New Tank Car Regulations Looming

[Euclid]

dehusman

Because steel doesn't care how many tank cars are coupled to the projection.  What they are measuring is the force required to puncture a steel vessel.  Using the simulator they could determine what the drawbar forces are in the train and then create a test environment that creates those forces.  They design a car to resist those forces.

There is no need to physically ram X number of cars into the test tank, you just have to get the equivalent forces.

You are making a whole ot of assumptions (once again),

Dave,

You say the steel doesn’t care how many tank cars are coupled to the projection.  But if they are measuring the force required to puncture the steel, as you say, the steel most definitely does care how much force is applied.  Isn’t that the whole point of the test?  And since the force applied rises with the number of tank cars that are coupled to the projection, how do you conclude that the steel does not care about the number of tank cars?

Perhaps you are saying that their test amounts to a scaled down version of the actual forces applied, and then they will simulate the actual strength needed to resist the actual forces based on the results of their scaled down test.  But if they can simulate the results, why even test with actual destruction of full size models? 

In our previous discussions, you have downplayed my idea that great cumulative forces can be applied to tank cars due to impacts from multiple cars coupled together.  I believe your point there was that a tank car receiving such impact will simply be displaced out of the line of force and escape relatively uninjured.  So when I wondered why they were using just one car in their test, the use of just one car would support your contention that the effect of multiple cars does not matter.  Could that be the reason why they only use one car in the test?  If so, that would be the answer to my original question above.

I did read the caption for the illustration of the derailment simulation and did notice that it referred to the scatter effect as being 25 seconds after the derailment began.  I should not have assumed that the derailment had stopped by this point and that the scatter pattern was the final result.  It may have continued for some time, and ultimately resulted in a more compacted pattern as I would generally expect.  In any case, my point in referencing that illustration is only remotely incidental and speculative to my larger point.  I drew no conclusions from it.   

You also said that I had made several other assumptions that are wrong.  Actually, I did not make any of those assumptions that you say I made.  You are misinterpreting me, inserting your own meaning for what I said, and then disagreeing with that meaning. 

To be specific, I cited the Lac Megantic accordion pileup as an example of a force pattern that is very common in derailments.  I did not state or assume that every derailment happens in an accordion pattern like Lac Megantic, as you say I did.  I realize that derailments can produce an infinite variety of patterns. 

I did not state or assume that the picture of the simulated derailment in the illustration only included the cars that are shown, or that they only analyzed the forces of those cars and ignored the forces in the rest of the train, as you say I did.

I did not state or assume that the pattern of derailed cars in the simulated derailment is somehow flawed, as you say I did. 

[dehusman]

Euclid

Suppose the test shows that a tank shell made of ¾-inch-thick steel will resist puncturing. 

My question is this:  How can the test result be meaningful when an actual derailment can have a widely varying number of tank cars composing the colliding element?  If the test shows that ¾-inch-thick steel survives impact from one tank car, it will probably not survive impact from two tank cars coupled together.  Yet, a derailment can produce colliding impact from any number of cars from one to fifty or more. 

Because steel doesn't care how many tank cars are coupled to the projection.  What they are measuring is the force required to puncture a steel vessel.  Using the simulator they could determine what the drawbar forces are in the train and then create a test environment that creates those forces.  They design a car to resist those forces.

There is no need to physically ram X number of cars into the test tank, you just have to get the equivalent forces.

Their computer model of a derailment with cars loosely scattered about suggests the same thing. 

You are making a whole ot of assumptions (once again),

1,  You are assuming that is the final positions of the cars.  You need to read the caption of the picture :

FIGURE 4 Computer simulation models of the dynamics of train derailment were

developed to understand the force of impacts on different parts of tank cars in

accidents: (a) 36-car train model and (b) calculated response of train 25 seconds

after derailment .

That is the position of the cars 25 sec after the derailment.  It is not necessarily the final positition.  We don't know the final position because it doesn't say how long the cars took to come to rest.  If it took 45 sec for the cars to come to rest then the cars would continue to move for an additional 20 sec.

2.  You are assuming all derailments accordian the cars like Lac Megantic.  That's just wrong.  It all depends on the speed of the train, the alignment of the track, how fast the initial cars stopped, where in the train the derailed cars are and the weight of the train.

3.  You are assuming that because of the picture they didn't take the rest of the train into account.  If you read the caption they describe that it is a 36 car train of mixed equipment, they even show the entire train in the picture above.  I have a hard time understanding how you think they would only be measuring the derailed cars because how would they know which cars derailed?  They would only know which cars derailed if they analyzed the entire train.

4.  Based on your assumptions in #1, 2 and 3, you are assuming that the "loosely scattered" pattern of the derailed cars is somehow flawed.  Its not.  It is not atypical.  The scatter pattern varies greatly.  Sometimes there is a pile, sometimes they accordian, sometimes squirt out in all directions.   Depends on a lot of factors.

[Euclid]

dehusman

Euclid

On page 6, they show a simulated model of a derailment with cars strewn about.  In that model, I see no indication of the derailed car resistance and force of the cars behind the derailment that would tightly compact the derailed cars and crush them...    

So you can see the formulas they use just by looking at one picture of derailment sequence?  I don't understand what the problem is,...

I have no idea what formulas they are using, or whether anything is wrong with the simulation.  I only mentioned it incidentally in relation to the broader point that I was making.  And that point is just an observation leading to a question which is as follows:

Their testing concerns the ability of a tank car vessel to resist puncture by projections extending from other tank cars which collide with resisting tank car.  The resisting tank car puncture depends on the following:  

1)      The strength of the resisting tank car vessel.

2)      The area of the face of the colliding projection.

3)      The force applied to the colliding projection. 

 

Their test controls all three variables and looks for the ability to puncture under those three conditions.

Condition #1 is the variable to be tested in order to learn how strong tank car vessels need to be in order to survive crashes without rupturing.

Condition #2 is based on an assumption of the average likely projection represented by features of tank cars, such as couplers. 

Condition #3 is the representation of one loaded tank car weighing 140 tons and traveling at some given speed approximating track speed of an oil train. 

 

Suppose the test shows that a tank shell made of ¾-inch-thick steel will resist puncturing. 

My question is this:  How can the test result be meaningful when an actual derailment can have a widely varying number of tank cars composing the colliding element?  If the test shows that ¾-inch-thick steel survives impact from one tank car, it will probably not survive impact from two tank cars coupled together.  Yet, a derailment can produce colliding impact from any number of cars from one to fifty or more.   

Their test suggest to me that they view the problem as being the result of just one tank car running into another one, as though all the cars in the train were merely independent vehicles like traffic on a highway.  Their computer model of a derailment with cars loosely scattered about suggests the same thing. 

[dehusman]

Wrong, all mirrors, its a non-smoking environment.  8-)

Here is the full DOT press release:

http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L05223

And the actual emergency order:

http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_D9E224C13963CAF0AE4F15A8B3C4465BAEAF0100/filename/Final_EO_on_Transport_of_Bakken_Crude_Oi_05_07_2014.pdf

[edblysard]

Well,

There’s the smoke, the mirrors come later…..

[chutton01]

New Regulations for transport of crude have been released by the FRA:

New DOT Regulations:

WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) issued an Emergency Order requiring all railroads operating trains containing large amounts of Bakken crude oil to notify State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) about the operation of these trains through their states.

Additionally, DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Safety Advisory strongly urging those shipping or offering Bakken crude oil to use tank car designs with the highest level of integrity available in their fleets.  In addition, PHMSA and FRA advise offerors and carriers to the extent possible to avoid the use of older legacy DOT Specification 111 or CTC 111 tank cars for the shipment of Bakken crude oil.

[dehusman]

Euclid

Here is a link to an article on tank car crash testing.  On page 6, they show a simulated model of a derailment with cars strewn about.  In that model, I see no indication of the derailed car resistance and force of the cars behind the derailment that would tightly compact the derailed cars and crush them:    

http://ict.uiuc.edu/railroad/images/NewsPhotos/2013/Barkan%20et%20al%202013%20TR%20News%20286%20Cooperative%20Tank%20Car%20Sefty%20Research.pdf

So you can see the formulas they use just by looking at one picture of derailment sequence?

I don't understand what the problem is, the scatter on the simulation is pretty similar to many actual derailments I've seen.  I've seen simulations of actual derailments and they are eerily accurate when compared to the actual derailment.  In one high speed derailment the simulation even had the divots in the ground in the right place when the engine flipped end for end.

These simulations measure the forces in the entire train.

[Euclid]

When I look at the tank car crash testing, there is one aspect of it that seems to be lacking or perhaps even misguided.  However, it would also seem that this simply can’t be.  With the amount of money and talent being thrown at this research, how can there possibly be something obvious that they have overlooked?  I must be missing something in my interpretation.

What I have noticed is that the testing seems to follow the reasoning and methods applied to the long-running automotive crash testing tradition.  That is, where individual vehicles are robotically crashed into each other or into fixed obstacles.  This certainly replicates the conditions of highway crashes.

Following this same model, the tank car tests that I have seen use a single weighted railcar to impact a stationary tank car tank backed up with a solid obstruction.  It appears that the single weighted railcar approximates the weight and speed of a single loaded tank car moving about the maximum speed of an oil train. 

While this could replicate one crash element of a high speed derailment, what about the likelihood of a whole string of tank cars striking one fixed tank car at track speed?  How can the conclusions of tank resistance to puncture be made on the basis of just one car when a wreck can easily apply the collective force of say ten tank cars?  Can they possibly be overlooking this because the thinking of the test is so strongly influenced by automotive crash testing where single vehicle collisions are studied?

 

This photo of the MM&A wreck shows the effect that I am referring to. 

http://news.ca.msn.com/canada/railway-suspends-employee-over-lac-megantic-disaster

 

The train was moving from right to left in the picture.  You can see how the first cars to derail at the left are accordioned, but the pile becomes more tightly compacted toward the right side of the photo.  Toward the right, the cumulative resistance of the heaped cars is greater because there are more of them in opposition to the oncoming cars still on the rails behind the pileup.  All but one of those trailing cars were uncoupled and pulled back to safety by the MM&A engineer while the wreck was burning.  Generally, I understood that he may have pulled as many as ten cars back. 

In the pileup, you can see the effect of the crushing force that was provided by kinetic energy of those ten cars.  Moving to the left from than first car on the right side, notice the two cars side by side, in line with the track.  You can see how the force of the trailing cars shoved those two cars into the car perpendicular to them, ahead of them.  The whole mass of cars in that area toward the right side has the cars crosswise to the track and tightly compacted by the force of the trailing cars.  That force came from no more than ten cars that stopped before then entered the pileup.  Think how much force there would have been if there were say 60 cars feeding their kinetic energy into the accordion heap, which could be the case with an oil train. 

 

Here is a link to an article on tank car crash testing.  On page 6, they show a simulated model of a derailment with cars strewn about.  In that model, I see no indication of the derailed car resistance and force of the cars behind the derailment that would tightly compact the derailed cars and crush them:    

http://ict.uiuc.edu/railroad/images/NewsPhotos/2013/Barkan%20et%20al%202013%20TR%20News%20286%20Cooperative%20Tank%20Car%20Sefty%20Research.pdf

 

[tree68]

Euclid

I would like to see a proposal for a coupler that is less like a can opener as the above linked article of the Popular Mechanics article mentioned.

I have yet to cut my self on a coupler.  Even an open coupler is more like a battering ram than a can opener, as I see it.  Any object struck by a moving, loaded tank car will act as a can opener - bridge abutments, bridges, the frames of cars, even old rail used as a parking barrier in a parking lot.

A push back coupler will only help if it is pushed along the design axis.  If the coupler connection is broken by vertical or horizontal shearing forces, the push back coupler won't push back, unless there is some form of automatic retraction mechanism.

And that is where the can opener analogy can come into play - if the breaking of the coupler leaves raw, sharp edges.  But if that happens, there are other forces in play that have just as much ability to breach the container as the coupler.

[Euclid]

BaltACD

The critical word in this entire thread - Looming!

Since no one feels confident in what the new requirements will be - no one is going to commit to anything in the absence of the new requirements.

While the new regulations are not here yet, there is plenty of scrambling now to find every useful idea possible to meet those impending new regulations when the do arrive.  And there actually is a commitment to improved “good faith” tank cars being built now before the new regulations arrive.  As much as they don’t want to risk building now only to find that it does not meet the new regulations, they can’t wait forever for the new regulations.  Tank cars are wearing out, and they need to be replaced.    

[BaltACD]

The critical word in this entire thread - Looming!

Since no one feels confident in what the new requirements will be - no one is going to commit to anything in the absence of the new requirements.

[Euclid]

I would like to see a proposal for a coupler that is less like a can opener as the above linked article of the Popular Mechanics article mentioned.

[Euclid]

BaltACD

Euclid

Push-Back Couplers

 

I know that puncture by couplers in tank car derailments have long been a major concern, and that it lead to the head shield remedy.  The head shield protects the tank end from puncture.  I assume that the tank end or “head” is most vulnerable to puncture because it is properly aligned to receive coupler impact as couplers override during a derailment.  The compound curve form of the tank head also makes it relatively unable to deflect during a coupler impact.  The lack of deflection causes the coupler impact to puncture.

Here is a link to an article in Popular Mechanics about safer oil trains. 

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/4212536

 

The article is a few years old, but is on the same track as tank car improvement today.  It talks about how couplers are liable to puncture tanks.  One person comments that couplers are shaped like giant can openers.  They say they can reduce this problem by eliminating the sharp edges of couplers.  I would like to see how that would be done and still be left with a compatible coupler. 

They also mention the possibility of equipping tank cars with “push-back couplers.”  Apparently the purpose is to permit the coupler to collapse telescopically in order to reduce the ability to pierce the coupler through a tank end. 

However, the push-back coupler, as it is presently conceived, seems to be intended as a crash energy absorbing feature for passenger trains or transit train application.  Here is a link to a description and illustrations of push-back couplers. 

http://www.voith.com/en/products-services/power-transmission/scharfenberg-couplers/scharfenberg-couplers-railcars/crash-energy-management-41850.html

 

They are shown as basic push-back couplers and also combined with energy absorbing anti-climbers.  They look pretty complex and costly.

The application of push-back couplers to tank cars for reducing the coupler puncture potential seems like an application that is different than the intended use as a crash energy absorbing feature, in which the intent is to resist the push back force.  Whereas, for coupler puncture protection, the couplers should push back with as little resistance as possible.   

Therefore I wonder if the push-back couplers would push through the end of a tank car tank easier than they would push back.  If they were redesigned for the puncture-prevention role, and made to push back with less resistance, then what happens with slack run-in?  Even without any involvement of a derailment, I would think that the force of slack run-in alone would be a strong enough force to pierce a coupler through a tank head. 

So the question is this: 

Can a coupler be designed with enough yield in its telescoping collapse to make it unable to puncture tank ends; and yet not have so much yield that it is unable to withstand the compression of slack run-in force?

If that is possible, it seems like threading a needle. 

Remember - every foot of 'cushioning' you put in the draft gear of a car becomes another foot of available slack within the the train - the more slack in a train, the harder it becomes to handle smoothly, especially when encountering undulating terrain where the train may be on multiple humps and sags all at the same time - with the slack doing it's own dance throughout the train and the engineer having limited abilities to keep the slack under control.

As I understand it, the so-called “push-back coupler” is not made to provide a slack cushioning effect during operation, and they do not affect slack action.  Instead, they only operate during a derailment or collision when they collapse under the compression shock of the wreck.  The point is to absorb and dissipate the compressive shock of a collision.  I believe the push-back couplers are actually destroyed in the performance of that shock absorbing function and require replacement.  So, they only function in wrecks, and will not have any effect of increasing the slack action during normal train operation. 

However, in the Popular Mechanics article that I linked to earlier, the use of push-back couplers was not to perform the normal function of absorbing crash energy during a wreck.  Instead, they were proposed as a coupler that would push back under the compression forces of a wreck rather than punch through the end of a tank car. 

I believe that was a flawed proposal because I think that a coupler that would be able to resist normal slack run-in would be fully capable of puncturing a tank car end.  I suspect that the term, “push-back coupler” simply sounded like a good solution to prevent punctures, but cannot actually meet that objective.    

 

[Deggesty]

dakotafred

MidlandMike

While this started out as a crude-by-rail regulatory concern, which was contentious enough, ethanol was brought into the mix, which thoroughly muddied the waters.  Ethanol is currently running adds on TV saying big oil is using their power to stifle clean energy (translation: ethanol industry wants to increase the amount of ethanol in gas to above 10%.

 

Ethanol, tax-subsidized and all, is a cornered rat, with not enough market -- because of increased fuel efficiency, less driving, etc. -- to soak up its product. It should go away -- and I say that as resident of a state that makes a lot of (subsidized) money off it.

Yes, let the corn go back to being food, which is where it belongs.

[dakotafred]

MidlandMike

While this started out as a crude-by-rail regulatory concern, which was contentious enough, ethanol was brought into the mix, which thoroughly muddied the waters.  Ethanol is currently running adds on TV saying big oil is using their power to stifle clean energy (translation: ethanol industry wants to increase the amount of ethanol in gas to above 10%.

 

Ethanol, tax-subsidized and all, is a cornered rat, with not enough market -- because of increased fuel efficiency, less driving, etc. -- to soak up its product. It should go away -- and I say that as resident of a state that makes a lot of (subsidized) money off it.

[MidlandMike]

While this started out as a crude-by-rail regulatory concern, which was contentious enough, ethanol was brought into the mix, which thoroughly muddied the waters.  Ethanol is currently running adds on TV saying big oil is using their power to stifle clean energy (translation: ethanol industry wants to increase the amount of ethanol in gas to above 10%.  The problem is that most car engines other than flex fuel can't handle this, but that is the topic for a different forum).  So it is hard to see that all the stake holders will come to consensus.  Shippers have buried their heads in the sand, and dream of derailment-free rail operation.  Railroads see no problem with shippers paying whatever it costs to build crash-worthy tank cars, but can't anticipate that will drive many shippers to pipeline.  The regulators really need some consensus, and that is why there is no clear path to new federal regulations yet.  If the railroads let it drag on too long, shippers might start to sign pipeline construction contracts (long term).  After that, the only likely captive rail crude shipments would be North Dakota to the Pacific Nnorthwest.

[dakotafred]

Euclid and all:

I too am suspicious of everything this administration does regarding fossil fuels. I hope BNSF has not taken a huge, good-faith gamble in ordering 5,000 new tank cars that are as safe as the current art can build them.

[Euclid]

 

Dakotafred,

I think Secretary Foxx’s comment and your follow-up remarks sum up the whole thing in a nutshell.  I am thoroughly convinced that the new Foxx Tank Car will indeed cripple the movement of oil by rail.  I expect that he and many others involved at his level consciously want that result.   And new regulations in the name of public safety is the perfect tool to get that result.    

The best thing that could happen is for Secretary Foxx to spend enough time dragging out the creation of new standards that it gives time to get all the Bakken oil out of the ground and to the refineries.    

[dakotafred]

U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx, in North Dakota yesterday, on "tough" new rules being promulgated by his department:

"The worst thing we could do is propose a tank-car standard that is inadequate to the material that is being transported."

A close second would be a standard so unrealistic that it cripples movement of oil by rail -- and its benefits to the U.S. economy -- without being able to do a thing about the real-world, worst-case scenario that WILL happen again one day, somewhere, given the right combination of circumstances.

 

 

 

[BaltACD]

lenzfamily

lenzfamily

I'll post the minister's order later, if/when I can find it.

Here you are.....from the horse's mouth.......

Transport Canada takes action in response to TSB's initial Lac-Mégantic recommendations

Improving the safety of Canada's railway and transportation of dangerous goods systems

April 23, 2014 - Ottawa - Transport Canada

The Honourable Lisa Raitt, Minister of Transport, today announced decisive actions to address the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's initial recommendations regarding the ongoing investigation into the Lac-Mégantic train derailment.

Following the tragic accident last summer, Transport Canada took immediate steps to protect Canadians and the communities along our country's railway lines. The Government of Canada is building upon this work by introducing concrete measures to further strengthen Canada's regulation and oversight of rail safety and the transportation of dangerous goods. Effective immediately, Transport Canada will:

• Issue a Protective Direction removing the least crash-resistant DOT-111 tank cars from dangerous goods service;
• Require DOT-111 tank cars used to transport crude oil and ethanol that do not meet the standard published in January 2014 inCanada Gazette, Part I, or any other future standard, to be phased out or refitted within three years;
• Issue a Protective Direction requiring Emergency Response Assistance Plans for crude oil, gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, and ethanol;
• Create a task force that brings stakeholders such as municipalities, first responders, railways and shippers together to strengthen emergency response capacity across the country; and
• Require railway companies to reduce the speed of trains carrying dangerous goods and implement other key operating practices.

Transport Canada is working closely with stakeholders—railways, shippers, municipalities, first responders, Aboriginal communities, provincial and territorial governments, and U.S. officials— to protect the health and safety of Canadians. The department continues to cooperate fully with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's ongoing investigation.

Quick Facts

• The Government of Canada invested $60 million to support response and recovery efforts in Lac-Mégantic and committed up to $95 million for decontamination efforts.
• Emergency Response Assistance Plans will be required for trains that have even a single tank car loaded with one of the following flammable liquids transported in large quantity by rail: crude oil, gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, or ethanol.
• Transport Canada is issuing a Ministerial Order that requires railway companies to develop new rules regarding operating practices for the safe transportation of dangerous goods.

Quote

"As the Minister responsible for Canada's transportation system, I am committed to making our country a model of world class safety. The measures I am announcing today improve the safety of the railway and transportation of dangerous goods systems from coast to coast to coast."
The Honourable Lisa Raitt
Minister of Transport

Charlie

Chilliwack, BC

While I applaud Canuckistan for implementing their tank car regulations, I foresee the US implementing regulations that will conflict and this mess will continue to drag out for the international movement of oil and other HAZMAT commodities that move in tank cars.

[lenzfamily]

lenzfamily

I'll post the minister's order later, if/when I can find it.

Here you are.....from the horse's mouth.......

Transport Canada takes action in response to TSB's initial Lac-Mégantic recommendations

Improving the safety of Canada's railway and transportation of dangerous goods systems

April 23, 2014 - Ottawa - Transport Canada

The Honourable Lisa Raitt, Minister of Transport, today announced decisive actions to address the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's initial recommendations regarding the ongoing investigation into the Lac-Mégantic train derailment.

Following the tragic accident last summer, Transport Canada took immediate steps to protect Canadians and the communities along our country's railway lines. The Government of Canada is building upon this work by introducing concrete measures to further strengthen Canada's regulation and oversight of rail safety and the transportation of dangerous goods. Effective immediately, Transport Canada will:

• Issue a Protective Direction removing the least crash-resistant DOT-111 tank cars from dangerous goods service;
• Require DOT-111 tank cars used to transport crude oil and ethanol that do not meet the standard published in January 2014 inCanada Gazette, Part I, or any other future standard, to be phased out or refitted within three years;
• Issue a Protective Direction requiring Emergency Response Assistance Plans for crude oil, gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, and ethanol;
• Create a task force that brings stakeholders such as municipalities, first responders, railways and shippers together to strengthen emergency response capacity across the country; and
• Require railway companies to reduce the speed of trains carrying dangerous goods and implement other key operating practices.

Transport Canada is working closely with stakeholders—railways, shippers, municipalities, first responders, Aboriginal communities, provincial and territorial governments, and U.S. officials— to protect the health and safety of Canadians. The department continues to cooperate fully with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's ongoing investigation.

Quick Facts

• The Government of Canada invested $60 million to support response and recovery efforts in Lac-Mégantic and committed up to $95 million for decontamination efforts.
• Emergency Response Assistance Plans will be required for trains that have even a single tank car loaded with one of the following flammable liquids transported in large quantity by rail: crude oil, gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, or ethanol.
• Transport Canada is issuing a Ministerial Order that requires railway companies to develop new rules regarding operating practices for the safe transportation of dangerous goods.

Quote

"As the Minister responsible for Canada's transportation system, I am committed to making our country a model of world class safety. The measures I am announcing today improve the safety of the railway and transportation of dangerous goods systems from coast to coast to coast."
The Honourable Lisa Raitt
Minister of Transport

Charlie

Chilliwack, BC

[Euclid]

Today, it is risky to build new tank cars because there is no way to know if they will meet the new federal tank car regulations said to be coming soon.  Nobody wants to buy a new tank car today and find it outlawed by new regulations in six months.  So it makes sense to simply postpone new tank car purchases until the new regulations are known. 

The problem with that strategy is that the industry is also being pressured to stop using the current fleet of tank cars which are deemed to be less safe than necessary.  The prospect of replacing that entire fleet of tank cars is daunting enough.  But when you add to it, the promise of new regulations, and the uncertainty of what they will require; forward action is almost impossible.  It is bad enough to have to replace tens of thousands of serviceable tank cars in one move.  Nobody wants to do that once, and then have to do it again next year because of new regulations.

Up until now, the industry has been building a new class of safer tank cars because some minimum number of new cars is needed for normal attrition.  It is still risky, but the industry has mitigated the risk by voluntarily making substantial safety improvements to the cars in the hope they will either meet the new regulations, or be accepted by the regulators as being grandfathered in.  Because the industry is taking this risk voluntarily, these new and improved cars are referred to as “good faith” tank cars.   It is like doing the right thing without a contract that requires it. 

But the good faith is still a part of a transaction.  The industry gives good faith in hopes that the regulating community will reciprocate by permitting the good faith cars to be exempt from the new regulations.  Such an exemption would amount to a return of good faith from the regulators to the industry.  It is like a romance between big oil and the regulators--  a heck of a way to do business. 

My sense is that the romance is becoming frayed as time wears on.  The one saving grace of good faith tank cars is that only limited quantities are needed over a given time.  But the longer the time, the greater the “good faith” investment becomes; and nobody knows how long the time will be. 

My prediction is that the new tank car regulations will certainly not be released this year and maybe not even next year.  And when they are released, it remains to be seen whether the good faith cars will be allowed to run without further modification to meet the new regulations.          

[tree68]

BaltACD

When it comes to being notified of 'potential hazards' the old saying - 'Be careful what you ask for - you may actually get it!' springs readily to mind.  There is much HAZMAT moving at any time - on railroads, and even closer to more homes - in trucks.

Indeed - If John Q Public wants to sit alongside the Interstate or other busy commercial route with an ERG (it's available on-line), they're gonna need some help, because there's a lot of placarded material on the move.

Fire department hazmat teams don't exist so much for the railroads as they do for the highways.

[BaltACD]

Euclid

lenzfamily

Hi All

On the CBC radio morning news today.

Ms Lisa Raitt, Canadian Federal Minister of Transport , issued new regulations, as I understand them, 1. mandating the retrofitting or replacement of 111 tank cars within a three year period. 2. requiring study and then establishment of reduced maximum speeds for, as well as establish emergency protocols for, oil and other hazmat trains and 3. a requirement that the railroads inform the communities through which they run such trains of the contents of such trains as well as the above mentioned protocols.

I'll post the minister's order later, if/when I can find it.

Charlie

Chilliwack, BC 

Charlie,

Thanks for that report.

On the very surface, informing the communities when oil trains are about to pass through sounds like a good idea because then the people in those communities will be forewarned and able to take appropriate measures to protect themselves. 

But what measures could be taken?  The only thing I can think of would be to evacuate the community until the train has passed.

What am I missing about the benefit of informing communities about approaching oil trains?  If communities have to be warned of possible annihilation several times a day for oil trains, it is time to move the railroad or the community.    

 

A number of years back - in the 70's - when HAZMAT incidents had become much too commonplace because of the financial stress on the industry and the deferred maintenance that let the track structure deteriorate to be much less than optimal.  A big city in my service territory decided it's Fire Department needed to be notified every time a HAZMAT shipment was either destined to the city or was going to pass through the city.  My carrier complied - after a very short period of time the FD decided being notified of 500+ shipments on a continuing daily basis was more information than they had bargained for and they decided it was better to get accurate information on any specific cars that were involved in a situation upon the occurrence of the situation.

When it comes to being notified of 'potential hazards' the old saying - 'Be careful what you ask for - you may actually get it!' springs readily to mind.  There is much HAZMAT moving at any time - on railroads, and even closer to more homes - in trucks. HAZMAT in it's many forms is at the foundation of our manufacturing economy and it must be transported or the economy will spiral into collapse.

[Euclid]

lenzfamily

Hi All

On the CBC radio morning news today.

Ms Lisa Raitt, Canadian Federal Minister of Transport , issued new regulations, as I understand them, 1. mandating the retrofitting or replacement of 111 tank cars within a three year period. 2. requiring study and then establishment of reduced maximum speeds for, as well as establish emergency protocols for, oil and other hazmat trains and 3. a requirement that the railroads inform the communities through which they run such trains of the contents of such trains as well as the above mentioned protocols.

I'll post the minister's order later, if/when I can find it.

Charlie

Chilliwack, BC 

Charlie,

Thanks for that report.

On the very surface, informing the communities when oil trains are about to pass through sounds like a good idea because then the people in those communities will be forewarned and able to take appropriate measures to protect themselves. 

But what measures could be taken?  The only thing I can think of would be to evacuate the community until the train has passed.

What am I missing about the benefit of informing communities about approaching oil trains?  If communities have to be warned of possible annihilation several times a day for oil trains, it is time to move the railroad or the community.    

 

[lenzfamily]

Hi All

On the CBC radio morning news today.

Ms Lisa Raitt, Canadian Federal Minister of Transport , issued new regulations, as I understand them, 1. mandating the retrofitting or replacement of 111 tank cars within a three year period. 2. requiring study and then establishment of reduced maximum speeds for, as well as establish emergency protocols for, oil and other hazmat trains and 3. a requirement that the railroads inform the communities through which they run such trains of the contents of such trains as well as the above mentioned protocols.

I'll post the minister's order later, if/when I can find it.

Charlie

Chilliwack, BC 

[Euclid]

Here is the link to the NTSB forum on tank car safety that took place yesterday and today:

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/railsafetyforum/agenda.html

I have not read the entire forum presentation, so I am not sure how much is really news.  Some of the related coverage focuses on the fact that the uncertainty of what the new regulations will require has resulted in putting new tank car manufacturing on hold, and leaving the industry in limbo.  But people have been voicing concerns over that issue for at least a couple months. 

I think the blockbuster news is yet to come in the form of the actual new federal regulations that result.   

[Norm48327]

Perhaps the tank car builders could take a cue from the aircraft industry regarding fill and drain valves. On most aircraft, fuel tank sump drain valves are flush with the outer surface yet still drain from the very bottom of the tank. It wouldn't be difficult to design such a valve for tank cars but would likely be more expensive.

[Euclid]

From the Popular Mechanics article I linked to in the push-back coupler post above:

“REMOVABLE VALVES AND FITTINGS
Projecting fixed valves, used to load and unload the tanks’ toxic contents, are vulnerable to damage or breaking off in crash impacts. Recessed and/or removable valves and fittings eliminate this hazard. Security against tampering would be vastly improved as well.”

It does not explain how this would actually be built.  Midland Mike makes good points about why the fittings need to project from the tank exterior.  What the quote describes seem like quite an engineering challenge.