oltmanndWhat is this and how would it function? How could it tell a derailment from truck hunting, rough crossing, slack action, etc?
If memory serves me corect, I think I read that some steam locomotives had derailment sensors. Basically looked like load/empty sensors and were mounted on the tender. If the body of the tender came too far away from the trucks, it dumped the brakepipe.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
zugmannIf memory serves me correct, I think I read that some steam locomotives had derailment sensors. Basically looked like load/empty sensors and were mounted on the tender. If the body of the tender came too far away from the trucks, it dumped the brakepipe.
See if you can find a reference for tender sensors.
There is, of course, a more famous derailment detector, in a more sensible place for a steam locomotive to have one: the "Wright's Little Watchman" as, for example, found on NKP 765. Too much relative motion between the leading truck frame and the locomotive, and the air goes into emergency until the device is reset by reaching under the pilot beam.
See the article in this .pdf from the RR Museum of Pennsylvania for more on the device.
Tender - trailing truck... close enough.
That was what I was thinking of.
oltmannd ECP braking just replaces the "brakes on" signal, that now runs at nearly the speed of sound down the trainline, with one that operates at near speed of light. All the other fancy stuff that could be done, like load/empty variable braking, car health monitoring, ride monitoring, bad journal bearing detection, are not part of basic ECP. ECP provides smoother braking because brake actuation can be faster (no need for damping that keeps pneumatic control valves stable) and will apply simultaneously on every car. You get faster recharge because the trainline just provides one fucntion - fill the reservoirs - and can be run "wide open". You get much shorter braking distances at low speed, but not very much improvment at higher speeds. One thing I don't know - how will an ECP train know to go into emergency at a break-in-two? Loss of comm?
ECP braking just replaces the "brakes on" signal, that now runs at nearly the speed of sound down the trainline, with one that operates at near speed of light.
All the other fancy stuff that could be done, like load/empty variable braking, car health monitoring, ride monitoring, bad journal bearing detection, are not part of basic ECP.
ECP provides smoother braking because brake actuation can be faster (no need for damping that keeps pneumatic control valves stable) and will apply simultaneously on every car.
You get faster recharge because the trainline just provides one fucntion - fill the reservoirs - and can be run "wide open".
You get much shorter braking distances at low speed, but not very much improvment at higher speeds.
One thing I don't know - how will an ECP train know to go into emergency at a break-in-two? Loss of comm?
I think the loss of air pressure in the train line (even though it is now a "supply" line in ECP)if it parts will still cause the brakes to go into emergency.
Jeff
oltmannd [snipped - PDN] . . . You get faster recharge because the trainline just provides one fucntion - fill the reservoirs - and can be run "wide open". . . .
I thought another advantage/ function of ECP braking was the capability of 'graduated release'. I.e., unlike the 'regular' air brake trainline - which has to be fully released before making another 'lesser' application (or recharging the reservoirs) - ECP can 'hold' (retain) the pressure in the brake cylinders while simultaneously signalling to the valve to allow the high air pressure trainline to recharge the reservoirs.
On this point (and others), see:
http://www.railway-technical.com/brake3.shtml - "Benefits", near the bottom
http://www.nyab.com/media/banner/documents/downloadsservices/products_1/ep60_1/ep60.pdf
http://www.uic.org/cdrom/2001/wcrr2001/pdf/sessions/1_6/465.pdf - middle of pg. 2
http://www.progressiverailroading.com/mechanical/article/Cost-constraints-economic-conditions-to-delay-widespread-electronically-controlled-pneumatic-brake-implementation--22315
Slides 3 and 5 of this 2007 NS presentation: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDEQFjAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Frsac.fra.dot.gov%2Fdocument.php%3Ftype%3Dmeeting%26date%3D20071025%26name%3DNS%2BECP%2BBrake%2BImplementation-10-25-07.pdf&ei=DTEfVfSKLYqpsAXB64PYCA&usg=AFQjCNGhZ4DPKA_0c9txIOO4uJy_01FrSg&sig2=L38iqyhTbFtXs45wZeO34w&bvm=bv.89947451,d.eXY
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDcQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fra.dot.gov%2FElib%2FDocument%2F1602&ei=DTEfVfSKLYqpsAXB64PYCA&usg=AFQjCNECHFaVGxvAqxcDEEUsn2faEc32RQ&sig2=FJbWII5hvHD8SZe4HZwa2w&bvm=bv.89947451,d.eXY
- Paul North.
Euclid ... However, this retention of braking control for both halves after separation requires some other way to communicate that message after the train separates. This is because when the train separates, the wire breaks. So any further communication between the two separated sets of cars has to be wireless. ...
For the wireless to work, wouldn't each car would have to be in communication with a tower or router? I suppose it could piggyback on the PTC system, however, they have had problems acquiring enough bandwidth for just for the engines. Now it seems you have complicated the problem a hundred-fold.
MidlandMike Now it seems you have complicated the problem a hundred-fold.
Now it seems you have complicated the problem a hundred-fold.
You have found the essence of Euclid.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
dehusman MidlandMike Now it seems you have complicated the problem a hundred-fold. You have found the essence of Euclid.
Winner! Winner! Chicken Dinner!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
1) Wireless control.
2) Adjusting braking according to train location.
Euclid So the derailment sensors tell the system to begin the instant a derailment happens, and from there on, the system is on its own without any further commands through the wire.
Another point to consider, however, is that even with the wire being broken, it still offers a continuous line of control on either side of the break. The difference in brake force called for in this system will come from reducing the brake force on the cars ahead of the derailment.
If if's and but's were candy and nuts, what a wonderful world it would be.
Inertia and Momentum decree what happens after a wheel leaves the rail - no matter how quickly and uniformly the brakes are applied.
Bucky, why is it that your solution to every problem seems to be the addition of nonexistant electronic whizbang doodads to the one of the the most reliable , simplest, and efficient machines, ( railcar) in history? And applied in areas where it is impossible to even keep a coat of paint? None of your ideas exist, or are well thought out, or can be practically implemented even if they did exist. Time to come back to reality.
Maybe take a look at your ideas on the the Nevada collision of the Southwest Chief to see how in touch with reality your ideas are.
EuclidBut, as I mentioned, the main point of this system is to stop the train or reduce its speed before the train parts, and also to help prevent it from parting.
You need to go back and watch that video I posted the link to a bit ago. Watch it very closely. Several times, even. It gives lie to many of the things you presume will prevent derailments, etc.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
What video is that? I don't recall it and don't readily find it.
Here is the reference (from March 24 at 10:50 am):
tree68Here's your derailment dynamics right here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-smEEHYdGQ This is the well known video of the train hit by a tornado.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-smEEHYdGQ
This is the well known video of the train hit by a tornado.
I don't think this is particularly demonstrative of the kinetics of most derailments. Here the cars were bodily toppled over (still 'railed' to the last!) almost incidentally taking the adjacent ends of the train off the rails as they went. One might argue that if the head end had not stopped short in emergency, the following part of the train would have come to a stop by itself once the parted-hose emergency braking had taken hold.
Euclid's system is assuming that the early moments of a derailment don't result in a catastrophic motion of the cars, either in massive yawing or massive deceleration, and that if through nothing else but momentum the car continues in a straight line, coupled at both ends, with flange contact with ties and ballast continuing to make the truck frame track approximately straight. The film of the Army tests 'optimizing' sabotage during WWII establishes how difficult it can be to produce an actual derailment even with large pieces of the rail missing.
It's that scenario -- one or more cars with wheels now bumping along the ties rather than smoothly on the rails -- that the differential-braking system is intended to address. I would be tempted to look into methods for assuring the integrity of trucks subjected to this -- locking the wheelset bearings to the sideframes, for example, or restricting the yaw rotation rate of the truck relative to the underframe, or providing some default detented centering of the truck frame relative to the underframe if a derailment is detected -- as things that might be secondarily beneficial.
I also think that differential-braking apparatus, if designed correctly, would help with other situations, notably the tendency to 'snatch a knuckle' during emergency braking. If braking effort is so proportioned in a given consist that the instantaneous load at any coupler is kept under control, but overall also modulated to produce high retarding force up to the point of wheelslide, you still have high 'enough' braking effort to produce a minimum-distance stop, but have virtually eliminated derailment or separation problems from things like dynamiters... without necessarily going to the expense of two-pipe electropneumatic braking.
tree68 Euclid But, as I mentioned, the main point of this system is to stop the train or reduce its speed before the train parts, and also to help prevent it from parting. You need to go back and watch that video I posted the link to a bit ago. Watch it very closely. Several times, even. It gives lie to many of the things you presume will prevent derailments, etc.
Euclid But, as I mentioned, the main point of this system is to stop the train or reduce its speed before the train parts, and also to help prevent it from parting.
Oh, I did not know that you posted it. I saw it posted by BaltACD. But in any case, I am extremely familiar with that tornado derailment. I have watched it at least 50 times, and start/stopped it at least 200 times. I have turned it inside out in order to learn exactly what was happening. So how does it give lie to my ideas about what will prevent derailments?
BaltACDInertia and Momentum decree what happens after a wheel leaves the rail - no matter how quickly and uniformly the brakes are applied.
And the "One Note Samba" goes on and on. The same never ending song.
Norm
Euclid BaltACD Inertia and Momentum decree what happens after a wheel leaves the rail - no matter how quickly and uniformly the brakes are applied. I am not talking about doing anything directly to the derailed cars for the purpose of influencing them. I am talking about doing things to the cars still on the rails in order to get them to influence the derailed cars. As the first wheel leaves the rail, it is at the decree of inertia and momentum, as you say, but there are maybe 100 cars with their 800 wheels still on the rails that are not at that whim. Those cars and their braking can surely affect what happens after the first wheel leaves the rail. They can exert influence over the train to keep it from parting at the derailment, even if the number of derailed wheels grows. So the derailed cars will not necessarily be entirely at the decree of inertia and momentum if staying coupled helps keep them aligned rather than jackknifing. Just stopping the train quicker will reduce the number of cars going into the pileup if one develops.
BaltACD Inertia and Momentum decree what happens after a wheel leaves the rail - no matter how quickly and uniformly the brakes are applied.
I am not talking about doing anything directly to the derailed cars for the purpose of influencing them. I am talking about doing things to the cars still on the rails in order to get them to influence the derailed cars.
I'm not talking about the derailed cars either - I am talking about the rest of the train - both fore and aft of the derailed cars.
Please exit your dream world of train dynamics.
Illustrations of the kind of derailment where controlled differential braking might apply:
In my opinion, slack running in is a major cause of these types of derailment progressing to the point that major fouling of adjacent tracks, or 'accordion'-style piling up as drawgear pulls cars laterally, or sequential rollover of cars through torsion. So detecting a derailed car and controlling the braking rate of both 'ends' in a way that controls slack action, as early as possible after the derailment, should be of benefit.
I think there should be enough intelligence in the system to recognize when there is a 'sequential' derailment (say, following a picked switch or displaced rail) and do some predictive modulation of the brakes, either by car or by block of cars.
Euclid, there is a valid point about 'instant' detection of derailments. I do not think this is practical; you'll have to distinguish actual derailment from rough track and the usual kinds of shock, with a robust and cost-effective device. There are plenty of approaches that would work in theory and on test, like adaptation of machine vision to watch wheel-rail interaction, that are not likely to prove effective in long-term service with typical maintenance even on dedicated 'safety' consists.
Wizlish, thanks so much for posting that Cresson video. [EDIT: Just 3-1/2 months ago, Dec. 27, 2014 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBYqdmsxeCQ ] It belongs in its own thread (and I was there just 2 weeks ago). More to the point, I've seen the result of that kind of derailment: "All it did was turn over 1 rail. Oh, by the way - the rail is 4,000 ft. long !" And it trumps the double-flanged wheel April Fool's Day thread, too - what's really needed is a U-shaped rail for the wheels to run in as in the video - note that everything stayed together and in line. The opposite side wheel might have even stayed up on its rail, too. (Wonder what finally got them stopped, and how much of the interlocking got torn up by then . . .)
Back in the 1960's, there was a heckuva explosion 9actually several) in the SP yard at Roseville, CA - might have killed a couple people, but it certainly destroyed a good portion of the yard. The cause was eventually attributed to a Navy bomb (bound for Vietnam) falling through the weak floor of a boxcar and rubbing against the wheel until the heat from the friction led to the explosion. See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roseville,_California#Notable_events
http://www.trainorders.com/discussion/read.php?1,185297
From http://www.insensitivemunitions.org/history/railroad-train-fires-and-munition-explosions/ [emphasis added - PDN]: "Fortunately, a person recording train sounds in the mountains outside of Roseville, CA had seen the train. He testified that he had seen a fire in the floor over the wheel of one of the boxcars in that train some six hours before the first explosion occurred in Roseville."
As a result of that and some other high-profile derailments, there was an attempt by the Navy Ordnance people to develop several kinds of sensors to detect derailments, "hot boxes", and other mishaps before they got too far out of control and caused other bomb shipments to explode; all of this was reported in Trains or Railway Age at the time. I specifically recall that the hot box detector would be mounted in or on the truck frame. Whether any of this was ever fielded for tests and then made practical (even if not widely adopted), I do not know.
At least one company has developed a derailment detector - in response to 3 tank car derailments in Switzerland ! (in the 1990's)
See slide 2 of 18 of this presentation from October 2014 (1.40 MB electronic file size):
http://www.otif.org/fileadmin/user_upload/otif_verlinkte_files/05_gef_guet/03_AG-Entgleisungsdetektion/2014_10/CE_GTDD_2014-A_Annex_V_Presentation_Knorr-Bremse_E.pdf
http://www.knorr-bremse.de/en/railvehicles/products/trainsafety/edt101.jsp
http://www.knorr-bremse.com/media/documents/railvehicles/en/p_1216_en_04_edt101.pdf (4 pages, 440 KB electronic file size)
Paul_D_North_Jr As a result of that and some other high-profile derailments, there was an attempt by the Navy Ordnance people to develop several kinds of sensors to detect derailments, "hot boxes", and other mishaps before they got too far out of control and caused other bomb shipments to explode; all of this was reported in Trains or Railway Age at the time. I specifically recall that the hot box detector would be mounted in or on the truck frame. Whether any of this was ever fielded for tests and then made practical (even if not widely adopted), I do not know. - Paul North.
I believe Amtrak uses on board Hot Box detection equipment. At least on my carrier, if a Amtrak car activates 2 Hot Box Detectors, the Amtrak car can continue in the train if the On Board Detector indicates no defect. With freight cars rule require a car activating 2 HBD's to be set out, PERIOD, even if the journal shows as being of 'normal' temperature.
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