As a cynical former colleague used to say (advise):
"Pigs just get fat - but hogs get slaughtered !" (i.e., don't get too greedy)
I'll say one more thing and that'll be the last I say. In an earlier post I stated I hadn't read Mr. Whites book and didn't have any plans to.
Why? Well from what I gather, Mr. White hasn't mentioned anything I didn't know already about the graft and corruption that swirled around the building of the Transcontinental Railroad, especially the UP side. And? So? I think anyone who's a student of railroad history has known that for years. Not a big revelation as far as I'm concerned.
Let's remember the people of that period of the 19th Century were not like us, their time was not our time. If someone was skimming a little off the top of any enterprise people of the time were usually willing to trun a blind eye to it, AS LONG as he delivered what he promised and didn't get TOO greedy. That was a rule Thomas Durant of the UP broke to his disgrace and downfall.
Interestingly, that little rule was followed with great success by the Richard Daly political machine in Chicago, according to the late journalist Mike Royko. Deliver the services you're SUPPOSED to deliver, police and fire protection, trash removal, keep the streets clean and safe,and do it all in an efficient and timely manner, and the people will let you get away with anything!
That's all!
It sounds like the author has taken the social concerns of the academic left of today and projected them back 150 years into an era with a different set of real world problems. I'm glad that Greyhounds took the time to read the book and write the analysis above, but I think I'll skip the effort of reading it.
There is a certain amount of irony here when one considers the author's employer is an institution founded by one of the Big Four.
greyhounds wrote the following [in part]:
[James E.Vance,jr.]"... cites an early and pronounced divergence of US and British railway operations and equipment. The reason for the divergence was that the rail systems were built into two very different situations. The British railways were built to link established population and commercial centers. They could expect a good traffic volume from the get go. They could spend more up front on their roadbeds secure in the knowledge that the traffic would come quickly after a line’s completion..."
"...Because most of the country wasn't settled, American railroad practice was different. US railroads were often built in to unsettled areas with the hope that settlement and traffic would develop with the provision of transportation..."
No argument with the underlined portions of the above statements!
I would point out the importance to the development of the American Railroad system and the importance of the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. (linked @) http://www.coxrail.com/land-grants.htm
The railroads were designed first of all to make money for the stakeholders and allow them to profit by selling adjacent land to those brought in by the Railroad Companies. One only has to look at late 19th and turn of the 20th Century maps to see the network of railroads. Particularly out here in the Midwest,in Iowa and Kansas rail lines ran virtually everywhere, connecting even small population centers. To be a community by-passed by a rail line was a death-knell for that community. Grain and cattle could not get to markets, travel overland was difficult at best and in bad weather virtually impossible.
FTL:"...How do you get "ten square miles of land" for every mile of track?"
The final step in understanding a land grant is to imagine a rail line snaking across the checkerboard in a curving, twisting manner. If you draw two lines parallel to the rail line and ten miles to the left and right, you have the outline of the typical land grant created by the 1862 law..."
Land grants were an important mechanism to make a railroad profitable in America, and assure a level of commercial success for the enterprise. Land Grant Colleges as well were a function of that system,as well.
In England the urban centers were long established and connected by a network of roads some good, some not. It was the facilitation of the commercial activities, and mobility of the population that were the functions of their railroads in England. Settlements were firmly, long established, and movement of goods was a necessity as well as the desire of the populations to travel in what amounted to speedy comfort.
To sum up by quoting a statement of Bucyrus' earlier:
"...In actuality, the settlers who moved into the territory were the government. So they were the investors that partnered with the railroad to bring rail transportation into the territory. And as Greyhounds mentioned, the settlers received a return on their investment in the form of better transportation. Better transportation made more money for them. Hauling their goods made money for the railroad. The whole thing together created wealth..."
I've read Richard White's "Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America." I don't see that he "Convincingly Argued" anything. His book is more of a political attack ad than a history.
He reaches several very much unsupported conclusions. The main one is that the transcons were built too soon. "Ahead of Development" (settlement) as he puts it. Because of this premature building they upset the Indians more than was necessary, damaged the environment (where?), brought down the US economy, and caused animal cruelty. (I am not making this up.) He also makes the claim that the western railroads were “overbuilt”. He provides precious little support for the “overbuilt” claim other than some quotes from the president of the Union Pacific. The UP president, Adams, was obviously not thrilled at the appearance of competition. (I don’t see much railroad overbuilding west of the Missouri River in the 19th century, the area and time White wrote about.)
In making his claim that the transcons were built too soon White totally ignores the 500 pound gorilla in the room. He mercilessly trashes the "Big Four" of the Central Pacific. Then he all but turns a blind eye to the fact that the transcontinental railroads were government projects. Both the US and Canadian governments basically contracted the building of transcontinental railroads.
It was the US Federal Government that decided when the first several transcontinental railroads would be built. White simply does not deal with this. He makes the unsupported assertion that the transcons were built too early, but then he totally fails to deal with why the government wanted them built at that time. There were reasons why the US Government took time out during some of its darkest days in the Civil War to enact legislation that would create a railroad linking the Pacific with the Missouri River. From reading White’s book no one can make a judgment as to whether these reasons were good or bad. He simply ignores the issue.
In making his claim of premature building “Ahead of Development” White demonstrates a remarkable lack of historical knowledge. (White is a professor of history at Stanford.) In the US it was common for the railroads to be built ahead of settlement. The US lines were commonly “Developmental Railroads” In his book “The North American Railroad” James E. Vance Jr. deals well with this fact.
Vance cites an early and pronounced divergence of US and British railway operations and equipment. The reason for the divergence was that the rail systems were built into two very different situations. The British railways were built to link established population and commercial centers. They could expect a good traffic volume from the get go. They could spend more up front on their roadbeds secure in the knowledge that the traffic would come quickly after a line’s completion.
Because most of the country wasn't settled, American railroad practice was different. US railroads were often built in to unsettled areas with the hope that settlement and traffic would develop with the provision of transportation. It worked. (I grew up in a town established by a railroad, Manito, IL) But it meant the lines had to be constructed cheaply and then upgraded as business conditions warranted. One major result from American style railroad construction was the 4-4-0 “American Type” locomotive. The pony truck gave it a three point suspension that could handle the tracks while pulling a decent load at a decent speed.
White is either ignorant of the history of the railroads in America or he chose to leave this part out because it didn’t fit the story he wanted to tell.
That’s enough for now. White also demonstrates a total lack of understanding with regards to railroad operations and the economics of railroading. I’ll get to that later.
As far as overbuilding of railroads it really depends on your point of view and the circumstances at the time. In the 1850's the railroads in the North were overbuilt and one of the comtributing causes of the financial Panic of 1857. (Don't you love that term 'panic'? A lot more colorful than 'recession' or 'depression'!)
Anyway, those overbuilt 'roads really came in handy and into their own when the Civil War occurred, and were well placed when industrial America was born with that war. Likewise, it's a good thing we had as many rail lines as we did during World War Two, Imagine trying to fight a two ocean war without them back in those pre-interstate highway days.
"Too many railroads" didn't become a problem again until the industrial North and Northeast turned into the Rust Belt, and all the traffic that supported the 'roads up there didn't exist anymore. Look at all the "Fallen Flags", too many to list here.
Paul_D_North_Jr But on a broader scale - yes, there were too many railroads between the major city centers (or 'nodes' in today's 'network-speak'). What was it - 7 railroads from Chicago to Kansas City ? (One of UCLA Professor of Economics George W. Hilton's articles in Trains of the 1960's - 70's documented this 'chapter-and-verse'.) And didn't all 3 northern transcons - NP, GN, MILW - serve Butte in each's attempt to claim a share of the copper mine traffic from there ? In that context, the 'overbuilding' criticism has a lot of merit, it seems to me. - Paul North.
But on a broader scale - yes, there were too many railroads between the major city centers (or 'nodes' in today's 'network-speak'). What was it - 7 railroads from Chicago to Kansas City ? (One of UCLA Professor of Economics George W. Hilton's articles in Trains of the 1960's - 70's documented this 'chapter-and-verse'.) And didn't all 3 northern transcons - NP, GN, MILW - serve Butte in each's attempt to claim a share of the copper mine traffic from there ? In that context, the 'overbuilding' criticism has a lot of merit, it seems to me.
- Paul North.
One parties 'overbuilding' is another parties 'competition'.
Shippers want carriers fighting for their business at the bottom dollar level and have no concern about the carriers profitability. Carriers want to price their services to cover the costs of maintenance and improvements to their lines and return profits to both the company and it's investors.
I find it very interesting that most of the customers that are complaining about the 'monopoly' power of the railroads that service them, have monopoly power over their customers in many cases. Monopoly power that they jealously guard. Monopoly power that they would use to bully competing carriers, were there to be competing carriers.
I have been employed in the rail industry for over 40 years - it has taken until recent years, where the carriers, post Staggers Act, have developed business accumen (that didn't really exist in the over regulated pre Staggers period) and through the services have generated pricing power on the traffic they handle and are able to put signifigant quantities of money back into the physical plant. My carriers physical plant is in the best condition that I have ever observed since the day I hired out.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
NKP guy [snipped - PDN] . . . White's thesis about the AT&SF, the SP, the 2 northern transcons and lots of the never-completed wannabes, is that they were not needed, at least not so quickly. They were built because they could be, and because there was plenty of subsidy and corruption to make it worthwhile to the owners, if not the stockholders. Railroad men themselves (think Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific) thought the number overlapping and competing lines ruinous and unnecessary. I think a simple look at the map will confirm that. The market, as White clearly and convincingly demonstrates, didn't and couldn't support this overbuilding. Were it not for subsidies, tax breaks, land grants, naked political corruption, etc., most, if not all of these railroads wouldn't have been built, at least not until later, when it would have been cheaper and the public wouldn't have been involved, at least not to the extent they were. . . .
As far as transit across the isthmus at Panama goes, once the Panama Railroad was completed in January, 1855, trains ran safely in 4-6 hours. Until the opening of the canal in 1914, carried the heaviest volume of freight per unit length of any railroad in the world. Not dangerous and rather fast.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Thanks to my friends schlimm & dakotafred.
First, I admit I was confused about which Bancroft was being quoted.
Second, I take your point, dakotafred about the dangers of the crossing. Certainly the Overland Route was a thing whose time had come. Also, in the Vanderbilt book (The First Tycoon) the author notes with detail the machinations of William (?) Walker of Nicaragua in fomenting a revolutionary movement there; surely the unstable political situation in Central America was a factor in the impetus to build the CP-UP route. And thanks for reminding us about Theodore Judah, a man too-often forgotten in these discussions.
Now, once we get past the point of admitting a need for the Overland route and public involvement.....what about the rest of the railroads White discusses?
(Do you think it was Commodore Vanderbilt's activity in Nicaragua that led to the whole place being called "Central America"?) lol
dakotafred NKP guy: I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive. I must take friendly exception to this characterization. The definitive modern account of the building of the first transcon, EMPIRE EXPRESS, by David Haward Bain, 1999, discusses the danger and slowness. (Can't recall what he said about expense.) Theodore Judah himself caught his death on his last Panama transit -- heartbreakingly, just as the first rails of his longtime dream were being laid, in California. I think the best way to understand the transcon is as a big idea, long aborning from many considerations, whose time came around at last, finally proving irresistable -- to government, to business, to the citizenry at large. Kind of like the breaking away from England; the abolishment of slavery; going to the moon. One can question, and pick and pick, without coming up with the one definitive answer. Life and history are messy that way.
NKP guy: I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive.
I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive.
I must take friendly exception to this characterization. The definitive modern account of the building of the first transcon, EMPIRE EXPRESS, by David Haward Bain, 1999, discusses the danger and slowness. (Can't recall what he said about expense.) Theodore Judah himself caught his death on his last Panama transit -- heartbreakingly, just as the first rails of his longtime dream were being laid, in California.
I think the best way to understand the transcon is as a big idea, long aborning from many considerations, whose time came around at last, finally proving irresistable -- to government, to business, to the citizenry at large. Kind of like the breaking away from England; the abolishment of slavery; going to the moon. One can question, and pick and pick, without coming up with the one definitive answer. Life and history are messy that way.
I should hasten to clarify that the trip across the isthmus itself was not slow (altho surely dangerous); it was the circuitous route itself, New York-San Francisco VIA the isthmus.
NKP guy For example, earlier I was going to ask Who has ever heard about a serious threat of California seceding from the Union? Well, here we have Bancroft to speak to that. He makes it clear it wasn't a major threat, but it was, apparently, a threat.
For example, earlier I was going to ask Who has ever heard about a serious threat of California seceding from the Union? Well, here we have Bancroft to speak to that. He makes it clear it wasn't a major threat, but it was, apparently, a threat.
I believe it is important to point out that the Bancroft cited was Hubert H. Bancroft, a writer of regional and local western histories, but not a trained historian. Ironically, he died after being run over by a streetcar. The famous historian was George Bancroft, author of the monumental History of the United States of America, from the discovery of the American continent. (8 or 10 volumes 1854-78).
NKP guy I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive.
NKP guy As to the major point about why the western railroads were built, I want to say again that White notes that the routes to California via Panama or Nicaragua were cheaper per ton than the transcontinental railroad from the day the railroad opened in 1869 and for many years, even decades, after. I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive. Also, I am sure that many readers here are unfamiliar with the instrumental role played by Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt in making the route via Nicaragua a huge success for him and his companies. In fact, last night as I looked again through The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt by T.J. Stiles (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009) I see no mention of his thinking about any idea concerning the transcontinental railroad. I find this interesting. Commodore Vanderbilt obviously did not see such a railroad as much of a threat to his Nicaragua route-interests, at least not in his foreseeable future. Also, he doesn't seem inclined to be involved in any discussions, let alone construction, of such a proposed line, no matter what the route. Then again, just about the time he was getting into railroading, the Civil War broke out. 1860-1862 must have been a hectic time for everyone, to say the least, and a game-changer in many ways.
As to the major point about why the western railroads were built, I want to say again that White notes that the routes to California via Panama or Nicaragua were cheaper per ton than the transcontinental railroad from the day the railroad opened in 1869 and for many years, even decades, after. I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive. Also, I am sure that many readers here are unfamiliar with the instrumental role played by Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt in making the route via Nicaragua a huge success for him and his companies. In fact, last night as I looked again through The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt by T.J. Stiles (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009) I see no mention of his thinking about any idea concerning the transcontinental railroad. I find this interesting. Commodore Vanderbilt obviously did not see such a railroad as much of a threat to his Nicaragua route-interests, at least not in his foreseeable future. Also, he doesn't seem inclined to be involved in any discussions, let alone construction, of such a proposed line, no matter what the route. Then again, just about the time he was getting into railroading, the Civil War broke out. 1860-1862 must have been a hectic time for everyone, to say the least, and a game-changer in many ways.
The rates may have been cheaper for coastal cities, or cities on a navigable river (e.g. Sacramento), but not likely for inland areas. Mining in Nevada took off only after the railroads provided a means of low cost transportation.
Vanderbilt was an honest, but sharp, man. He would never have fit with that gang of thieves and scoundrels we call the Big Four, who finally got the CP-UP built, but not by using primarily their money, but rather the public's. And they profited, shall we say, handsomely. Their influence on national and state politics was corrupt and corroding. We owe them little, if any thanks, I think. Want to thank someone? Try Grenville Dodge or the Casement brothers who actually were responsible for building the railroad.
The real scoundrel and thief was Durant of the Credit Mobilier and UP. Dodge and the Casement brothers were responsible for building the UP and had nothing to do with building the CP.
You vastly underestimate Crocker and Huntington. While they used some questionable tactics in getting construction subsidies, the CP had better track than the UP. Unlike Durant of the UP, the Big Four intended to make money of running the CP rather than just on construction.
White's thesis about the AT&SF, the SP, the 2 northern transcons and lots of the never-completed wannabes, is that they were not needed, at least not so quickly. They were built because they could be, and because there was plenty of subsidy and corruption to make it worthwhile to the owners, if not the stockholders. Railroad men themselves (think Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific) thought the number overlapping and competing lines ruinous and unnecessary. I think a simple look at the map will confirm that. The market, as White clearly and convincingly demonstrates, didn't and couldn't support this overbuilding. Were it not for subsidies, tax breaks, land grants, naked political corruption, etc., most, if not all of these railroads wouldn't have been built, at least not until later, when it would have been cheaper and the public wouldn't have been involved, at least not to the extent they were.
Much of the financing for the SP came from profits generated by the CP. The SP was getting a lot of traffic from the copper mines in Arizona even before it was completed through Arizona. You would do well to read Myrick's Railroads of Arizona, Vol 1 to get a good picture of how and why the SP was built.
- Erik
I am as impressed as I am delighted with the responses to this thread, even those I disagree with.
But I must genuflect before Wanswheel's posting. Here we have several sound examples of scholarship which, while they certainly don't support some of my contentions, certainly have to be not only considered, but admitted as significant. For example, earlier I was going to ask Who has ever heard about a serious threat of California seceding from the Union? Well, here we have Bancroft to speak to that. He makes it clear it wasn't a major threat, but it was, apparently, a threat. Still, I have not seen anything to make me think secession in Washington, Oregon, or Idaho was a serious threat either, but it was bandied about, I guess by a few.
I don't think any of this necessarily refutes White's book or its several theses. He simply doesn't give any credence to this being a major cause. It needs to be reiterated here that White does admit that the Overland route was probably a necessity as well as a good thing. From what I read, the onset of the Civil War got Congress off the dime and the thing was authorized.
Now, it seems we have 2 questions in this thread: One, why were the railroads built, and two, what was the seriousness of the secession threat in the motivations behind the transcontinental RR in 1862? I think we've seen plenty of evidence from White to Bancroft and others that the secession threat was, at best, rather minimal or slight, except for that dust-up in New Mexico. I can't help but note that the canonic text in American History, Morison & Commager (& Leuchtenburg)'s The Growth of the American Republic (two volumes, Oxford University Press, many editions; mine the 1980) makes absolutely no mention of West Coast secession as a cause or impetus for the transcontinental railroad. In fact, on this point they are rather silent, as if the need for such a railroad was inevitable or obvious.
Lastly, on top of the financial, political, and ecological damage all tis railroad building did for the country, can we railfans please think of people other than White Men like ourselves? The railroads were a disaster for the Indians of the West and White makes a convincing argument that if the building had come a generation or so later the Indian tribes might have had more time to adjust, as the Navajos did, instead of causing wars and all the attendant misery that resulted in many if not most other areas. And while I'm at it, please remember, too, the cost to white European (and other) immigrants who believed all that malarky the midwestern and western railroads were feeding the public.
Look, I'm glad I can ride a train across the West, too, and I'm glad all this transpired before I was born. But this railroad building has been a mighty complex story with a cost that can be figured in many ways. I also think a few contributors here ought to know better than to gainsay a book they not only haven't read, but have no intention of reading. That isn't what I call an open mind.
Schlimm, those books from 1883, 1890, and from 1919 were referenced by "wanswheel", not me. You give me too much credit! At any rate, just because a book's old doesn't necessarily mean it's dated, trust me. There's a lot of gold in those old volumes!
Anyway, I hit the archives here at the "Festung Firelock" looking for some references to back my assertions, although it looks like everyone else has done the job pretty well. I found Theodore Judahs sales pitch for the transcontinental where he said the government needed the railroad. California HAD to be bound to the Unions side. The Far West had to be settled and made a permanent part of the Nation. AND how could you move the troops that might be needed in the West if the War went badly?
A Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts said "What are seventy-five or a hundred million dollars in opening a railroad that shall connect the people of the Atlantic and Pacific and bind us together? Nothing!"
Then there was Grenville Dodge, quoting the MAN himself, Abraham Lincoln as saying the railroad was "... a military necessity and should be built."
Researching California and the Civil War in the Wikepedia, I found there was a strong secessionist movement in southern California. It had been put down by the few US Army personnel in California with the help of Unionist militias, but there was a VERY strong secessionist movement in the Arizona Territory that was still very active. They flat-out voted to join the Confederacy but in the end it came to nothing.
So no, I didn't find anyone using the term "breakaway republic" at the time, but Abe Lincoln would have been a very poor Chief Executive indeed if it didn't cross his mind and taken steps to prevent it happening, either in 1862 or at some point in the future.
Oh, and to edblysard: I was amazed when you told of all the relics such as bullets and such being found around the San Jacinto battlefield, considering it was a fairly small battle. I guess those Texans under General Sam must have been very, VERY emotionally stirred up!
REMEMBER THE ALAMO! REMEMBER GOLIAD!
Interesting references, firelock, if secondary and pretty dated. What would be more intriguing would be primary sources and more recent topical histories.
daveklepper Tsarist Russia claimed Alaska.
Tsarist Russia claimed Alaska.
Tsarist Russia owned Alaska until Sec. of State Seward had the wisdom to purchase Alaska (Seward's Folly, indeed!) from Russia in 1867 for $7.2 million. The Russian government was seeking buyers as early as the late 1850's. Britain showed no interest and the US turned down a Russian offer in 1859.
This latest information on the geopolitical reasoning behind the transcontinental railroad certainly does clarify and ring true. Moreover, it suggests that the motive behind the transcontinental railroad was uniquely different from the motives behind the ensuing age of railway fever where every town wanted a railroad.
Personally, I find no such ring of truth to what has been described of White’s book. He seems to conclude that all railroad construction was a scam to defraud the public on the part of corporations in bed with the government; to execute railroad projects, which were destructive and unnecessary. This portrayal of corporations seems way too familiar as a modern-day cliché for me to believe that White is not looking back at history through this modern lens of corporate disdain.
Pleasse don't forget that even before considerations of slave vs. free society, there was also concern about Euorpean powers grabbing part of the West Cost and settling it. Canada was still a British colony, not a separate country. Tsarist Russia claimed Alaska. Etc.
Excerpt from Building the Pacific Railway by Edwin L. Sabin (1919)
The exigencies of a war threatening the Pacific country would crowd the Panama route; and the hazards of war would render the long trip down the Atlantic, across the Isthmus, and up the Pacific an undertaking trebly fraught with menace.
Now war had come from an awkward quarter - a quarter that closed the exit of transports from New Orleans, and imperiled the high seas to the Isthmus. The Trent affair, by which England was almost alienated, and the disaffection in California which seemed to incline her toward the Confederacy or a Pacific Republic, sharpened the call for quick and secure interior communication between East and Farthest West.
A Pacific Railroad therefore was a military measure as well as a measure for domestic improvement; and while it never developed into a Rebellion measure, and its actual military province was that of subduing the Indians, its prospective course through loyal territory appeared to be an asset.
Excerpt from History of the Northern Pacific Railway by Eugene V. Smalley (1883)
The beginning of the civil war in 1861 postponed any determination by Congress of the question of the route to be favored by the Government. In 1862, however, when the war was in its most doubtful stage, political considerations hastened action on the transcontinental railway project. California, during the gold fever, had attracted a considerable immigration from the Southern States. The settlers from that section naturally sympathized with the rebellion. The power of the Government, absorbed in the fierce contest raging from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, was but feebly felt on the Pacific coast. A separation of California and Oregon from the United States, and the erection of a Pacific republic or empire, was freely talked of. There were also bold projects of a rebel expedition across the plains to conquer California for the South with the aid of its Southern-born citizens. An expedition from Texas did, in fact, go as far as New Mexico, but was driven back with heavy loss. Meanwhile the loyal people of California urged upon Congress the importance of speedily uniting their State with the East by a railroad, as a political as well as commercial measure. So Congress stopped in the midst of the great task of providing men and money to carry on the struggle for national existence, to create and subsidize corporations to build a railway across the continent. When the first Pacific Railroad Bill was passed, the cannon of the defiant enemy could almost be heard at the Capitol in Washington. This was in June, 1862, shortly after the defeats of McClellan on the Peninsula, and just before the disastrous battle known as the second Bull Run.
Excerpt from History of California by Hubert H. Bancroft (1890)
The Pacific republic idea which had always haunted the southern brain had assumed some definiteness, or was at least more openly broached, when the southern states seceded. The California senators had proclaimed it in Washington in 1860 to intimidate the north, and it continued to be talked of in a threatening manner during the winter of 1860-1. The inside workings of the conspiracy were not divulged. There was a secret movement, with a history, carried on by an order called Knights of the Golden Circle. And there were other organizations. Even at the time enough was known at Washington to cause the president to dispatch, with every effort at secrecy, General Edwin A. Sumner to the Pacific coast to relieve General Albert S. Johnston of the command of the military department. But with all the caution observed in this transaction, Johnston received information by pony express in time to resign before Sumner arrived. Not an hour was lost when the general landed before taking command, but Johnston was evidently not surprised. He yielded gracefully, no doubt gladly, and was soon on his way overland, via Texas, with other officers and volunteers for the southern confederacy. He was a Kentuckian, and was imbued with that devotion to state, instead of general government, which was the political religion of the south. He gave his sword to the "lost cause," and laid down his life at Shiloh as a proof of his loyalty to an idea.
edblysard While not an actual citation, I can provide a source to substantiate the statement, See the article in Trains Magazine; Feb, 2009, beginning on page 29, by Peter Hudson...the same concept is quoted as being of great concern to newly elected President Abraham Lincoln. I have also read a book that concerned itself with the relationship of Fredrick Douglas, and Lincoln during the years just prior to the outbreak of actual hostilities between the Confederate and Union states,, this book also mentions the concept, although it suggested that Lincoln was just as concerned, if not more concerned with the economic binding of the west to the north in terms of supply and demand of raw product as he was in insuring a pro Union slave free west. schlimm: Firelock76: I was interested in your statement about federal concerns of breakaway republics on the west coast. I ran your statement by a friend who is a well-known historian, although of an earlier period (through 1820). However, he has never come across references to this. Could you pass on a citation or two regarding this?
While not an actual citation, I can provide a source to substantiate the statement,
See the article in Trains Magazine; Feb, 2009, beginning on page 29, by Peter Hudson...the same concept is quoted as being of great concern to newly elected President Abraham Lincoln.
I have also read a book that concerned itself with the relationship of Fredrick Douglas, and Lincoln during the years just prior to the outbreak of actual hostilities between the Confederate and Union states,, this book also mentions the concept, although it suggested that Lincoln was just as concerned, if not more concerned with the economic binding of the west to the north in terms of supply and demand of raw product as he was in insuring a pro Union slave free west.
schlimm: Firelock76: I was interested in your statement about federal concerns of breakaway republics on the west coast. I ran your statement by a friend who is a well-known historian, although of an earlier period (through 1820). However, he has never come across references to this. Could you pass on a citation or two regarding this?
Firelock76: I was interested in your statement about federal concerns of breakaway republics on the west coast. I ran your statement by a friend who is a well-known historian, although of an earlier period (through 1820). However, he has never come across references to this. Could you pass on a citation or two regarding this?
A few more data points...
While it predates Lincoln's presidency, the Pony express was set up in 1860 to provide improved communication between California and the east. Pony Express service ended in October 1861 when the transcontinental telegraph line was installed.
Nevada as admitted to the Union in 1864 in large part because of the mining activity surrounding the Comstock Lode.
edblysard I came to the same conclusion,, and it seemed almost a assumed occurrence in the mid-east states...if a local town/county or state built a railroad, it would be merged or bought by a major road...in some instances, it appears quite a few were built and incorporated for just that purpose, with the help/guidance and financing of the major road, and once completed, if profitable it was absorbed into that road. henry6: My question is about White's assertion that all railroads were built under the umbrella of big business, major railroads during the last half of the 19th Century. My conclusion has been that major railroads were merged into existance from the handsful of smaller roads built by local interests (often in hope they would get the attention of the mjor roads or become part of a "system"). A lot of the expansion was done by merger and acquisition rather than building for oneself.
I came to the same conclusion,, and it seemed almost a assumed occurrence in the mid-east states...if a local town/county or state built a railroad, it would be merged or bought by a major road...in some instances, it appears quite a few were built and incorporated for just that purpose, with the help/guidance and financing of the major road, and once completed, if profitable it was absorbed into that road.
henry6: My question is about White's assertion that all railroads were built under the umbrella of big business, major railroads during the last half of the 19th Century. My conclusion has been that major railroads were merged into existance from the handsful of smaller roads built by local interests (often in hope they would get the attention of the mjor roads or become part of a "system"). A lot of the expansion was done by merger and acquisition rather than building for oneself.
My question is about White's assertion that all railroads were built under the umbrella of big business, major railroads during the last half of the 19th Century. My conclusion has been that major railroads were merged into existance from the handsful of smaller roads built by local interests (often in hope they would get the attention of the mjor roads or become part of a "system"). A lot of the expansion was done by merger and acquisition rather than building for oneself.
henry6 My question is about White's assertion that all railroads were built under the umbrella of big business, major railroads during the last half of the 19th Century. My conclusion has been that major railroads were merged into existance from the handsful of smaller roads built by local interests (often in hope they would get the attention of the mjor roads or become part of a "system"). A lot of the expansion was done by merger and acquisition rather than building for oneself.
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Don't forget considerations of ordinary commerce. There was the increasing necessity of commercial travel between California and the money centers of the East, which travel took WEEKS via steamship, the fever swamps of Panama and another steamship.
One of the originators of the transcon idea, Theodore Judah, got his inspiration from an interminable trip to the Far East that could have been shortened by those weeks with a transcon. Eventually he and others were able to convince the pols that what was good for business was also good for the country.
Faster has always been better for a country in a hurry. We had barely finished paving all the important two-lane highways when it was time to build the Interstates. Three hundred miles an hour wasn't fast enough in the air, so we had to have jets ... then supersonics.
Does anybody want to bet against teleportation by the 22nd century?
....and everybody forgets the Jefferson Davis / Pacific Survey conections. (Capt. Gunnison and your Topags, I do remember/ won't forget)
I've always had a similar impression, namely to build the transcontinental to prevent the Confederacy from gaining some kind of foothold with the coastal states, not to prevent them from forming breakaway republics on their own. It might have been just an excuse, however, as Confederate expansionists tended to look south (Cuba, Mexico) and to the west of TX.
There also was the ongoing question of the Mormon state (within USA) of Deseret from 1849 through about 1872, which mostly was contained in the Utah Territory after 1850.
Also there was a movement after 1865 to form the state (within the USA) of Lincoln, from the eastern 1/2 of Washington, plus some of Idaho.
None of those were breakaway (from the USA) republics.
greyhounds schlimm: Firelock76: I was interested in your statement about federal concerns of breakaway republics on the west coast. I ran your statement by a friend who is a well-known historian, although of an earlier period (through 1820). However, he has never come across references to this. Could you pass on a citation or two regarding this? It would be a great favor if you could ask your historian friend just why Federal Government policy was so focused on getting railroads built to California and other west coast points such as Puget Sound. No businessman would have built the first transcontinetal railroads when they were built without government land grants and loans. It was government policy to extend the rail network to connect the west coast with the area east of the Missouri River. There was a reason for that policy. Does anyone know that reason? The government had the Army out there finding several routes for a transcon well before the Civil War. The only reason construction didn't start before that war was that northern and southern factions couldn't agree on which of the routes to build. After the southern members of congress departed, the US Government took time out during the freaking Civil War to cause a railroad to be built between the Pacific Coast and the rest of the United States. Why? If it wasn't to prevent regional economies and cultures from developing seperate from the established and populated United States, what was the reason?
It would be a great favor if you could ask your historian friend just why Federal Government policy was so focused on getting railroads built to California and other west coast points such as Puget Sound. No businessman would have built the first transcontinetal railroads when they were built without government land grants and loans. It was government policy to extend the rail network to connect the west coast with the area east of the Missouri River. There was a reason for that policy. Does anyone know that reason?
The government had the Army out there finding several routes for a transcon well before the Civil War. The only reason construction didn't start before that war was that northern and southern factions couldn't agree on which of the routes to build. After the southern members of congress departed, the US Government took time out during the freaking Civil War to cause a railroad to be built between the Pacific Coast and the rest of the United States. Why? If it wasn't to prevent regional economies and cultures from developing seperate from the established and populated United States, what was the reason?
That's what I've always gotten from reading about the railroad and Lincoln. It was to be able to "move" the territory from the Mexican American war close to the eastern states. The danger was the western territory would be hard to hold otherwise. There is a Lincoln quote I can't seem to find, roughly, "an iron belt to tie the nation".
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
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