Not bad, henry6, as a partial, albeit psychological, explanation. The rails didn't know, at the time the PCE was conceived and built, that we were at the end of the era of railroad expansion (usually put at 1916 or thereabouts).
henry6 The PCE was built in part with the belief that there would be a continuous expansion and growth of population and commerce and, thus, the need for a good railroad. And the one with the better grades, more modern applied technologies coupled with filling the gaps between the other roads, would be a winner. Remember, too, that unlike today, the endpoints were not the end all but the untapped natural resources and undeveloped land in between the end points were as important if not more so. Business thinking and models were different than what we have today. Today investors invest for today and the end of next week rather than for the next 20, 50 or a hundred years. Yesterday they were empire builders working to build and nourish a new country rather than merely lining their own nests and working for their own self interests,
The PCE was built in part with the belief that there would be a continuous expansion and growth of population and commerce and, thus, the need for a good railroad. And the one with the better grades, more modern applied technologies coupled with filling the gaps between the other roads, would be a winner. Remember, too, that unlike today, the endpoints were not the end all but the untapped natural resources and undeveloped land in between the end points were as important if not more so. Business thinking and models were different than what we have today. Today investors invest for today and the end of next week rather than for the next 20, 50 or a hundred years. Yesterday they were empire builders working to build and nourish a new country rather than merely lining their own nests and working for their own self interests,
You cite a belief of the management in continued Western Expansion. What evidence do you have for this belief?
You cite improved grades and technology. What is the technology you refer to? Electrification? I don't see how a technology that can't possibly pay for itself, but requires a bankruptcy to wipe out the investment, is a great idea. What are the improved grades? How do the grades break down into lower operating costs? I don't see it, and I've looked at it pretty closely from a professional viewpoint, so what am I missing?
You talk about development of the untapped natural resources between end points. Seeing as the route skipped around most of the natural resources en route, choosing long stretches through deserts over parallel routes through arable land, traversed forests of no to low commercial viability then or now, and valleys with no known mineral resources, I don't get what they were thinking about. If you drive the route, like I have, the single thing that jumps out is the lack of traffic potential. Do you build the railroad in the valley where the farmer can haul his grain 6 miles to a station? Or up in the hills where there are no roads, no farms, and no likelihood of either? From Mobridge to Miles City, the Milwaukee Road chose the former, then repeated it from Harlowton to Three Forks, then again from Malden to Ellensburg. Meanwhile the NP hewed to the banks of the Yellowstone, Clark Fork, and Yakima where the farms, towns, and people wanted to be. Given the choice between Lookout Pass leading to the mineral weath of the Couer d'Alene district, or St. Paul Pass, the Milwaukee chose St. Paul. As for the forest wealth, the Bitterroots where penetrated by the Milwaukee Road have never been a happy forest for the lumbermen. Weyerhaeuser, the major timber operator in the region, lost money on its investments and shipments were small in comparison to its Puget Sound, Klamath, and Columbia River watershed operations.
You claim they were empire builders with long-range vision. Interestingly, the business press of the era denounced the railroad builders as stock promoters seeking instant rewards. And in contrast, you claim today is short term. That's interesting in light of the fact that the improvements the railroads are making today are investments with lifetimes of 25-40 years (rolling stock) and 100 years (track and bridges). Do you have evidence to support your celebration of then and condemnation of now?
What you've posted above is a hypothesis. It's a very old hypothesis. It's been around for at least 100 years. But I haven't seen enough evidence to make me want to buy it, and reject all others.
RWM
henry6 Business thinking and models were different than what we have today. Today investors invest for today and the end of next week rather than for the next 20, 50 or a hundred years. Yesterday they were empire builders working to build and nourish a new country rather than merely lining their own nests and working for their own self interests,
Business thinking and models were different than what we have today. Today investors invest for today and the end of next week rather than for the next 20, 50 or a hundred years. Yesterday they were empire builders working to build and nourish a new country rather than merely lining their own nests and working for their own self interests,
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
I just breezed through a general history of the West. And here is some information on the context into which the Milwaukee was building its western extension.
1) From the end of the Civil war to the close of the century was a period of consolidation between railroads. By the turn of the 20th century, the western rail net was consolidated into a few large roads under control by a few people. Ownership of the NP, GN and CB&Q by Jim Hill carried with it essentially a complete monopoly on the Northwest. Harriman had tried to gain ownership of the NP, but had failed. So, in building to the Northwest, the Milwaukee was attempting to penetrate a region under monopoly control by Hill.
2) The Milwaukee started planning its Western extension in the 1890's at the same time as an economic depression that was triggered by "The Panic of 1893." That depression lasted through the 1890's and had serious consequences for railroads, so I read. Big western railroads went into the hands of receivers in the 1890's, including the NP and the UP. What came out of those receiverships was evidence of excessive expansion and over-capitalization by western railroads. Interestingly, however, the Granger roads as a group remained solvent during that depression.
My question is this:
Given that other roads which built west to the Pacific found themselves in receivership during that 1890's depression, why did the Milwaukee, which was a strong Granger road, choose to build to the west in the face of that? It seems to me that those bankruptcies with western roads should have convinced them that building west was a sure road to bankruptcy. It also seems to me that building a new route that competed with the existing northwestern roads that were consolidated under Hill was also a risk.
I guess it did turn out to be the road to bankruptcy. Three bankruptcies in fact: 1925, 1935, 1977. So it looks like the Milwaukee's western extension was another case of excessive expansion and over-capitalization by a transcontinental road.
It's hard to understand why they decided to build it.
This message was edited (3/21 at 08:30) for clarity and to provide a link.
- Rails West
We sometimes think that good management is what makes a company successful-true enough, but occasionally it's a successful company that makes the management look good. Even with the best information and insight, there's always an element of plain dumb luck. Get on the right side of it and you're a genius; the wrong side and you're a bum.
No way to know; all you can do is make the most educated decision possible and covers as many scenarios as you can. Perhaps the Milwaukee's Board was simply as caught up in the seemingly magic profits that would come from "& Pacific" in the 1910's as much people were with ".com" in the 1980's (or "plastics" in the 1960's). Not a good basis for a "bet the farm" investment...
I'll stand by my hypothisis. Financiers of the time were cutthroats out to make instant fortunes but they had to build something that wasn't there. Today's financiers ar cutthroats out to make instant fortunes by dismanteling factories, businesses, and towns which are there. Technology by 1909 was quite different than that of 1869: construction methods, size and power of engines, and the ability to start, roll, and stop a train were all advanced so that construction was different; electric propulsion was just a small part of it. Of course in the early 1900's the US was still looking at westward expansion of the country and an expansion of Pacific trade. Plus the vast empty plains and mountains would be infused with people just like happened along the Transcontental and other routes in the decades before; timber was great natural resource, but if the rest of the land out west was any indication, there had to be other minerals under that surface dirt, or so they hoped. America was an ever expanding land of people and prosperity. And as long as we breathed it would continue unabated. Could PCE break the Hill monopoly? Could it be faster and more efficient than the lines cut into the earth in the previous decades? Americans were risk takers then with little insurances and assurances, government guidelines, and investment bankers double and triple layering of risks so as not to really take a risk at all. We, in the 21st Century, don't understand how hugely different people and thinking and society and business was over a hundred years ago; we can't seem to grasp the meaning of those differences.
RIDEWITHMEHENRY is the name for our almost monthly day of riding trains and transit in either the NYCity or Philadelphia areas including all commuter lines, Amtrak, subways, light rail and trolleys, bus and ferries when warranted. No fees, just let us know you want to join the ride and pay your fares. Ask to be on our email list or find us on FB as RIDEWITHMEHENRY (all caps) to get descriptions of each outing.
Your first and last paragraphs are well-stated and need no further comment or repsonse from me.
Kevin C. Smith [snipped] Would the Milwaukee have been able to carry the PCE's construction debts if WWI, postwar inflation, auto/truck competition and finally the Great Depression hadn't happened as they did?
Kevin C. Smith Will BNSF finish the Abo Canyon double-tracking in time to handle a resurgence in Asian imports-or in time to watch that particular traffic boom level off and decline, leaving them with a very expensive piece of railroad they could have done without?
Kevin C. Smith Will the first railroad to commit to large scale electrification get saddled with a huge capital cost that exceeds operating savings-or spend the next decade laughing all the way to the bank as its competitors try to cope with diesel costs doubling and redoubling?
Back in the 1970's - 80's when electrification was last discussed widely, the saying was that all of the likely candidate railroads were willing to be "the 2nd railroad to electrify" - they were all waiting for another railroad to make that huge financial commitment, and in effect raise the competitive level that they would all have to meet then. Well, none of those railroads stepped up to the electrification plate at the time, so it didn't happen for any No. 1 or any of the putative No. 2's. But I think much the same dynamic applies today, where the operational factors are similar - for example, CSX and NS coal and intermodal routes across the Appalachian mountains. And out west, I suppose BNSF's Southern TransCon and UP's Sunset Route are superficially similar enough - the worst grades are at the western end, at Cajon Pass and Beaumont Hill, respectively - that electrification will occur on both at about the same time. But up north, CN's line across the Rockies is so much flatter than CP's that while CP may well choose to hang wires through the Rogers Pass area, CN won't feel the same need for its crossing. Likewise, the profiles of the northern transcontinental routes - UP's over Sherman Hill and through the Blue Mountains of eastern Oregon, as compared to BNSF's summits further north - are sufficiently different enough that the competitive forces may not force them to act in 'lock-step'.
Finally, keep in mind that the larger the perceived risk of that cost differential, the more likely it is that a competitor will electrify as well, which will tend to re-level the playing field. Also, electrification will likely start just when the tipping point is reached, and the added capital costs are only a little more than the fuel cost savings - thus, there likely won't an opportunity for a potentially huge cost savings advantage to build up, because someone will 'jump the gun' make it happen for them before that opportunity gets to be that large.
- Paul North.
Remember, too, that the only "real" or major electric railroad in the US, the PRR, was wired with governent "stimulus" money.
Before anyone starts yelling, I call the PRR the only "real" electric road in the US because of the route miles and the almost exclusivity of motive power used. The New Haven, the Reading, and the Lackawanna all electrified with catenary but with fewer route miles, more used by commuter and passenger traffic if only because ot the depression and lack of expansion of the wire. NYC and LI were (are) third rail commuter..and even at that a lot more was added post 1950 than back in the 30's. There were other small, short installations on the N&W and Virginian and mabye a few others. And the roads in this paragraph did the work with more of their own resources.
One thing that tends to get overlooked when one starts to talk about electrified territory. Clearances!
As the industry has matured the stature of the cars has changed from 30-40-50 years ago. The cars have gotten both longer and higher as the carriers try to move more product with fewer cars as fewer cars equals less capital investment. The normal 'desired' clearance at present is a plate that permits the unrestricted operation of 20 foot two inch high intermodal and auto rack cars.. The National Gateway and Heartland Corridor projects of CSX & NS are being constructed to facilitate movement of these cars. To electrify would require at least another one to two feet of overhead clearance. Creating that clearance on any carriers major routes would be a rather significant cost in stringing wire for electrified operations.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The actual clearance required depends on the voltage of the catenary (as well as the 'type' of electricity), the shape of the tunnel 'arch' overhead, and the amount of insulation and other retrofits that the railroad is willing to install there.
As an extreme, the Philadelphia area commuter agency SEPTA runs a fleet of several different kinds of commuter cars with 11,000 volts AC single-phase on the catenary - and in the ex-PRR Suburban Station tunnels, at a mere 9" from the tops of some of those cars ! That's also the voltage the PRR used, and Amtrak still uses, though the preference and trend is clearly towards higher voltages. Someplace or another I read that the 'rule of thumb' is about 1 centimeter (3/8") per KV, so for the most common higher voltages that clearance would be: 11 KV - 4-3/8"; 25 KV - 10"; 50 KV - 20", which seems to conform to oberved practice.
There also needs to be a similar sufficient distance down from the top of the arch for the hanger and insulators, etc., unless an insulation panel or strip of some kind is installed there and the hanger recessed into the tunnel roof, in which case the wire can be quite a lot closer. This problem also occurs at overhead bridges . . .
But even in that event, the closest distance can turn out to be the energized 'horns' out at the ends of the pantograph shoes, which are off-set from the 'high point' and out to the side 2 -3 feet where the arch is starting to come down more. Again, some insulated panels out there may eliminate that concern.
henry6 Remember, too, that the only "real" or major electric railroad in the US, the PRR, was wired with governent "stimulus" money. [snip]
Paul_D_North_Jr The actual clearance required depends on the voltage of the catenary (as well as the 'type' of electricity), the shape of the tunnel 'arch' overhead, and the amount of insulation and other retrofits that the railroad is willing to install there. As an extreme, the Philadelphia area commuter agency SEPTA runs a fleet of several different kinds of commuter cars with 11,000 volts AC single-phase on the catenary - and in the ex-PRR Suburban Station tunnels, at a mere 9" from the tops of some of those cars ! That's also the voltage the PRR used, and Amtrak still uses, though the preference and trend is clearly towards higher voltages. Someplace or another I read that the 'rule of thumb' is about 1 centimeter (3/8") per KV, so for the most common higher voltages that clearance would be: 11 KV - 4-3/8"; 25 KV - 10"; 50 KV - 20", which seems to conform to oberved practice. There also needs to be a similar sufficient distance down from the top of the arch for the hanger and insulators, etc., unless an insulation panel or strip of some kind is installed there and the hanger recessed into the tunnel roof, in which case the wire can be quite a lot closer. This problem also occurs at overhead bridges . . . But even in that event, the closest distance can turn out to be the energized 'horns' out at the ends of the pantograph shoes, which are off-set from the 'high point' and out to the side 2 -3 feet where the arch is starting to come down more. Again, some insulated panels out there may eliminate that concern. - Paul North.
Current standard is 26'6" above top of rail clear to overhead structures.
Railway Man You talk about development of the untapped natural resources between end points. Seeing as the route skipped around most of the natural resources en route, choosing long stretches through deserts over parallel routes through arable land, traversed forests of no to low commercial viability then or now, and valleys with no known mineral resources, I don't get what they were thinking about.
You talk about development of the untapped natural resources between end points. Seeing as the route skipped around most of the natural resources en route, choosing long stretches through deserts over parallel routes through arable land, traversed forests of no to low commercial viability then or now, and valleys with no known mineral resources, I don't get what they were thinking about.
There are some pretty substantial coal fields around Roundup, though these didn't really become attractive before the 1970's. Had development of the Roundup coal mines started in the mid-70's as opposed to the last couple of years, the PCE would most likely have been kept intact east of Roundup, though would undoubtedly required quite a bit of work for heavy coal traffic. Then again, the NP line east of Forsythe needed a lot of work for handling the coal traffic.
Compared to the quarter of a billion dumped into Cue-Cat, the money invested in the Puget Sound Extension was a model of sanity...
- Erik
P.S. One reason that Wyoming (ahem) outstripped Montana in coal mining is the severance tax Montana imposed on coal shipped out of state in the early 1970's.
post deleted by the author
Derleth's book on the Milwaukee has information on financing the western extension.
Derleth writes:
"The financing of the westward expansion was accomplished by issuing bonds and stocks to the general public; the bonds were sold until 1918 in blocks, and were in various issues, all of which were bought up readily because the credit and reputation of the management were of the soundest. There were several important issues."
Derleth goes on to describe the complicated structure of the bonds. He describes how the company "executed a general and refunding mortgage on its property", which made further bonds into mortgage bonds. Derleth then describes how the company borrowed on the mortgage to pay for additional money for branch lines and the electrification. Derleth concludes by saying that, "from 1909 to 1917, there was an increase of $266 million in the company's funded debt in public hands," due to the western extension.
Derleth states that the actual cost of the pacific extension, including branch lines and electrification, was $257 million. That figure is roughly equal to the funded debt of $266 million quoted above that the Milwaukee took on to build it.
Here is a pregnant image from 1907 that might provoke some discussion.
The $257 Million figure correlates well with what the Woods wrote - $234 for the extension itself, plus $23 for the electrification add-on a few years later = $257.
The Milwaukee Road: Its First Hundred Years by August Derleth, University Of Iowa Press (May 16, 1969), 376 pages, ISBN-10: 9780877458012 , ISBN-13: 978-0877458012 , ASIN: 0877458014, from $15 to $26 at Amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/Milwaukee-Road-First-Hundred-Years/dp/0877458014/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1300876545&sr=1-1
I'm sure the figure of $257 million is valid for the entire lines west project, which includes branches and electric traction.
But where a lot of guys goof profoundly is by taking that figure of $257 million, then comparing it with the engineer's estimate that was made for only the main track to the west. Of course the two numbers are not going to be close to each other, so it isn't a valid comparison.
Rails West I'm sure the figure of $257 million is valid for the entire lines west project, which includes branches and electric traction. But where a lot of guys goof profoundly is by taking that figure of $257 million, then comparing it with the engineer's estimate that was made for only the main track to the west. Of course the two numbers are not going to be close to each other, so it isn't a valid comparison.
Murphy Siding I'd guess that the bulk of the $257 million was indeed for the main line of the PCE. As far as I can recall, there wasn't a huge amount of branch lines on the PCE. Even if there was, wouldn't that require a lot of branch lines to add $197 million over the estimated budget?
I think someone said the mainline cost $100 million. If true, then I guess that means branch lines out west cost even more to build than the mainline. There were some pretty extensive branches in central Montana with huge steel bridges, tunnels and so on. Also, Derleth mentions that competitors (I guess NP & GN interests?) bought property ahead of the Milwaukee and sold it back to them for inflated values. How much that added to the cost, I don't know.
My apologies for being only peripheral to recent posts, but the name August Derleth recalls an amazingly versatile and accomplished man -- journalist, novelist, poet, publisher, historian and chronicler of all things Wisconsin (hence his interest in the Milwaukee Road).
Derleth has been gone for almost 40 years; but by quite a coincidence the daughter who took over and continued to run his publishing house, Arkham, died only on Monday.
My research indicates his book on the MILW appeared originally in 1948.
As you were, gentlemen.
Rails West Murphy Siding: I'd guess that the bulk of the $257 million was indeed for the main line of the PCE. As far as I can recall, there wasn't a huge amount of branch lines on the PCE. Even if there was, wouldn't that require a lot of branch lines to add $197 million over the estimated budget? I think someone said the mainline cost $100 million. If true, then I guess that means branch lines out west cost even more to build than the mainline. There were some pretty extensive branches in central Montana with huge steel bridges, tunnels and so on. Also, Derleth mentions that competitors (I guess NP & GN interests?) bought property ahead of the Milwaukee and sold it back to them for inflated values. How much that added to the cost, I don't know.
Murphy Siding: I'd guess that the bulk of the $257 million was indeed for the main line of the PCE. As far as I can recall, there wasn't a huge amount of branch lines on the PCE. Even if there was, wouldn't that require a lot of branch lines to add $197 million over the estimated budget?
I see that Kevin on page two of this thread explained what went into that grand total figure of $200+ million. It included all sorts of improvements, betterments, etc.
Kevin C. Smith If I recall from another post... the $234 million amount was not strictly the construction cost but was "total investment in plant" or something like that-at any rate, it was the total (as of the 1920's, I believe) of all the capital investment since construction. I believe the example given was if you added in the replacement of appliances or of adding carpet, etc. to your house. They are all capital expenditures but aren't properly considered part of the cost of building the house in the first place. Taking that out, the final construction cost of the PCE was nearer $100 million.
If I recall from another post... the $234 million amount was not strictly the construction cost but was "total investment in plant" or something like that-at any rate, it was the total (as of the 1920's, I believe) of all the capital investment since construction. I believe the example given was if you added in the replacement of appliances or of adding carpet, etc. to your house. They are all capital expenditures but aren't properly considered part of the cost of building the house in the first place. Taking that out, the final construction cost of the PCE was nearer $100 million.
Sorry, but I don't buy that $100 million figure, either - at least not without a more detailed list and explanation of where the rest of the money went. The MILW's PCE was notable precisely because it wasn't done "on the cheap" - it was all solidly built the right way the 1st time through, unlike most of the other transcontinental lines. So I don't see what other capital investment would have been needed or possible, in the just 10 or so years from the completion of construction until that figure was compiled. To follow the analogy above, perhaps it was for locomotives and cars to 'fit out' that portion of the line - but at about 134% of the line's cost seems excessive, even so.
Murphy Siding I dunno....If I look at a map of the PCE, it looks like the branch lines are few- perhaps 10% as much mileage as the mainline? From that angle, I can't agree with the math aspect of the branch lines adding so much to the total. That would make the branch lines approximately 14 times more expensiveper mile to build than the main line. I doubt the branch lines went over the big mountains like the main line. In fact, some of the branch lines were in western North and South Dakota, which are reletively flat prairie.
I dunno....If I look at a map of the PCE, it looks like the branch lines are few- perhaps 10% as much mileage as the mainline? From that angle, I can't agree with the math aspect of the branch lines adding so much to the total. That would make the branch lines approximately 14 times more expensiveper mile to build than the main line. I doubt the branch lines went over the big mountains like the main line. In fact, some of the branch lines were in western North and South Dakota, which are reletively flat prairie.
The line from Morbridge to Tacoma is just shy of 1400 miles based on the milepost numbers. The branch lines from Lewiston MT to Winnet, Roy and Winifred add up to 126 miles, which alone are close to 10% of the mainline mileage. Note that this isn't counting the Harlowton to Lewiston mileage, nor the Lewiston to Agawam (through Great Falls). It wouldn't surprise me if there was more mileage in the branch lines than in the mainline itself, though the per-mile costs of the branch lines were undoubtedly less than the mainline (note that the Judith River bridge looked like something that belonged on the main line - in part because the Milwaukee was contemplating a second main through Great Falls).
Paul_D_North_Jr Sorry, but I don't buy that $100 million figure, either - at least not without a more detailed list and explanation of where the rest of the money went. The MILW's PCE was notable precisely because it wasn't done "on the cheap" - it was all solidly built the right way the 1st time through, unlike most of the other transcontinental lines. So I don't see what other capital investment would have been needed or possible, in the just 10 or so years from the completion of construction until that figure was compiled. To follow the analogy above, perhaps it was for locomotives and cars to 'fit out' that portion of the line - but at about 134% of the line's cost seems excessive, even so. - Paul North.
I've been trying to find Michael Sol's post about it. Like I said, I'm not vouching for the figures but he usually cited his sources. The rash of Milwaukee Road related threads we had at the time tend to go into many pages, however (assuming I'm even looking in the right ones).
Understood - good luck with that ! But I'm willing to be proven wrong by that kind of better information.
Just as an excercise, assuming our numbers so far are right, here is the breakdown.
$257 million : Grand total for Western extension through first bankruptcy proceedings (1925).
$23 million : Total for electrification
$100 million : main line construction in 1909
Subtracting the two above known costs from the grand total yields,
$257 - 23 - 100 = $134 million
So that $134 million covered "something else" through the bankruptcy of 1925. I am wondering if it included these items:
1) All the branch lines on the western extension
2) Replacement of wooden trestles in the mountains with steel trestles, or filling in original bridges
3) Drilling of a new 2-mile tunnel in the cascades (Snoqualmie Tunnel in about 1914)
4) Electrification extension to Seattle Union Station
5) Conversion of steam facilities to electric facilities
6) signaling
7) improved and new passing sidings
8) Miscellaneous small capital projects (new depots, possibly?)
9) (what else did I miss?)
Seems to me if you add up all these kinds of capital costs, maybe you'll come close to that $134 million. Probably the bankruptcy reports for 1925 given to the court and the ICC have all the costs broken down for anyone patient enough to study all that stuff.
Rails West [snipped] So that $134 million covered "something else" through the bankruptcy of 1925.
Rails West2) Replacement of wooden trestles in the mountains with steel trestles, or filling in original bridges 3) Drilling of a new 2-mile tunnel in the cascades (Snoqualmie Tunnel in about 1914) 6) signaling 7) improved and new passing sidings [snipped] Probably the bankruptcy reports for 1925 given to the court and the ICC have all the costs broken down for anyone patient enough to study all that stuff.
[snipped] Probably the bankruptcy reports for 1925 given to the court and the ICC have all the costs broken down for anyone patient enough to study all that stuff.
2) Unlikely - my understanding is that the MLW built the permanent steel trestles and bridges right from the start.
3) Believe this is already in the $100 million figure as part of the original construction. Unlike all of the other western trans-cons with summit tunnels - NP, GN, and CP - I've never seen any indication that MLW ever had a temporary 'switch-back' route over the top of the mountain, or an earlier, shorter, and higher 'first tunnel'. Again, this was the permanent one, right from the start.
6) Part of original construction ?
7) Was there a program to do that ? Unless so, again I think those were part of the original construction.
While 'fact-checking' the Snoqualmie Tunnel - see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snoqualmie_Tunnel , here's an interesting webpage that I found, by latter-day MILW trainman John Crosby - note his comments about the quality of that route as contrasted with the others: http://www.mrcd.org/main_line_snoqualmie_pass.html
The other pages on the right side will be of interest to you hard-core fans.
Re: Steel bridges
Paul_D_North_Jr 2) Unlikely - my understanding is that the MLW built the permanent steel trestles and bridges right from the start.
I've seen some early photos showing wooden trestles in the Cascades. Don't know how temporary they were, but photos show them carrying main-line freight trains.
Edit: Aha. I just found a photo in the book, "The Milwaukee Road," by Jim Scribbins, that shows a train crossing a wooden trestle in the cascades in 1910. Interestingly, I see in the photo that they are just starting to replace one end of the trestle with steel members.
The year 1910 falls outside the traditional dates of the lines contruction, 1906 - 1909. But maybe the steel bridge contracts were made pre-1909, in which case it would indeed be part of the original construction project cost, as you mentioned.
My knowledge is now exhausted on this topic.
Re: Snoqualmie Tunnel
Paul_D_North_Jr 3) Believe this is already in the $100 million figure as part of the original construction. Unlike all of the other western trans-cons with summit tunnels - NP, GN, and CP - I've never seen any indication that MLW ever had a temporary 'switch-back' route over the top of the mountain, or an earlier, shorter, and higher 'first tunnel'. Again, this was the permanent one, right from the start.
Actually, the Milwaukee did originally cross the cascades over a steep route over Snoqualmie Pass for its first 5 years of operation. Photos show that line to have some extensive snow sheds. The 2+ mile tunnel was constructed (if I recall) 1912-1914, some 5 years after the original construction, and, unfortunately, that would have been during WWI-era inflation too.
Again, that's all I know about this, and my knowledge on it is now exhausted.
Paul_D_North_Jr The other pages on the right side will be of interest to you hard-core fans.
What? The Milwaukee has hard-core fans?
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