The economics of Positive Train Control

[Anonymous]

It has been suggested here that the FRA is neutral on PTC, and only carrying out the will of congress as though the FRA has nothing to do with the mandate.  I understand that the mandate comes from congress and not from the FRA, but did not the FRA play a role in promoting the idea to congress?      

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Jeff and Don -

Thanks much for the informative replies, as always. 

One further/ alternative question:  Would it be a big deal to change the max. speed setting on the ATC from the 22 MPH down to - say, 10 MPH instead ? 

It might be painful to have to creep through a 4-mile long block at that speed = 24 mins., some other adverse and operational difficulties might ensue - and a collision might still be possible and do some damage.  However, I think the damages would be significantly less, and with almost no chance of a TIH release or passenger fatalities, without some 'Bizarro World' set of circumstances occurring.

- Paul North. 

[henry6]

Wouldn't the length of the block determine even this speed, Paul?  Blocks are shorter on heavily trafficed lines but longer on light density...maybe as short as a half mile and as long as two miles. Traffic density and train length are the other factors.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

henry6 - I don't think so - it's the other way around, usually - i.e., the block lengths are already established based on the max. authorized speed, grade, train length and weight, max. Tons Per Operable Brake, etc. and the resulting 'worst case' = longest realistic stopping distance. 

As I understand Jeff's description, a train could go past a red block signal as fast as 22 MPH as long as the engineer acknowledged that the red signal was there - the 'No, but . . .' scenario -  that's fast enough to do some damage in a collision.  And a flat-out ''Stop and stay stopped !'' prohibition would prevent 'closing in' on a crippled or stalled train to push it into the clear or over the hill.  So I'm wondering if changing the 22 MPH to 10 MPH would reduce the concern by downgrading the threat of a serious low-speed collision to the railroad equivalent of a 'fender-bender'. 

In any event, at certain places - crossings at grade with other railroads, interlockings, movable bridges, etc. - the 'absolute stop' must still mean that, and there the allowable speed past the 'home' signal should be 0 MPH; at the previous or approach signal it could be no more than the 10 MPH speed, so that running past the home signal would dump the air and lead to a pretty quick stop.  Some rejiggering of the signal locations would be needed to provide adequate distance for that, but a couple hundred feet ought to be enough in most situations, I think.

- Paul North. 

[cordon]

oltmannd

Bucyrus

It sounds like congress believes that mandating PTC will be benificial and the railroad industry does not believe that.  How did congress alone reach their conclusion on such a complex issue as universal PTC?

The industry and the FRA think it will be beneficial, but the industry thinks it isn't worth the cost. It costs about $22 for every $1of return in safety. IT came about because of a few horrific crashes (like Graniteville, SC and Chattsworth, CA) and several notable smaller ones (like the Amtrak train that rear-ended the NS stack train in Chicago.)

 

Can anyone provide the source of the numbers in the statement, "It costs about $22 for every $1of return in safety?"

 

[The Butler]

Cordon, that number was stated by Matt Rose, referenced in the seventh post on the first page of this thread:

edblysard

Matt Rose, in this months issue of Railway Age, as part of his acceptance speech for winning the Railroader of the Year award from RRA, pointed out that the cost to benefit ratio of PTC is 22:1, for every $22.00 railroads will spend implementing PTC, $1.00 in possible benefits may be realized....not what I would call a favorable ratio, and that is not the first time or the first place I have seen and heard that ratio. ...snip

 

[Anonymous]

I have rarely seen a paper that is as difficult to absorb as the one linked to the first post of this thread.  To simplify its position as much as possible, let’s look at the summary of findings which it gives as follows:

"II. Summary of FindingsAt its core, the “positive train control” (PTC) mandate focuses strictly on improving the safety of train operations. The benefits being ascribed to PTC, however, are largely non-safety related and based on the assumption that the railroads and shippers will realize collateral benefits by implementing complementary technologies as part of PTC. This assumption, derived largely from the analyses of an early PTC-type project carried out in the late 1980s, ignores the tremendous strides that the US railroad industry has made in the past three decades in terms of productivity and efficiency – improvements driven in large part by the industry’s continuous pursuit of state-of-the-art operational processes and technology. These advances – and railroad plans to continue this process independent of PTC – greatly reduce the collateral benefits that might be realized by implementing PTC. In some cases, the implementation of PTC likely will be of no benefit or even have an adverse impact on railroads’ ability to fund technologies that would be of greater value in terms of increasing the quality and reliability of service to their customers.".  

Now just to make it as simple as possible, I have removed the less important phraseology, and it reads thus:

 

.

 

"II. Summary of FindingsAt its core, the PTC mandate focuses strictly on improving the safety… The benefits, however, are largely non-safety related and based on the assumption that the railroads and shippers will realize collateral benefits… This assumption… ignores the tremendous strides that the US railroad industry has made in the past three decades in terms of productivity and efficiency… These advances – and railroad plans to continue this process independent of PTC – greatly reduce the collateral benefits that might be realized by implementing PTC. In some cases, the implementation of PTC likely will be of no benefit or even have an adverse impact on railroads’ ability to fund technologies that would be of greater value in terms of increasing the quality and reliability of service to their customers." 

.

Can anybody translate this?  It seems to be opposing PTC, but I cannot imagine a more poorly made case for that position. 

 

[BaltACD]

Bucyrus

Now just to make it as simple as possible, I have removed the less important phraseology, and it reads thus:

 

.

 

"II. Summary of FindingsAt its core, the PTC mandate focuses strictly on improving the safety… The benefits, however, are largely non-safety related and based on the assumption that the railroads and shippers will realize collateral benefits… This assumption… ignores the tremendous strides that the US railroad industry has made in the past three decades in terms of productivity and efficiency… These advances – and railroad plans to continue this process independent of PTC – greatly reduce the collateral benefits that might be realized by implementing PTC. In some cases, the implementation of PTC likely will be of no benefit or even have an adverse impact on railroads’ ability to fund technologies that would be of greater value in terms of increasing the quality and reliability of service to their customers." 

.

Can anybody translate this?  It seems to be opposing PTC, but I cannot imagine a more poorly made case for that position. 

 

I would translate it as requiring very expensive steam engine firebox and boiler protection devices on each diesel electric locomotive, even though diesel-electric locmotives have neither firboxes or boilers.

[henry6]

My translation:  The PTC model depicted in the study is over 20 years old.  Since we (the railroads) have implimented many other improvements in our systems we feel we don't need (nor want) PTC and will continue to impliment technology and other measures to assure that we won't use PTC.

My take:We (the railroads) don't want it because we don't feel we need it.

My comments:  Railroads think that they have overcome the 1989 perception of PTC and that the cost of PTC vs gained safety is negligable even though they have not provided a real statistic and do not seem to feel increased speeds and frequencies and fewer accidents on heavily trafficed lines which would yeld better service is not a figure that makes a difference to the bottom line. Good will, reliabale service, cost of accident in terms of equipment and "down time", nor the cost of injury or death.  I think that there actually are lines where PTC is not useful and that should be granted to the railroads. What they are preparing to do is, in the end, make it seem like they are giving in to the demands of the government and the public by conceding to put PTC on heavily trafficed lines while holding back from lines with little or no traffic to warrent PTC.  In otherwords, they want to finagle a way to make them look like good guys in the end.  They also will probably ask the government for the money.

[UPReading85]

OK, some PTC thoughts on what many of you have said....

First, the 22-to-1 cost-benefit number comes from a 2005 or 2006 FRA study on the economic viability of PTC before the Congressional mandate to implement the technology. The mandate itself was, as many have said, a kneejerk Congressional reaction to the Chatsworth accident, losing sight of the fact that the rail industry is an exceptionally safe industry. In fact, prior to Chatsworth, you probably have to go all the way back to Big Bayou Canot in 93 to find the last major passenger rail accident in which there were fatalities. I'd say 12 years is a pretty good run and a testament to the operating practice and discipline of the railroaders in the field. It is that good safety record that partially causes the 22-to-1 CBA ratio. Trains don't collide very often so it doesn't make sense to implement for its safety benefits.

2) To the timing question (and admittedly I have to be slightly cautious in what I say on this).....But let's just say we need to be properly skeptical of any "independent" study that is funded by an association or lobbying group, as you might find more often than not the opinion of the people writing the checks is contained within the body of the work. The AAR study is presumably in response to this study published about a month ago by the Chlorine Institute that accompanies a petition for reconsideration to FRA on the grounds that PTC has business benefits that FRA's 22-to-1 study didn't include.
http://www.chlorineinstitute.org/files/PDFs/PTC%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration.pdf 

 For those who love studies, here's another that runs counter to the Oliver Wyman study, done by the TRF for FRA on the benefits of PTC:

http://www.trforum.org/journal/2005sum/article6.php

 3) In conclusion, the key takeaway is that both the PTC supporters and the PTC detractors studies, though the antithesis of each other, are both 100pc accurate in what they say. How so? Because they are each tone-deaf to each other's presence. The railroads say they will not receive business benefits because under the first generation systems that will be implemented under this mandate they probably won't. The supporters say they will, because when PTC advances to second generation, moveable block technology the railroads will accrue business benefits and PTC could justify itself on a business basis through the additional capacity it will add to the network, NOT its safety benefits. PTC supporters note that the industry has been working on developping PTC for several decadesand they have, but they fail to mention that the industry would not have rolled it out as quickly or extensively as they are required to under the RSIA mandate. Hence, both groups are right, but are consciously ignoring the facts that do not support their thesis.

[oltmannd]

UPReading85

Hence, both groups are right, but are consciously ignoring the facts that do not support their thesis.

Pretty fair statement.

There may be some common ground where projected future line capacity constraints intersect the areas where safety would be the most improved. Perhaps territory where there is a high concentration of hazardous and/or passenger traffic on lines nearing capacity. I suspect if the RRs could get some relief on the scope, timetable, and hardware requirements, they might go along more willingly. They didn't really start squawking until the FRA wrote the regs around the law.

[henry6]

How often do we see whole industries automatically rebuff safety features or other outsiders' suggestions because of costs.  The auto industry decried about safety belts and air bags...railroads about airbrakes and automatic signaling.  They bought time.  Being green has been another activity finally being embraced by industries for their own economic benefits.  The tobacco industry didn't heed the warnings...the food industry, especially restaurants and fast food purveyors, are beginning to heed the word before there are more "no fat zones".  Railraods found that air brakes and automatic signals did increase the bottom line with faster schedules, decreased interruptions of service, and fewer fatalities.  The auto industry finds safety is a good selling point as are clean burning boilers to produce electricity and recycling plastic, glass and metals and reusalbe tote bags.  Cigaretts aren't sold to minors nor advertised in much of todays mass media outlets anymore and lost so much of their market share from the 60's that we rarely think of them.  The the soda and beverage industry, the fast food industry, the pre prepared food industry, and the food industry over all are making big changes before the law sends them the way of the tobacco industry.  Even Walmart has found that local produce can be in their stores faster and cheaper than hauling from Chili or even California to the east coast.  So PTC will come about when and where the railroads want it and not before.  They know they need it in some places, even will be very useful in someplaces, but they're looking over their plant's right now before saying "yes".  They, of course, don't want government control of their business so they will certainly act in time.

[oltmannd]

henry6

The auto industry decried about safety belts and air bags

That's an interesting point, but in both cases, full implementation didn't occur at once. It was phased in. First lap belts in the front only (although, Ford did make selling safety a big deal in the mid-50's offering seat belts as an option. Chevy ate their lunch selling performance.) Then all seats had to have lap belts, then added shoulder belts for front two seats, etc. Same thing with air bags, although the industry has pretty much been stuffing airbags all over the interior on their own, since safety actually DOES sell, now.

Same thing probably would work now for PTC. The regs just laid out too much to swallow on the first go-round.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

As I understand it, that's basically how we got to the present state of train signalling and control on US railroads - a little at a time.  Recall that in the 1920's, the ICC required each major railroad to install either Automatic Speed Control, Automatic Train Stop, or Automatic Train Control on something like at least 100 miles of key hoigh-speed passenger routes.  Then in the 1950s, the ICC prohibited speeds over 79 MPH on routes not equipped with such systems. 

From Railway Technical Web Pages - US Railroad Signalling - The Imposition of ATS/ATC near the bottom of the webpage at:  

 http://www.railway-technical.com/US-sig.shtml

"In 1922, the US Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) told railroads that it wanted them to install some sort of ATS or ATC on hi-speed lines as a safety precaution.  The ICC made no regulations at first but it warned that it would do so in the future.  Initially, several companies began to build ATS/ATC systems but then the depression of the 1930s, followed by WW2, slowed development.  In 1951, the ICC made good on its word and mandated a nationwide 79 mph speed limit on any track not equipped with some sort of ATC/ATS.  By this time many Americans had bought cars and given up on train travel so a number of railroad companies felt that ATS/ATC was not worth it and just accepted the speed limit but there were a few notable exceptions.  These included the Pennsylvania R.R., which was a firm believer in safety systems."

 An interesting anti-PTC 'read' that I stumbled across is this - only 12 pages, approx. 158 KB in size, at:   

http://www.amtrakengineer.net/Gamst05ptc.pdf 

The NTSB's PTC Systems Symposium

Report FCG-B-05-3

March 9, 2005

Dr. Frederick C. Gamst

I don't know anything about Dr. Gamst or his positions other than just what appears in this ''Confidential'' paper, but here's what he had to say at the bottom of his page 2:

"Additionally the FRA's 1999-estimated nationwide cost of PTC--ranging from $1.2 billion for a simple level 1 to $7.8 billion for the most advanced level 4--makes implementation, today, economically unfeasible for any governmentally unsubsidized implementation."

- Paul North.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Bucyrus

  I have rarely seen a paper that is as difficult to absorb as the one linked to the first post of this thread.  To simplify its position as much as possible, let’s look at the summary of findings which it gives as follows:  [snip]  Now just to make it as simple as possible, I have removed the less important phraseology, and it reads thus:

"II. Summary of FindingsAt its core, the PTC mandate focuses strictly on improving the safety… The benefits, however, are largely non-safety related and based on the assumption that the railroads and shippers will realize collateral benefits… This assumption… ignores the tremendous strides that the US railroad industry has made in the past three decades in terms of productivity and efficiency… These advances – and railroad plans to continue this process independent of PTC – greatly reduce the collateral benefits that might be realized by implementing PTC. In some cases, the implementation of PTC likely will be of no benefit or even have an adverse impact on railroads’ ability to fund technologies that would be of greater value in terms of increasing the quality and reliability of service to their customers." 

Can anybody translate this?  It seems to be opposing PTC, but I cannot imagine a more poorly made case for that position. 

First - Bucyrus, kudos to you for taking the time and intellect to plow through this stuff, parse it, and post it.  God bless you, man - I don't always agree with your points, but by golly you sure put the maximum effort into it, as I wish I could if I had more time to devote to it.  Thank you. 

Next - What, you don't speak ''Beltway Bandit Bureaucratese'' ?    It's just a kissin' cousin to academic publication English [?].  Well, I'll take a whack at your request, as follows.  Note that I take it that "collateral benefits" really translates to meaning operational savings and/or increased revenues: 

"Although PTC is now being required to improve safety, it is also being credited with financial benefits, which are based on a late 1980's study.  But since then, most of those benefits have already been achieved by industry advances, which are expected to continue.  So the claimed future financial benefits from PTC are overstated, and the required PTC implementation may even divert finances that could be used to produce greater benefits.''

Let me know how you think I did with that. 

- Paul North. 

 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

UPReading85 - Thanks much for those links and the commentary, which seems to be pretty much 'on the mark', especially your 3.  I'll need some time to review and digest all those studies myself before I comment on them further.  This situation reminds me of a seminar description of a dysfunctional communication - "Two TV sets blaring at each other".   

- Paul North.

P.S. - I just noticed your avatar - that combination of gateman's tower, catenary structures, and the PECO 'overbuild' are unique.  Unfortunately - and maybe this is your point with it - that gateman's tower is now gone since the DALE interlocking was reconfigured a couple years ago and the crossing signals automated. - PDN. 

[cx500]

henry6

The auto industry decried about safety belts and air bags

Actually, I think the air bag aspect has some relevance.  My understanding is that the original theory behind air bags was to provide protection to those who refused to buckle up.  Rather than attempting to enforce mandatory seat belt use, the intent was to provide the same protection with the air bag.

But, it turned out that the air bag does not provide the needed protection unless the seat belt is also worn.  While I am sure the airbags do increase the level of protection, I suspect the improvement is rather marginal. and the initial costs, plus the replacement costs after a fender-bender, are very significant.  I wouldn't be surprised to find its cost benefit ratio may be similar to PTC.

Once a safety initiative gets the bit between its teeth, anyone trying to slow it down with a little reasoned thinking is immediately derided.

I think the history of the railroad industry shows that they have generally been evolving towards more efficient and safer ways of operating, working within the economic realities.  Much regulation was just enshrining what was already adopted as the way of the future.  Admittedly it was sometimes forcing the laggards to shape up.

John

[UPReading85]

Paul_D_North_Jr

This situation reminds me of a seminar description of a dysfunctional communication - "Two TV sets blaring at each other".  

 That is exactly what it is. Great analogy, Paul. Though you would hope that the AAR, as spokesmen for the industry would bring some sanity to the debate and EXPLAIN the realities, but unfortunately Inside the Beltway that doesn't get you very far and so we are left to parse political speak and make sense of two dueling TVs.

[greyhounds]

UPReading85

Paul_D_North_Jr

This situation reminds me of a seminar description of a dysfunctional communication - "Two TV sets blaring at each other".  

 That is exactly what it is. Great analogy, Paul. Though you would hope that the AAR, as spokesmen for the industry would bring some sanity to the debate and EXPLAIN the realities, but unfortunately Inside the Beltway that doesn't get you very far and so we are left to parse political speak and make sense of two dueling TVs.

The reality of positive train control has been well EXPLAINED by the AAR and others.  It's just that some folks don't like the reasoned, logical EXPLINAITONS.  (Yourself?)

PTC will be a collosal waste of money.  It will have no significant beneficial impact on rail safety.  (We already have the safest rail freight network in the world.  PTC could well have a negative impact on rail safety as it will divert funds that could have been used elsewhere.)  The study that started this thread was about whoes money will be wasted - nothing more, nothing less.

In the end it will be our money that is wasted.  Cost pretty much always find their way through to the end users.  So whether the railroads just have to eat the huge bill for a basically useless (or harmful) system or are able to charge their TIH customers extra to pay the huge bill will be of little matter to the people of the United States.  One way or another the money will come out of our pockets.

There really was no reasoning behind this mandate.  It was just an irrational emotional response by congress.  

[BaltACD]

There is not free lunch.  A lunch you are forced to buy may not be nutritious or even taste good.