schlimm BaltACDNobody - Railroads, Shippers, Consignees, FRA can implement an action on their own - all must be involved! Regardless the public increasingly is demanding a solution NOT 40 years of what amounts to inaction. Additionally, the railroad execs ARE recognizing that the status quo endangers the future of the railroads: [from PDN] "There was an excellent article by a Betsy Morris starting on page A-1 and continuing on page A-12 (IIRC) of yesterday's (Thursday, 09 Jan. 2014) print edition of the Wall Street Journaltitled "Fiery Oil-Train Accidents Raise Railroad Insurance Worries", which also discussed haz-mat liability issues. Unfortunately, the article does not seem to be available on-line without being a subscriber. I thought it was pretty fairly balanced. It quoted Hunter Harrison quite a bit. One key point (pun not intended !) is that present insurance coverage is limited to about $1.5 Billion, but the "worst-case scenario" is much higher than that. However, higher insurance limits are said to be uneconomical as a practical matter.One CEO (Rose or Moorman) said that as a result, they are essentially risking bankrupting the company with each carload shipment of toxic haz-mats - a cold and sobering thought."
BaltACDNobody - Railroads, Shippers, Consignees, FRA can implement an action on their own - all must be involved!
Regardless the public increasingly is demanding a solution NOT 40 years of what amounts to inaction.
Additionally, the railroad execs ARE recognizing that the status quo endangers the future of the railroads:
[from PDN] "There was an excellent article by a Betsy Morris starting on page A-1 and continuing on page A-12 (IIRC) of yesterday's (Thursday, 09 Jan. 2014) print edition of the Wall Street Journaltitled "Fiery Oil-Train Accidents Raise Railroad Insurance Worries", which also discussed haz-mat liability issues. Unfortunately, the article does not seem to be available on-line without being a subscriber. I thought it was pretty fairly balanced. It quoted Hunter Harrison quite a bit. One key point (pun not intended !) is that present insurance coverage is limited to about $1.5 Billion, but the "worst-case scenario" is much higher than that. However, higher insurance limits are said to be uneconomical as a practical matter.One CEO (Rose or Moorman) said that as a result, they are essentially risking bankrupting the company with each carload shipment of toxic haz-mats - a cold and sobering thought."
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
daveklepper It is the ability to meet Fred Frailey's suggestion of limiting hazmat train speeds to 40mph and insuring that all meets and bypasses have one of the two trains at rest that needs this approach.
It is the ability to meet Fred Frailey's suggestion of limiting hazmat train speeds to 40mph and insuring that all meets and bypasses have one of the two trains at rest that needs this approach.
Why are we taking Fred Frailey's suggestions as gospel?
An "expensive model collector"
Dave,
You have not detailed what you are proposing and why it would be better than the current system. Until you do that no one can intelligently comment on your concept.
Mac
BaltACDThe carriers (all of them) have been working with HAZMAT Shippers and Consignees for the past 40 years or more to come up with a 'final solution' to the safe carriage of HAZMAT commodities.
Exactly. the goal post is always moving. There will NEVER be a final solution. Only a better one than the last.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
And every year new 'HAZMAT' materials are created which generate new hazards to attempt to control. HAZMAT is the proverbial 'Wack a Mole' game, every time you think you have solved a issue - 10 more pop up.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
schlimm Dave Klepper: Judging from their comments on the various threads, some forum members would prefer the issue to simply disappear from the media, as though that would solve the problem. They do not seem to realize that their railroads at the highest level of leadership, are very concerned about liability and safety issues and are looking for solutions beyond waiting years until sufficient replacement tank cars are delivered, even if that means losing some revenue..
Dave Klepper: Judging from their comments on the various threads, some forum members would prefer the issue to simply disappear from the media, as though that would solve the problem. They do not seem to realize that their railroads at the highest level of leadership, are very concerned about liability and safety issues and are looking for solutions beyond waiting years until sufficient replacement tank cars are delivered, even if that means losing some revenue..
schlimm They do not seem to realize that their railroads at the highest level of leadership, are very concerned about liability and safety issues
They do not seem to realize that their railroads at the highest level of leadership, are very concerned about liability and safety issues
Please do tell, who has stated they don't think the higher ups are concered about safety issues?
n012944Please do tell, who has stated they don't think the higher ups are concered about safety issues?
I don't know whether to laugh or shake my head.
yes, please do tell.
Murphy Siding ... Do YOU think that safety in the movement of hazmat materials has changed over the last 40 years?
...
Do YOU think that safety in the movement of hazmat materials has changed over the last 40 years?
The Hazardous Material Transportation Act came about in 1975 and continued bringing the separate modes of transportation together in standardizing hazard handling, worker training, and response procedures. Standardized emergency response guides were published and the first responders really grew in in their hazmet capabilities. 40+ years ago it seemed like once a week would see on the news, a huge field filled with drums of waste chemicals. It seems like you see a lot more tank cars today than 40 years ago.
BaltACD The carriers (all of them) have been working with HAZMAT Shippers and Consignees for the past 40 years or more to come up with a 'final solution' to the safe carriage of HAZMAT commodities.
zugmann: Exactly. the goal post is always moving. There will NEVER be a final solution. Only a better one than the last.
As usual, tasteless as well as defensive. If you don't know why or what, find out and never use it again.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimmAs usual, tasteless as well as defensive. If you don't know why or what, find out and never use it again.
Yeah, yeah, yeah....nothing new from you. Whatever.
n012944 daveklepper It is the ability to meet Fred Frailey's suggestion of limiting hazmat train speeds to 40mph and insuring that all meets and bypasses have one of the two trains at rest that needs this approach. Why are we taking Fred Frailey's suggestions as gospel?
When You say "hazmat trains," do you mean those that are Key trains (I assume that's where the proposed Key Transportation name comes from) or those that carry hazmat? They aren't always the same thing.
I'm guessing that it's assumed that Key trains are mostly unit trains of ethanol or crude oil, etc. I think there are probably as many, if not more, manifest trains than unit trains that meet the Key train definition. A key train can have as little as one or as many as twenty or more cars, depending on type of load, of hazmat cars. You could have a 19 car block of ethanol in a 100 car manifest and it's not a key train. Yet those cars 19 cars can cause big problems if they are involved in a derailment. So to be truly safe, you are going to have to include almost any train with a hazmat load.
So if we start restricting trains to 40 mph and/or positive meets where one must be stopped (I can almost read how law makers would word the restriction now, "When a train meets another train on an adjacent track that has loads classified as hazardous materials by the USDOT, both shall come to a full and complete stop and neither shall move until the other as departed.) It will impact more than just a few trains a day.
On the positive side, it will increase the number of train crew jobs to handle all the dog catching because the system becomes grid-locked.
Jeff
schlimm,
If you think upper management isn't concerned about safety you're delusional. Every hazmat incident cost the railroad big bucks, and potentially huge lawsuits. You are refusing to accept what those in the industry know as fact. Your adding ifs, ands, or buts doesn't change the equation one bit.
Norm
Norm: I have no idea why you say that. It is the opposite of what I have been saying. I know that top rail management is very concerned and i have said so. I reposted the summary Paul North posted from the WSJ that mentioned the views of CEO's.. It has been and continues to be that some on these forums want to pretend the transportation of Bakken crude (and other hazmats) is no big deal, hope the subject is ignored by the media and the public and the governments.
schlimm It has been and continues to be that some on these forums want to pretend the transportation of Bakken crude (and other hazmats) is no big deal, hope the subject is ignored by the media and the public and the governments.
Funny... I haven't seen that. So which people in which posts? Be specific.
schlimmIt has been and continues to be that some on these forums want to pretend the transportation of Bakken crude (and other hazmats) is no big deal, hope the subject is ignored by the media and the public and the governments.
It's not that Bakken crude isn't a big deal - it's just no bigger a deal than any other hazmat on the rails. And there's stuff that's far worse than crude riding the rails every day.
And it's not hoping that the media will ignore it, it's knowing that coverage of any given incident won't last longer than a news cycle or two.
Of course, that won't stop the media from bringing crude-by-rail into virtually any rail-based story, witness the derailment of three hoppers of coal in BC this past weekend: http://o.canada.com/news/b-c-train-derailment-throws-coal-dust-into-river-system/
Beavers got the blame for that one, but the story did manage to question whether CN was properly inspecting its rails...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Did the beavers have a permit to construct the dam? Was it constructed to the specifications (tailored to the location) for such a dam?
Johnny
And the poor Beavers are now among the homeless.
I have been asked to be more specific, and now I will be:
First, I expect that safety and operating people of the new corporation will fine-tune any suggestions I or others may have, may come up with alternative or better methods, or additional methods.
But treating the entire rail network as one system and planning hazmat movements for maximum safety will probably:
Reduce the number of times hazmat loads are carried on regular manifest trains and increase the number of times they move in dedicated trains.
Adopt Fred Frailey's suggestions or something parallel. It is perfectly obvious that having one train stopped when a hazmat train and another train pass reduces the admiinttadly tiny risk by more than 50%. Why? Because with both trains moving either one can have a defect. A defect on either train can be a derailment. A defect on a manifest train can be loose load. Again, it is obvious that reduced speed reduces the chance of most defects. So Fred's suggesstions make sense to me and I hope they do to you. But operating people and safety people with years of experience will make the decisions, not us.
Whre hazmat loads and dedicated hazmat trains now are routed on high-density routes, they will tend to use lower density routes. Alternatives for the use of BNSF's Transcon and UP's Cheyenne-Green River routes for hazmat loads and trains will be found and used.
Hamat loads with origines and destinations that are served by different railroads that now move in different trains will be handled more in jointly operated and preferably dedicated trains.
Thee may be a safety officer assigned by the corporation to travel with each hazmat shipment and train. Llike the Pullman concductor when railroads hanlded Pullman cars on passenger trains.
... Trying not to be cynical, but..... Wouldn't hazmat be best shipped on the high-density routes? Those routes are probably built for heavier cars, and maintained the best of any lines. They are typically the shortest route between pointA abd point B. They serve more of the important origination and destination pairs. What would we gain, by having a trainload of hazmat from Houston to New Jersey move over the DM&E, even though DM&E is low density and misses every southern and eastern population center? Wouldn't having a babysitter on each hazmat shipment blow the cost through the roof? As I understand it, railroads cannot charge higher rates for hazmat material (?) Who will pay for what must be a huge increase in shipping costs? If it is mandated that railroads must spend lots of money, to haul freight at a loss, how is that much different than 1970's passenger trains? Where is the incentive for railroads not to put a hazmat train into a siding and leave it there, while other, profit making traffic rolls by?
Murphy Siding ... Trying not to be cynical, but..... Wouldn't hazmat be best shipped on the high-density routes? Those routes are probably built for heavier cars, and maintained the best of any lines. They are typically the shortest route between pointA abd point B. They serve more of the important origination and destination pairs. What would we gain, by having a trainload of hazmat from Houston to New Jersey move over the DM&E, even though DM&E is low density and misses every southern and eastern population center? Wouldn't having a babysitter on each hazmat shipment blow the cost through the roof? As I understand it, railroads cannot charge higher rates for hazmat material (?) Who will pay for what must be a huge increase in shipping costs? If it is mandated that railroads must spend lots of money, to haul freight at a loss, how is that much different than 1970's passenger trains? Where is the incentive for railroads not to put a hazmat train into a siding and leave it there, while other, profit making traffic rolls by?
daveklepper I have been asked to be more specific, and now I will be: By treating the entire rail network as one system and planning hazmat movements for maximum safety will probably: Reduce the number of times hazmat loads are carried on regular manifest trains and increase the number of times they move in dedicated trains. Adopt Fred Frailey's suggestions or something parallel. It is perfectly obvious that having one train stopped when a hazmat train and another train pass reduces the admiinttadly tiny risk by more than 50%. Why? Because with both trains moving either one can have a defect. A defect on either train can be a derailment. A defect on a manifest train can be loose load. Again, it is obvious that reduced speed reduces the chance of most defects. So Fred's suggesstions make sense to me and I hope they do to you. But operating people and safety people with years of experience will make the decisions, not us. Where hazmat loads and dedicated hazmat trains now are routed on high-density routes, they will tend to use lower density routes. Alternatives for the use of BNSF's Transcon and UP's Cheyenne-Green River routes for hazmat loads and trains will be found and used. Hamat loads with origins and destinations that are served by different railroads that now move in different trains will be handled more in jointly operated and preferably dedicated trains. There may be a safety officer assigned by the corporation to travel with each hazmat shipment and train. Llike the Pullman concductor when railroads hanlded Pullman cars on passenger trains.
By treating the entire rail network as one system and planning hazmat movements for maximum safety will probably:
Where hazmat loads and dedicated hazmat trains now are routed on high-density routes, they will tend to use lower density routes. Alternatives for the use of BNSF's Transcon and UP's Cheyenne-Green River routes for hazmat loads and trains will be found and used.
Hamat loads with origins and destinations that are served by different railroads that now move in different trains will be handled more in jointly operated and preferably dedicated trains.
There may be a safety officer assigned by the corporation to travel with each hazmat shipment and train. Llike the Pullman concductor when railroads hanlded Pullman cars on passenger trains.
I worked in the rail hazardous material control business for 13 years, 5 with the AAR Bureau of Explosives and 8 with Southern Pacific Transportation Company. I went to derailments, transfered product, dealt with FRA and NTSB people and was involved in the data gathering for, discussion of, and have a knowledge of the changes to DOT 112 and 114 spec tank cars that had by 1975 shown a too high probablility to release their contents, often in a fireball as a result of being involved in a derailment.
The historical approach to transporting bulk (tank car quantity) hazmat has been to keep the juice in the can. In the case of 112/114 cars (noninsulated pressure cars) the government mandated, after years of study funded by the carriers, the car builders, and the government, three engineering changes. One was thermal protection since history showed that intact cars exposed to fire would some times fail catastrophically. The second was "headshields" which were/are 1/2 inch steel plates that covered the bottom half of the tank head. The theory was that they would spread impact forces and reduce the probablitiy of head punctures, which accounted for about 90% of the initial releases IIRC. The third was double shelf couplers, a requirement that was soon extended to all DOT spec tank cars, that is all that were authorized to haul haz mat.
The real world results were that thermal protection and head shields worked, that is they substantially reduced the probablity of release given derailment or exposure to fire. The results for shelf couplers were not as clear. The theory was that they would reduce the probability of coupler bypass, thus preventing the coupler from becoming a spear. In fact they tended to break behind the head, so the spear was still there in half the cases and in the other half the coupler pocket could still impact the adjacent car, but the impact occurred over a wider area, a good thing.
The research process took about 15 years. Shortly after the rulemaking on 112/114 cars the DOT required headshilds on new 105 cars, which were/are insulated pressure cars.
Before I left the Bureau, we convinced the AAR Tank Car Committee to require skid protection of bottom outlets of nonpressure cars and to phase it in on a commodity basis that protected the highest economic risk materials first and extended to all cars over time. Adding the protection to new cars was relatively low cost. Modifying many cars in a short time would have been both very expensive and disruptive to commerce. Allowing a longer time for modifications allowed the work to be done when the cars were otherwise in the shop reducing both cost and disruption. I understand that AAR and DOT investigated protection for top fittings after I left the business, but I have no knowledge what has been done in this much lower risk (lower probablilty of event) area.
You have still not addressed whatever corporate changes you envision, so you are basically talking about two things; routing and concentrating hazmat traffic into "pure" trains.
As a practical matter, even if we imagine a single corporation able to control routing without considering corporate desire to control the traffic and revenue, alternate routings either do not exist, or are worse in terms of track quality, transit time, or excessive mileage.
You particularly call out the BNSF transcon and the UP Cheyenne-Green River routes as lines that you think traffic could/should be routed away from. First, traffic to or from an intermediate point on any line segment MUST move on that line segment, so you are talking end to end or utilizing existing junctions.
The transcon is Los Angeles to Chicago. It is not a big hazmat route, but lets say there was traffic that could be diverted. Where would it go? The only credible routes are UP to Ogden and then to Chicago or UP to El Paso then either the old SP-Cottonbelt to East St Louis and Chicago or the old MP thru Fort Worth to East St Louis and Chicago, or up to Kansas City and then Chicago. How are you going to choose between them?
Cheyenne-Green River is even worse in terms of alternatives. There are none. If your concern is avoiding population exposure this segment is about as low as you can go.
Lets be more realistic. A substantial portiion of hazmat traffic originates on the Texas Gulf Coast. Think Houston, Beaumont, and Lake Charles LA. Much of it flows to Northern New Jersey, some to the Southeast, and some to California. The origin is served by UP and BNSF, with UP in the dominant position. This is carload traffic, some here, some there, typically in single cars to perhaps 4-5 to a single destination customer on a single day. From my SP days I can tell you that traffic to the Northeast is predominately interchanged at East St, Louis. Historically this moved SP-SSW or MP to eastern connections. Since the UP-SP merger, UP has imposed directional running on the more or less parallel MP and SP lines, which eliminates most train meets. UP dominates this traffic and there are few if any practical alternatives, except to change interchange points.
Interchange at Chicago would add both miles and population exposure. Memphis could work but introduces a need to move the traffic northward along the densely populated eastern seaboard. We could interchange at New Orleans, but we still have the eastern seaboard problem. The cure seems worse than the disease.
Another poster proposed a combination of cast off lines between Chicago and New Jersey. The fact that they are cast off implies substantial investment, several hundred million to a billion or two, to bring them up to standard in terms of track quality and PTC. Assuming that poster is correct, I would count this as possible but not a good idea under the current circumstances. I would not want to explain to the local folks that their town will see all the hazmat between Chicago and New Jersey because there are fewer of them than via alternative route. There is no political upside to telling that tale.
Your second concept is to concentrate hazmat traffic as opposed to letting it flow as it does now in the normal course of business. If I were to be argumentative I would claim that unit trains of hazmat are the problem, since two of the three accidents that started this conversation involved unit trains, but I will not do that.
The nature of carload, or manifest, traffic is that it moves from a single origin to a single destination. Operationally carriers gather up traffic from many shippers at a yard, classify it by destinatiion, and operate selected blocks in designated trains to a designated terminal, often setting out and picking up blocks enroute. This system is designed to move the traffic through the yards, which are the choke points, with as little total switching effort as possible.
When I was with the SP we ran a train called the SRASK, Strang to Alton & Southern K train. Yes, SP invented the "K" train which got modified into the "Key Train". Strang is a yard on the south side of the Houston Ship Channel. It serves many petrochemical plants that make all sorts of hazardous materials and the SRASK hauled them all to the Alton & Southern yard in East St. Louis. The A&S put the traffic in various trains for Conrail and perhaps the NS. The SRASK ran to about 90 cars, and most days 80 of them were hazmat. It had five cars of plastic pellets on the head end and five on the rear with the middle being about the nastiest brew of hazmats that American Industry is capable of producing. About once a year the SRASK, or its predecessor, derailed spectacularly. Fortnately the Texas portion ran thru lightly populated piney woods country. The point here is that since the SRASK was virtually a hazmat unit train there was no question that the consequences would be bad, they only question was "how bad".
The other day a saw an eastward manifest train on the NS just east of Memphis. The train obviously came off the UP and probably 30 of 100 or so cars were hazmat. You propose that these cars be held somewhere and gathered up into a "pure" hazmat train. Separating hazmat into dedicated trains will certainly delay the traffic since it will take three or four trains worth of business to make your hazmat train. That will tend to congest the yards where that activity takes place, and I think tend to make whatever accidents do occur worse than the current system. It was entirely possible to derail the train I saw without involving any hazmat. If hazmat was involved some would have been away from other hazmat cars, and some would not, basically the luck of the draw. There currently a seldom enforced rule that prohibits unusual or excessive delay of hazmat shipments. That rule would have to be changed to legalise your program.
When I was with SP we had 10 Hazardous Material Control Officers system wide (14,000 miles of line) We did respond to hazardous material releases and accidents. I can tell you from living it that simply having someone ride along will accomplish nothing except run costs up.
My prediction for what will happen is that we will see headshields on nonpressure (spec 111) tank cars. In fact I saw one on that NS train of the other day. Keeping the juice in the can is the right strategy. Slowing trains down is not.
First, alternativfe routes do exist. Hazmat trains on the UP should be routed throughh the Moffat, not through Shermann Hill. On the Mofffat, opposing movements are far fewers and Fred Frailey's suggestions can be implemented. As for the Transcon, BNSF should consider reviving the Chief's route specifically for Hazmat operations. One incident avoided and the extra expense is worthwhile.
Second, at present the railroads are forced to undercharge for carrying Hamat. It is exactly analagous to having forced railroads to provide sleeping accomodations at coach fares during the Classic period. Which did not happen. Once this railroad corporation is established, you can be confident that the Supreme Court would uphold the extra charges for extra supervision and diversions and liability insurance, because the safety of many people will be greatly enhanced. Anything else would amount to siezure of property.
It will take a long time to replace and/or modify the existing tank-car fleet. You saw one pair of shields on one car. What immediate measures are you proposing to improve safety that railroads themselves can implement without involving Government orders to them to do something?
There was a time when RPO and Express cars carried cash and securities. Now Brinks has this business, not only throughout the USA, but even overseas, including Israel. They have a virtual monopoly, and very little of any of this business goes by rail. I am not suggesting it should. But Brinks has a reputation for securitiy. I am suggesting an approach that should allow the raiilroads to retain the business and give both a public impression and also a real effect of increased security. What plan do you have?
Obviously I am referring to lower densisty routes that still have good track maintenance or would be justified in restoring good maintenance before the Hazmat traffic is shifted to them. Routes with 5 - 30 trains a day instead of 60 - 100.
There wiill always continue to be the need to carry hazmat in manifest trains, but the proportion can be reduced. There may even be hazmat origine or destination points on the Transcon or Sherman Hill lines that cannot be reached by alternate routes. Any plan put into operation will be done by railroaders familiar with specific needs and be sensible, not Draconian.
The use of directional running is of course an excellent solution. Possibly this new corporation will foster cooperation between CSX and NS in the East, comparible to what CN and CP in western Canada, since there are places where they are parallel. This would of course be preferable to spending tons of money to upgrade branch and secondary lines. And in California possibly there are places where it can be done with UP and BNSF, for north-south traffic.
Mac Half a dozen photos and a catchy title, and you darn near have a Trains Magazine article written.
Fred Frailey knows all these points, and he started the ball rolling. I simply tried to figure out how to get his basic ideas implemented without gumming up the rest of railroaoding, and this new corporation and its mehtods was my solution. I've already transferred some of these ideas to commennts on his blog, and I think he can take it from there.
daveklepper First, alternativfe routes do exist. Hazmat trains on the UP should be routed throughh the Moffat, not through Shermann Hill. On the Mofffat, opposing movements are far fewers and Fred Frailey's suggestions can be implemented. As for the Transcon, BNSF should consider reviving the Chief's route specifically for Hazmat operations. One incident avoided and the extra expense is worthwhile.
Dave.
Lets talk about Moffat vs Sherman Hill. Common points are Julesburg NE (IIRC) and Ogden UT. Sherman is less mileage, lower ruling grade, lower operating cost, higher capacity, and LESS population exposure. I would never propose the Moffat route if my objective was to reduce risk. Risk is a function of miles, of grades, and of population exposure. To protect Cheyene and Rawlins you would route traffic through Denver and Salt Lake City? You can not be serious.
The same kinds of things rear their ugly heads via Raton Pass, first you introduce two sets of mountain grade, one of 3%, and then you have to rebuild a marginal line to support through traffic.Bad, bad, bad.
I would lobby the feds to do nothing because anything the do regarding operations will either gum up the operation, that is destroy capacity, or force the kind of idiocy you are proposing here. Even during the 112/114 problems no one suggested slowing hazmat trains down or stopping them for meets. I would do what the AAR has done, which is to lobby for "better" tank cars, but there are costs associated with headshields as well.
I would not buy into the political assumption that we "have to do something" because the something often ends up worse than doing nothing.
I disagree with your evaluation of safety but agree with your comment on the Feds. On the Moffat you can run your Hazmat train on the Moffat at a steady 40 mph, stop it when it is meeting the one BNSF manifest train each way each day, stop the coal trains to let it go by, and not gum up operations. On Sherman Hill you have to keep running at 60mph, pass trains going at the same speed for a combined passing velocity of 120mph, and this difference does far more than compensate for the safety advantages, which I admit are also real, that you mentioned.
Anyway, I would not be the one makiing these decisionsI. Experiences and knowledgable railroaders in Key Transportation or whatever office or entity combines the expertise of all Class I's will make such decisions.
The higher operating costs are part of the price for increased safety and shoujld be reflected in the tarrifs.
daveklepper that having one train stopped when a hazmat train and another train pass reduces the admiinttadly tiny risk
that having one train stopped when a hazmat train and another train pass reduces the admiinttadly tiny risk
Tiny risk is where this conversation should end. The end does not justify the means. Lets take the recent BN derailment in ND. The grain train derailed into the oil train. So if the dispatcher had the oil train stop to follow Fred's "rules" we would still have had a collision. In fact, had the oil train been stopped, the collision would have been closer to the head end of the train, putting its crew in greater danger.
daveklepper So Fred's suggesstions make sense
So Fred's suggesstions make sense
Fred's suggestions sound exactly like they came from someone that does not work for a railroad. They do not make sense at all to someone who does this for a living. Writing for a fan magazine does not make one an expert on safety.
So we have an oil train and a general slop train going pass each other on a 2% continuous grade. Who do we stop? The slop train with a kicker going downhill, or the oil train with the engine that isn't loading right and probably won't be able to start again?
I doubt that any oil train headed to or from a 2% grade is going to be assigned one unit unless it is very short. I don't see the case cited in the last post as a possibility. In any case, I admit that I was basing my proposal on Fred's suggestions. If his suggestions don't make sense, then possibly my idea doesn't make sense. But in any case, we have problem that should involve all seven Class I's working together to minimize risk. That is the basic idea I wish to promolgate, and I am absolutely certain it is an excellent and unchallangeable idea.
If having lots of 120 mph meetings is more safe than rerouting to implelment Fred's ideas, then I stand corrected, but the decision will be made by the railroads in anyy case, not by us on this Forum.
I can also return to the North Dakota derailment. If the oil train had been stopped, there may have been time to bring the grain train to a stop before any blows to the oil tank cars were received, and if such blows were received, their strength would be lower, possibly half the strength, and the possibility exists that fewer or no tankcars would have been breached. It would have been a safer situation. If the grain train had been stopped the accident would not have occured
The fact that the cars struck initially were being pushed as well as pulled may have contributed to the severitiy of the accident, but this would not have occured if the oil train was not moving. Indeed the grain car door and load would probably just have pushed several tank cars off the track without catastrophic damage. I am sure an historical search of such accidents with the recipient train stopped as compared with those moving will show the damage far less with the recipient train stopped.
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