Murphy Siding In reading the article, I think something was overlooked. The reporter made sure to use all the popular talking points and buzzwords about that naughty, old oil being shipped by tank car. It appears that 2 cars of liquid propane also derailed. Isn't that stuff highly explosive?
Which is not so far out as it might appear. This derailment occurred in Vandergrift, PA, along the Kiskiminetas River, which is about 20 miles northeast of Pittsburgh. Zippo lighters were traditionally manufactured in Bradford, PA, which is about 80 miles (as the crow flies, not as the tracks are laid = maybe twice that distance ?) north-northeast of the derailment site . . .
- Paul North.
dehusman That's when a "BLVE", blevey (boiling liquid vapor explosion) entered the common language. Explosions of those cars was the reason a lot of the modern hazmat rules and documentation is in place now. What the industry did was redesigned the cars, the put head shields, shelf couplers, increased shell thickness and thermal protection. Much of the same stuff that is being proposed for the standards for the DOT111 cars.
Would it be fair to say that you see the main reason the DOT 111 cars fail now is the difference (more flammable) in Bakken crude? But the NTSB was already saying the DOT 111s were unsafe in accident reports in the 1990s (as early as 1991). NTSB/SS-91/01 questioned "the safety of 111A tank cars. It determined that this classification of tank car has a high incidence of tank integrity failure when involved in accidents and that certain hazardous materials are transported in these tank cars even though better protected cars (less liable to release the transported product when involved in accidents) are available." Why were the cars not re-equipped earlier?
https://archive.org/details/ensuringrailroad003725mbp
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
In reading the article, I think something was overlooked. The reporter made sure to use all the popular talking points and buzzwords about that naughty, old oil being shipped by tank car. It appears that 2 cars of liquid propane also derailed. Isn't that stuff highly explosive?
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Yes, but....
23 17 46 11
The big thing about the PA derailment: no explosions, no fire, not even from the LPG. Underlines what we already knew, that not every derailment -- not even those involving hazardous materials, like LPG, more volatile than Bakken crude -- has to result in Armageddon. (I do realize the oil here was "Canadian," presumably not Bakken.)
dehusmanAn engineering degree and 30+ years of service on railroads and training on rigourous problem solving.
Good. That makes at least two, probably three folks who have an applicable technical background.
And this should all be on the thread about safety, not the most recent accident.
As the OP of this thread, I wish it to be solely about this accident. PLEASE keep all else, such as the oil train design, on its own thread.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Yes but..... :p
dehusman An engineering degree and 30+ years of service on railroads and training on rigourous problem solving.
An engineering degree and 30+ years of service on railroads and training on rigourous problem solving.
Pleeeeeeeeeeeeeease MAKE IT STOP!
This thread is about the details of the Pennsylvania incident. Most of the recent posts here belong in the adjacent Euclid 'safe oil train' proposal thread. We don't need two of those.
tree68 EuclidAnd then you turn right around and say building new tank cars is the proper solution because it is doable, and will result in cars that are more survivable. Why don’t you apply your all-or-nothing requirement to the viability of strengthening tank cars like you apply it to my idea? It seems like a huge double standard. The fancy braking solution is an all-or-nothing proposition. All of the cars in the train must be so equipped. If even one car is not so equipped, the system is essentially useless. Ditto if no locomotive is available with the necessary electronics. On the other hand, if cars built to the new standards are part of the consist, the consist is safer by a factor of the ratio of new cars to old. Eventually, all of the cars will meet the new standard. As noted so far, the fancy braking solution would currently be 0 for 4 in preventing recent incidents. I suspect that the derailments that such a system would mitigate are those which do not usually cause catastrophic results in the first place. Railroads don't want derailments - they cost money regardless of the outcome. That's why they inspect track and manage trains the way they do. It's not just a matter of Bakken crude.
EuclidAnd then you turn right around and say building new tank cars is the proper solution because it is doable, and will result in cars that are more survivable. Why don’t you apply your all-or-nothing requirement to the viability of strengthening tank cars like you apply it to my idea? It seems like a huge double standard.
The fancy braking solution is an all-or-nothing proposition. All of the cars in the train must be so equipped. If even one car is not so equipped, the system is essentially useless. Ditto if no locomotive is available with the necessary electronics.
On the other hand, if cars built to the new standards are part of the consist, the consist is safer by a factor of the ratio of new cars to old. Eventually, all of the cars will meet the new standard.
As noted so far, the fancy braking solution would currently be 0 for 4 in preventing recent incidents. I suspect that the derailments that such a system would mitigate are those which do not usually cause catastrophic results in the first place.
Railroads don't want derailments - they cost money regardless of the outcome. That's why they inspect track and manage trains the way they do. It's not just a matter of Bakken crude.
By "all-or-nothing," I am referring to Dave Husman’s assertion that a safety feature has to be 100% reliable, or it is 100% worthless. That is what I meant by all or nothing.
The fact that this idea may not have helped with four derailments seems like grasping for straws to conclude that it is worthless. It would not have helped with Lac Megantic once the runaway was in progress. However, the more sophisticated ECP brake system might have prevented the runaway in the first place.
It would not have mitigated Casselton because the oil train collided with the grain car and started the compression impact from the head end. There would be no way for my system to offset that.
I don’t know much about the wreck in Alabama, the one on the bridge, and the one in Pennsylvania. Dave Husman has declared that my system would not have mitigated those derailments. Maybe he or somebody else with that opinion can back it up with some facts as to why my system would have had zero effect on those wrecks. All I have said is that my system may have helped. I don’t have the ability to say what the effect would have been, and I certainly don’t have the ability to say that the effect would have been zero as Dave concludes.
You said this: “The fancy braking solution is an all-or-nothing proposition. All of the cars in the train must be so equipped. If even one car is not so equipped, the system is essentially useless. Ditto if no locomotive is available with the necessary electronics.”
True enough, but so what? That reasoning applies to ECP brakes alone, and the industry is very serious about adopting that. The first intended application would be to unit trains with every car equipped. The locomotive also must be equipped. This first application is expedited by excluding the requirement for interchangeability. Yet that did not seem to rain on the parade of ECP brake development.
It is true that building cars to a new standard can allow those cars to be mixed with other cars, and gradually achieve 100% cars of the new standard. But you don’t get full performance until all the cars in the train are of the new standard. And the larger question goes to how much safer will oil trains be when built that the new standard. And another question concerns the time required to reach that new standard. What I am proposing will take some time, but so will replacing the tank car fleet.
Euclid I never presented the idea as being capable of mitigating the damage of every derailment. But it would accomplish that with enough of them to make it worthwhile. However that objective is only the engineering component of the idea. A larger component is the marketing pushback against the media momentum pushing this “crisis.”
I never presented the idea as being capable of mitigating the damage of every derailment. But it would accomplish that with enough of them to make it worthwhile. However that objective is only the engineering component of the idea. A larger component is the marketing pushback against the media momentum pushing this “crisis.”
Certainly sounded like your idea was going to prevent cars from piling up in the event of a derail. The laws of physics say that's going to happen given that the cars have kinetic energy that braking or keeping them in a line is not going to stop. That energy must go somewhere, and it's going to push cars off the track unless the trailing cars can stop on the proverbial dime. That is a physical impossibility.
Your marketing idea does not have merit. One more accident after the railroads have crowed about solving the problem when in fact little has actually been done will fall on it's face.
If you think engineers, both mechanical and civil, haven't been working solving on this problem and are satisfied with the status quo, you truly have your head in the sand. As I've said previously; put your ideas on paper and present them to those who have been tackling the problem.
Norm
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
dehusmanEuclidThe industry could use that marketing component to their advantage in a week or so when they have to explain to Congress what they are doing about the crisis. They could come out of that hearing leaving Congress impressed with the industry’s resolve to do something big about the problem—a robust solution. I don’t think Congress is going to too impressed by this multi-year program to make tank cars a little stronger. But if the "robust solution" doesn't solve the problem then its not "robust", its not even a solution. Even worse than doing nothing is presenting a solution that won't fix things. We know that building a car to the new standards is doable. We know that building a car to the new standards will be more survivable (similar changes were made to flammable gas cars). We know that building a car to the new standards will work in general freight trains (like the derailment in PA) and in unit trains. Building cars to the new standard is faster (the standard is out there and the cars are already in production). It requires no new technology development, it requires no testing period (yah I know all the parts for the proposals are "off the shelf" but they have never been assembled together to do what has been proposed on the scope that has been proposed so there will be years of development). Building cars to the new standard doesn't require specialized, dedicated equipment (no modifications to engines). Building cars to the new standard is cheaper. Building cars to the new standard is more flexible. Having a solution that works 90% 100% of the time is better than a solution that works 100% 10% of the time.
EuclidThe industry could use that marketing component to their advantage in a week or so when they have to explain to Congress what they are doing about the crisis. They could come out of that hearing leaving Congress impressed with the industry’s resolve to do something big about the problem—a robust solution. I don’t think Congress is going to too impressed by this multi-year program to make tank cars a little stronger.
But if the "robust solution" doesn't solve the problem then its not "robust", its not even a solution.
Even worse than doing nothing is presenting a solution that won't fix things. We know that building a car to the new standards is doable. We know that building a car to the new standards will be more survivable (similar changes were made to flammable gas cars). We know that building a car to the new standards will work in general freight trains (like the derailment in PA) and in unit trains. Building cars to the new standard is faster (the standard is out there and the cars are already in production). It requires no new technology development, it requires no testing period (yah I know all the parts for the proposals are "off the shelf" but they have never been assembled together to do what has been proposed on the scope that has been proposed so there will be years of development). Building cars to the new standard doesn't require specialized, dedicated equipment (no modifications to engines). Building cars to the new standard is cheaper. Building cars to the new standard is more flexible.
Having a solution that works 90% 100% of the time is better than a solution that works 100% 10% of the time.
I don’t understand your reasoning. You say that if my solution doesn't solve the problem then it’s not even a solution. You say it is worse than doing nothing. So you are saying that if my solution does not 100% solve the problem, then it is 100% worthless. There is no safety feature ever invented that meets that criteria.
And then you turn right around and say building new tank cars is the proper solution because it is doable, and will result in cars that are more survivable. Why don’t you apply your all-or-nothing requirement to the viability of strengthening tank cars like you apply it to my idea? It seems like a huge double standard.
And you also continually modify what I am proposing in order to weaken its viability and then criticize it for being unviable. You say that strengthening tank cars will be faster because it is already under way. Yet you ignore the marketing component of my proposal, which could be presented for full effectiveness within a few weeks.
I never said what I am proposing would be cheap or benefit from off the shelf parts. You are adding that part in order to criticize the idea.
The strengthened tank car standard that you cite as being under way is not the ultimate standard that will address this latest public safety controversy. That standard is still 2-12 months away, and nobody knows what it will require.
And then you say this: “Having a solution [your solution] that works 90% 100% of the time is better than a solution [my solution] that works 100% 10% of the time. That is statistical gobbledygook. Either system has to address too many variables to even define what “works” means let alone quantify it in terms of a percentage of working perfectly.
One thing that has never been mentioned in the 'Oil Train of the Future'. How many drawbared units will constitute a 'car'? More than one is a given. Three units? (180 feet) Five units? (300 feet). Ten units? (600 feet) More?
Anything mechanical will fail. When it fails the 'car', in it's entirity will be bad ordered and will have to be repaired at some 'shop' location. Will specialized shops be required? The more units drawbared together the high the probability of the 'car' being bad ordered and shopped.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
We have 4 incidents: Lac Megantic, Casselton, Philadelphia and this one.
At Lac Megantic the crew parked the train, the engineer "secured" the train, the lead unit caught fire, they shut down the unit. The train rolled away. Both solutions rely on a computer on the lead unit. Once the lead unit caught fire and was shut down (if they did that properly) the power would have been turned off and the computer would have incommunicado. After it rolled away there would be no computer to direct the train to use the sophisticated systems. In Euclid's system if the brakes bled off then there wouldn't be any air to operate the brakes even if the computer was functioning.
At Casselton, a train struck the side of the oil train. Both persons have said that that type of accident would result in some sort of pile, the best their systems would have done is make the pile smaller.
At Philadelphia the derailment was only two or three cars, there was no pile to prevent. The outcome would have been the same with or without their systems.
In the current one, the train that derailed was a general freight train. Both proposals require a unit train with dedicated, specially equipped power and cars. Since this was a general freight neither system would have been operative because the it wasn't a unit train.
Zero for four.
I have no problem with new ideas. They just have to influence the outcome. Haven't seen where the proposals would do that significantly for the derailments that have occurred.
Euclid The industry could use that marketing component to their advantage in a week or so when they have to explain to Congress what they are doing about the crisis. They could come out of that hearing leaving Congress impressed with the industry’s resolve to do something big about the problem—a robust solution. I don’t think Congress is going to too impressed by this multi-year program to make tank cars a little stronger.
The industry could use that marketing component to their advantage in a week or so when they have to explain to Congress what they are doing about the crisis. They could come out of that hearing leaving Congress impressed with the industry’s resolve to do something big about the problem—a robust solution. I don’t think Congress is going to too impressed by this multi-year program to make tank cars a little stronger.
dehusman Euclid dehusman One more derailment that the complicated proposals by Euclid and Klepper wouldn't have helped. What I have proposed in the safe oil train thread might easily have prevented all of the upset and rupture in this wreck. This popular defensive notion that nothing about railroading can ever be improved gets a little comical. But in the face of this mounting public relations crisis, it amounts to whistling past the graveyard. Besides crude oil, these tank trains are delivering gallons of new regulations. Its not defensive, its just that so far its quite possible that there hasn't been a single derailment reported on these forum that either of the systems proposed would have had any effect on, including Lac Megantic.
Euclid dehusman One more derailment that the complicated proposals by Euclid and Klepper wouldn't have helped. What I have proposed in the safe oil train thread might easily have prevented all of the upset and rupture in this wreck. This popular defensive notion that nothing about railroading can ever be improved gets a little comical. But in the face of this mounting public relations crisis, it amounts to whistling past the graveyard. Besides crude oil, these tank trains are delivering gallons of new regulations.
dehusman One more derailment that the complicated proposals by Euclid and Klepper wouldn't have helped.
One more derailment that the complicated proposals by Euclid and Klepper wouldn't have helped.
What I have proposed in the safe oil train thread might easily have prevented all of the upset and rupture in this wreck. This popular defensive notion that nothing about railroading can ever be improved gets a little comical. But in the face of this mounting public relations crisis, it amounts to whistling past the graveyard. Besides crude oil, these tank trains are delivering gallons of new regulations.
But it is neither the industry nor Congress that is in the driver’s seat here. It is fate who is in charge of whether or not oil trains injure the public in the coming months when the issue is in the limelight. I would characterize that as the biggest marketing gamble ever made in the history of the world. I can’t believe that the industry would make such a gamble unless they were unaware of it.
I am not sure of the background for Euclid. Dave Klepper has a strong engineering background. Overmod may also. But you dismiss their proposals repeatedly. What is the basis for that? What is your background?
Paul_D_North_JrComments to that article are kind funny . . .
Yep. Got my laughs for the day in, right there.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Euclid dehusman One more derailment that the complicated proposals by Euclid and Klepper wouldn't have helped. What I have proposed in the safe oil train thread might easily have prevented all of the upset and rupture in this wreck.
What I have proposed in the safe oil train thread might easily have prevented all of the upset and rupture in this wreck.
Show us the money.
CSSHEGEWISCH It appears that the previous poster has investigated this accident even faster than NS and already knows how it happened.
It appears that the previous poster has investigated this accident even faster than NS and already knows how it happened.
His powers are wasted with us mere mortals.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Per the Reuters article cited/ linked in the Original Post: 21 tank cars of a 120-car general cargo freight train derailed. 19 carried oil, 4 of which leaked between 3,000 and 4,000 gallons; the other 2 had LPG on board.
Comments to that article are kind funny . . .
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-energy-crude-derailment-idUSBREA1C13120140213
No major rupture, interestingly. And more importantly, no major injuries!
I have seen unsubstantiated rumors that the Reading heritage unit was second out, none of the locomotives appear to be damaged.
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