Hi!
This is my first post.
I love to travel on the trains and have been on every train now running in Canada plus a few which are no longer active lie the connection between Senneterre Quebec and Cochrane Ontario, The Northlander on the Ontario Northland Railroad, and the service on Vancouver island from Victoria BC.
The disaster in Lac Megantic could have been avoided if the short line MMA had done more track maintenance and had ensured that 2 members of the crew were aboard the train. Even with a beltpack, it is impossible for one man to maintain his presence 24 hours a day. Parking the train on a slope is, in my humble opinion, not a safe thing to do if you are not sleeping next to the train.
Hindsight is always 20-20 but I hope that saner minds will prevail when the trains are running again.
All Aboard!!
Peter
in a Very Hot Montreal
The number of axles is beside the point. The point is to compare complex to non-complex. I think the point is fairly clear.
BucyrusWhen I park my truck, I just move the lever to the PARK position. I don't have to go out and wind up 30 handbrakes, and then come back and see if I can move the truck or not. Not complex.
And your truck has how many axles?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
zugmann Bucyrus I think it is too risky to rely on one man performing a complex hand brake procedure when a failure to get it right can destroy much of a town. It is too risky to leave an oil train there even if the engineer could be relied on to set sufficient hand brakes every time. ...complex...? Seriously?
Bucyrus I think it is too risky to rely on one man performing a complex hand brake procedure when a failure to get it right can destroy much of a town. It is too risky to leave an oil train there even if the engineer could be relied on to set sufficient hand brakes every time.
I think it is too risky to rely on one man performing a complex hand brake procedure when a failure to get it right can destroy much of a town. It is too risky to leave an oil train there even if the engineer could be relied on to set sufficient hand brakes every time.
...complex...?
Seriously?
Apply this many hand brakes, but maybe more, apply so tight, check and see if the train can be moved, if it moves, apply some more, consider the grade, consider the train weight, apply brakes to the locomotives. Complex.
When I park my truck, I just move the lever to the PARK position. I don't have to go out and wind up 30 handbrakes, and then come back and see if I can move the truck or not. Not complex.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
tree68 BucyrusI think it is too risky to rely on one man performing a complex hand brake procedure when a failure to get it right can destroy much of a town. It is too risky to leave an oil train there even if the engineer could be relied on to set sufficient hand brakes every time. It would seem to me that the simplest answer would be not parking the train in such a vulnerable location. I have no idea of what the profile of that line looks like, but it's hard to believe the whole thing is one continuous grade. It would be a whole lot easier than re-equipping every railroad car in North America.
BucyrusI think it is too risky to rely on one man performing a complex hand brake procedure when a failure to get it right can destroy much of a town. It is too risky to leave an oil train there even if the engineer could be relied on to set sufficient hand brakes every time.
It would seem to me that the simplest answer would be not parking the train in such a vulnerable location.
I have no idea of what the profile of that line looks like, but it's hard to believe the whole thing is one continuous grade.
It would be a whole lot easier than re-equipping every railroad car in North America.
BaltACDThe human reality is iffy at best! I can't trust you either.
Well sure. Nothing can be infallible. But still, people do things to reduce the chance of things going wrong. There is value in managing risk. It may be all relative, but you can usually use good judgment to decide where the risk seems a little too high.
I would not, as a blanket policy, conclude that something is safe enough as long as people do their job. It depends on how much damage can occur if the one man fails to do his job.
Jerry Pier The recent Quebec disaster raised questions in my mind as to whether proper lay-up procedures were followed. If memory serves me, for lay-up, the train brakes should be placed in "Emergency" (zero brake pipe pressure) and hand brakes set on a number of cars as required by train length, and, if one or more locomotives are left running, independent brake should also be applied. Tests run by the AAR and FRA on PRR'S Horseshoe Curve in the 1930's (2% grade") showed that a fully loaded 150 car freight train with AB Brake systems in "Emergency Mode but without locomotives, would hold for a matter of days. I have been unable to locate the report on these tests. I suspect they were covered in Dave Blaine's "The Westinghouse Air brake Story" appearing in the December 1945 and January 1946 issues of TRAINS Magazine. Can anyone help on this? Jerry Pier
The recent Quebec disaster raised questions in my mind as to whether proper lay-up procedures were followed. If memory serves me, for lay-up, the train brakes should be placed in "Emergency" (zero brake pipe pressure) and hand brakes set on a number of cars as required by train length, and, if one or more locomotives are left running, independent brake should also be applied. Tests run by the AAR and FRA on PRR'S Horseshoe Curve in the 1930's (2% grade") showed that a fully loaded 150 car freight train with AB Brake systems in "Emergency Mode but without locomotives, would hold for a matter of days. I have been unable to locate the report on these tests. I suspect they were covered in Dave Blaine's "The Westinghouse Air brake Story" appearing in the December 1945 and January 1946 issues of TRAINS Magazine. Can anyone help on this?
Jerry Pier
With respect to the Altooona tests you mention, FRA did not exist in the 1930's. If a Federal agency was involved in these tests, it was probably the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). This isn't just a matter of agency acronyms. When the ICC regulated rail safety, its authority was much more limited than FRA's authority is today. ICC never had authority over train securement practices, or many other operating practices.
Bucyrus BaltACD It is up to company officials to continuously supervise and test the employees for all manner of duties that they perform - signal compliance - speed compliance - switch handling - train securement - train handling. The reality of T&E crews is that they are always looking for a short cut in the performance of their duties (they are human after all). Short cuts and doing things RIGHT are frequently mutually exclusive. Well that is not very reassuring. If it requires weed weasels to make sure employees do their job, who makes sure the weed weasels do their job? The whole process sounds too iffy. It may be fine if all that is at stake is the train, but when whole towns are on placed at risk along with the train, it is time for a better mousetrap.
BaltACD It is up to company officials to continuously supervise and test the employees for all manner of duties that they perform - signal compliance - speed compliance - switch handling - train securement - train handling. The reality of T&E crews is that they are always looking for a short cut in the performance of their duties (they are human after all). Short cuts and doing things RIGHT are frequently mutually exclusive.
It is up to company officials to continuously supervise and test the employees for all manner of duties that they perform - signal compliance - speed compliance - switch handling - train securement - train handling.
The reality of T&E crews is that they are always looking for a short cut in the performance of their duties (they are human after all). Short cuts and doing things RIGHT are frequently mutually exclusive.
Well that is not very reassuring. If it requires weed weasels to make sure employees do their job, who makes sure the weed weasels do their job?
The whole process sounds too iffy. It may be fine if all that is at stake is the train, but when whole towns are on placed at risk along with the train, it is time for a better mousetrap.
The human reality is iffy at best! I can't trust you either.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
T&E crews complain about the 'Weed Weasels' - Company officers performing efficiency tests. tI would appear evident that the MM&A Weed Weasls were not up to snuff in having crews secure their trains. There are many aspects of rules compliance that are involved in safely and successfully operating a railroad - be that a Class I carrier or a Regional or a short line. It is up to company officials to continuously supervise and test the employees for all manner of duties that they perform - signal compliance - speed compliance - switch handling - train securement - train handling.
The reality of T&E crews is that they are always looking for a short cut in the performance of their duties (they are human after all). Short cuts and doing things RIGHT are frequently mutually exclusive. No doubt the MM&A engineer thought he was taking a 'safe' short cut - subsequent events proved, for the world to see, that that short cut was anything but safe.
Employees are paid to do their jobs properly. Company officials are charged with supervising employees to esure that they are performing the jobs properly and in conformance with all the appropriate safety and operating rules.
The territory I am responsible for has a number of mountain grades - when a train has a undesired emergency application of the air brakes - the first thing the crew starts doing as they proceed to inspect the train is to tie on hand brakes as they go - hand brakes to hold the train in place as the trainline gets recharged - train inspection and problem resolution on these territories will take 2 to 3 times longer than solving the same problem on flatland territory - because of the necessity of securing the train.
Railroading is not a easy job - it requires all employees doing their jobs properly. Saw a article about the SFO plane crash, questioning if their was too much reliance on computer operations in flying the current crop of commercial planes. You have to expect and insure your employees perform their duties properly. That is the cornerstone of any business.
The problem that I see with the requirement for proper application of hand brakes, when called for, is that it is a lot of work to apply them. And since they are redundant to the air brakes, I can see the possibility of rationalizing away the need to apply hand brakes to the full requirement of the circumstance.
A person might decide that, between hand brakes and air brakes together, adequate holding will surely result; rather than seeing it properly in that each system must be capable of doing the holding independently of the other.
I wonder how often that kind of rationalization has been cited as the cause of wrecks or runaways in the history of railroading. It would be an interesting statistic, but I do not know where it can be found.
I do know of one fatal runaway that occurred in Upper Michigan in the early 1950s, and was caused by ignoring the importance of hand brakes while relying only on the air brake. I posted the story here about a year ago. When nearly stalling while climbing L’Anse Hill, they cut the diesel road engine off to run ahead and break the snow and sand the rails for about 1000 feet.
Meanwhile, a steam helper on the hind end kept a push on the train with steam in his cylinders. When the diesel returned, he cut the air in, but apparently had lost most of the car reservoir charges. As soon as the brakes released, he shot backwards. The engineer of the steamer thought the road engineer was shoving back to get to a better place to start, and he worried about flattening the drivers on the steamer, so he stopped resisting. What happed next was a confusing attempt to set the air, but once they had run back a couple hundred feet, they were goners.
The rules called for hand brakes to be set when they cut the road engine off, but the crew did not see the necessity.
Jerry Pier Key words IF PROPERLY APPLIED. Depends upon the falibilty of man for safety. I rest my case Jerry Pier
Key words IF PROPERLY APPLIED. Depends upon the falibilty of man for safety. I rest my case
That's everything. Even the new procedures are worthless if not properly followed.
I rest my case.
Gratified to see Transport Canada's response. That should end the debate.
Because of the Lac-Mégantic disaster, the operating rules for securing a train have been changed as of July 12. I was told by a trainmaster that these changes to the operating rules came from Transport Canada and are in effect immediately.
A train tied-up online will be secured with handbrakes. The hand brakes will be tested to ensure the train will not move. If the train still moves, add more hand brakes until it does not. This part has not changed.
Previously, we would leave the automatic brake released and the isolation switch in "isolate". This was done for efficiency reasons. First, the emergency reservoirs would remain charged which would allow the train to recharge the brakes and depart quickly after the relief crew arrived, and second, putting the locomotive in "isolate" would save fuel because the auto-start/stop systems would NOT restart the locomotive if air pressure dropped below 105psi,
Today, a train tied-up online will be secured with hand brakes as I described above. Then the train's automatic brake will be placed into "emergency". The isolation switch will remain in run. The generator field will be switched off, the reverser removed from the locomotive and the doors locked of the lead locomotive.
When I was trained as an engineer, I remember my first instinct was to set the automatic brake when leaving a train tied-up online. Of course I was taught that was not the procedure as the operating instructions dictated to leave the train with the brakes released. To me it was common sense to leave the automatic brake set on a train that was to remain tied-up. Just like we are taught to set the parking brake in our cars when we leave them parked. Its the same thing. For many years this oversight in a simple safety procedure was able to continue, and in hindsight, it was only a matter of time before a disaster of this magnitude was going to happen. Its a *** shame and I feel for the people of Lac-Mégantic and the engineer of the train. For all of them it is a hell nobody ever wants to go through. Again, in my opinion, this was an accident that was completely avoidable if common sense and safety were the priority over efficiency.
Handbrakes are unsafe? How? If properly applied and tested, they are a lot better than relying on an emergency application. Ever see cars immediately bleed themselves off after being dumped? I have. Handbrakes normally don't self-release.
The essence of safety is that a failure of any type leads to a more restrictive condition. Dumping the parked train into "Emergency" meets that requirement. Depending on the Brake Pipe to remain charged and the independent brakes to stay on is planning for good luck. Handbrakes are also unsafe because they depend on the operator to assure effectiveness. Avoiding the time required for a terminal test cost a lot of lives, not to mention property damage. "Normal Procedure was wrong"
I suspect the normal procedure was to leave the train "charged" at least 60 psig.. This allows the engineer hop on board in the morning, raise the brake pipe to 90 psig (or whatever they specify) and to do a "set and release" test and then get underway. The "set and release" is a reduction of the brake pipe by 20 psi and see that the rear brakes apply or that the pressure falls at least 15 psi on the rear of the train. As stated above, if you take the brake pipe to zero and leave the train, you would have to do an "initial terminal" test in the morning. That test requires charging up the train (maybe 30 minutes), setting the air brakes, inspecting all the brakes on the train, releasing the air brakes and inspecting that all brakes are released.
So what was most likely done is that the engineer stopped the train, did a 20 or so psi reduction on the train line to set the brakes on the train, set 10 or so hand brakes, set the independent and hand brakes on the locomotives full on and left for the motel. For the independents to stay on the locomotives must continue to put air into the locomotive brakes. The train brakes would actually only depend on the hand brakes as eventually the car air brakes leak out and release.
The fire department pushed "emergency stop" on the side of the locomotive and that shut off the air compressor. The locomotive slowly bled off and the independent brakes released. Now the only thing holding the train are the locomotive and car hand brakes. If the hand brakes were not sufficiently set the train would begin to roll. Previously, the locomotive air brakes helped hold the train, but with the locomotives shut down that didn't help.
oltmanndThis is all really interesting and puzzling. Was the lead loco equipped with 26L brake? If so, why not zero the brake pipe at full service rate and take brake handles and reverser off the locomotive? Brake pipe continuity and brake test rules? Is this a case where stricter FRA rules actually worked against safety perhaps?
If the train line is below 60 psi for 4 hours or more, a full initial terminal air brake inspection must be made.
Taking the handle out would leave 0 psi in the train line. Would be a lot of walking for a single-person crew to re-airtest 70-some cars.
If the engine was shut down, the train line would eventually get down to zero, and the air brakes on the train should be set up. Air brakes should remain set for at least three minutes, and sometimes for years.
For the train to start rolling after a hour or two, I feel some outside force did something (tampering).
Mike WSOR engineer | HO scale since 1988 | Visit our club www.WCGandyDancers.com
We don’t know that he didn’t in fact do exactly what you suggest….without the event recorder data we are simply guessing.
On my carrier, our engineers remove the reverser, and it goes into a holder on the control stand.
They carry spares, because when we have to use UP, BNSF KCS or other “foreign” power, the reversers are gone with the crew that brought the train in.
Not knowing this carriers rules, it is entirely possible there was no reverser or brake handle…then again, there may have been.
23 17 46 11
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Bucyrus,
You are right. The independent brake is "straight air", applied by drawing air directly from the main reservoir, whereas the automatic brake system on the cars is applied by using air from the reservoir on each car, making it a "failsafe" system.
rfpjohn,
Thanks for that explanation. You have also answered some questions I had about the independent brakes. I can see your point about a fireman accidentally releasing the automatic brake, but the independent brake keeps holding long enough for everybody to leave and be unaware that they released the automatic brake. But shortly the independent leaks down and releases, and lets the train loose.
Would it be accurate to say that shutting down the engine and losing the compressor would cause the independent brakes to release? If so, would that release be due to air leaking from the pressurized cylinder circuit, and not being replenished by the compressor?
I would think that the event recorder is going to shed a lot of light on what happened with the releasing of the air brakes.
I would also think they would want to ask those 12 fire fighters and one MM&A man what they all did when they were at the fire event. I thought I read somewhere that the cab had been left locked. But that could have been mis-stated.
The possibility of a person accidentally releasing the brakes from the control stand has never been mentioned in all of the news reports. They only refer to shutting down the idling engine as causing the release.
BUCYRUS: I think your interpretation is pretty spot on.
Perhaps the firemen responding to the first fire, entered the cab of the locomotive to shut it down. Firefighting attire tends to be a bit bulky. In maneuvering about the control stand, it would not be difficult to snag the automatic brake valve with said clothing, and return the handle to release position. Here's where insufficient hand brakes come into play. The air releases on the cars, leaving the independent brakes of the engines and whatever hand brakes applied to hold the train. As the engine brakes leak off, this will happen faster than a properly conditioned train brake system, the true test of the hand brakes happens. The independent brakes act on all wheels of the locomotive consist. Hand brakes act against one wheel per unit. The gradually diminishing engine brakes would be a possible reason for the lag in time between the fireman's visit and the train rolling away.
Jerry Pier [snipped - PDN] . . . I have been unable to locate the report on these tests. I suspect they were covered in Dave Blaine's "The Westinghouse Air brake Story" appearing in the December 1945 and January 1946 issues of TRAINS Magazine. Can anyone help on this?
"The importance of being able to stop - The Westinghouse air brake story" by Blaine, David G., from Trains, October 1975, p. 44
"Load-to-tare ratios vs. braking - The Westinghouse air brake story" by Blaine, David G., from Trains, December 1975, p. 48
- Paul North.
Lion,
But what is the answer to my question that you quoted?
BucyrusConsider this possibility: Suppose the engineer did not set any hand brakes, and somebody went into the cab and released the air brakes resulting in a disaster. Would the disaster be 100% the fault of the engineer for not setting the hand brakes to back up the air brakes?
LION has been trained by BNSF to shut down a locomotive in an emergency (got the paper and the hat to prove it!) One method is to bull the throttle handle out and then move it off past its normal stop. Al well and good. But what if a fireman in his haste pulled on a brake lever instead? Fortunately, I believed that they did use the button by the fuel tank, but....
ROAR
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