The Milwaukee Road

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

Fact of the matter: Despite all of the alleged advantages of MILW's Pacific Coast Extension over the GN main line, the GN main line is still operating and the MILW is still dead.

Is that meant to be an answer, or part of an interesting question?

Best regards, Michael Sol

A statement of fact and an answer. Since time moves in only one direction, the past cannot be undone and the Pacific Coast Extension cannot be resurrected.

[nanaimo73]

Michael-
I would like to see your thoughts on what might have happened if Ben Heineman had stayed with the Minneapolis and St. Louis in 1956. Do you think the CMSP&P would have taken over the C&NW and become the Chicago, Milwaukee and North Western in 1960 ? Would this have led to the Great Northern Pacific merger around 1965 ? Would the CM&NW still have gained entry into the PRB, and on the current route from the south or on the proposed DME route? And would the CM&NW be part of today's Union Pacific ? Surely you have thought about all of this at sometime in the last 25 years.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

Fact of the matter: Despite all of the alleged advantages of MILW's Pacific Coast Extension over the GN main line, the GN main line is still operating and the MILW is still dead.

Is that meant to be an answer, or part of an interesting question?

Best regards, Michael Sol

A statement of fact and an answer. Since time moves in only one direction, the past cannot be undone and the Pacific Coast Extension cannot be resurrected.

Although VerMontanan made specific references on the Milwaukee list to "disciples" and "non-disciples," and his personal role in protecting one from the other, I guess I missed the part about the Resurrection. Who proposed that?

Nearly all education begins with a study of the past. That's were our collective civilizational experience resides. Nowhere else.

Presumably, proper analysis of the past would be an assistance and guidance to decision-making in the future. I think that's true of Milwaukee Road, and others, from a business perspective, not necessarily even limited to a railroad business perspective.

And, I think it's quite an education.

A statement of the obvious isn't particularly helpful in that process, but I have to wonder, given your attifude about it, why you would read anything about the past at all?

Or wonder about it?

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Michael-
I would like to see your thoughts on what might have happened if Ben Heineman had stayed with the Minneapolis and St. Louis in 1956. Do you think the CMSP&P would have taken over the C&NW and become the Chicago, Milwaukee?

Well, those 1954-1955 discussions between Milwaukee and the North Western were certainly covering some ground. All sorts of things were happening as a result of those discussions, the Omaha line upgrade on the Milwaukee, the transfer of the passenger traffic, the resulting line consolidation study by Wm Wyer & Associates, jointly funded by both companies, then the outright merger study that Wyer was directed to do.

I know nothing about that CNW management except a general impression that they were stymied as to what to do with the North Western, and saw the Milwaukee under Kiley as offering a more vigorous direction. If that impression of indecisiveness is correct, then that's obviously what Heineman and Morton Weinress took advantage of in their takeover.

It was a big setback for both railroads. Heineman couldn't really pull anything off at North Western, and Milwaukee was left with an expensive line that didn't get the traffic and line consolidation they had been discussing with the old management team. I think Weinress more quickly realized the mistake, but in any event, Heineman came back around and re-opened those merger talks in the early 1960s.

At the moment, I don't recall the specific details, but as you know, North Western again pulled out of further talks after the ICC revoked its order granting the merger, on the grounds of changed stock valuations. Milwaukee believed they could resolve the discrepancy in the stock exchange terms, but apparently it was Heineman, over Weinress' objections, that refused to go on with talks. Somewhere in there, Weinress and Heineman broke their many years of association and Weinress resigned from the CNW Board. He briefly thereafter served on the Board of CMC, but quickly saw they were not interested in the railroad, and resigned.

W.L. Smith mentioned that, while he knew nothng of the details of that episode, he did note that, after his arrival at Milwaukee Road, occaisional references to the North Western would evoke very strong expressions of bitterness from Board members over the way the merger had been handled.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

While a study of the past is a useful part of the analysis of decision-making in the future, Mr. Sol's study of the past appears to be confined to what Milwaukee's management should have done and not how the management of other operations could learn from these management decisions and their effects. However, Mr. Sol's study also ignores other business factors, such as the interest of the shareholders and what they perceive to be the best return on their investment, which management ignores at their own peril. If the shareholders believed that they would obtain a better return by selling out to C&NW, liquidation or any option other than continued operation as an independent railroad, than management also has to consider that factor in its decisions, whether we like it as enthusiasts or not.
The Milwaukee Road, as a property, may have been superior to the Hill Lines, but as a business entity, it obviously was not or it would still be in operation.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Would this have led to the Great Northern Pacific merger around 1965 ?

A thorough review of operating ratios, and their trends as discerned from a specific linear regression and trend line analysis, shows some interesting things about the Northern Lines over the period, 1950-1970. A MILW/CNW merger in the mid-50's would have upset considerably the applecarts of both the UP, and the Northern Lines.

Interestingly, the loudest complainer in the later merger proceedings was the Southern Pacific, that observed that so many shippers in the consolidated Midwest market of MILW and CNW would now have single line service over the Milwaukee's PCE to the Pacific Northwest, that lumber shippers in Oregon, for a variety of reasons, would choose to use the MILW line rather than the SP/UP line, or the SP long route, to the tune of $30 million in losses. Whether that was hyperbole or not, the later merger of course contemplated that Milwaukee would get a Portland connection, which wasn't in the works in the 1950s.

A bit of irony, since later SP chose and relied on Milwaukee Road as its preferred Western connection at Portland when that Gateway opened.

If I recall correctly, CNW was the biggest interchange of traffic with the Northern Lines at Minnesota Terminals, not CBQ, surprisingly enough, and of course was the biggest carrier of UP traffic. Certainly a combined company could have obtained a significant number of long hauls over the Milwaukee transcon that CNW had been theretofore turning over to UP, or the Northern Lines.

Naturally, the new company, had that merger happened, wouldn't have been much concerned with minor grade differences as a controlling reason to route as much of their traffic as possible over the PCE.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

While a study of the past is a useful part of the analysis of decision-making in the future, Mr. Sol's study of the past appears to be confined to what Milwaukee's management should have done and not how the management of other operations could learn from these management decisions and their effects. However, Mr. Sol's study also ignores other business factors ...

A lot of very broad opinions for something you have not, in fact, actually read.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[bobwilcox]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
If I recall correctly, CNW was the biggest interchange of traffic with the Northern Lines at Minnesota Terminals, not CBQ, surpisingly enough, and of course was the biggest carrier of UP traffic. Certainly a combined company could have obtained a significant number of long hauls over the Milwaukee transcon that CNW had been theretofore turning over to UP, or the Northern Lines.

This was true.

[bobwilcox]

I know of cases where shippers routed lumber from the PNW to Official territroy via BN-STPAUL-CNW-CHGO-PC but the route got changed when the waybill was prepaired.
Did this ever happen when the MILW was shown as the overhead carrier?

[Anonymous]

Bottom line: the Milwaukee Road suffered an ignoble end due to questionable management moves, and wasted opportunities, but left behind a rich and compelling history.

Two other railroads come to mind that were brought to their knees in part by inept management and other problems: Penn Central and Rock Island.

[edblysard]

"Doesn't anyone pay attention to credentials and qualifications anymore? "


Kinda wondering when you planned on telling us yours....

Ed

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by edblysard

"Doesn't anyone pay attention to credentials and qualifications anymore? "
Kinda wondering when you planned on telling us yours....Ed

Oh boy, here we go again. You go first. I am looking forward to seeing them.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

I stand corrected regarding mileage Twin Cities to Seattle. Although I haven't checked MM's numbers, I'll take his word for it. Milwaukee was only marginally shorter than GN, and after the BN merger the Milwaukee route was actually longer. Yet the Milwaukee schedules were faster even after the BN merger, and BN's operating costs over the mountain districts were apparently higher. How can that be?

Not quite sure what the Missoula-Spokane mileages have to do with anything. For the Milwaukee the only trains that used that routing were the passenger trains, and I have no interest in that. A more relevent example would be Missoula to Seattle. I don't suppose you have the relevant mileages and operating schedules Milwaukee vs BN on that segment, do you?

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
If I recall correctly, CNW was the biggest interchange of traffic with the Northern Lines at Minnesota Terminals, not CBQ, surpisingly enough, and of course was the biggest carrier of UP traffic. Certainly a combined company could have obtained a significant number of long hauls over the Milwaukee transcon that CNW had been theretofore turning over to UP, or the Northern Lines.

This was true.

I knew as most observers would that a MILW/CNW would create problems for UP in getting into Chicago, possibly forcing UP to dress up RI. But I am suprised that the Northern Lines would pass off to CNW at the Twin Cities rather than to CB&Q, given the latter's common ownership with NP and GN. Why would the two Hill lines ignore the third Hill line rather than consolidate all Windy City traffic through CB&Q?

Just for kicks, what was the combined mileage of CNW/GN and CB&Q/GN Chicago to Seattle vs Milwaukee's Chicago to Seattle mileage?

[bobwilcox]

The ability of rail carriers to impact routing since 1920 is vastly overstated. The CNW did things to attract traffic originating West of St. Paul. C&NW built a potato and onion terminal in Chicago for brokers marketing Red Valley products. C&NW would hold lumber loads at Marshalltown, IA. Many of those loads of the GN or NP were diverted to final destination before reaching St. Paul.

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: VerMontanan Actually, the freight route used by most GN trains was 12 miles longer (between these points only) than the MILW route, which is even less than one percent of the total distance. Then, then you have to ask if the 12 fewer miles is worth all that extra power and helper crews.

This brings up two points.

1. Since Trains Magazine ran a profile of Western Railroads, showing highly distorted scale representations of comparative grades, the discussion of grades has been in a considerably different context than prior to that publication. It was as though everyone became an instant expert. However, the "1%" comment above, is interesting, if applied to the "grade" context as well as the distance context.

Trains' profiles made these grades look pretty significant, by skewing the scales considerably. Well, of course they had to, in order to fit in the Magazine. And by that I mean this.

If you stand back, way back, and you are able to see, for instance, a railroad mainline from Chicago to Seattle, Los Angeles or any other destination, how will the profile look?

It will be, at that resolution, a perfectly flat line. The rise is so small for all railroads, compared to the run, that the difference is beyond the power of resolution at that distance. Taking the 8,000 foot Sherman Hill, for instance, it is not 1% of the total distance, or even 1/10 of one percent, but is 7 hundredths of one percent of the distance.

This is not to discount the operational difficulty of mountain grades under various conditions, but placed in the context of very long runs, the significance of grades, in this broader context, is relatively small.

This pretty much shows Mr. Sol's lack of operating experience here. The ruling grade is always a major limiting factor. If you can't get over the next hill, you're sunk. A case in point is a comparison between the current operation of unit grain trains between Laurel, Montana and Spokane, Washington. There are two routes, via Great Falls on an all-BNSF routing, and via Helena on an MRL routing. The BNSF route, 96 miles further, requires adding a single unit to a standard grain train consist at Shelby as the only power modification enroute (trains are operated with distributed power). On MRL, these same trains do not use distributed power, and receive manned helpers at Livingston and Helena (actually two helpers) and sometimes Townsend. While the hills are relatively short - 12 miles from Livingston to the top of Bozeman Pass (the helpers actually cut off in Bozeman, usually) and 20 miles Helena to Blossburg, and represent a small fraction of the entire route, these obstacles are significant, and costly. Helper crews have to be stationed, power has to be kept there, or in the absence of either of these, the crews utilized to double or triple - whatever it takes - to get the train over the hill. Any modification to the train enroute just to get it from origin to destination is an expense, and one most railroads like to avoid. In the case of BNSF/MRL comparison, this is why, in spite of the difference in mileage, that the BNSF routing is significantly cheaper than that of the MRL. While Mr. Sol considers such grades to be insignificant, operationally, those of us that work with this on a daily basis know that "the next hill" is really the ultimate goal of getting a train from point A to point B.

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

2) Helper Crews. The Gentleman ran into a firestorm on the Milwaukee List with a rendition of helper districts that, unfortunately, ran into resistance from actual train crews who didn't recall helpers after 1974, particularly on Milwaukee's worst grade, the 2.2% out of Beverly. Now that wasn't the first time, nor will it probably be the last time, that this individual attempts to tell railroad people all about their railroad. I didn't participate in the discussion much, except to comment that I thought there was a diesel helper after 1974 at Haugan, Montana, but that "I would be interested to hear of other helpers after 1974."

For some reason, after that, I was accused by the gentleman of claiming there were no helper districts after 1i974, and that this claim was, blah, blah, blah. It was a fairly typical manipulation of attribution of one set of facts, to a different source, for the purpose of the usual personal comments. I was even informed that various people had "chimed in" suggesting there were helpers at places like Haugan. He didn't note that I was the one who suggested Haugan, even as he accused me of denying there were helpers. You had to have been there.

There was some further discussion about people who knew a little more about it, and the final conclusion was there was apparently some helpers for a very brief time, on the Pacific Extension after 1974.

This did fit with a Worth Smith interview in which he stated "We abolished the helper districts out West in 1974." I think this Smith quote was used somewhat as it was above when Smith discussed the impact of curvature using the Twin Cities line as an example. Smith's comments were attributed by VerMontanan -- and you can see it clearly in a prior post -- to me, and that is false. But that is typical and you can see that example as plain as day as an example of a typical distortion of commentary for whatever reasons he always does it.

However, for the record, I did go back and obtain a clarification on helper districts. Milwaukee did not use helper districts out West after 1974, while it is true that BN did, and still does, and of course maintains what are the equivalent of two additional helper districts (in terms of big engines running and fixed facilities) at two tunnel locations where they incur permanent operating expense running those big locomotive engines to keep the tunnels clear.

But, to clear up the mystery of the temporary helpers on the Milwaukee, here's what happened.

"We were able to aboli***he helper districts in 1974. Your note reminds me that we did put some power on some hills for a few days in 1977, or possibly 1978. I think it was 1978. It was summer, and for some reason there wasn't much grain moving, but we knew there was quite a bit of storage overhang out in the elevators. The harvest season was coming up and of course that's when all of a sudden the new crop doesn't have anywhere to go because there is old grain sitting there. Then all of sudden, the railroads don't have enough cars, of course. Well, we had a lot of empty cars sitting around, and there was a lot of grain out there. It made sense for us to anticipate the upcoming season and help everyone by getting that grain out. We dropped our rate by 15% for a very short period, a week or so. Just to fill up those empty grain cars. Make some money.

"Well, it was wildly successful. We had to scramble to meet the demand. I think Cargill alone bought 600 carloads or something like that.

"So, all of sudden we had all these carloads of wheat, and we begged and borrowed every extra hopper we could get our hands on. Unfortunately, we had a power shortage at that time, and this presented some problems moving these big trains. So, to facilitate these special trains, we broke the power assignments up, so much was assigned to the the trains, and then power assigned at key locations to get them over the hills.

"I think it took us maybe three, four days to get these trains moved to the Coast, and then the power was taken back to the regular trains."

Whether this supports the conclusion that Milwaukee "needed" three, four or five helper districts, I guess that is a matter of semantics under the circumstances. Regular operations did not. Four days out of six years does not support the conclusion that Milwaukee Road used helper districts on the mainline affer 1974.

.
Mr. Sol's information seems to be in conflict with dispatchers I've talked to who worked in the Deer Lodge and Tacoma offices during the time period in question, but no matter. Mr. Sol also seems hung up on whether or not there were helper districts or not. He simply does not understand that it doesn't matter whether there are helper districts or not, the grade still remains. Either you help the trains at each hill, and run minimal power in between, or you run your trains through with enough power to crest the steepest hill (or double the train). In any event, the lack of helpers does not make the hill go away. It can, however, cost you many more road units in the process.

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

What's important?

1) Expense of operation
2) Transit time
3) Capacity
4) Ancillary costs

If "helper" districts are a "cost," then surely if BN has a couple, there is an additional cost of operation of those big blower plants at the tunnels. Milwaukee did not need these, but I understand at both Cascade and Flathead, there are two 645 engines working pretty hard on a daily basis to clear those tunnels. They are, in effect, two additional helpers, in a very direct sense of the term. In any case, they cost money to run, and they appear to run more than actual helpers. Actually more necessary than helpers. Do those count, or is there a reason to selectively count some things, and not others. Are there then four equivalent helper districts? Again, semantics I suppose.

The employee personal injury suits from lung damage in the tunnels. Settlements are typically confidential, but BN and BNSF employees refer to these suits from time to time, and apparently they are out there, and costly. They don't show up as operating costs, but are these expenses properly attributed to the costs of that line?

This could be true, though this is just a supposition planted by Mr. Sol. By his own admission they're confidential, so he has no idea of the costs. And I'd be willing to bet that the Milwaukee had no such instances in its tunnels, which were strategically located atop all its toughest grades, except Loweth. Unlike the Milwaukee or NP, GN crested the Contiental Divide without using a tunnel. Other tunnels along the route were in areas of minimal grade. As for the cost of operating the tunnels, this is indeed a cost. But then you should talk about all the costs, like that the MILW didn't have CTC on its route, and had to pay telegraphers to move trains while the BN route was nearly all CTC or double track. On the other hand, the poor BN had to pay for the electricity to move power switches, where the MILW saved by using spring switches (not the most reliable) or by hand. But not a great way to move a bunch of traffic.

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Finally, the extremely limited capacity of the GN line, 28 trains a day, is the most constrained mountain passage of any of the Western lines, and more so substantially than either the Milwaukee or NP Stampede.

It's ultimate efficiency and usefulness is so limited, that expense must be incurred to send freight elsewhere that might otherwise go over that crossing. This will get worse in the future.

Mr. Sol, who seems fixated on Cascade Tunnel, the seemingly only portion of the GN route that could be considered inferior to the MILW, keeps forgetting about the rest of the GN route, and that unlike the MILW that had to conquer all its hills to get freight to the West Coast, GN had the option of routing cars via the water level SP&S line. But, claiming that Cascade Tunnel has limitations ignores that the other routes had limitations, too. GN's route over Marias Pass and through Flathead Tunnel has not seen major capital improvements since GN days (those that have been made tended to be installation of CTC on double track portions on either side of Marias Pass), yet today this route handles 50 trains per day. I would interested in hearing Mr. Sol's analysis of how Pipestone Pass and then St. Paul could handle this volume of traffic and if the MILW would still not be using helpers (which would be really interesting considering the 16,000- ton trains of today). And that Mr. Sol would derate the ex-GN Cascade Tunnel route for "only" being able to handle 28 trains per day seems a bit hollow. After all, could the MILW line handle that many trains? Did it ever? And if so, what was the occasion, and were they as heavy as today's trains? And what about east of the Cascades? Did the MILW Pacific Extension ever handle 50 per day in Montana. With three major grades east of the Cascades, that the MILW line would have limitations is certainly a given, it's just that it would be multiplied.

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
This is why GN could not put a train on the track as fast as Milwaukee's #261 and #262 under contemporaneous circumstances.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Could not or did not?
One could also ask:
Why the MILW did not field the fastest passenger train ever between Chicago and Seattle (which was the CB&Q-GN Empire Builder)?
Why the MILW did not fied the fastest frieght train ever between Chicago and Seattle (which was the BN Pacific Zip)?
And why the Pacific Extension with all its superior operating characteristics, was the lone transcontinental route in this country to be largely abandoned?

[passengerfan]

Having traveled the western extension of the Milwaukee Road and driven as many parallel miles as possible I observed two things the Milwaukee Road track i rode was never in the shape of rivals NP or GN. The route over Snoqualmie Pass was slow due to numerous sharp curvature which I haven't seen mentioned. The westbound climb from the Columbia River was hard on equipment and remeber weather plays a part. This region of washington State often sees summer tempeartures near the century mark and winter temperatures get down to the twenties and even teens. Often their is ice along this stretch along with the grade increasing operating problems even more. Having ridden the rails of all three Northwest railroads i always found the Milwaukee Road other than equipment in third place as their roadbed never received the maintenance necessary as did the other two. Equipment wise the Milwaukee was tops in my book, but that alone could not overcome their operating dificiencies.

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Mark Meyer-
1-Could you please tell me the length of the Flathead tunnel, in feet ?
2-Is there any information on the Flathead tunnel line project on the web ?
3-How about doing an article on it for Trains (or CTC Board) ?

Nanaimoguy,

The length of Flathead Tunnel is 36,970 feet - just over 7 miles. It's the second longest railroad tunnel in the United States.

I don't know about on line information, but if you can find a copy of the 1998 "Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Annual" by Robert C. Del Grosso and published by Great Northern Pacific publications of Bonners Ferry, Idaho, you may find it of interest. It features a story on the line change that came to be as a result of the construction of Libby Dam. Especially interesting is all the proposals for routes that ranged from one with a 12.5 mile tunnel to one that included an alignment back through Kalispell, then tunneling through the Cabinet Mountains and merging onto the ex-Northern Pacific line at Noxon, Montana.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: While Mr. Sol considers such grades to be insignificant, operationally, those of us that work with this on a daily basis know that "the next hill" is really the ultimate goal of getting a train from point A to point B.

As usual, this is not what I said. What I placed grades into was "context."

A very elusive state of mind for some.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[nanaimo73]

Mark, thank you. Everytime I've looked for the length of Flathead i"ve only seen 7 miles.
I would enjoy reading a Great Northern and/or Northern Pacific thread on this forum.
Could you start one please ? You could include SP&P, Oregon Trunk and Oregon Electric as well. I think we could agree GN was better than NP, but was NP worth more because of the land grant property ? Would NP have bought some F45s if the merger had not happened in 1970 ? Do you prefer GN BSB or green and orange ? Can you drive over Lookout Pass on the former NP ?

[MP173]

The comment was made that the GN never scheduled anything as fast as 261/262 between the midwest and PNW.

Scheduling is one thing, operations are another.

What was the actual operations of 261/262 (not schedules, but actual performance)? How did those performances change as the massive lack of attention to the line continued to drag the line down (slow orders, etc.).

My question is based not on actually being there and seeing the operations, but from what I have read.

ed

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173

The comment was made that the GN never scheduled anything as fast as 261/262 between the midwest and PNW.

Scheduling is one thing, operations are another.

What was the actual operations of 261/262 (not schedules, but actual performance)? How did those performances change as the massive lack of attention to the line continued to drag the line down (slow orders, etc.).

Well, they changed just as you might expect.

When instituted, these weren't "artificial" schedules -- the ones that promise that moon, but never deliver -- #261 and #262 were designed to deliver on time and did. When it was time to put some money into the track in 1971 and 1972, while there was in fact some work done, it wasn't so much a matter of the lack of prior maintenance, as it was that maintenance did not keep up with the significant upsurge in the traffic that resulted from the Burlington Northern merger conditions, as well as some traffic improvements Milwaukee had made indepedendent of the BN conditions, such as the Kent Auto Marshalling Yard project which practically killed GN/BN's auto traffic out west.

Beginning with #261's debut in September, 1963, these trains kept good schedules throughout the '60s. They promised 12 hours faster than the nearest competitor. GN couldn't match these schedules because it didn't have the track structure. As of 1967, Milwaukee had nearly 1400 miles of 131 pound rail installed; GN had 77 miles. Plus, as Milwaukee later found, the GE Little Joe Electrics gave the Company an unmatched ability to keep schedule time in mountain territory, and nobody else had anything like those.

The reliability of the original 55.5 hour schedule can be shown by the fact that the train was frequently early, and test runs had been able to do the trip in as little as 50 hours. However, the 55.5 hour schedule was promised and advertised as the Company was able to ensure that schedule under all conditions.

#261 reblocked in Aberdeen, for instance, but despite that, its average speed east of the mountains was something like 42 or 48 mph. I would have to go back and re-check Rob Leachman's interesting analysis of its transit times.

Between 1971 and 1975, as the track structure carried two and three times what it had previously been carrying, the money being made from that traffic was not being put into the track. The track was just being pounded to pieces. Transit times began to fall. The Little Joes were retired and not only did the Company lose the 7000 available hp from each unit, my impression is that the power that replaced them was significantly harder on the track than the Joes had been.

From 55 .5 hours, #261 gradually declined to a 70 hour, then an 80 hour, schedule. I suppose the irony is that #261 and #262 met all challenges except those posed by management.

Although you might note that these aren't bad times by today's standards, for a 2200 mile run.

By 1979, typical transit times were over 100 hours, which oddly enough, is just about the average train speed (22 mph) on Class I railroads today, even though this includes yard time, whereas ClassI's typically exclude that from their calculation of train speed..

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by VerMontanan

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
This is why GN could not put a train on the track as fast as Milwaukee's #261 and #262 under contemporaneous circumstances.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Could not or did not?
One could also ask:
Why the MILW did not field the fastest passenger train ever between Chicago and Seattle (which was the CB&Q-GN Empire Builder)?
Why the MILW did not fied the fastest frieght train ever between Chicago and Seattle (which was the BN Pacific Zip)?
And why the Pacific Extension with all its superior operating characteristics, was the lone transcontinental route in this country to be largely abandoned?

This guy posts this where-ever a Milwaukee Road thread appears. He haunts these lists for Milwaukee threads, so he can post this stuff. As many have remarked in other places, who spends this kind of time attacking railroad companies with which they had absolutely no affiliation or knowledge of whatsoever?

I suppose anyone with a little history in railroading has some opinions about good points and bad points of other railroads/competitors and the like. But who goes to their forums to repeatedly and specifically point them out, even to the point of fabricating criticisms?

Or is this something common that I am unaware of?

Best regards, Michael Sol

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Point to remember (again): The former GN main line has trains operating over it, the Pacific Coast Extension is little more than a glorified bike trail.

Since Mr. Sol is so certain of his scenarios regarding the demise of the Milwaukee Road, he should submit them to a business/academic symposium or seminar where it could be sliced, diced and analyzed by academics and business professionals much more rigorously than is possible on these forums.

[MP173]

Was Aberdeen the only location the train was reclassified?

Did it make pickups and setoffs in transit? or was it basically a Chicago - PNW train? What other thru freights were run on this line?

It appears that MILW suffered that dual sword of strong competition and poor management.

I will not fall into what others seem to be doing here in getting emotionally attached to this railroad. The simple fact remains...it failed.

I have often wondered about the Erie Lackawanna in the east and what could have been for that line...but the eastern railroad landscape and very strong competition converted the ROW into other uses.

The real issue in discussing the MILW and EL is that today both lines could be utilized. Perhaps the EL would be a stretch, but at some point in time in the future, it would be a valuable conveyor of Chi - NYC intermodal trains.

ed

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

Since Mr. Sol is so certain of his scenarios regarding the demise of the Milwaukee Road ...

I guess I'm not certain what you mean by "scenarios regarding the demise of the Milwaukee Road." Do you mean the points of view offered to me by the executives of the railroad, and which I will sometimes note as an observation relevant to a topic of discussion? Yes, I am "certain" who the executives were, and what they said, and say. I talk to several of them on a fairly regular basis. I guess they do have opinions about "scenarios." Does that bother you for some reason?

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

....he should submit them to a business/academic symposium or seminar where it could be sliced, diced and analyzed by academics and business professionals much more rigorously than is possible on these forums.

While I note your frequent opinions on everything are always quite confidently expressed, I am wondering, when you express broad conclusions like this one, how you are so certain that this has not occured?

Or are you just always so certain of everything?

Do your remarks add anything to the topic?

I am however, glad to agree with you that the quality of discussion among genuine railroad and business professionals, including professional historians, on this particular topic is, in actual fact, of a considerable difference in quality.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173

Was Aberdeen the only location the train was reclassified?

Did it make pickups and setoffs in transit? or was it basically a Chicago - PNW train? What other thru freights were run on this line?

Rob Leachman did a terrific analysis of #261 on another List, and it was fascinating. Aberdeen was the only place, as I recall, that blocking occured. I believe that it was a through train. It may have set out or picked up, but by and large, it had a tight schedule. Rolling crew changes. and the "whole nine yards."

QUOTE: It appears that MILW suffered that dual sword of strong competition and poor management.

One close observer on the West End, a BN man who had a nice perspective on both operations from the GN/NP days, suggests that "Milwaukee was having BN for lunch" on Lines West. That's not something I can see from the revenue reports since I haven't done a station by station comparison with BN in the era, so I have to take his word for what he saw. Certainly, the growth in revenues was coming from somewhere even as the fast trains were slowing down, and the track starting to fall apart.

And this is the interesting part of the Milwaukee's paradox in 1977. Traffic was at record levels during the 1970s. Milwaukee couldn't carry it all. Forbes Magazine noted in 1974 that Milwaukee Road had been America's "fastest growing railroad" in the six month period prior to its note.

This is why these pontificate comments that some like to drop, that "well, it didn't survive" concluding ipso facto it "failed," is just a facile conclusion, not much of an analysis. These comments misunderstand what is a nagging question among observers and participants who are actually knowledgeable about the Company.

As detailed earlier, Lines West was swimming in cash. From a low cost, low revenue operation, it had become a low cost, high revenue operation. It was indeed having someone for lunch. It's operating ratio was below 65%. It generated the equivalent, in today's dollars, of $178 million in net cash flow to the Company off of what would be today $519 million in revenue, with another $207 million in orders that could not be handled because of lack of equipment (all in 2005 dollars). These are from Company figures submitted to the ICC for Miles City west, not even the entire PCE.

Management? I guess that is the obvious final place where responsibility ultimately stops, but that's a complicated question, and a complex answer.

Best regards, Michael Sol
I

[MP173]

Management of a corporation is seldom anything but complex. It is a big picture issue and the fact that the management didnt know where the revenue was coming from and how much of it was retained is one hell of a case study.

ed

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MP173

Management of a corporation is seldom anything but complex. It is a big picture issue and the fact that the management didnt know where the revenue was coming from and how much of it was retained is one hell of a case study.

Well, that happens to be exactly what I have been working on. This isn't a hobby. Among other things, there was a enormous corporate culture cla***hat reverberates to this day among senior executives.

Best regards, Michael Sol