So I heard on the news the Obama Administration is going to try and take up this issue via regulation before they leave office. Believe it or not I am in favor of the two person crew minimum based on my past Army experience with moving heavy equipment with limited visibility. It is extremely dangerous in my view to do so with only one person and we saw one disaster already with a short line in Canada with a tank train in which the train rolled away and wiped out a whole town. Army requires two people to move a armored vehicle on post in built up or bivowac areas one of the persons has to be on the ground in front guiding the driver........that comes from years of experience where people got ran over from tanks in their sleeping bags while resting in their tents or on the open ground.
Same deal when loading armored vehicles on trains, min of two people required. You just need the second pair of eyes as well as oversight sometimes. So I hope they keep the crews at two people. Seriously doubt automation is at the point where the second person is no longer needed. I think the railroads are pushing the issue much too early and technology will not be able to make up for the missing second crew member.
I don't think the rails are "pushing" one-man so much as resisting having two-man set in Washington stone that will be next to impossible, politically, to relax in the future.
Let's not loose sight of the fact that the longest, heaviest trains in the world are regularly safely operated with single person crews.
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Point taken Buslist, but aren't those trains in Canada and Australia and operate through sparsely populated or unpopulated areas? Makes a difference.
I do not believe that the Lac Megantic wreck is evidence of inadequacy of one-person crews. It was caused by a failure to follow the rules of train securement. The same thing may have just as likely happened if there were five people in the crew.
Firelock76 Point taken Buslist, but aren't those trains in Canada and Australia and operate through sparsely populated or unpopulated areas? Makes a difference.
Yes those in Australia and South Africa are in sparsely populated areas but the argument presented in the opening post had nothing to do with population density, just the prevention of a locomotive running over someone in their sleeping bag (LOL).
dakotafred I don't think the rails are "pushing" one-man so much as resisting having two-man set in Washington stone that will be next to impossible, politically, to relax in the future.
"Pushing" --My thought is that the operative word here is 'pushing'. I would suspect that the motivations from the railroad side would be the 'beancounters' who would be looking at the cost-benefit analysis...ie: 'Cheaper is better' from their standpoint.
On the Union side, maybe they might view the situation as a reduction in dues payers /their bargaining power(?).
On the Regulators side(?) who knows(?) Could be anything from the writing of a new regulation, to the enforcement of the regulation (a need to add more enforcement(?).
From the actual employees sude: could be the fact that another pair of eyes can be a 'good thing', another pair of hands, similarly(?). I have driven both as a single operator, and as half of a 'team'. Simply, having another person along is a detrement to boredom, and an ability to get some relief when to the point of one being 'over-tired', can be helpful. Not to mention another point of view when faced with a problematic situation.
In the case of railroad employees (T&E) having to 'hold' at some point; for possibly hours while 'monitoring' radio traffic for some instructions, could be a factor. Particularly, if a single employee should 'nod-off' while waiting for possibly an extended period of time(?). Potentially, bad things can happen.
I know that many short line operators do run single person engine crews. The areas I am familiar with also seem to have another 'crewman' in as company vehicle, operating in conjunction with the crewman on the train. I would suspect that this practice might be 'workable' in many situations, but also a disadvantage in others.
Notice no where was the word 'Safety' or 'Safe Operation' mentioned... On the Regulator's side they mention having 'dead-man switches' and inward facing, and outward facing cameras on the Equipmet to monitor the 'Crew'.
There have been stories of each of these being rendered usesless by the effected crew members...Personally, I would hate to have to sit for an entire working shift being monitored by an unknown person, or having to answer for each of my 'actions' after the fact. "Scratching whateve might 'itch'", 'Having to stop for a personal call of nature'... One can go on, and on about the 'what if' situations when a single individual is alone, and operating the equipment assigned... To the point of rediculousness.
I think that single crews operating trains would create more problems than it would solve. Just my
Buslist Let's not loose sight of the fact that the longest, heaviest trains in the world are regularly safely operated with single person crews. .
The length and weight of a train, while a factor, isn't a huge one in the debate. Depending on where you are running, a long and heavy train can be easier to operate.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclid The same thing may have just as likely happened if there were five people in the crew.
But there wasn't. Just one.
Actually, BNSF is pushing for one person crews outside of any regulation being proposed yet.
Euclid I do not believe that the Lac Megantic wreck is evidence of inadequacy of one-person crews. It was caused by a failure to follow the rules of train securement. The same thing may have just as likely happened if there were five people in the crew.
I disagree, had there been a second person there as oversight, likely that accident would not have happened. I have seen accidents repeatedly happen in the Army with heavy equipment where only one person was allowed to perform a task with nobody checking. I had a crew member myself tighten the lug nuts on a front sprocket wheel of an armored vehicle, which I drove for about 80 miles on German roads then paused and did a vehicle check while I was paused........only half the lug nuts remained in that same sprocket wheel. Someone incorrectly told the idiot tightening the lug nuts that if he stood on the wrench they would be torgued to his body weight so the guy never used a torgue wrench as he should have. Could have rolled the armored vehicle if that sprocket wheel came off and cost me my life (crushed me in the rollover) but thankfully it was caught due to my checking the vehicle when I could after so many miles operation. Second pair of eyes should have been in play during maintenence.
Buslist Firelock76 Point taken Buslist, but aren't those trains in Canada and Australia and operate through sparsely populated or unpopulated areas? Makes a difference. Yes those in Australia and South Africa are in sparsely populated areas but the argument presented in the opening post had nothing to do with population density, just the prevention of a locomotive running over someone in their sleeping bag (LOL).
I'm laughing too! Quite honestly, if you're grabbing some Z's on a railroad track you deserve to get squashed!
zugmann Euclid But there wasn't. Just one.
Euclid
Who was told ... by someone else at the RTC ... to leave the sick unit running, and shut down everything else. And then was told not to return to the train a few minutes later. Then someone else, in the fire crew, shut the engine down without applying the automatic brake, and asked a trackworker with no knowledge of locomotives rather than the engineer (right there at the Auberge!) or anyone at the RTC if that was OK. Then you have a safety device bleeding off just the right amount of air not to release the automatic brakes.
Some of the cause was "single-man crewing" - but nowhere near enough to cause the accident. The only effective aspect would be whether Tom Harding was too tired to set more 'brakes', or was told to quit setting brakes too soon when another crewmember could have been assisting in putting them on ... and since he thought 'seven brakes' (did he think each locomotive counted as a 'full' braking unit? that was never quite clear to me in the TSB material) was adequate, why would two people not think the same? Likewise, while it's possible that a second person would question Farnham's decision to leave the deflicted unit running and shut down the good ones, I saw nothing in the report that indicated that two crewmembers would be ordered to do anything other than just what Harding alone was.
There are many reasons not to use single-man crews; Lac Megantic is not really a particularly serviceable one.
It blows my mind that a train would be allowed to be parked with the automatic released - granted you should never rely on air to hold anything, and you should always test your handbrakes thoroughly, but still.... But apparently that was how it was supposed to be done (from what I read).
Just like many disasters - it was the culmulation of stupid decisions that caused the major incident.
zugmann It blows my mind that a train would be allowed to be parked with the automatic released - granted you should never rely on air to hold anything, and you should always test your handbrakes thoroughly, but still.... But apparently that was how it was supposed to be done (from what I read). Just like many disasters - it was the culmulation of stupid decisions that caused the major incident.
So I concluded that the choice to leave the automatic released was okay, but setting insuficient hand brakes and relying on the independent brakes to hold the train was the fatal error, and a clear violation of the securment rules. Oddly, the engineer did perform a push-pull test, but he did that with the independent brakes applied.
The engineer demonstrated a lack of knowledge or lazy carelessness in the way he attempted to secure his train. Depending on the comunications, some of this carelessness and ignorance may have been affirmed by the engineer's supervisors as well.
Could an additional crew person have made a difference? Sure. He may have understood and been willing to abide by the proper procedure. Or he may have gone along with the engineer in his lax performance. A second person may have actually reinforced the lax attitude of the first person, thus giving confidence to the improper procedure. It would be like peer pressure reinforcing bad behavior.
There is no certain point at which "extra eyes" would have prevented this. Therefore adding extra people to the crew is not the proper solution. The only solution is to implement reasonable safety procedures that are sufficiently staffed to execute, teach them to the people responsible, and fire those people if they fail to properly execute them.
But if instead, you go down the road of adding extra eyes, it can always be argued that if extra eyes help, then the more extra eyes the better.
zugmannJust like many disasters - it was the culmulation of stupid decisions that caused the major incident.
I still wonder how the Sept. 15, 1958 NJT Bayonne Bay Bridge accident which killed 48 people
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/tragic-train-accident-new-jersey-1958-article-1.2360153
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newark_Bay_rail_accident
happened with two men in the cab. Ran through multiple signals and still went into the water. Did they both fall asleep? I believe that the second set of eyes may be a false sense of security. The systems need to be as idiot proof as possible but anything made and/or operated by man can fail. We have to accept some risk and be aware of it.
When
I have always gotten a laugh out of highway signs that say "TRAVEL AT YOUR OWN RISK" because since when don't you travel at your own risk? When you drive on the highway, you assume no one will drive the wrong way on a divided highway but it happens. Yesterday on I88 in Naperville is just the latest. Who would expect an airliner to run out of fuel but the plane carrying the soccor team that crashed did. It becomes very easy to become a fatalist. I am a fotunate man who had his wife fall asleep at the wheel on I65 doing 70 mph and we both walked away from the crash. Just wasn't our day but could have been so much worse. Good airbags, car design, no traffic and helpful people came to assist. Car was totaled. I was dozing and she succumbed to the boredum of the highway.
Associated Press, Mar. 16, 1987
Too Many Soldiers Getting Run Over by Tanks, Report Says
WASHINGTON (AP) –The Army, alarmed by the number of its soldiers who are being run over in their sleep by tanks and other vehicles, has launched a new safety campaign and demanded stricter disciplinary action by officers against troops who ignore safety guidelines.
''Getting run over by a tactical vehicle is not and should not be something soldiers expect to happen - especially when they are sleeping. But happen it does - and too often,'' according to a report appearing in Countermeasure, an Army safety publication.
The report said that from March 25, 1984 to Oct. 28, 1986, 22 sleeping soldiers were run over in 19 separate accidents during field training exercises.
''Seven of the soldiers died,'' the report said. ''Eight of the accidents involved tracked vehicles; the other 11 involved wheeled vehicles. In three of the accidents, two soldiers were run over.''
The report concluded that most of the accidents occurred for two reasons - soldiers went to sleep in areas where they shouldn't have, and vehicle drivers failed to send out crew members as walking guides to spot sleeping soldiers.
It found that 74 combat vehicles had been involved in accidents over the past three years because of improper ''ground guiding.'' Those accidents resulted in 71 injuries and 12 fatalities and left $1 million worth of damage in their wake, the report found.
The Army was unable Monday to provide precise figures on accidents involving sleeping soldiers before 1984, but acknowledged that such mishaps appeared to be increasing.
In launching the new safety campaign, Countermeasure included a photograph on its cover showing an armored personnel carrier bearing down on two apparently sleeping soldiers zipped into sleeping bags.
The safety report also included accounts of some recent accidents. Among them:
- After a training exercise, a soldier was told to sleep in a special area marked off by wire and lights. He ignored the order and bedded down some distance away in tall grass, only to be run over by a construction loader that moved through the area without a walking guide. The soldier died of his injuries.
- An armored personnel carrier got lost and ended up driving through a designated sleeping area - primarily because the vehicle's commander failed to dispatch a walking guide. A soldier awoke as the carrier ran over his foot.
- And in another case involving a personnel carrier, the vehicle broke down in the field and the crew was told ''to hold its position awaiting maintenance.'' While waiting, one soldier climbed off the carrier and went to sleep beside it. When another personnel carrier pulled up beside the disabled vehicle, the soldier was crushed.
To counter such mishaps, the safety publication called for a new education campaign to teach all soldiers a series of ''ground-guiding'' hand motions that are recognized by vehicle drivers. The Army's Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., also has issued a notice to officers, urging tough disciplinary action and an end to the labeling of such mishaps as accidents.
''The word 'accident' implies that no one was at fault,'' the notice stated.
''But the truth of the matter is that, in most cases when soldiers injure themselves or their fellow soldiers, they have violated written or oral policies or procedures. Now is the time ... to start calling it like it is and start taking disciplinary action against violators.''
Excerpt from Army Regulation 385-55, effective 13 April 1987
http://www.asse.org/assets/1/7/PreventionofMotorVehicleAccidents.pdf
Tactical operations put special demands on vehicle operators because of adverse environmental factors (rain, snow, mud, and dust), fatigue, and blackout operations. The following safety requirements apply:
(1) Before a tracked vehicle is started in an assembly area, a crewmember will walk completely around the vehicle to ensure that no one is in danger.
(2) Tracked vehicle movement within or through an assembly area requires ground guides front and rear. Guides must be able to see each other and be visible to the driver.
(3) Wheeled vehicles will normally require one ground guide; however, two ground guides will be used when backing a wheeled vehicle when vision is restricted.
It's always good to have a second pair of eyes in the cab, especially when something goes wrong.
Somebody has to decide whether it is worth paying for a second pair of eyes.
Electroliner 1935I still wonder how the Sept. 15, 1958 NJT Bayonne Bay Bridge accident which killed 48 people http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/tragic-train-accident-new-jersey-1958-article-1.2360153 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newark_Bay_rail_accident happened with two men in the cab. Ran through multiple signals and still went into the water. Did they both fall asleep? I believe that the second set of eyes may be a false sense of security. The systems need to be as idiot proof as possible but anything made and/or operated by man can fail. We have to accept some risk and be aware of it. When I have always gotten a laugh out of highway signs that say "TRAVEL AT YOUR OWN RISK" because since when don't you travel at your own risk? When you drive on the highway, you assume no one will drive the wrong way on a divided highway but it happens. Yesterday on I88 in Naperville is just the latest. Who would expect an airliner to run out of fuel but the plane carrying the soccor team that crashed did. It becomes very easy to become a fatalist. I am a fotunate man who had his wife fall asleep at the wheel on I65 doing 70 mph and we both walked away from the crash. Just wasn't our day but could have been so much worse. Good airbags, car design, no traffic and helpful people came to assist. Car was totaled. I was dozing and she succumbed to the boredum of the highway.
You had to go back to 1958 to find an example? That should tell you something. Of course accident investigations back then were not as carefully examined either because we did not have the technology nor the medical knowledge we do today.
Euclid Somebody has to decide whether it is worth paying for a second pair of eyes.
Ah, now there's the crux of the matter. Is this all about saving the salary of an additional crew member? That salary's a pittance when you consider the operating income.
Maybe the accountants think it's worthwhile, but another poster here once said words I'll never forget...
"Professionals know sometimes you have to spend money to make money. Accountants think you make money by not spending any money."
Putting an extra brain in the cab sounds like cheap insurance, no matter what it costs.
EuclidThe engineer demonstrated a lack of knowledge or lazy carelessness in the way he attempted to secure his train. Depending on the comunications, some of this carelessness and ignorance may have been affirmed by the engineer's supervisors as well.
Interesting on how being tired does not figure into your calculations of this accident as the Engineer specifically said he was trying to get to bed to get some sleep. No mention of fatigue......just he was reckless or lazy.
wanswheel Associated Press, Mar. 16, 1987 Too Many Soldiers Getting Run Over by Tanks, Report Says WASHINGTON (AP) –The Army, alarmed by the number of its soldiers who are being run over in their sleep by tanks and other vehicles, has launched a new safety campaign and demanded stricter disciplinary action by officers against troops who ignore safety guidelines. ''Getting run over by a tactical vehicle is not and should not be something soldiers expect to happen - especially when they are sleeping. But happen it does - and too often,'' according to a report appearing in Countermeasure, an Army safety publication. The report said that from March 25, 1984 to Oct. 28, 1986, 22 sleeping soldiers were run over in 19 separate accidents during field training exercises. ''Seven of the soldiers died,'' the report said. ''Eight of the accidents involved tracked vehicles; the other 11 involved wheeled vehicles. In three of the accidents, two soldiers were run over.'' The report concluded that most of the accidents occurred for two reasons - soldiers went to sleep in areas where they shouldn't have, and vehicle drivers failed to send out crew members as walking guides to spot sleeping soldiers. It found that 74 combat vehicles had been involved in accidents over the past three years because of improper ''ground guiding.'' Those accidents resulted in 71 injuries and 12 fatalities and left $1 million worth of damage in their wake, the report found. The Army was unable Monday to provide precise figures on accidents involving sleeping soldiers before 1984, but acknowledged that such mishaps appeared to be increasing. In launching the new safety campaign, Countermeasure included a photograph on its cover showing an armored personnel carrier bearing down on two apparently sleeping soldiers zipped into sleeping bags. The safety report also included accounts of some recent accidents. Among them: - After a training exercise, a soldier was told to sleep in a special area marked off by wire and lights. He ignored the order and bedded down some distance away in tall grass, only to be run over by a construction loader that moved through the area without a walking guide. The soldier died of his injuries. - An armored personnel carrier got lost and ended up driving through a designated sleeping area - primarily because the vehicle's commander failed to dispatch a walking guide. A soldier awoke as the carrier ran over his foot. - And in another case involving a personnel carrier, the vehicle broke down in the field and the crew was told ''to hold its position awaiting maintenance.'' While waiting, one soldier climbed off the carrier and went to sleep beside it. When another personnel carrier pulled up beside the disabled vehicle, the soldier was crushed. To counter such mishaps, the safety publication called for a new education campaign to teach all soldiers a series of ''ground-guiding'' hand motions that are recognized by vehicle drivers. The Army's Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., also has issued a notice to officers, urging tough disciplinary action and an end to the labeling of such mishaps as accidents. ''The word 'accident' implies that no one was at fault,'' the notice stated. ''But the truth of the matter is that, in most cases when soldiers injure themselves or their fellow soldiers, they have violated written or oral policies or procedures. Now is the time ... to start calling it like it is and start taking disciplinary action against violators.'' Excerpt from Army Regulation 385-55, effective 13 April 1987 http://www.asse.org/assets/1/7/PreventionofMotorVehicleAccidents.pdf Tactical operations put special demands on vehicle operators because of adverse environmental factors (rain, snow, mud, and dust), fatigue, and blackout operations. The following safety requirements apply: (1) Before a tracked vehicle is started in an assembly area, a crewmember will walk completely around the vehicle to ensure that no one is in danger. (2) Tracked vehicle movement within or through an assembly area requires ground guides front and rear. Guides must be able to see each other and be visible to the driver. (3) Wheeled vehicles will normally require one ground guide; however, two ground guides will be used when backing a wheeled vehicle when vision is restricted.
According to other forum readers here you should expect nothing but absolute perfection and no mistakes when moving a heavier, more restricted view, more complicated train.
Everything should be perfect all the time, crew rest time, weather, tracks, physical condition of cars, no trespassers, etc. So why would a second person make a difference?
Pretty sure the "Somebody" is "We" since we have a representative government still.
Some of these posts read like: "Thats not how it works on my train layout, I can drive the train myself there without any help".....
CMStPnP.....since we have a representative government still.
Norm
Railroads are just full of rules that are supposed to be followed. If they are not followed, there is no end of things that will kill people. There is also no end of extra procedures and more rules that would provide more back up in case of a failure to follow the basic current rules. An extra set of eyes will help, but only somewhat. There will still be danger everywhere, and there is no end of things that could improve safety. Where do you draw the line?
If the engineer of the train that ran away into Lac Megantic was too tired to comply with the securement rules, he should have told his supervisor that he could not complete the job and had them send out another man. There was no excuse for failing to secure the train.
zugmannIt blows my mind that a train would be allowed to be parked with the automatic released - granted you should never rely on air to hold anything, and you should always test your handbrakes thoroughly, but still.... But apparently that was how it was supposed to be done (from what I read).
They explained it, too: Remember the next guy was supposed to take over the train at about 7:00 (replacing the handle conveniently left on the seat for him)? If the automatic brake had been applied, he'd have to do an air test to ensure everything released properly - granted, one man could leave the independent applied to hold the train and check that the manually-applied brakes released cleanly when taken off, but since the train was left unattended there's still the need to walk the length of the consist twice. How many hours of useful on-duty time would that consume, especially coming back up a 2% grade in those weather conditions?
Of course politically you can't go wrong saying 'set the air' -- but there is nearly as much "wrong" trusting the automatic to hold an unattended train as having the independent do it (assuming the brake in each case is sufficient to hold the train when fully applied, which at Lac Megantic was not argued). The critical issue was that all the places where the automatic brake SHOULD have been applied ... all the great concatenation of stupidity ... it never was. And had it been, at almost any point short of when the tankers started piling up and accordioning each other, the accident might have been far less severe or outright avoided, single-man or otherwise. THAT to me is the most shocking and horrifying failure here.
Euclid zugmann It blows my mind that a train would be allowed to be parked with the automatic released - granted you should never rely on air to hold anything, and you should always test your handbrakes thoroughly, but still.... But apparently that was how it was supposed to be done (from what I read). Just like many disasters - it was the culmulation of stupid decisions that caused the major incident. I don't know whether not applying the automatic was a violation in the procedure, even though it might have prevented the catastrophe. I don't recall the TSB report saying it was a violation. I assumed that since securement must not rely on air brakes, the choice of whether to apply the automatic was moot. So I concluded that the choice to leave the automatic released was okay, but setting insuficient hand brakes and relying on the independent brakes to hold the train was the fatal error, and a clear violation of the securment rules. Oddly, the engineer did perform a push-pull test, but he did that with the independent brakes applied.
I don't know whether not applying the automatic was a violation in the procedure, even though it might have prevented the catastrophe. I don't recall the TSB report saying it was a violation. I assumed that since securement must not rely on air brakes, the choice of whether to apply the automatic was moot.
No, it was not ok. Had the automatic been set the train would not have run away as the leak would only led to a stronger brake application. While at the time there was no rule requiring the automatic brake to be set on an unattended train, Transport Canada has changed the rules since Lac-Megantic and now it is required, in addition to handbrakes. I think that makes their stance on the automatic brake's usefullness pretty clear.
Euclid The engineer demonstrated a lack of knowledge or lazy carelessness in the way he attempted to secure his train. Depending on the comunications, some of this carelessness and ignorance may have been affirmed by the engineer's supervisors as well. Could an additional crew person have made a difference? Sure. He may have understood and been willing to abide by the proper procedure. Or he may have gone along with the engineer in his lax performance. A second person may have actually reinforced the lax attitude of the first person, thus giving confidence to the improper procedure. It would be like peer pressure reinforcing bad behavior.
While the TSB stopped short of saying that one-man operation directly contributed to the incident, they did say this:
"[The TSB] conducted a survey of LEs and conductors to determine train securement practices at Nantes, and it showed that the number of hand brakes applied to trains varied. Two-person crews would consistently apply at least the minimum number of hand brakes specified in MMA’s GSIs. Some single-person train operators reported applying less than the minimum number of hand brakes."
Some of this can be attributed to MMA's poor training, but my experience working on the railroad has proven that 2 heads are indeed better than one, and we often have to remind each other to do or not do certain things. This is not due to stupidity or incompetence, but instead stems from fatigue and a stressful work environment involving lots of multitasking over long, irregular shifts.
Euclid There is no certain point at which "extra eyes" would have prevented this. Therefore adding extra people to the crew is not the proper solution. The only solution is to implement reasonable safety procedures that are sufficiently staffed to execute, teach them to the people responsible, and fire those people if they fail to properly execute them. But if instead, you go down the road of adding extra eyes, it can always be argued that if extra eyes help, then the more extra eyes the better.
I somewhat agree with that, but there is also a point where having too few crew members comprimises safety. For example, modern airliners can take off, fly and land all by themselves, yet we still have 2 people in the cockpit. They are needed in case anything goes wrong. The same goes for trains in that when running smoothly only the Engineer is needed, but for anything outside the cab you still need a second person.
I do take issue with your statement about firing people, it seems (like most modern railway managers and executives) you would rather fire immediately and ask questions later rather than try to re-educate and give them a second chance, which I believe almost everyone deserves. Human beings are not infallible and no one is perfect, not even you Euclid.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Euclid If the engineer of the train that ran away into Lac Megantic was too tired to comply with the securement rules, he should have told his supervisor that he could not complete the job and had them send out another man. There was no excuse for failing to secure the train.
Not how it works out here in the real world. Crews do just that all the time where I work, and the Company almost always ignores it and tells them to keep working.
The old "do it now, grieve it later" line. I'm sure you are familiar with that one.
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