The tracks in the San Juaquin Valley from Bakersfield to Stockton is flat and pretty straight and is definetly capable of 70MPH trains. I do not know what speed Amtrak runs its trains at along this corridor to Sacramento.
Railway Man henry6: Another way to achieve faster freight schedules was what the D&RGW did years ago: shorter trains. Yeah, more trains, more crews, but got over the road faster, got better locomotive/equipment utilization, better crew utilization, less overtime, satisfied customers. Win/win/win/win/win situation. But bottom liners saw longer trains meant fewer trains, fewer crews, maybe only a couple fewer locomotives, and less money spent therefore higher return. But that higher return was on investment and not repeat business. Larger locomotives, larger cars, better equipment technology of course allows for longer trains, but still, I don't think it matches fast, reliable service to the customer (who will pay for the service) nor for the equipment utilization. [snipped out "fleeting"] Short-fast-frequent trains on D&RGW is one of those stories that captured the railfan imagination following an article in Trains (circa 1964, as I recall), and subsquently amplified, celebrated, and held up as an example to us by numerous railfan pundits. It didn't work and was abandoned; D&RGW reverted to long-slow-infrequent trains. Under the short-fast-frequent concept, crew costs went up, fuel costs went up, and locomotive costs went up. Car hire went down a little. Revenue per car did not go up. It could not; railroads were regulated at that time! Because costs per car went up, but revenue per car could not go up, every carload of additional business attracted by the faster service (which was not much faster, nor was much new business attracted) was a carload hauled at a lower margin, in some cases at a negative margin. You cannot lose a dollar on every carload and hope to make it up on volume. Bottom-line types -- which is what railroaders are supposed to be, because this is a business -- looked at the numbers and concluded that it didn't pay. [snip] RWM
henry6: Another way to achieve faster freight schedules was what the D&RGW did years ago: shorter trains. Yeah, more trains, more crews, but got over the road faster, got better locomotive/equipment utilization, better crew utilization, less overtime, satisfied customers. Win/win/win/win/win situation. But bottom liners saw longer trains meant fewer trains, fewer crews, maybe only a couple fewer locomotives, and less money spent therefore higher return. But that higher return was on investment and not repeat business. Larger locomotives, larger cars, better equipment technology of course allows for longer trains, but still, I don't think it matches fast, reliable service to the customer (who will pay for the service) nor for the equipment utilization. [snipped out "fleeting"]
Another way to achieve faster freight schedules was what the D&RGW did years ago: shorter trains. Yeah, more trains, more crews, but got over the road faster, got better locomotive/equipment utilization, better crew utilization, less overtime, satisfied customers. Win/win/win/win/win situation. But bottom liners saw longer trains meant fewer trains, fewer crews, maybe only a couple fewer locomotives, and less money spent therefore higher return. But that higher return was on investment and not repeat business. Larger locomotives, larger cars, better equipment technology of course allows for longer trains, but still, I don't think it matches fast, reliable service to the customer (who will pay for the service) nor for the equipment utilization.
[snipped out "fleeting"]
Short-fast-frequent trains on D&RGW is one of those stories that captured the railfan imagination following an article in Trains (circa 1964, as I recall), and subsquently amplified, celebrated, and held up as an example to us by numerous railfan pundits. It didn't work and was abandoned; D&RGW reverted to long-slow-infrequent trains. Under the short-fast-frequent concept, crew costs went up, fuel costs went up, and locomotive costs went up. Car hire went down a little. Revenue per car did not go up. It could not; railroads were regulated at that time! Because costs per car went up, but revenue per car could not go up, every carload of additional business attracted by the faster service (which was not much faster, nor was much new business attracted) was a carload hauled at a lower margin, in some cases at a negative margin. You cannot lose a dollar on every carload and hope to make it up on volume. Bottom-line types -- which is what railroaders are supposed to be, because this is a business -- looked at the numbers and concluded that it didn't pay.
[snip]
RWM
I believe this is the article that RWM referenced above - it's the only one I'm aware of, anyway:
"The Fast and Frequent Railroad - An operating ratio isn't necessarily holy writ" by Frank E. Shaffer, Trains, September 1968, Vol. 28 No. 11, pgs. 20 - 23 inclusive. The financial and statistical comparisons in the 'sidebar' "D&RGW must be doing something right" at the top of pg. 22, cols. 1 - 2 is interesting.
A couple years later in 1970 a pair of 'companion' articles - to me, at least - by Robert A. Le Massena were also published in Trains, as follows:
"Is GTM/TH Valid? - Tonnage x Speed = Deception", April 1970, Vol. 30 No. 6, pgs. 37 - 39 inclusive; and,
"SHORTER+STEEPER=FASTER+CHEAPER - Survival as It Relates to Distance and Gradients" (also "Can Steep Be Speedy?" on the cover, and "Steeper Equals Faster" in the Table of Contents), August 1970, Vol. 30 No. 10, pgs. 44 - 46 inclusive.
- Paul North.
More pertinent to the topic of this thread, the "Fast and Frequent Railroad" referenced above says that back then, of the D&RGW's 564 rail miles from Denver to Salt Lake City, 2/3 (372 miles) were posted for freight speeds of 60 MPH, and 1/4 (130 miles) for speeds up to 70 MPH (pg. 20, cols. 1 - 2).
On page 22, there's another 'sidebar' - "The West Corners The Speed Market" (cols. 1 - 2), but that is based on the number of miles included in recent years in Trains' then-annual "Speed Survey" by Donald M. Steffee. In that year's article "Setting The Stage For Speed" in the June 1968 Trains (Vol. 28. No. 8, pp. 24 - 37), the thresholds are 50 and 55 MPH for extended distances between yards or crew change/ train service points, etc. - "Race Of The Redballs" (pgs. 30 - 32), and "Table of Aggregate MIleage" (pg. 33). In the latter, the U.S. "Freight" total for "55 MPH Or Over" was 7,185 miles for 55 "runs" = a specific train's schedule that operated at 5 times weekly, so an indiividual route segment could have been counted or included more than once, which is of course different from the Original Poster's question. Similarly, the U.S. Freight total for "50 MPH Or Over" was 32,083 miles for 236 "runs".
The annual "Speed Survey" was discontinued sometime in the 1970's, supposedly because poor track conditions were limiting the number of miles with high-speed running, as I recall. In addition, the passenger trains that were the mainstays of the Survey's review anad reader interest had been cut drastically by the May 15 (?), 1971 advent of Amtrak, which also slowed down some of those schedules. Further, the 1974 fuel crisis led to other slowdowns of all kinds of trains - and I suspect that the 12 to 14 pages that the Survey took in each issue were too much for most of the readership's interest, and could be put to better use. Certainly I have yet to read any of those Speed Surveys in its entirety - they seemed like a lot of dry numbers and analysis of trivia, kind of like the railroading version of sports statistics . . .
The CSX 'Chicago Line' (nee, CR/NYC Water Level Route) through Utica routinely sees 60 MPH freights, as evidenced by the reports from the Whitesboro defect detector.
But I've never heard anything faster, Amtrak notwithstanding.
The 2008 CSX timetable lists 50 for freight and 60 for intermodal for most of the line between Selkirk and Buffalo, with a few assorted slowdowns for stations, yards, and special features ("Big Nose Curve" at MP QM192.5 gets 45).
Dewitt Yard garners 30, and Rochester 45 for through trains.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Paul, I well remember the article
When I took my first ride on the RG, in July of 1972, I was looking forward to seeing such freights--but I do not recall seeing a single freight on our way from Denver to Salt Lake City.
As to current speeds, the California Zephyr makes good time when it is not going up or down mountains, especially around Grand Junction and west into Utah. Of course, the Gilully Loops (south of Provo), the Front Range, and the canyons east of Glenwood Springs make for slow travel for both freight and passenger service.
Johnny
So it has been brought up that maintenance cost is a key factor in deciding to maintain Class 4 of 5 track, which most of us seem to already know.
So the question I have know is what exactly is factored in to find out that maintenance cost? Does the overall length of the trains have any sort of impact on what kind of maintenance is going to be needed?
Now lighter trains (like intermodal trains) do tend to have higher speeds. So even if not all of the trains on the route have to operate at 70 mph, how much of an affect is it to insure certain trains can operate at high speeds?
Its simple: will you make more money if track speed at a given point is 55, 60, 70, whatever miles per hour. If you don't get a return on the traffic your carrying, it's not worth the extra cost of faster track.
And if it is 70 mph for five out of 100 miles it certainly not worth it, But 70 out of a hundred miles might depending on cargo carried.
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A question for Railway Man, is increasing train length running up against a problem of diminishing returns? It has been commented that the return from going to 315k freight cars from 286k , was significantly less than the gain going from 263k to 286k. Part of the problem was increased rail wear, and part of the problem was tare to weight ratio dropped slightly.
BT CPSO 266 So it has been brought up that maintenance cost is a key factor in deciding to maintain Class 4 of 5 track, which most of us seem to already know. So the question I have know is what exactly is factored in to find out that maintenance cost? Does the overall length of the trains have any sort of impact on what kind of maintenance is going to be needed? Now lighter trains (like intermodal trains) do tend to have higher speeds. So even if not all of the trains on the route have to operate at 70 mph, how much of an affect is it to insure certain trains can operate at high speeds?
The short answer is that maintenance cost of a track segment is influenced most strongly by four independent variables: its location; FRA track class that it's maintained to; gross tonnage (typically measured in million gross tons per year, or MGT); train frequency; and desire for operating reliabilty, as follows.
You mentioned that intermodal trains are light. TOFC trains and RoadRailer trains might be, but when I think "intermodal" I am typically planning for double-stacks loaded right to the capacity of those 125-ton center trucks on the well cars. Backhaul trains in particular are often loaded to the load limits of the containers with grain, seed, scrap materials, or ore concentrates. Backhaul containers are loaded beyond street-legal and can only be moved on rubber tires within the confines of the transload terminal and the port.
You asked about the effect on maintenance costs if only a few trains are operated at high speeds. The effect here will primarily be felt in tie defects, and more frequency of surface and line. Those in turn mean more time on track for machinery, which can start to bump up against available windows for track machinery. Track maintenance time is often the fatal flaw when one is thinking about adding passenger trains, along with overtake events, as described below.
For freight trains, track maintenance cost increase is usually NOT the factor that ultimately decides whether some trains will operate at higher speeds. More often, it's line segment capacity. It's impossible to run some trains at higher speeds than most of the trains on lines that have a large number of trains relative to their capacity, because it creates overtake events. On relatively empty main lines, if marketing says they want to put a pair of intermodal trains out there with 70 mph speeds, it might not to hard to get the manifests and locals out of the way. The question is whether the incremental revenue of the new intermodal trains is greater than the incremental cost of improving the track class. On a relatively congested main line, however, those fast trains will soon find themselves bumping up against the rear of the manifests and unit trains, which have no place to go to get out of the way. So the question then becomes whether the incremental revenue of the intermodal trains can pay either for new sidings and/or additional main track plus likely some terminal tracks, so the fast trains have some running room, or whether the revenue from the fast trains can overcome the loss of revenue from the manifest and unit traffic that will have to be pulled off the line in order to make room for them.
Generally we have calculate this on spreadsheets. Think about 60-100 linked pages into which we substitute "what if" values and see what happens to the discounted cash flow.
Railway Man Generally we have calculate this on spreadsheets. Think about 60-100 linked pages into which we substitute "what if" values and see what happens to the discounted cash flow. RWM
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
beaulieu A question for Railway Man, is increasing train length running up against a problem of diminishing returns? It has been commented that the return from going to 315k freight cars from 286k , was significantly less than the gain going from 263k to 286k. Part of the problem was increased rail wear, and part of the problem was tare to weight ratio dropped slightly.
I think that for most main lines on most railroads, train lengths are already at or close to the maximum that the infrastructure will reasonably allow, dictated mostly by siding length and terminal R/D track lengths. Thirty years ago there were some length limits that were dictated more by train-handling concerns and low-strength couplers than by infrastructure. Since 1980 the advent of DP, more uniform consists, air brake improvements and high-strength couplers have enabled train lengths to approach what the infrastructure will allow. I think we will see a continued steady increase in train length, though to what upper limit I don't know. (But clearly there is one.) Current planning envisions 175-car bulk trains within the next 3-5 years, and new sidings at 12,500 feet.
Increased weight limits are more dictated by metallurgy and rail/wheel interface. The closed-system Australian iron ore lines have successfully reached the 315K plateau, but the methods used to do so are not readily transferred economically to North American open-network railroading. The Australian iron ore lines found that if they pay very close attention to wheel profile and rail profile it's possible to achieve 315K economically without uneconomical rail and wheel wear, or rail failures, but they can do so because they control the car fleet and there are no bad-actor cars.
oltmannd Railway Man: Generally we have calculate this on spreadsheets. Think about 60-100 linked pages into which we substitute "what if" values and see what happens to the discounted cash flow. RWM I hope you start with RTC. It's a capacity problem, primarily, no?
Railway Man: Generally we have calculate this on spreadsheets. Think about 60-100 linked pages into which we substitute "what if" values and see what happens to the discounted cash flow. RWM
I hope you start with RTC. It's a capacity problem, primarily, no?
Yes. But as you know RTC just tests the performance of a given infrastructure/train combination, not whether it makes money or not.
Railway Man:
I assumed capacity was a key problem against increasing train speeds, but does it seems there is no point in increasing speeds without suitable capacity. It seems unless a third party get involved with the funding of increased capacity, we are not going to see faster speeds on much of the rail network.
Thanks for the info.
When I rode UP City of St. Louis with my parents "back in the day" near Green River, WY, we were in the diner and the staff kept dropping dishes. My Dad said we have to be going faster than normal, because they are used to serving as the train is moving.
We were running late and when we went up to the Dome car after dinner, Dad talked to a man who was tracking mileposts with his stopwatch. He said we'd been running about 100 mph. Not something that would be allowed today. That's my experience with "high speed" rail.
"It seems unless a third party get involved with the funding of increased capacity, we are not going to see faster speeds on much of the rail network. "
Third party involvement has nothing to do with it. If the need is there, and there is a return on investment, the money is there to do it. This is frieght not passenger rail, so it would be done if the product was in need of the speed and the client would pay enough to recover the cost of building and maintainence, ie, ROI or Return On Investment.
And, yes, "back in the day", there was a lot of 100mph running. Some sanctioned but more often than not, not. Railroaders knew their railroad, thier equipment, and their job. Management knew its railroaders and who among them they could count on to deliver. It was not as romantic as Freeman Hubbard and David P. Morgan would have you believe, but rather nuts and bolts operations.
Railway Man oltmannd: Railway Man: Generally we have calculate this on spreadsheets. Think about 60-100 linked pages into which we substitute "what if" values and see what happens to the discounted cash flow. RWM I hope you start with RTC. It's a capacity problem, primarily, no? Yes. But as you know RTC just tests the performance of a given infrastructure/train combination, not whether it makes money or not.
oltmannd: Railway Man: Generally we have calculate this on spreadsheets. Think about 60-100 linked pages into which we substitute "what if" values and see what happens to the discounted cash flow. RWM I hope you start with RTC. It's a capacity problem, primarily, no?
60-100 linked spreadsheets pages is scary to contemplate! Ever think of building the application onto a more robust platform?
On a slight tangent: I spent a couple of months each in 1967 & 1968 in the Utica, NY area, and was impressed with the speed of the freights on the NYC. I remember my car rocking side to side at a grade-crossing from the wind stirred up. Does any one know what speeds were common in that area around that time? Seemed like about 90 MPH to me, though I don't think it's likely.
_____________
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henry6 "It seems unless a third party get involved with the funding of increased capacity, we are not going to see faster speeds on much of the rail network. " Third party involvement has nothing to do with it. If the need is there, and there is a return on investment, the money is there to do it. This is frieght not passenger rail, so it would be done if the product was in need of the speed and the client would pay enough to recover the cost of building and maintainence, ie, ROI or Return On Investment. And, yes, "back in the day", there was a lot of 100mph running. Some sanctioned but more often than not, not. Railroaders knew their railroad, thier equipment, and their job. Management knew its railroaders and who among them they could count on to deliver. It was not as romantic as Freeman Hubbard and David P. Morgan would have you believe, but rather nuts and bolts operations.
My train of thought was coming from the perspective of how more people want freight to move on a faster rail network, really should not assume that the railroad companies are just going to add capacity because it is "needed" vs. being financially fruitful for the railroad company.
You are punny BT CPSO 266! But it is the managers of the private investor railroad who make the determination of what and where a railroad will build or improve based on the need to serve their definition of railroad and service. The public can demand that trucks come off the roads but that will not build nor improve track unless the public is also willing to pay for it. And if the railroad company thinks something is needed to make money they will add it, if they don't see how it will help make money, they won't, "Financially fruitful" ventures is what investment is all about.
Maybe it's the "vision thing." Some managers/executives are very good at maximizing profits within the status quo; others (not many) are able to project their company into the future, investing R&D dollars in new projects that may or may not pay off for years.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
henry6 You are punny BT CPSO 266! But it is the managers of the private investor railroad who make the determination of what and where a railroad will build or improve based on the need to serve their definition of railroad and service. The public can demand that trucks come off the roads but that will not build nor improve track unless the public is also willing to pay for it. And if the railroad company thinks something is needed to make money they will add it, if they don't see how it will help make money, they won't, "Financially fruitful" ventures is what investment is all about.
Now when you say "public is also willing to pay for it" are you speaking in terms of the business community or government investing for the benefit of the public?
BT CPSO 266 henry6: You are punny BT CPSO 266! But it is the managers of the private investor railroad who make the determination of what and where a railroad will build or improve based on the need to serve their definition of railroad and service. The public can demand that trucks come off the roads but that will not build nor improve track unless the public is also willing to pay for it. And if the railroad company thinks something is needed to make money they will add it, if they don't see how it will help make money, they won't, "Financially fruitful" ventures is what investment is all about. Now when you say "public is also willing to pay for it" are you speaking in terms of the business community or government investing for the benefit of the public?
henry6: You are punny BT CPSO 266! But it is the managers of the private investor railroad who make the determination of what and where a railroad will build or improve based on the need to serve their definition of railroad and service. The public can demand that trucks come off the roads but that will not build nor improve track unless the public is also willing to pay for it. And if the railroad company thinks something is needed to make money they will add it, if they don't see how it will help make money, they won't, "Financially fruitful" ventures is what investment is all about.
And therein lies the rub.
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