PNWRMNMIt is not about the switch rate, it is about the line haul rate.
Okay, I see. So are they free to refuse to establish a haul rate, and to refuse to do the hauling? Other than losing the haul, are there no downsides to this tactic?
Euclid PNWRMNM It is not about the switch rate, it is about the line haul rate. Okay, I see. So are they free to refuse to establish a haul rate, and to refuse to do the hauling? Other than losing the haul, are there no downsides to this tactic?
PNWRMNM It is not about the switch rate, it is about the line haul rate.
Let us reason together.
Assume shipper is on line to railroad A. Assume shipper is opened to reciprocal switching by the STB. Assume railroad B could access the shipper via their newly acquired reciprocal switching rights at a cost of $400 per car. Assume line B has no rates in effect for the involved traffic. What would you do if you were railroad B?
The NITL wants you to poach A's traffic. Without some real numbers we can not determine how attractive this traffic is to you as B. This is kind of like shooting pool, the first shot is obvious, setting up the second is the mark of a skilled player.
The shipper will tell you what rate he wants and usually what he is paying, since he is trying to entice you with his traffic. He may or may not lie in this negotiation. You decide what rate you will offer and run your costs against it. Your costs may or may not be higher than railroad A's, you do not know. What you care about is your contribution margin, which is Revenue minus Variable Costs, which include A's switch charge if you absorb it. The first decision is whether or not the traffic is attractive, that is has a 'high enough" contribution margin. Lets assume it is. Should you take the shot at railroad A?
If you are smart you will remember that you too are exposed to poaching by railroad A. Maybe not this town, this commodity, this customer, but you are exposed, and probably about as much as A is to you on a system basis. This is analogous to the second shot in pool.
My point is that since line haul rates are generally not regulated the railroads as a group would be wise not to take the shot, since you should expect retailiation and all of the money you are saving the customers comes out of your collective pockets.
My hope is that the railroads do not step into the trap the NITL is trying to lay for them.
As to consequences if carriers are smart, the NITL, say the subject customers which is the same thing, get pissed off that the carriers avoided the trap. That is no change since they are pissed off now. No change. NITL could lobby to repeal Staggers. They have been doing that since 1980. I do not see any down side to the railroads being smart.
Whether they will or not is another question and your guess is as good as mine.
Mac
Mac,
I have no idea what they will do. But all I am asking is this: Are the railroads free to refuse to establish a rate for, and refuse to haul freight when they consider it to be poaching, as you describe it? What I mean is, are they free to do this without invoking government intervention that forces a rate be adopted and the forces the poaching freight to be hauled?
Euclid Mac, I have no idea what they will do. But all I am asking is this: Are the railroads free to refuse to establish a rate for, and refuse to haul freight when they consider it to be poaching, as you describe it? What I mean is, are they free to do this without invoking government intervention that forces a rate be adopted and the forces the poaching freight to be hauled?
There are two answers. The first is that as a common carrier the railroads must haul any freight offered that is in proper condition for transportation.
The second answer is since they are (largely) deregulated as to rates. This means they can offer any rate they want subject to R/VC ratio tests not to exceed certain thresholds, and the customer's willingness to challenge the rate as too high.
If you as railroad B do not want the business you can simply say so, you can say you do not have the equipment, which the poacher would be obligated to supply, or you can offer a non-competitive rate. That is what (partially) deregulated means.
PNWRMNM Euclid Mac, I have no idea what they will do. But all I am asking is this: Are the railroads free to refuse to establish a rate for, and refuse to haul freight when they consider it to be poaching, as you describe it? What I mean is, are they free to do this without invoking government intervention that forces a rate be adopted and the forces the poaching freight to be hauled? If you as railroad B do not want the business you can simply say so, you can say you do not have the equipment, which the poacher would be obligated to supply, or you can offer a non-competitive rate. That is what (partially) deregulated means. Mac
Well railroad B is the one who is asking to haul the load for a customer located on railroad A. Railroad B would therefore be the poacher. Railroad B is the one who is asking for the haul business. This requires railroad A to switch the car to railroad B as part of the reciprocal switching agreement. So why would railroad B then say they do not want the business?
Euclid So why would railroad B then say they do want not the business?
Two reasons.
One, because not all business is good business. Good business is that which is profitable enough to support reinvestment and throw something to net earnings. Most of the time the business will be less attractive to the poacher than to the current line haul carrier, for at least two reasons, one the poacher has to offer a cheaper rate (buy the business), and then has to pay the switch charge. Odds are the poacher's car hire expense will be more than the incumbent's as well, due to the delay inhearent in the two interchange moves required to do the switch.
Two, what goes around comes around aka Mutal Assured Destruction. If B poaches A, A can also poach B.
If you are B, are you willing to work cheap and risk starting a rate war that will bleed both you and A dry for the benefit of the shippers? It would make more sense to light your cigars with hundred dollar bills.
Okay, I can see that. Basically what you are saying is that reciprocal switching is dead on arrival because the relationship between competing lines is already sufficiently competitive to preclude the need for reciprocal switching to seek a lower shipping charge. So the railroads just stick together and railroad B does not offer a haul rate lower than railroad A. So, agreeing on the reciprocal switching charge is beside the point if railroad B is not interested in taking traffic away from railroad A on the basis of the reciprocal switching law.
The premise of reciprocal switching is that rates are too high due a lack of competition. So when reciprocal switching is mandated, the shippers expect rates to drop due to the added competition. So what happens when reciprocal switching does not bring rates down and a shipper thinks both railroads have their rates too high?
The 'Free Market' is free only when there are choices, i.e., competition, not monopolies. Capitalism 101.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
What I described above would be two railroads working in a competitive way without any monopoly. And their competing relationship already has the rate as low as either one wants it, so the competition is 100% effective in forcing the lowest possible rate. The shipper has choices, but neither choice offers a rate lower than the other. What is wrong with that?
Euclid Mac, Okay, I can see that. Basically what you are saying is that reciprocal switching is dead on arrival because the relationship between competing lines is already sufficiently competitive to preclude the need for reciprocal switching to seek a lower shipping charge. The premise of reciprocal switching is that rates are too high due a lack of competition. So when reciprocal switching is mandated, the shippers expect rates to drop due to the added competition. So what happens when reciprocal switching does not bring rates down and a shipper thinks both railroads have their rates too high?
Okay, I can see that. Basically what you are saying is that reciprocal switching is dead on arrival because the relationship between competing lines is already sufficiently competitive to preclude the need for reciprocal switching to seek a lower shipping charge.
As to paragraph 1 the customer is currently closed, so railroad B can not offer a rate so there is no RAIL competition. Odds are there is lots of other competition, but I am not in the mood to explain all that.
As to paragraph 2, the NITL/SHIPPERS' perception is that the rate is too high, despite the fact that it is low enough for the incumbent carrier to have the traffic. What happens IF nothing happens is that the NITL will loudly and longly accuse the railroads of collusion. The STB may or may not investigate. More work for the lawyers and lobbyists. More waste in overhead.
I understand what you said about my paragraph 2, but not what you said about paragraph 1. My illustration using railroads A and B is what you offered when you began this explanation. You had a customer located on railroad A in your example. How did the customer get closed as you say in your last post?
PNWRMNM Euclid Mac, Okay, I can see that. Basically what you are saying is that reciprocal switching is dead on arrival because the relationship between competing lines is already sufficiently competitive to preclude the need for reciprocal switching to seek a lower shipping charge. The premise of reciprocal switching is that rates are too high due a lack of competition. So when reciprocal switching is mandated, the shippers expect rates to drop due to the added competition. So what happens when reciprocal switching does not bring rates down and a shipper thinks both railroads have their rates too high? As to paragraph 1 the customer is currently closed, so railroad B can not offer a rate so there is no RAIL competition. Odds are there is lots of other competition, but I am not in the mood to explain all that. As to paragraph 2, the NITL/SHIPPERS' perception is that the rate is too high, despite the fact that it is low enough for the incumbent carrier to have the traffic. What happens IF nothing happens is that the NITL will loudly and longly accuse the railroads of collusion. The STB may or may not investigate. More work for the lawyers and lobbyists. More waste in overhead. Mac
Before someone chimes in "take this post to the Model Railroader forum", I am "wondering out loud" how a model railroad operating session would implement reciprocal switching?
The model railroad world has various levels at which participants in this hobby seek to replicate or simulate or represent various aspects of the 12 inch-to-the-foot scale world. Some people are satisfied to run trains "around in a loop" while indulging the fantasy that they are at the throttle of a locomotive. Other people want to more accurately conduct operations. The Model Railroader editorial staff has devoted considerable coverage to the model operations world and to tools such as card systems to direct the composition and breakup of trains to layout planning to give a model layout purpose in terms of where the trains go and where the cars are switched and why.
Apparently there are people who have planned and built model train layouts with "operations" in mind and are quite serious about this. I don't have such a layout, I don't know anyone with such a layout well enough to be invited to an "operating session" on their layout, and I have not seen such an operating session take place on a modular layout at a public model train show. If someone "operates" a layout at a show instead of merely runs trains around in a loop, this has never been apparent to me as an attendee of such shows.
But I have talked to a least one person who enjoys the "operations" side of the hobby. And Model Railroader, as I mention above, devotes considerable column space to this aspect.
Some of these operations sessions, I read, can get quite involved and quite specialized, with two-man train crews of driver and conductor, and with some hapless hobbyist sequestered in a windowless basement room where he can't see the model trains roll by, who is the "dispatcher" issuing "on-sheet" (OS) train orders to those train crews through a telephone headset.
The more I read about attempting to replicate real railroad operations on the model, the more it seems to me like work that someone would need to be paid to do rather than a recreational hobby.
But wouldn't the operations modeling people have twice as much model railroading "fun" if the layout were divided into two "railroad companies" connected by an interchange. And there were two dispatchers in windowless basement rooms, separated from everyone including each other apart from a telephone? And they had to coordinate everything.
And in addition to the two-man train crews and the sequestered dispatchers, one could enlist additional personnel from amongst one's inner circle of friends one invites to the house for these sessions. You could have "shippers", "railroad marketing guys", and yes, even "lawyers" and "government regulators." And if an operating session got heated, like the discussion on this thread, one could employ additional friends as "arbitrators" or "appeals-court judges"?
Oh, boy, the opportunities of model-train operation after reading this thread are growing by the minute. Now tell, which editor over at Model Railroader do you recommend that I pitch an article on "Incorporate the Surface Transportation Board's Proposed Competitive Switching Rule Into Your Next Operating Session for Even More Model Railroading Fun!"
If GM "killed the electric car", what am I doing standing next to an EV-1, a half a block from the WSOR tracks?
Euclid Mac, I understand what you said about my paragraph 2, but not what you said about paragraph 1. My illustration using railroads A and B is what you offered when you began this explanation. You had a customer located on railroad A in your example. How did the customer get closed as you say in your last post?
He did not get closed, he was never open.
A bit of history and some conjecture. As I mentioned before, I think the USRA (the Federal Government) invented reciprocal switching when they controlled the railroads during and after WW I. If so some bureaucrat said something like 'I decree that all customers in the NAME terminal area will be open to reciprocal switching, and the terminal area is defined as anything less than X miles from Y point'.
It is also possible, even likely, that the railroads agreed to reciprocal switching among themselves in the era when if it moved it moved by rail and there were multiple railroads in many towns. Better to get a switch charge than nothing when you did not serve the destination, but did serve the shipper. Either way there was/is a line, customers inside the line were/are open to reciprocal switch, outside they are not. In this case both the customer and the station are said to be closed to reciprocal switching.
That does not mean that the closed customer can not get to an interchange point, but he will have to pay a combination of line haul rates, and line haul rates for short moves tend to be high on a per mile basis for rational economic reasons that are beyond the scope of this discussion.
The NITL has only one goal which is cheaper freight rates. The railroads do not want to lower their rates. That is all this is about.
Euclid What I described above would be two railroads working in a competitive way without any monopoly. And their competing relationship already has the rate as low as either one wants it, so the competition is 100% effective in forcing the lowest possible rate. The shipper has choices, but neither choice offers a rate lower than the other. What is wrong with that?
Without access through reciprocal/competive switching, the customer has no choice of rails. It's a captive market.
"Oh, boy, the opportunities of model-train operation after reading this thread are growing by the minute. Now tell, which editor over at Model Railroader do you recommend that I pitch an article on "Incorporate the Surface Transportation Board's Proposed Competitive Switching Rule Into Your Next Operating Session for Even More Model Railroading Fun!"
-Paul Milenkovik
Well with the disagreements expressed so emphatically on this thread and occasionally on others, you would wonder what the outcomes would be with an actual physical presence of the opposing parties. However, I'm sure they are all really fine gentlemen.
Mind you I've attended a few N-Trak meets where all hell broke loose...I've seen entire trains sailing off the "end of track" and to the floor with a disgruntled party pulling out a module.
Ö¹Ö¹Ö¹Ö¹EUCLID, THERE ARE ALWAYS TRURCKS!!!!
daveklepper Ö¹Ö¹Ö¹Ö¹EUCLID, THERE ARE ALWAYS TRURCKS!!!!
This is all a tempest in a teapot. The NITL members are industries that have monopolies in their own fields of operation and sales. In the ICC era, they had the power to dictate rates and traffic to the carriers and took great delight in 'playing one against another' to the detriment of both carriers. Since Staggers and deregulation they have had to deal with the carriers that service them as business equals - and they feel agrieved at having to deal with their former 'underlings' as business equals. It is all as simple and complex as that.
I believe, when one does the math in constant dollars one will find that the NITL members are paying less for their transportation today than they were in the period they would like to recreate. Everybody wants 'free shipping'.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
schlimm Euclid What I described above would be two railroads working in a competitive way without any monopoly. And their competing relationship already has the rate as low as either one wants it, so the competition is 100% effective in forcing the lowest possible rate. The shipper has choices, but neither choice offers a rate lower than the other. What is wrong with that? Without access through reciprocal/competive switching, the customer has no choice of rails. It's a captive market.
The scenario that I described above includes reciprocal switching having been established. The customer does have a choice. There is no captive market. But the alternative railroad will not underprice the originating railroad.
I think that reciprocal switching is based on a flawed premise.
Some rail customers who are captive to one railroad believe that they are being overcharged on shipping rates, and that this is due to a lack of competition. So they ask the government to mandate reciprocal switching which gives many captive rail customers a second choice of railroads to ship on. This will provide the needed competition.
The presence of the alternate railroad acts as a watchdog to assure that the railroad directly serving a customer does not overcharge the customer. This is because if the direct railroad overcharges a customer, the alternate railroad will underbid the direct railroad with a fairer rate because they are a competitor and they want the business. All of that is fine economic theory.
The problem is that this theory goes beyond just recognizing that fact a railroad has no competition for a captive shipper. It goes beyond that by embracing the unprovable belief that captive customers are being overcharged based only on the evidence that competition is lacking. That is the premise that mandated reciprocal switching is based on. But it is a flawed premise.
While competition assures fairness, it does not necessarily follow that a lack of competition assures unfairness. It may very well be the case that there is a perfectly fair rate even without any competition. But the premise of reciprocal switching does not accept that as a possibility. So what will be the conclusion when a captive shipper turns to an alternate carrier under reciprocal switching and does not receive a lower rate? The only conclusion can be that both carriers are agreeing to keep the price unfairly high. That is the result of the reciprocal switching premise being flawed. What will be the remedy?
Free market economics says that competition assures greater efficiencies and pricing based on non-skewed cost-demand curves. Do you dispute that? Competitive switching simply attempts to provide alternatives for captive customers.
schlimmFree market economics says that competition assures greater efficiencies and pricing based on non-skewed cost-demand curves. Do you dispute that? Competitive switching simply attempts to provide alternatives for captive customers.
No, I don't dispute any of that. My point is that the captive shippers who advocate reciprocal switching will expect lower rate from the alternative carrier. Yet economic theory does not guarantee that. So the expectation is flawed. It is based on the shipper sense of victimization in that the carrier will always cheat.
Therefore the shipper is not prepared for the fact that there may be fairness without reciprocal switching. So if reciprocal switching fails to lower a rate, the shipper will blame the carrier and seek a remedy. The only possible remedy for such a shipper is a regulation on the rate.
Euclid schlimm Free market economics says that competition assures greater efficiencies and pricing based on non-skewed cost-demand curves. Do you dispute that? Competitive switching simply attempts to provide alternatives for captive customers. No, I don't dispute any of that. My point is that the captive shippers who advocate reciprocal switching will expect lower rate from the alternative carrier. Yet economic theory does not guarantee that. So the expectation is flawed. It is based on the shipper sense of victimization in that the carrier will always cheat. Therefore the shipper is not prepared for the fact that there may be fairness without reciprocal switching. So if reciprocal switching fails to lower a rate, the shipper will blame the carrier and seek a remedy. The only possible remedy for such a shipper is a regulation on the rate.
schlimm Free market economics says that competition assures greater efficiencies and pricing based on non-skewed cost-demand curves. Do you dispute that? Competitive switching simply attempts to provide alternatives for captive customers.
I suggest you examine market economics. The point of competition (not monopolies) is the lowest prices consistent with customer demand and supplier production/offers. If there is only one railroad, or utility, that is a monopoly, period, by any definition. And the price curve is thus distorted.
When Staggers was passed, there was far more competition among more rail lines than now, 36 years later. Link to study
schlimmI suggest you examine market economics. The point of competition (not monopolies) is the lowest prices consistent with customer demand and supplier production/offers. If there is only one railroad, or utility, that is a monopoly, period, by any definition. And the price curve is thus distorted.
You are missing my point. I am not denying the market benefits of competition.
My point, in the application of reciprocal switching, is that there is an unfounded expectation that adding competition will always lower prices. That is not economics. Economics states that competition will prevent prices from becoming artifificially high. But if prices are not artificially high, adding competition will not lower them. It may or may not be the case that rail rates are artificially too high. In cases where that is not so, even with a captive shipper, adding reciprocal switching will not cause the alternative shipper to under-bid the railroad directly serving the shipper.
But let me ask you this: Suppose you are a captive shipper who believes the railroad serving you is over-pricing the service. So you get reciprocal switching which provides you with an alternate carrier. Then the alternate carrier quotes a slightly higher price than the carrier that directly serves your business. How would you react?
Competition will not always lower prices. Only a fool thinks that. Beware of anyone who reframes a discussion in terms such as "always" and "never" as they are sophistry. But with competitive switching, with at least some competion, there is a higher probability of a market-determined price . In a truly free market, there would be many choices. Rails are like utilities were in terms of supplier of product (as opposed to distributor).
Why are you so avoidant of an attempt to make rails more market-sensitive?
Your question is just another of your endless word games.
schlimmCompetition will not always lower prices. Only a fool thinks that. Beware of anyone who reframes a discussion in terms such as "always" and "never" as they are sophistry. But with competitive switching, with at least some competion, there is a higher probability of a market-determined price . In a truly free market, there would be many choices. Rails are like utilities were in terms of supplier of product (as opposed to distributor). Why are you so avoidant of an attempt to make rails more market-sensitive? Your question is just another of your endless word games.
When I said there is an unfounded expectation that adding competition will always lower prices, I did not mean that is my expectation, if that is what you mean in your reply.
I was referring to it being an expectation of the advocates of reciprocal switching. With them, there seems to be a foregone conclusion that rates are too high. How does anyone know that rates are too high? Certainly, the people who are calling for reciprocal switching believe that rates are too high. They conclude that rates are too high simply because they can see a way to add competition. They believe that competition reduces rates, so from that, they conclude that rates are too high. They have even calculated how much they expect to save.
There may be some rate reduction or there may be none. If reciprocal switching does not cause rates to drop, I don’t think the reciprocal switching boosters are going to say, “Well, we were wrong. Rates are not too high, but at least we discovered the truth, and we also added some competition, so that is a good thing. At least we now have choices.”
Euclid schlimm Competition will not always lower prices. Only a fool thinks that. Beware of anyone who reframes a discussion in terms such as "always" and "never" as they are sophistry. But with competitive switching, with at least some competion, there is a higher probability of a market-determined price . In a truly free market, there would be many choices. Rails are like utilities were in terms of supplier of product (as opposed to distributor). Why are you so avoidant of an attempt to make rails more market-sensitive? Your question is just another of your endless word games. When I said there is an unfounded expectation that adding competition will always lower prices, I did not mean that is my expectation, if that is what you mean in your reply. I was referring to it being an expectation of the advocates of reciprocal switching. With them, there seems to be a foregone conclusion that rates are too high. How does anyone know that rates are too high? Certainly, the people who are calling for reciprocal switching believe that rates are too high. They conclude that rates are too high simply because they can see a way to add competition. They believe that competition reduces rates, so from that, they conclude that rates are too high. They have even calculated how much they expect to save. There may be some rate reduction or there may be none. If reciprocal switching does not cause rates to drop, I don’t think the reciprocal switching boosters are going to say, “Well, we were wrong. Rates are not too high, but at least we discovered the truth, and we also added some competition, so that is a good thing. At least we now have choices.”
schlimm Competition will not always lower prices. Only a fool thinks that. Beware of anyone who reframes a discussion in terms such as "always" and "never" as they are sophistry. But with competitive switching, with at least some competion, there is a higher probability of a market-determined price . In a truly free market, there would be many choices. Rails are like utilities were in terms of supplier of product (as opposed to distributor). Why are you so avoidant of an attempt to make rails more market-sensitive? Your question is just another of your endless word games.
For enlightenment, read the scholarly article I linked.
I will note that the endless arguments on price have completely ignored the other half of the puzzle, namely service on the long haul portion. Sometimes a shipper is more concerned with reliable handling, or has fought with Railroad A in another corridor and wants to avoid them as much as possible.
John
schlimm Murphy Siding ergo, you've just proved that the term competitive switching does not appear in the section. Not literally, of course, but in context it his the heart of the matter. Where do you think the STB got the idea and basis for its proposal? From outer space? Are you even capable of inferential reading? It is a skill that is sadly in decline in our schools. But more likely, you are engaging in another of your silly games. One thing stands out in this "discussion." Many folks have never read the Staggers Act itself, just about it.
Murphy Siding ergo, you've just proved that the term competitive switching does not appear in the section.
Not literally, of course, but in context it his the heart of the matter. Where do you think the STB got the idea and basis for its proposal? From outer space? Are you even capable of inferential reading? It is a skill that is sadly in decline in our schools. But more likely, you are engaging in another of your silly games.
One thing stands out in this "discussion." Many folks have never read the Staggers Act itself, just about it.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
PNWRMNM Murphy Siding You're making it too difficult. It's not practical to gouge the other guy today, because he would then feel obligated to gouge back tomorrow and payback's a...banana. Murphy, I think you are looking at the wrong end of the transaction. The big deal is not whether the new switch charge is $300 or $500, but the NITL will want it as low as they can con the STB into. Likewise the carriers will want it be as high as possible to help them resist the temptation to poach the newly open traffic from the other guy. The NITL wants expanded reciprocal switching for just one reason, they want to be able to threaten to divert line haul traffic from the newly opened facilities to DRIVE THEIR RATES DOWN. If threats fail then they will divert. Either way the incumbent carrier looses and the shipper gains, just like taking candy from a baby. The point I was trying to make is that the carriers have the ability to nullify this whole production simply by refusing to establish a rate to poach the other guy's traffic. They can do this without any illegal conspiracy simply by keeping the knives sheathed, which is what NITL obviously does not want. Think about the Cold War doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Logically the NITL plan is to set up that game. The question is whether the railroads will be smart enough NOT to play. In the regulated days this plan to separate the railroads from their money would not work since the rates on every commodity from every point to every other point were equalized regrdless of route AS A MATTER OF LAW. In those days reciprocal switching enabled shippers to reach points not on the origin road, or to use a route with supperior service, and enabled the rail system, taken as a whole, to provide the economy with a wide variety of route options. Since there were so many customers and routes, I suspect in most cases it was not worth the clerical effort to identify "reprisal" switches and find out what the customer's issue was. Of course the carriers had field marketing guys who could take a customer out to lunch. No such thing now. Mac
Murphy Siding You're making it too difficult. It's not practical to gouge the other guy today, because he would then feel obligated to gouge back tomorrow and payback's a...banana.
You're making it too difficult. It's not practical to gouge the other guy today, because he would then feel obligated to gouge back tomorrow and payback's a...banana.
Murphy,
I think you are looking at the wrong end of the transaction. The big deal is not whether the new switch charge is $300 or $500, but the NITL will want it as low as they can con the STB into. Likewise the carriers will want it be as high as possible to help them resist the temptation to poach the newly open traffic from the other guy.
The NITL wants expanded reciprocal switching for just one reason, they want to be able to threaten to divert line haul traffic from the newly opened facilities to DRIVE THEIR RATES DOWN. If threats fail then they will divert. Either way the incumbent carrier looses and the shipper gains, just like taking candy from a baby.
The point I was trying to make is that the carriers have the ability to nullify this whole production simply by refusing to establish a rate to poach the other guy's traffic. They can do this without any illegal conspiracy simply by keeping the knives sheathed, which is what NITL obviously does not want. Think about the Cold War doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Logically the NITL plan is to set up that game. The question is whether the railroads will be smart enough NOT to play.
In the regulated days this plan to separate the railroads from their money would not work since the rates on every commodity from every point to every other point were equalized regrdless of route AS A MATTER OF LAW. In those days reciprocal switching enabled shippers to reach points not on the origin road, or to use a route with supperior service, and enabled the rail system, taken as a whole, to provide the economy with a wide variety of route options. Since there were so many customers and routes, I suspect in most cases it was not worth the clerical effort to identify "reprisal" switches and find out what the customer's issue was. Of course the carriers had field marketing guys who could take a customer out to lunch. No such thing now.
Murphy Siding I don't know if I can agree with your line of thinking. If you can add things that aren't there by way of context, then anyone can as well and what do you have? You infer something is in there, I infer it is not. Tie? Thank you for the inferential insult. That skill must have been declining since I graduated high school in 1979. Would you like me to yell at the kids to get off your lawn for you?
I don't know if I can agree with your line of thinking. If you can add things that aren't there by way of context, then anyone can as well and what do you have? You infer something is in there, I infer it is not. Tie?
Thank you for the inferential insult. That skill must have been declining since I graduated high school in 1979. Would you like me to yell at the kids to get off your lawn for you?
Maybe this will help. You're never too old to learn: Reading
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