Link to newspaper article with a pretty informative photo - - it makes clear that a lot of the yellow machines which appear to be derailment clean-up equipment in the background is actually MOW equipment still on a flat on top of the loco, and strewn further back on it and fallen down on the ground alongside, etc.:
http://www.crestonnewsadvertiser.com/articles/2011/04/17/84482592/index.xml
See also this article for a few more, mainly of the Hulcher Cat 'sidebooms' and firemen on a concrete highway bridge over the tracks near the site:
http://www.omaha.com/article/20110417/NEWS01/110419727#2-dead-in-iowa-train-crash
- Paul North.
Paul, it appears that just the cab was sheared off. The nose had damage, but I think the collision posts did their job--at least they stayed put. Even so, nothing could prevent the onslaught of flat cars overriding each other in this case. Perhaps collision posts as high as the cab roof, but that presents its own problems.
I'm curious about the couplers on the flat cars. I don't know if Type F couplers or even shelf-E couplers could have prevented the accident (I'm sure drawbars were broken by the telescoping action), but I'm wondering whether it would have affected the physics just enough to send the crush of flat cars in other directions.
As for blame, I'm sure the signal tests and locomotive event recorders will help determine blame. And with the two best witnesses gone, they'll probably have to shoulder the blame...unfortunately, that's often the way things work. And I sincerely hope that, whatever the outcome, they don't come up with a bunch of rules or edicts to further burden the operating crews. If it was their fault, there are plenty of rules on the books already.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Paul_D_North_Jr See also this article for a few more, mainly of the Hulcher Cat 'sidebooms' and firemen on a concrete highway bridge over the tracks near the site: http://www.omaha.com/article/20110417/NEWS01/110419727#2-dead-in-iowa-train-crash - Paul North.
Does it appear from this photo that the frame of the lead truck on the lead unit is actually bent upwards at the center axle?
IMHO, the only thing that could have a chance of crew survival would have been something akin to the nuclear waste transfer canisters that have been subjected to a lot of crash tests, or perhaps an F-16 ejection seat system (which would in this case probably have launched just as they were under the bridge...not a very good option in that case, it would seem).
Looking at the pictures Paul linked just makes me cringe. Really cringe.
ChuckCobleigh or perhaps an F-16 ejection seat system (which would in this case probably have launched just as they were under the bridge...not a very good option in that case, it would seem).
or perhaps an F-16 ejection seat system (which would in this case probably have launched just as they were under the bridge...not a very good option in that case, it would seem).
Actually, it looked like the coal train wasn't moving very fast at all. 10 to 15 MPH max would be my most generous guess and 15 MPH is a stretch. No, I believe the carnage would've been a alot worse if the train was moving faster and if the crew was alert, they would've seen it coming. I would've told my conductor or engineer "See ya, pal... I'm bailing!" and made my way back to the trailing cab or off the train all together. I'm convinced that these guys were out of it and didn't see it coming until it was too late to do anything about it. In which case an ejection seat would've been useless anyway.
Ted M.
got trains?™
See my photos at: http://tedmarshall.rrpicturearchives.net/
Sometimes a trailing unit can be a deathwish as well...
DMIR 401 was the 3rd unit and empty cars rode up and destroyed the cab, thank goodness no one was there.
Mechanical Department "No no that's fine shove that 20 pound set all around the yard... those shoes aren't hell and a half to change..."
The Missabe Road: Safety First
Paul_D_North_Jr coborn35: Saw some more picture today, the cab is sheared clean off. There are about 5 flat cars stacked on top of each other right through where the cab should have been. No wonder cab would have prevented this. Just above the low nose = through the windshield area only ? Or everything above the frame = the flat cars sheared took off the 2 vertical "collision posts", too ?
coborn35: Saw some more picture today, the cab is sheared clean off. There are about 5 flat cars stacked on top of each other right through where the cab should have been. No wonder cab would have prevented this.
Just above the low nose = through the windshield area only ?
Or everything above the frame = the flat cars sheared took off the 2 vertical "collision posts", too ?
The pictures I saw were taken from the other side and it looked to me like the collision posts had been nearly sheared right off. Cab was completely gone but front nose section was leaning hard inward. Flat cars started at the frame and went to around the electrical cabinet.
Information being circulated through industry channels reports that the train passed the Stop & Proceed signal prior to the Work Train at 22 MPH...NO braking actions were taken.
I understand that BNSF Restricted Speed rules state that the Maximum permissible speed is 20 MPH being able to STOP within 1/2 the range of vision.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Might answer some questions. A few of the "burn" marks are from the welders cutting the cab open for recovery.
Might answer some questions.
A few of the "burn" marks are from the welders cutting the cab open for recovery.
23 17 46 11
Paul_D_North_Jr [snipped] Would Positive Train Control (PTC) have prevented this collision from happening ?
When the supposed 'benefits'/ cost savings of PTC from prevented or reduced impact of collisions, etc. are predicted and calculated, do they include the value of the reduction in 'out-of-service' and restricted speed time for main lines while the wreck is cleared and the track is restored ? I'm sure those computations include typical values for equipment damage, track repairs, injuries to employees, and an allowance for liability claims to innocent bystanders and owners of adjoining lands and buildings, etc. But I can't recall whether any of those reports addressed the value of keeping the main line in service.
Nevertheless, I understand that commonly the delays to trains on the damaged route and the 'ripple effect' of the subsequent disruptions to train operations elsewhere on the system or network have a huge negative value as well - that's why the 'mantra' and usual priority is to reopen the main ASAP after the people have been rescued (recovered), regardless of what further damage is inflicted on the derailed cars and their cargos. Preventing those incidental costs should have a positive 'avoided cost' value as well, so it would be interesting to see if any attempt has been made to quantify and include them in any of the 'pro-PTC' studies, such as those by the FRA. Anybody here know ?
Preliminary information has been released by the NTSB on this accident. Most important points to my mind are that at the point of impact the coal train was making 23 mph (more than allowed under restricting speed), and also that emergency braking was never applied. Unfortunately the front window camera was destroyed in the accident, and its data was not recoverable.
NTSB release on accident on BNSF
The press release says that the crash investigators were able to identify the standing train from about 1,376 ft. away. 23 MPH is about 34 ft. per second, so the crew should have been able to see the standing train about 40 seconds before they collided with it. The obvious and so far unanswered question is of course: "What were they doing instead during all that time ?"
Notably, the press release also indicates that the NTSB is going to look into the crashworthiness of the locomotive as well:
"Finally, the NTSB has formed a work group which will examine the crash performance of the leading locomotive where crew members were fatally injured."
Thanks for posting that link.
Link to FRA document that I just found - "Locomotive Crashworthiness Final Rule" (31 pages, approx. 1.79 MB in size) at:
http://www.fra.dot.gov/Downloads/counsel/LocoCrashworthiness062806.pdf
There's an interesting discussion on pages 4 - 11 inclusive of this 'PDF" format version. Notably, this sccenario apparently occurred in an August 23, 1996 collision at Phoenixville, PA [ConRail, though it does not seem to have been the subject of either a NTSB or FRA accident report or investigation - PDN], per "Table 1. - Collision Scenario, Collision Mode, and Accident Representative of Scenario" on page 6 of 31 of this PDF version - "3a. Overtaking collision, locomotive to flat car . . . loading of window frame structure. However, footnote 5 on the same page states that while the Report contained "one [scenario in which] an overriding freight car impacts the window structure during a rear-end collision", and "The Working Group initially considered" that scenario, it was not used for the crashworthiness evaluation. [emphasis added - PDN] Stated another way - they didn't look at this possibility in detail.
Bucyrus, and others who are still interested in this level of detail: There is also an discussion of collision post strength requirements from the bottom right corner of page 20 through the 1st column of page 22. Apparently AAR Standard S-580-2005 requires each collision post to be able to resist 750,000 lbs. at the point of attachment to the underframe, and 500,000 lbs. at 30" above the frame. It seems that the Working Group considered further increasing the required strength at the latter point to 800,000 lbs., but "The Working Group found it more desirable to have the collision posts fail before the underframe does, thereby reducing the possibility of override due to either the formation of a ramp caused by underframe deformation or catapulting." [emphasis added - PDN]
In short, "they blew it" - twice, even. Perhaps that's why the NTSB is going to look at this further.
Paul_D_North_Jr Bucyrus, and others who are still interested in this level of detail: There is also an discussion of collision post strength requirements from the bottom right corner of page 20 through the 1st column of page 22. Apparently AAR Standard S-580-2005 requires each collision post to be able to resist 750,000 lbs. at the point of attachment to the underframe, and 500,000 lbs. at 30" above the frame. It seems that the Working Group considered further increasing the required strength at the latter point to 800,000 lbs., but "The Working Group found it more desirable to have the collision posts fail before the underframe does, thereby reducing the possibility of override due to either the formation of a ramp caused by underframe deformation or catapulting." [emphasis added - PDN] In short, "they blew it" - twice, even. Perhaps that's why the NTSB is going to look at this further. - Paul North.
It appears that 500k at 30" was too much as the underframe did buckle. On the other hand how many Megajoules of energy does an 18,000 ton train traveling at 23 miles per hour possess ?
Paul,
Thanks for finding and posting that information. It seems to be confirming my general conclusion about the failure of the posts. I am rather amazed because I find it hard to believe that they could get it wrong with all of the developmental work, resources, and testing that would go into a locomotive crash performance standard. As I said before, I expect the crash performance in this collision to become the focus of intense review and debate within the regulatory bodies that come into play.
What they needed was not only collision posts that were strong enough, but also a stronger frame. I sure would like to see an image of the locomotive frame if anybody knows of one.
Beaulieu,
I don’t think they would need to build a strong enough cab to withstand the force of the whole train. It just needs to be strong enough to either directly deflect, or jackknife the train it hits and/or the train it is pulling without destroying the cab. With that deflection, the whole force of the train could not come to bear on the cab.
This collision deflected the flat cars nicely. The only problem was that the deflection system ended when the cars were only half way over the cab. Otherwise, there would be nothing fundamentally wrong with a ramp-over-the-top type of deflection system. But on the other hand, if the posts had not bent over and formed a ramp, the deflection would probably have occurred in the form of jackknifing the flat cars, or even stacking them up on each other to some extent in combination with jacknifing.
I think they need heavy bars that go up the front, under the nose, and up the windshield frame, and all if it strong enough, (and the main frame strong enough) that it can deflect and/or jacknife most of what it hits without yielding. And if anything does manage to ride up the front of the cab, the bars would protect it from puncture.
Link to another thread here with a discussion of "Locomotive Cabs, and Crew Safety in Collisions" at: http://cs.trains.com/trccs/forums/p/190807/2089800.aspx#2089800
beaulieu It appears that 500k at 30" was too much as the underframe did buckle. On the other hand how many Megajoules of energy does an 18,000 ton train traveling at 23 miles per hour possess ?
Well, not counting the not insubstantial energy in the rotating wheels of the cars and locomotives. about 860 to 870 would be a good guess. That's just below a quarter of a Megawatt-hour. A bunch.
There are different ways to dissipate the impact energy of a collision, but all of them utilize a cushion. The cushion can be part of the moving object or a part of the object that is struck. With energy-absorbing cushions on the back of highway maintenance trucks, the cushion is a part of the object struck. The same is true with energy absorbing guardrail systems built up around concrete bridge columns. Likewise with an airbag where the cushion is part of the object, which is the steering column. The moving object in the case of the airbag is the driver.
On the other hand, in the case of shock absorbing bumpers on cars, the cushion is part of the moving object rather than part of the object that is struck. Following the same principle, there are some rather outlandish proposals to add big airbags to the front of locomotives in order to protect pedestrians, which amounts to a cushion on the moving object.
In a collision between railroad equipment, the impact-absorbing cushion is the softest part of either the moving locomotive or rolling stock, or the locomotive or rolling stock that is struck. Usually, it is a combination of both, as in this case of the Iowa crash.
Since the point of crash protection is to safeguard the crew personnel, it would be most cost-effective to place the impact-absorbing cushion on locomotives rather than on every freight car. But the larger problem is the extreme amount of impact energy that needs to be absorbed when one train collides with another. The amount of momentum energy in a 15,0000-ton train, for instance, is hundreds of times greater than what could possibly be absorbed in any reasonably sized locomotive-borne cushion. When this coal train in Iowa plowed its way through all those flat cars of maintenance equipment, it was only moving 23 mph, when it first hit.
The way to absorb collision energy in a train crash is to make the freight cars of the train being struck absorb all of the energy. But you don’t do this by adding cushions to freight cars. You do it by making locomotive cabs so strong that they cannot act as cushions by being crushed. That way, all of the energy will be dissipated by the freight cars being struck.
The problem is a little different in the case of locomotives striking other locomotives in head-on collisions. But if the locomotive cabs are strong enough, they will not crush each other. Both will be protected while the impact is absorbed by the trailing rolling stock.
The locomotive frames are stronger than freight car frames, and locomotives weigh more than freight cars. The only problem is that locomotives are as soft as freight cars in locations above the level of the frames. So you have to provide a rigid structure that effectively raises the height of the locomotive frame at the front end where crash impact will occur.
There is nothing technically difficult about this workable crash protection system, but it adds cost to the locomotive. I would not be surprised if it increased the cost by 50%. The added cost is not only in the extra steel and labor, but also in the engineering and design modifications needed to fit this crash protection into the locomotive. Particularly problematic would be reinforcing the area around the windshield without significantly reducing the size of the cab interior or reducing the visibility. So the real problem is paying for a system that should not be necessary if railroaders are doing their job. I can see where railroad companies would come down on this. The problem is that you have regulatory bodies that can call the shots, and for such organizations, it is so easy to be all about safety. Public safety is the mother’s milk of growing bureaucracies.
And when it comes to crash protection for railroad workers, nothing could so dramatically drive home the point that more is needed than this crash in Iowa. They say that all railroad rules are written in blood, meaning that the need for them is unknown until someone is hurt or killed. It is that way with most safety measures. People need to be shown what can go wrong before they see a need to protect against it. So I suspect that this Iowa crash will lead to a collision between the call for mandated safety features and the need to pay for them.
Bucyrus [snipped] There is nothing technically difficult about this workable crash protection system, but it adds cost to the locomotive. I would not be surprised if it increased the cost by 50%. The added cost is not only in the extra steel and labor, but also in the engineering and design modifications needed to fit this crash protection into the locomotive. Particularly problematic would be reinforcing the area around the windshield without significantly reducing the size of the cab interior or reducing the visibility.
I think it would not be that expensive nor that space-consuming. In 2004 - 2 years before the current regulations were finalized - the FRA already did a demonstration of something of the sort to resist hitting an eccentrically-loaded container, as in a 'shifted load scenario, and the 'Principal Objectives" addressed all 3 of those points. See slide 3 of 8 of the "Locomotive Collision Test #9 - Freight Locomotive With a Strengthened Windshield Frame Impacting a High/Offset Intermodal Container" in the "PDF" format file (approx. 435 KB in size) at:
http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/Research/Test5_Info.pdf
See also http://www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/policy/640.shtml
and http://www.fra.dot.gov/rpd/policy/2004.shtml
Bucyrus So the real problem is paying for a system that should not be necessary if railroaders are doing their job. I can see where railroad companies would come down on this. [snipped]
"The 'unworthy' thought occurred to me that if a union representative proposed to a railroad management that the next order of locomotives have cabs with enhanced protection - such as the center post or 'cage' that I referenced above, the response might well be along the same lines as an SP trainmaster gave to an engineer who objected to the lack of protection with the first "cab-forward" type steam locomotives by saying he didn't want a caboose in his lap someday: "Mister, you do your job right, and that'll never happen to you".
Well, fair enough - but even if a crew runs perfectly (and just like me driving on the highway ), that's no guarantee that some other guy out there isn't going to screw up and do something that causes a collision. And aside from that, there are other impact incidents which can be caused by someone or something other than any train crew which would make such protection worthwhile, such as: shifted loads/ containers/ trailers; steel coil trucks at grade crossings; trees down; rockslides; runaways from industrial sidings; blind shoves or other bad moves in yards; construction equipment too close to the tracks; MOW equipment fouling the track; a derailment of another train on an adjoining track right in front of the locomotive, etc."
It would appear that the coal train crew was asleep, missed the previous signal and just rear ended the MOA train. There is no way I would have been going anything over 6 to 8 mph with this coal train in this situation. I have operated trains this size, as soon as I see the train ahead, I bring it to an easy stop. I'll call the train ahead and have them tell me when they are on the move. It's very simple.
The dispatchers might tell you of a train ahead, but the don't have to. You just follow signal indication, and a restricting, or restricted proceed tells me I'm following another train, and this is where you have to be very alert and not take stupid chances. Definitely a tragedy that could have been avoided! RIP brothers.
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