Nine Dead 150 Injured - Never Should Have Happened

[xjqcf]

From what I have read on this incident it appears that the dispatcher authorized the train at Bad Aibling to pass the exit stop signal to proceed toward Kolbermoor. This he did by activating a so called substitute aspect (three white lights arranged in an upward-pointing triangle). The engineer, following standard proceedures, proceeded past the signal, pressing an override button on the operator's panel as he passed over the still activated 2000 kHz inductive magnet which is used on most lines in Germany as part of the PZB train protection system at no more than 40 kph until clear of the points after which he could proceed at track speed; within the same time frame, however, the other train had left Kolbermoor toward Bad Aibling on a green signal, setting up the collision on a blind curve.

 

The signalling system allows this display of a substitute signal if the signal cannot be cleared, but only after some specific proceedures, which I have not yet been able to determine. It has been alleged by the German prosecutor that these proceedures were not done. Why these proceedures were not followed has not been made public, and one can only speculate. I would guess the dispatcher, wanting to avoid further delay (The train was already 4 or 5 minutes late; tight standards in Germany compared to the U. S.), had lost sight of the fact that the Kolbermoor train was already on the way and just assumed it was some unexplained signal failure.

 

The question as to why the substitute signal was displayable is misplaced; the question really is should any human proceedure permit the override of a protective state from a machine, such as the signal system here? 

Such overrides are also possible here in the U. S. although they are mostly verbal, such as NORAC rule 241 or the various proceedures under GCOR 9.12. The bottom line is that no technology is 100% effective; most are designed in a way to try to design them to "fail safe," in this case meaning stop and stay. While safe this means nothing moves until there is some form of human intervention ranging from waiting until someone confirms the danger which triggered the stop signal or discovers and corrects the fault, which could be hours in length. Perhaps, as some have suggested, a "second pair of eyes" is needed such as a chief dispatcher, who must also operate an independent control to authorize the overrride, so that the dispatcher can't just independently do so; this should be doable with causing much more unreasonable delays. 

[schlimm]

The investigation has gone beyond that.

"Authorities in the southern German city of Rosenheim arrested a 39-year-old signals control officer on Tuesday, whom they accused of negligent homicide for playing games on his mobile phone just before a fatal train crash in February. They alleged that he attempted to make up for his inattention by sending an emergency message, which the train drivers ultimately did not hear. Investigators believe that "the accused was distracted." Prosecutors said the man admitted to playing a game on his phone, but denied that that had distracted him. Two commuter trains collided on a single-track line near Bad Aibling in Bavaria on February 9. The crash left four train drivers and seven passengers dead and more than 80 people injured. Within a week of the case, the prosecutor in charge of the case had identified human error as the cause. The dispatcher now faces a heavier penalty than he had shortly after the accident, when authorities had accused him of sending the wrong signal."

[Deggesty]

schlimm

The investigation has gone beyond that.

"Authorities in the southern German city of Rosenheim arrested a 39-year-old signals control officer on Tuesday, whom they accused of negligent homicide for playing games on his mobile phone just before a fatal train crash in February. They alleged that he attempted to make up for his inattention by sending an emergency message, which the train drivers ultimately did not hear. Investigators believe that "the accused was distracted." Prosecutors said the man admitted to playing a game on his phone, but denied that that had distracted him. Two commuter trains collided on a single-track line near Bad Aibling in Bavaria on February 9. The crash left four train drivers and seven passengers dead and more than 80 people injured. Within a week of the case, the prosecutor in charge of the case had identified human error as the cause. The dispatcher now faces a heavier penalty than he had shortly after the accident, when authorities had accused him of sending the wrong signal."

 

It is a mistake to employ infants to look after the welfare of other people. Of course, I am confident that this infant was not asked if he played games when he was supposed to be working. He obviously did not realize the gravity of  his task.

[Firelock76]

I'm going to succumb to the urge to be nasty just this once...

You know, in the old days of the Prussian Railways this incompetant would have been left alone in a room with a Luger loaded with one cartridge with the expectation he'd do the honorable thing.

Like I said, just this once.

There's few things sadder than someone who's old enough to know better, and doesn't.

[schlimm]

Negligent homicide under the German criminal code carries a sentence of up to five years in prison and/or a fine.

[Euclid]

 

xjqcf

The question as to why the substitute signal was displayable is misplaced; the question really is should any human proceedure permit the override of a protective state from a machine, such as the signal system here? 

That is my question too.  If you have two trains heading for a conflicting route, the signals should automatically prevent them from colliding.  If the trains are far enough apart, you can take the signal away from one train and give it to the other because there will be enough space to get the train losing its signal room to stop.

But in this case, it sounds like this manual override imposed a stop signal on a train that was already past it.  So, I don’t get the functionality of this system.  What happened should not have been possible.  We like to speak of red herrings here, and I would say that the dispatcher playing a video game is the reddest of red herrings.

If the distraction of a video game is sufficient to cause this disaster, then a thousand other distractions would be capable of producing the same result.  Railroading has the functionality to physically prevent route conflict, and uses it in cases where the consequences are sufficiently dire.