daveklepperIf someone can produce EVIDENCE, not opinion, that I am wrong in this memory, I will be glad to be corrected.
Here's a thought, rather than rely on sketchy memories of things you probably didn't understand 40 years ago, why don't you produce some EVIDENCE that supports your opinion and establishes that you are correct.
So far every single person that actually deals with ATC on a daily basis has told you you are mistaken. Since you are the one contradicting the professionals, YOU need to provide EVIDENCE that your recollection is correct. We have no responsibility to provide evidence of ghosts.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
dehusmanThe train crews sees the restricting signal, but because they always get a restricting signal and they "know" the restricting signal is for the curve and they "know" they get a clear signal when they get out of the curve, they treat the restricting signal like just a speed restriction instead of a restricting signal. The go around the curve and run into the rear end of the train ahead.
That wouldn't be the fault of the signal system. That's the fault of the crew that is not following the signals and the rules.
Assuming gets your killed out here.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
dehusmanHere's a thought, rather than rely on sketchy memories of things you probably didn't understand 40 years ago, why don't you produce some EVIDENCE that supports your opinion and establishes that you are correct. So far every single person that actually deals with ATC on a daily basis has told you you are mistaken.
Here's another thought: do a little research. According to Amtrak (in 2008) "ATC" was the term for "CSS + SCS" (the latter, explicitly 'speed control system', being implemented after 1952, nominally as one of the responses to the Spirit of St. Louis wreck in 1950.
Meanwhile, LIRR had a separate speed-control system, with its own distinct speed display (at least some implementation after its own high-profile wrecks in the early Fifties, specifically Kew Gardens). This was ASC, Rule 409, I think.
Bennett Levin and Hart of the NTSB both clearly indicate that a speed limiting function was implemented on CSS using a 'phantom device' that injects one of the restricting indications -- separated IIRC via the cab-signal/lsl 'drops' Zug referred to -- into a section of a formal CSS block. This is what would have been in use for the curve at Shore.
There is a useful primer on position-light CSS and some of its improvements here.
Overmod There is a useful primer on position-light CSS and some of its improvements here.
interesting! Amoung other things it puts to bed the false claim that the CNW ATC system had civil speed enforcement. I was pretty sure it didn't but hard to find proof!
Buslistinteresting! Amoung other things it puts to bed the false claim that the CNW ATC system had civil speed enforcement. I was pretty sure it didn't but hard to find proof!
Where and how?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm Buslist interesting! Amoung other things it puts to bed the false claim that the CNW ATC system had civil speed enforcement. I was pretty sure it didn't but hard to find proof! Where and how?
Buslist interesting! Amoung other things it puts to bed the false claim that the CNW ATC system had civil speed enforcement. I was pretty sure it didn't but hard to find proof!
follow and read the hotlink in my quote.
I read it before and it clearly supports the idea the CNW ATC restricts speed. Perhaps your term "civil speed enforcement" has some other meaning? The Winter 1984 issue of NorthWestern Lines is devoted to ATC on the CNW. Perhaps Jeff Hergert or Carl could elucidate?
[from Railroad Net by an engineer]: in exCNW Automatic Train Control territory (two aspect cab signal, clear or restricting), when the cab signal goes to Restricting above 40 MPH we have 6 seconds to go to suppression. This gives a full service application but suppresses the penalty application from occuring. If for some reason you can't get to suppression within the 6 seconds, the penalty application takes the air and reduces the equalizing resevoir to 0 psi at a service rate. Our rules require us to stop anytime an air brake application over 18psi is made before attempting a release.
[from Wiki]: "ATC systems in the United States are almost always integrated with existing continuous cab signalling systems. The ATC comes from electronics in the locomotive that implement some form of speed control based on the inputs of the cab signalling system.[7] If the train speed exceeds the maximum speed allowed for that portion of track, an overspeed alarm sounds in the cab. If the engineer fails to reduce speed and/or make a brake application to reduce speed a penalty brake application is made automatically.[7] Due to the more sensitive handling and control issues with North American freight trains, ATC is almost exclusively applied to passenger locomotives in both inter-city and commuter service with freight trains making use of cab signals without speed control."
Yes, it's hard to find anyone who knows how CNW's ATC works on this forum.
Jeff
PS. I haven't been following this thread for a while.
jeffhergertYes, it's hard to find anyone who knows how CNW's ATC works on this forum.
Fortunately we do have some ...
JeffHergert from 2009 The biggest difference between ATC and ATS or coded cab signals (original UP) is that with ATC you can acknowledge the signal change AND have to slow down or stop. The other systems you can acknowledge the change and keep on going at track speed if you wanted. ... [t]he ex-CNW's ATC ... uses a two aspect cab signal, Clear or Restricting. What happens when the cab signal changes from Clear to Restricting depends on the speed you're travelling at. Above 40mph you'll get a high speed audible warning. You then have 6 seconds to place the automatic brake valve in suppression or you get a penalty (not emergency) brake application. The audible alarm (air operated whistle on older equipment, electronically generated tone on newer equipment) will sound continuously until speed is below 40mph. The tone changes to the low speed alarm and it may be acknowledged and will go silent. Our current rules require freight trains to stop when making a heavy brake application. Below 40mph but above 22mph you'll get the low speed alarm. It can be acknowledged but speed must be brought under 22mph within 70 seconds or you'll get a penalty application. Below 22mph but above 17mph you'll get a different low speed alarm that can't be acknowledged but won't take the air unless speed goes over 22mph. Below 17mph you get the low speed alarm and can acknowledge it to silence it. Intermittently, about every 90 seconds or so, there will be an alertor type warning that must be acknowledged as long as you are moving. I kind of simplified some of the terminology, but that's the basics of our ATC. I know I wrote this before, but I gave up looking for it. Easier just to write it again.
The biggest difference between ATC and ATS or coded cab signals (original UP) is that with ATC you can acknowledge the signal change AND have to slow down or stop. The other systems you can acknowledge the change and keep on going at track speed if you wanted.
... [t]he ex-CNW's ATC ... uses a two aspect cab signal, Clear or Restricting. What happens when the cab signal changes from Clear to Restricting depends on the speed you're travelling at.
Above 40mph you'll get a high speed audible warning. You then have 6 seconds to place the automatic brake valve in suppression or you get a penalty (not emergency) brake application. The audible alarm (air operated whistle on older equipment, electronically generated tone on newer equipment) will sound continuously until speed is below 40mph. The tone changes to the low speed alarm and it may be acknowledged and will go silent. Our current rules require freight trains to stop when making a heavy brake application.
Below 40mph but above 22mph you'll get the low speed alarm. It can be acknowledged but speed must be brought under 22mph within 70 seconds or you'll get a penalty application.
Below 22mph but above 17mph you'll get a different low speed alarm that can't be acknowledged but won't take the air unless speed goes over 22mph. Below 17mph you get the low speed alarm and can acknowledge it to silence it.
Intermittently, about every 90 seconds or so, there will be an alertor type warning that must be acknowledged as long as you are moving.
I kind of simplified some of the terminology, but that's the basics of our ATC. I know I wrote this before, but I gave up looking for it. Easier just to write it again.
Easier still if you don't have to write it yet again...
Some supplemental information (lightly edited) from DPMan, later in the same thread from 2009:
TLeary01 ... the CNW ATC system does not require a heavy brake application to comply with a high speed restricting signal. If the train speed is already less than 40 mph or only slightly above, then a light to moderate service application will reduce the speed to less than 40 mph within the 6 seconds, [and] there will be no penalty. If service brake application can reduce train speed to less than 22 mph within 70 seconds, there will be no low speed penalty. In the real world however, if a heavy train (say a loaded coal train) is moving at 60 mph and a high speed [restricting] signal occurs, only the immediate movement ot the automatic brake handle to Suppression can forestall the penalty before the 6 seconds are up which leaves the engineer no choice but to place the handle into Suppression position [which] also makes the automatic brake produce a straight-away full service brake pipe reduction. All the engineer can do [then] is to bail off and brace for a strong slack run-in... There is another way that the high speed penalty can be prevented. Apply the independent brake above 30 psi. This works but the risk of flattening locomotive wheels is high. When locomotives first employed high friction composition brake shoes CNW used a J1.4-14 brake cylinder relay valve that produced a maximum of 64 psi at full independent. UPRR used a J200 brake cylinder relay valve that produced 90 psi at full independent. When UPRR locomotives were run through on CNW they would rerurn with flat spots on the wheels. It was found that CNW engineers were using a 35 - 40 psi independent application to prevent the high speed penalty but they did not realize that the trailing UPRR locomotives were getting more than 50 psi brake cylinder. The fix for UPRR locomotives was to change the brake cylinder relay valves to J1.6-16 which produced independent brake cylinder pressures only slightly higher than the CNW locomotives.
There is another way that the high speed penalty can be prevented. Apply the independent brake above 30 psi. This works but the risk of flattening locomotive wheels is high. When locomotives first employed high friction composition brake shoes CNW used a J1.4-14 brake cylinder relay valve that produced a maximum of 64 psi at full independent. UPRR used a J200 brake cylinder relay valve that produced 90 psi at full independent. When UPRR locomotives were run through on CNW they would rerurn with flat spots on the wheels. It was found that CNW engineers were using a 35 - 40 psi independent application to prevent the high speed penalty but they did not realize that the trailing UPRR locomotives were getting more than 50 psi brake cylinder. The fix for UPRR locomotives was to change the brake cylinder relay valves to J1.6-16 which produced independent brake cylinder pressures only slightly higher than the CNW locomotives.
Buslist Overmod There is a useful primer on position-light CSS and some of its improvements here. interesting! Amoung other things it puts to bed the false claim that the CNW ATC system had civil speed enforcement. I was pretty sure it didn't but hard to find proof!
What is the writer's definition?
Johnny
Deggesty Buslist Overmod There is a useful primer on position-light CSS and some of its improvements here. interesting! Amoung other things it puts to bed the false claim that the CNW ATC system had civil speed enforcement. I was pretty sure it didn't but hard to find proof! At the mention of "civil speed enforcement," I thought of a connection between the railroad signals and civil (local police, state police, or some other political law enforcement). police. To me, such an idea is absolutely asinine. What is the writer's definition?
At the mention of "civil speed enforcement," I thought of a connection between the railroad signals and civil (local police, state police, or some other political law enforcement). police. To me, such an idea is absolutely asinine.
Civil speed evforcement is the term often used in the signal community to indicate speed restrictions imposed by route conditions such curvature as opposed to those imposed by operating conditions. You will find it frequently used in technical discussions of the NEC signal system for example.
Thank you, Buslist. So, it has no connection with civil government.
DeggestyThank you, Buslist. So, it has no connection with civil government.
No, but it does with civil engineering.
Remember that this is what the "C" in ACSES stands for.
Yes, I have always thought of MC as being a courteous man.
I have to confess that I am not familiar with "ACSES." Now, I know it is a civil organization (as in civil engineering).
zugmann dehusman The train crews sees the restricting signal, but because they always get a restricting signal and they "know" the restricting signal is for the curve and they "know" they get a clear signal when they get out of the curve, they treat the restricting signal like just a speed restriction instead of a restricting signal. The go around the curve and run into the rear end of the train ahead. Assuming gets your killed out here.
dehusman The train crews sees the restricting signal, but because they always get a restricting signal and they "know" the restricting signal is for the curve and they "know" they get a clear signal when they get out of the curve, they treat the restricting signal like just a speed restriction instead of a restricting signal. The go around the curve and run into the rear end of the train ahead.
- Paul North.
DeggestyI have to confess that I am not familiar with "ACSES." Now, I know it is a civil organization (as in civil engineering).
Johnny, ACSES is the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System - the enhancements to CSS+SES that Amtrak uses to get safe operation up to 150 mph. See the NORAC rulebook for more.
[EDIT: that buffoon Arotz Maimon and his gang of imbeciles may send you a message saying the above link is 'not authorized by Yahoo' but that you can at your own risk click to receive it. It is safe to do so. I now have 6 copies of the Rulebook without virus content or Canadian pharmacy advertising to prove it.]
DeHusman: Not everyone disagrees with me. The report of freight crews who ran on the NEC substantiante what I remember. And those "who deal with ATC on a daily basis" do not and did not deal with PRR's ATC which was definitely not identacle with their ATC.
Oh, and the horizonztal bar below the regular position-light signal had another purpose, if my memory is correct. When lit under a stop indication, producing two horizontal bars, one in the signal itself and one on the horizontal bar underneath, it meant stop and stay stopped. Without the horizontal bar, one could stop and then proceed at very restricted speed prepared to stop, if one could see the wayside signal.
I am absolutely certain that PRR's ATC provided safety for permanent speed restrictions in the corridor (and elsewhere as well), and you cannot budge me from that until you show me facts as to the actual installation.
I also had some experience with the more normal type of ATC. The New Haven had it, but NOT in electrified territory. I t was betwen New Haven, actually the junction with the line to Hartfrod, Springfiled, and connection to Ceder Hill Yard, and Boston, possibly with gaps. It was a system that simply repeated block signals and may not have given any information on track speed restriction. I don't know the answer to that question regarding the New Haven's system. Road and road-switcher diesels were equipped, and the I-4 Pacifics and I-5 Hudsons and possibly some freight power as well. Regular color-light display, if my memory is correct.
I never was in the cab of a New Haven electric locomotive (which I deeply regret), and do not know if they had the PRR cab signals to operate on the LIRR-PRR tracks into Penn Station. The New Haven MU's which also gave me frequent front platform rides did not have cab signals and ran into GCT. The FL-9's had the New Haven system I mentioned, and did occasionally, rarely but they did, operate into Penn. I was told the cab signals did respond to the PRR system, but without all the information because of the reduced number of displays.
All New Haven stuff is mostly from observations 1949-1967. But the PRR observations began earlier, around 1939 at age seven.
Mention is made of "civil speed restrictions" being introduced into the LIRR ATC in the 1930's following a speeding-on-curve accident. Is not it extremely doubtful that an improvement to the LIRR ATC would be implemented without the same improvement being introduced to the PRR?
Thank, you, Overmod, for decoding ACSES. Now, if I had a NORAC rulebook....
The advances that have been made in the last sixty-five years are truly amazing.
Deggesty Thank, you, Overmod, for decoding ACSES. Now, if I had a NORAC rulebook....
Did you not click on the little red link to download your PDF copy?
daveklepperAnd those "who deal with ATC on a daily basis" do not and did not deal with PRR's ATC which was definitely not identacle with their ATC.
That sort of statement does not provide evidence for the accuracy of your memory. Even if we assume "their" refers to employees of other than former PRR lines, you provide no independent conirmatory evidence.
daveklepperAll New Haven stuff is mostly from observations 1949-1967. But the PRR observations began earlier, around 1939 at age seven.
Memories from such early ages ~70 years later are notoriously inaccurate. And you do not provide any independent confirmatory evidence from citable sources.
Oh back off Schlimm, you don't have to be right or get the last damn word in every time.
And you don't have to be insulting either.
And let me tell you something about old-timers memories, maybe they can't remember where they put the car keys, or what they had for dinner last night, but many, if not most times their memories of what happened decades ago turn out to be amazingly accurate.
And if I happen to know an old-timer's wrong about something I just smile and keep on listening. After all, he was there and I wasn't, and and in the long run it just doesn't matter anyway.
So cool it, OK?
Mr.klepper i suggest you read following by a few who have more experience : http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/the-short-the-long-the-skinny-and-the-fat.html?channel=00 and the rebuttal at: : http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/william-vantuono/amtrak-188-wreck-opinion-ntsb-responds.html?channel=00
Firelock76 Oh back off Schlimm, you don't have to be right or get the last damn word in every time. And you don't have to be insulting either. And let me tell you something about old-timers memories, maybe they can't remember where they put the car keys, or what they had for dinner last night, but many, if not most times their memories of what happened decades ago turn out to be amazingly accurate. And if I happen to know an old-timer's wrong about something I just smile and keep on listening. After all, he was there and I wasn't, and and in the long run it just doesn't matter anyway. So cool it, OK?
Who are you to decide what others can say? I do not insist I am right about ATC as I only know what I can read. Klepper has access to sources as well as we do. And hey, I'm not so young either. But I do understand cognitive processes, including memories a bit better than most forum memories. Just because someone is elderly does not mean he gets a free pass, especially when he keeps insisting that his opinion/memory is correct with zero evidence. BTW, many octogenerians' memories are quite intact, frequently better than those of folks in their 50s.
And just to set the record straight, the somewhat rough response to Klepper was from DHusman, not me. Check it out.
I'm no-one to decide what others can say.
But I won't stand by quietly when the bounds of civility are being crossed.
I've fired my shot across your bow, now heave to, before I come about and you get the full broadside and I give the command "away boarders!"
In the years I've been on this site I've NEVER filed a complaint against any other poster, but unless you get civil so help me you'll be the first.
Be warned.
Yeah, real civil guy. I never yield to bullies. Check your facts before blowing a gasket.
daveklepperOh, and the horizonztal bar below the regular position-light signal had another purpose, if my memory is correct. When lit under a stop indication, producing two horizontal bars, one in the signal itself and one on the horizontal bar underneath, it meant stop and stay stopped. Without the horizontal bar, one could stop and then proceed at very restricted speed prepared to stop, if one could see the wayside signal.
I don't remember a horizontal bar under the main signal head on the PRR New York Division - what I do remember seeing was that the center lamp in the bottom head was illuminated when there was a train coming the other way on that track.
As noted, the 'SES' overlay to CSS cab signaling enforced several speeds (corresponding to cab-signal displays) -- and as noted theses were not aligned with 'civil' restriction speeds; they corresponded to rulebook speeds (20mph as the 'failsafe', for example). When this setup was to be used as a 'civil restriction' (to the sometimes-inconvenient corresponding rulebook speed) a section of a control block (complete with deadband 'drop' of cab-signal carrier isolating it on either side) would be hard-coded with the restrictive code frequency corresponding to the speed of restriction, and the SES would then enforce that speed.
As further noted, this was expanded to give more speeds with the introduction of ACSES, and in the years post-Chase, freight locomotives in the Corridor were equipped with Harmon locomotive speed limiters (LSLs) which were capable of receiving and discriminating more than one code frequency at a time (unlike the old CSS bar which as previously noted could be 'distracted' by AC motor frequency nearby).
I also had some experience with the more normal type of ATC. The New Haven had it, but NOT in electrified territory. I t was betwen New Haven, actually the junction with the line to Hartford, Springfield, and connection to Cedar Hill Yard, and Boston, possibly with gaps. It was a system that simply repeated block signals and may not have given any information on track speed restriction.
New Haven in fact had one of the very first GRS inductive ATS systems, in 1912, and apparently stayed with that supplier through the '50s. The system adopted in the post-Esch-Act '20s was apparently a straight ATS inductive system; I'm having some difficulty actually finding the full technical specs of the system, but here is the valve supposedly off one of the streamlined GE electrics of the '30s:
Someone will know what this is, advise the other operational details, etc.
I am not sure Dave's memory is correct about "Road and road-switcher diesels were equipped, and the I-4 Pacifics and I-5 Hudsons and possibly some freight power as well [with] Regular color-light display ..." As described (admittedly with little technical savvy - it describes what I think is a forestaller pedal as a 'deadman pedal') this might be a straight intermittent-inductive ATS with no cab-signal display. I'd like to see a full description from Alstom (which is I think still what GRS is now) or one of the New Haven specialists on what was actually there.
On the other hand, the New Haven was notable for receiving the first transistorized (as opposed to vacuum tube) automatic train-control equipment, in 1953, and actually operated a 'driverless' train as an experiment in 1955. Both of these should make fascinating reading when documented...
No, not doubtful at all; I'm not even sure I'm surprised it didn't go 'the other way' with PRR installing multiple-speed ASC display on all its myriad locomotives.
The way I saw the post-'52 system described, it had no position-light cab-signal display at all -- just the little speed-control lights. One reference indicated that the LIRR systems still at that point actually included safety trips, like the ones on subway cars, and so the speed-control actuation had to include compatibility with those valves. I also found no reference to a speed-control system earlier than a vague 'the Forties', with no attached details, and at least a couple of equally vague references that think full-blown seven-speed ASC might not have come in until after the takeover in '68 (which might also be reasonable; it has that late-'60s Government-project flavor to it). But certain it is that PRR didn't have LIRR ASC, and what they built from '51 onward was a patch on CSS, not a separate speed-control-centric arrangement.
Dutchrailnut Mr.klepper i suggest you read following by a few who have more experience : http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/the-short-the-long-the-skinny-and-the-fat.html?channel=00 and the rebuttal at: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/william-vantuono/amtrak-188-wreck-opinion-ntsb-responds.html?channel=00
Mr.klepper i suggest you read following by a few who have more experience : http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/the-short-the-long-the-skinny-and-the-fat.html?channel=00 and the rebuttal at: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/william-vantuono/amtrak-188-wreck-opinion-ntsb-responds.html?channel=00
... and most importantly of all, Schanoes' comments after the rebuttal, particularly what he has to say about T. Bella. (I disagree with him more than a little about the wild-hair ideas at the NTSB that seat belts would help dramatically in these types of rail crash, but he and I, too, can agree to disagree sometimes; as Riddles said so eloquently when discussing Bulleid's Leader.)
I continue to be bothered, especially now having read this rebuttal by the NTSB about how thoroughly they said they looked at things, by how cavalierly they 'established' that there was no projectile damage to the windshield of 188's locomotive. That's not to say I think there was any projectile at all, or a grassy knoll it was deployed from -- only that for the NTSB to have any credibility according to its own expressed criteria there needed to be at least a discussion, with a couple of pictures showing the damage and some comparative impacts of known objects in similar media, culminating in a reasoned dismissal of the idea that there was a rocking or shooting that affected 188's engine or distracted or injured Bostian. And that, of course, has been notably and annoyingly absent.
Overmod Deggesty Thank, you, Overmod, for decoding ACSES. Now, if I had a NORAC rulebook.... Did you not click on the little red link to download your PDF copy?
DeggestyI at last got around to clicking on the link--and was told that I did not have the authority to access it.
Just goes to prove that even thinking you've checked something downloads doesn't mean it downloads for everyone... I find that my system is now telling me Yahoo (why I'm hearing from them, G-d only knows) doesn't 'approve' of me seeing this, but if I click the little indicated link 'anyway' it downloads the rulebook right to my system. (I'd be tempted to note 'if I send you a link it's safe to click through' ... but don't ever ever assume that can be true. In this particular case, I think it is.)
Try this link to see if you get through.
This is the 10th edition from 2011, but it contains enough about the subject of older speed control to make it worthwhile. The link will download a PDF to your system, which should open with a 'tab guide' to the sections on the left side.
Let me know if this one fails to produce.
Excerpt from FRA Report to Congress, Jul. 8, 1994
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/33000/33500/33517/33517.pdf
Development of Railroad Communications and Train Control
This chapter briefly describes the development of railroad communication technologies, signal and train control systems, and operating rules. It also traces the development of pertinent Federal statutory and regulatory requirements and outlines the residual safety risks associated with current methods of operation.
The Early 20th Century
At the turn of the century the railroad industry was rapidly expanding, and experimentation prevailed. Faster, more powerful locomotives were being introduced to meet the demands for high speed passenger trains and the hauling of heavier tonnages. Greater use of the telegraph as the primary means of communication was being made to eliminate the costs of closely spaced stations to control the movement of trains and to cope with higher speeds and train densities, changing schedules and traffic patterns, and competitive pressures. Operating rules were primitive, often adopted as the result of tragic accidents.
In 1906, the Congress passed the Block Signal Resolution which directed the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to investigate and report on the use of block signal systems and appliances for the automatic control of trains. Thus began the initial Federal effort at curbing train accidents caused by human error. For the next 14 years, the ICC studied existing trainstop and train control systems and submitted its findings in reports to each Congress. On the basis of these findings the Congress enacted legislation in the Transportation Act of 1920 that authorized the ICC to require the installation of trainstop and train control systems where found necessary in the public interest.
In issuing the first order for trainstop and train control systems, the ICC summed up the accident experience as follows:
The accident reports made by the railroads show that from January 1, 1906, to December 31, 1921, there were 26,297 head-on and rear-end collisions. These resulted in death to 4,326 persons and injury to 60,682. The damage to railroad property alone amounted to $40,969,633. The annual average of these collisions amounted to 1,643; the average number killed, 270; and the average number injured 3,792. The average damage to railroad property alone amounted to $2,560,603 per year.
The trainstop and train control devices of the early 1900s were mainly mechanical and electromechanical devices of a crude design compared to modern engineering. Several systems required wayside structures of inductors, ramps or trips to activate mechanical or electrical devices installed on steam locomotives. The harsh environment of steam locomotives and increasing train speeds were punishing to the onboard devices necessitating daily inspections, maintenance and repair. Failures were frequent.
The wayside block signal systems were of a wide variety — mechanical, pneumatic, hydraulic, electromechanical and electropneumatic. Few systems had continuous track circuits. Technology in the application of electricity to signal and train control systems was in the developmental stage. The reliability of the interconnection of onboard devices with wayside equipment was poor.
There was an intensive search for a means of operating trains safely and efficiently. As a result, thousands of patents were applied for to cover railroad equipment, particularly signal and train control devices. The ICC reviewed and reported its findings on trainstop and train control devices. Some railroads had as many as three incompatible systems. There was even more disparity in the types of block signal and interlocking systems.
The prevalent methods of operation were by timetable and train orders or timetable schedules only. Train orders required a thorough understanding of a complex set of rules involving the rights of trains, and orders were often misinterpreted. Timetable schedules were based on a time interval scheme which was heavily dependent on accurate time and flag protection when a train was delayed.
The organizational structure of the typical railroad further complicated this situation. Railroad management and employees were initially antagonistic toward signal systems. Mechanical departments saw little value in proper maintenance of trainstop and train control devices on locomotives. Communication engineers tasked with the installation and maintenance of wayside signal systems generally viewed the responsibility as burdensome. In general, railroad companies had not yet recognized that signal systems can increase track capacity, improve safety, save fuel and expedite train movements.
Efforts to Improve Technology and Rules
In 1895, a group of young signal engineers formed a signaling club in Chicago, Illinois, to share experiences and standardize signal equipment. Among their first undertakings were the preparation and adoption of a standard and uniform set of rules and practices for interlockings in the Chicago area. Using sound engineering principles, various committees also set standards for signal aspects and indications and automatic block signal systems (ABS). As a result, train collisions, which frequently occurred at crossings-at-grade, were significantly reduced. The success of the signaling club did more than any other group in dispelling antagonism toward signal systems. The club became widely recognized and respected, and subsequently was accepted into the American Railway Association (now the Association of American Railroads) (AAR) as that organization's Signal Section.
The primary duty of the Signal Section was to develop recommended practices for equipment and materials for signal systems. However, within the AAR it was better able to influence the various committees of the AAR's Operation and Mechanical Divisions, resulting in a higher standard of recommended practices for operating rules and maintenance of trainstop and train control devices installed on locomotives.
Over time, the AAR's Standard Code of Operating Rules, prepared and adopted by the Operating Rules Committee that was composed of member railroads' top rules officers, was revised to provide succinct rules for train operations at interlockings and in various types of signal, trainstop and train control systems. Each railroad had its own book of operating rules and rules officers could adopt an AAR rule or modify it to their railroad's needs. The effect of the AAR's improved Standard Code of Operating Rules resulted in an overall improvement of its member railroads’ rules. The AAR even provided written responses to rules officers who made inquiries for interpretations of special situations, further standardizing acceptable rules practices.
The AAR's member railroads' Chief Mechanical Officers (CMOs) focused seriously on trainstop and train control devices for locomotives. Beginning in 1920, the CMOs played a major role in setting standards for the design, construction, installation and maintenance of those systems. Working in conjunction with the signal engineers, the application of electrical technology in trainstop and train control devices was improved—even a vacuum tube-driven electronic amplifier was introduced that was used for more than 30 years until replaced by solid state equipment.
By 1920, the telegraph was widely used in the industry for issuing train orders. The telephone was rapidly expanding, and voice transmissions of train orders commenced, with the telegraph being relegated to other communication purposes. Train order stations were becoming further apart as the railroad companies realized the economic benefits from the application of dependable signal systems, communications and operating rules. Still, the failure of train crews to interpret train orders properly, obey speed limits, comply with signal indications, and the failure of railroads to enforce compliance with operating rules, plagued the industry with frequent and sometimes catastrophic accidents.
Federal Intervention in Train Control
In 1922, under authority of the Transportation Act of 1920, the ICC issued Order 13413 requiring 49 respondent railroads to install either a trainstop or train control system on at least one division over which passenger trains were operated. The Order was expanded in 1924 to include an additional passenger division on each railroad.
The ICC set minimum standards that required trainstop systems to operate automatically, upon the failure of an engineer to acknowledge a restricting signal, to apply the brakes until the train was brought to a stop. A train control system was required to apply the brakes until the train was brought to a stop in the event an engineer failed to take action to control the speed of the train in accordance with signal indications. (Train control systems by design do not operate to enforce signal indications when the speed, under control of the engineer, has been reduced below 20MPH to Restricted Speed, a feature found acceptable on the theory that train movements are safe when all trains are operating prepared to stop in one-half the range of vision.)
Many of the railroad companies objected to the Order and filed appeals, mainly on the basis of poverty. Some argued successfully and were waived from the requirements. A few railroads saw the value of trainstop or train control and made installations systemwide. Other railroads made more than the required number of installations but most railroads met only the requirements of the Order.
Certain railroads elected to install trainstop systems; others installed train control systems; and a few installed systems that had the features of both. Five railroads sought and obtained ICC approval to install trainstop or train control devices only on passenger locomotives. All other railroads installed them on both passenger and freight locomotives used in the equipped territory.
The Pennsylvania Railroad pioneered the development of a four-aspect cab signal system with an audible alarm that sounds when the cab signal changes to a more restrictive indication. The railroad petitioned the ICC for approval to install the automatic cab signal system (ACS) on its line in lieu of a trainstop or train control system. After investigation, the ICC approved the cab signal system in 1930. Subsequently, two other railroads also adopted the cab signal system.
The reliability of cab signal, trainstop and train control devices are dependent not only on the quality of maintenance and repair performed by mechanical department employees, but also by the quality of installation, maintenance and repair of wayside signal equipment. While the affected railroads complied with the ICC's order to install the systems, many railroads did not install or maintain the wayside systems in a manner to assure the cab signal, trainstop and train control devices functioned as intended. The ICC had no authority to require safe and proper installation, maintenance and repair of interlockings and block signal systems with the result that cab signal, trainstop and train control installations frequently functioned with less than the desired results expected by the Government.
Acting on the basis of reports from the ICC, in 1937 the Congress passed the Signal Inspection Act giving the ICC almost plenary authority over signal and train control systems. In 1939, the ICC promulgated rules, standards and instructions (RS&I) governing the installation, maintenance and testing of block signal, interlocking, cab signal, trainstop and train control systems. The impact of the RS&I resulted in the wayside and onboard equipment becoming highly reliable operating tools for the safe movement of trains. In addition, in order to meet the requirements contained in the RS&I, carrier operating rules pertaining to train operations in these systems were revised to clearly indicate the actions to be taken.
Post-World War II Developments
Traffic control systems were developed in the 1930s and successfully utilized during World War II to increase track capacity and expedite train movements. The post-war years confronted the railroad companies with the need to downsize as the volume of traffic diminished. One means of reducing plant was by the expansion of traffic control systems.
A traffic control system (TCS) is controlled from a machine operated by one person, usually the dispatcher. Frequently used switches, such as siding switches, are power-operated and also positioned from the control machine. The method of operation is by signal indication, eliminating the need for train orders and train-order situations.
By 1954 there were over 17,000 miles of railroad equipped with automatic cab signals (ACS), automatic train stop (ATS) or automatic train control (ATC). The industry began to petition for removal of equipped territory and installation of TCS, resulting in more than 7,000 miles of equipped territory being discontinued.
The expansion of traffic control systems signaled the demise of traditional methods of operation whereby train orders were issued using the telephone and telegraph. Significant returns on the capital investment for traffic control was earned by the closing of train order stations, remote control of manual interlockings and the reduction of multiple tracks to fewer or single main tracks. Operating rules in traffic control systems are much more succinct than train order rules, which improves operating safety.
In addition, the railroad companies began to introduce radio to railroad operations as a means of communication. In territory where signal systems were not in use, and in automatic block signal territory, radio was increasingly relied upon as an adjunct to telegraph and telephone for the purpose of delivering the text of movement authorities (initially train orders).
As the use of the radio expanded, the railroad companies began to adopt rules for its use. As a result of incidents that occurred and the disparity of radio rules among the carriers, the FRA, the successor to the ICC in matters concerning railroad safety, promulgated rules in 1977 for the use of the radio (49 CFR Part 220). The rules provided
• Standard protocols for radio discipline;
• Procedures for sending movement authorities; and
• Rules for use of radio during switching operations.
Radio technology continued to develop and its reliability grew as new installations were made and existing installations were updated. Today on many carriers almost 100 percent coverage exists along their lines.
As a result of almost complete coverage, in 1974 one railroad pioneered Voice Control Radio System operating rules in which directives were given to train crews (through block or "relay" operators) authorizing limits of authority to operate, including whether to hold the main track or take sidings for the purpose of meeting other trains. After investigation and examination, the Voice Control Radio System received the approval of FRA for three primary reasons: (1) radio communications across the line involved were excellent; (2) instructions were presented simply, reducing the risk of human error about actions to be taken in the movement of trains; and (3) maintenance-of-way personnel were brought under the same protection as trains which greatly enhanced the safety of those employees.
In 1983, several western railroads also received the approval of FRA for the use of a radio-based operation termed "track warrant control" for the same reasons. Track warrant control differed from the Voice Control Radio System in that dispatchers communicated directives directly to train crews rather than to a relay operator to do so. While the check and balance of the relay operator was eliminated, FRA still favored implementation of track warrant control for the above reasons. However, full protection of maintenance-of-way employees was never implemented mainly because of the workload imposed on dispatchers.
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