and not detecting trains when things dry out.

 

[Euclid]

Norm48327

One of my signal maintainer friends tells me heavy rain, snow and ice can wreak havoc with the track circuits.

 

I would think those problems would short the circuit and cause false activation, which is mainly a nuisance.  That was apparently what was happening sporadically, so (maybe) the company took the signals out of service. But then, if that is so, the signals failed to activate which is deadly.  If the signals had been taken out of service, I assume they failed to activate because they had been taken out of service, and not because of water, ice, snow, and salt conditions.   

[tree68]

Norm48327

One of my signal maintainer friends tells me heavy rain, snow and ice can wreak havoc with the track circuits.

Not to mention the salt used to combat said snow and ice...

[richg1998]

I was also wondering if the pickup truck parked near the equipment box is the MOW crew.

Google train hits fedex truck. Not the first time but apparently not the drivers fault.

Rich

[Norm48327]

One of my signal maintainer friends tells me heavy rain, snow and ice can wreak havoc with the track circuits.