Paul_D_North_Jr...Even if the economic life of the PRB's traffic base is only 20 to 30 years, that might be enough to get the payback from the electrification, though there is indeed the vulnerability to changes in market forces that you correctly point out - some of that risk might be mitigated by the small scale of the investment there.....- Paul North.
- Paul North.
The limited traffic life for PRB coal seems to be an issue for your power plant as well as the investment in wiring a railroad. The LAB sounds like a better starting point, Port of LA to San Bernardino.
In a related matter, a piece on peak oil commented that the oil companies were not building or even rebuilding refineries because of the limited life of known oil reserves. Then again, this may be more truly indicative of the profundity of the need for electrification.
Harvey
Railway Man Paul_D_North_Jr Kevin, we're thinking very much alike - although my starting point was the Powder River Basin lines. More next week. - Paul. Think LA Basin, like Kevin suggested, Paul. Emissions reductions (in a non-attainment area) = substantial public benefit = public participation in the capital cost in order to monetize those benefits. Also, an enormous population base that isn't going to leave = permanent rail demand. The Powder River Basin is single-commodity with a finite lifetime and high vulnerability to stranded investment with very little externalized public benefit to capture and monetize. Also, a serious lack of electrical generation capacity and transmission capacity, and near-zero capability for any of that investment once built to be repurposed to any other rail traffic. Electrifying the PRB would be a very Soviet thing to do, i.e., it would fit well with a rigid, centrally planned economic model that can control all other economic activities in order to force any project to realize its anticipated benefits, but not with a flexible, open-market economic model where rail traffic needs shift and change rapidly in reaction to independent market forces. RWM
Paul_D_North_Jr Kevin, we're thinking very much alike - although my starting point was the Powder River Basin lines. More next week. - Paul.
- Paul.
Think LA Basin, like Kevin suggested, Paul. Emissions reductions (in a non-attainment area) = substantial public benefit = public participation in the capital cost in order to monetize those benefits. Also, an enormous population base that isn't going to leave = permanent rail demand.
The Powder River Basin is single-commodity with a finite lifetime and high vulnerability to stranded investment with very little externalized public benefit to capture and monetize. Also, a serious lack of electrical generation capacity and transmission capacity, and near-zero capability for any of that investment once built to be repurposed to any other rail traffic. Electrifying the PRB would be a very Soviet thing to do, i.e., it would fit well with a rigid, centrally planned economic model that can control all other economic activities in order to force any project to realize its anticipated benefits, but not with a flexible, open-market economic model where rail traffic needs shift and change rapidly in reaction to independent market forces.
RWM
Oh yeah - as soon as Kevin wrote about the LA Basin I could see the clear advantages with that over the PRB, and you've just added the icing to that cake.
The only reasons I started with the PRB is that just a couple hundred route miles over the worst of the terrain and with the heaviest traffic would be enough to serve as a 'beta-test' or 'demonstrator' of what's achievable with the state of the art, and start yielding some returns reasonably quickly. As such, it would be fairly 'small', and would not be a 'bet the firm' proposition. Being out in the open like that would minimize the NIMBY, R-O-W, and construction-type problems, and would not involve entanglements with a bunch of public agencies, commuter authorities, etc. - just 2 sophisticated railroads. The lack of power plants is an obstacle, but it wouldn't take a huge one to power the rail lines - I even thought about letting one of the local Indian tribes take that on under a 'jobs creation' rationale with a guaranteed customer base - who could object to that ? The transmission lines could be strung on top of the catenary poles, as the PRR and RDG and perhaps others did 'back in the day'. Even if the economic life of the PRB's traffic base is only 20 to 30 years, that might be enough to get the payback from the electrification, though there is indeed the vulnerability to changes in market forces that you correctly point out - some of that risk might be mitigated by the small scale of the investment there.
So, for the initial experimental implementation as proposed by Kevin, I suppose it comes down to a choice between the seemingly simpler but potentially 'bear the entire cost and risks' of starting with the PRB as I suggest, or the institutionally more complex but shared costs/ funding and risks of the LA Basin as suggested by Kevin and supported by you. I'd be a little wary of the 'too much new at once' syndrome for the latter - but if it were that or no electrification at all, then yep - I'd go for it, too.
And RWM - I've continued to think about the broader implications of electrifcation on a railroad's operation, as you mentioned some time ago on this thread. I just received the R&HLS Vol. 181 as referenced by greyhounds, and am in the midst of reading TRB Report No. 180 on Electrification: The Issues from 1977. So I haven't forgotten or ignored the intellectual challenge there - but I'd rather take the time to formulate a response appropriate to the level of detail that we can be involved with here, than merely 'shooting from the hip' on such an interesting and broad question.
Kevin, we're thinking very much alike - although my starting point was the Powder River Basin lines. More next week.
Ya know what they say...great minds run in the same gutter.
Looking forward to whatever you crunch for the latest numbers.
HarveyK400 I've heard 1.5kV DC may be possible for metra; but not the 25kV AC given the clearances at Union Station. This includes the Milwaukee West and North hosting CP, the North Central and Heritage Corridor (Alton) tenancy on the CN, and the Southwest (Wabash) where it interfaces with other railroads. If 1.5Kv or 3Kv is all that is possible at downtown stations use of dual voltage motors is not that much of a problem. The motors can be either AC or DC low voltage although AC would be preferred. The METRA electric DC is a problem. As station clearances are improved (many years) then the CAT can be converted to 25Kv. In addition, reconstruction of overhead structures would be needed for catenary clearance for double stacks.
I've heard 1.5kV DC may be possible for metra; but not the 25kV AC given the clearances at Union Station. This includes the Milwaukee West and North hosting CP, the North Central and Heritage Corridor (Alton) tenancy on the CN, and the Southwest (Wabash) where it interfaces with other railroads.
If 1.5Kv or 3Kv is all that is possible at downtown stations use of dual voltage motors is not that much of a problem. The motors can be either AC or DC low voltage although AC would be preferred. The METRA electric DC is a problem. As station clearances are improved (many years) then the CAT can be converted to 25Kv.
In addition, reconstruction of overhead structures would be needed for catenary clearance for double stacks.
Hopefully the CREATE projects will take care of this problem.
To be more exact, Paul, think LA Basin area, as Kevin put it. LA Basin alone doesn't even reach far enough east to include yards, passenger stations, population centers, congested freeways, etc., at inland smog bowls like West Colton, San Bernardino, Riverside, or Corona. A couple years ago, a Trains article placed West Colton Yard at the west edge of the LA Basin. I knew that was wrong, but after further study I found that many of us have been wrong in our overall perception of the LA Basin. Its eastern boundary is not defined by the San Bernardino Mountains. Geologists and topographers peg the eastern boundary of the LA Basin at the San Jose, Puente, and Chino hills, and the northern tip of the Santa Ana Mountains. In other words, the LA Basin ends about halfway between LA and West Colton/San Berdoo. Or so they say.
Kevin C. SmithPaul_D_North_Jr 6. But why the METRA's Chicago-Aurora commuter line 'Racetrack' hasn't been electrified before or even now is inexplicable to me . . . Were there any plans to electrify any suburban services in the Chicago area after IC strung wires (in 1926, IIRC)? A question that comes up for me from this thread and some other ones in the past is, what might be "demonstration" or "seed" project that could make incremental additions feasible? Something like the Pennsy started out with-once New York to Philly was strung, Baltimore and Washington were logical extensions. With that done, Harrisburg was added to the system. If it had all stayed under one ownership, we might be talking about juice to Pittsburgh right now. If, say, lines to Joliet, Aurora, Elgin and Kenosha were already electrified, both UP and BNSF would have shop facilities, motive power, etc. already in place. Even if it had all passed to Metra by now, it might be still make stringing wire to Galesburg, Milwaukee or Indianapolis (to pull some places out of my brain) manageable. From there-someday-Omaha, Minneapolis or Louisville? Since Chicago isn't already wired, then, might we focus/limit our efforts to providing the beginning now? Something like the LA Basin area? Perhaps as far as San Diego, Colton, Santa Barbara, Bakersfield and Barstow? A lot of traffic and mountains seem to make it attractive from an operating standpoint for UP and BNSF. Covering the whole area doesn't ask either company to assume any risks (or risk missing any benefit) that the other isn't. It also spreads part of the costs to Metrolink and Amtrak. Emissions reduction (from mobile sources, at least) and/or a boost to area employment might bring in the outside money needed to tip the scales-grants, loan guarantees or something like that.
Paul_D_North_Jr 6. But why the METRA's Chicago-Aurora commuter line 'Racetrack' hasn't been electrified before or even now is inexplicable to me . . .
Were there any plans to electrify any suburban services in the Chicago area after IC strung wires (in 1926, IIRC)? A question that comes up for me from this thread and some other ones in the past is, what might be "demonstration" or "seed" project that could make incremental additions feasible? Something like the Pennsy started out with-once New York to Philly was strung, Baltimore and Washington were logical extensions. With that done, Harrisburg was added to the system. If it had all stayed under one ownership, we might be talking about juice to Pittsburgh right now. If, say, lines to Joliet, Aurora, Elgin and Kenosha were already electrified, both UP and BNSF would have shop facilities, motive power, etc. already in place. Even if it had all passed to Metra by now, it might be still make stringing wire to Galesburg, Milwaukee or Indianapolis (to pull some places out of my brain) manageable. From there-someday-Omaha, Minneapolis or Louisville? Since Chicago isn't already wired, then, might we focus/limit our efforts to providing the beginning now? Something like the LA Basin area? Perhaps as far as San Diego, Colton, Santa Barbara, Bakersfield and Barstow? A lot of traffic and mountains seem to make it attractive from an operating standpoint for UP and BNSF. Covering the whole area doesn't ask either company to assume any risks (or risk missing any benefit) that the other isn't. It also spreads part of the costs to Metrolink and Amtrak. Emissions reduction (from mobile sources, at least) and/or a boost to area employment might bring in the outside money needed to tip the scales-grants, loan guarantees or something like that.
Were there any plans to electrify any suburban services in the Chicago area after IC strung wires (in 1926, IIRC)?
A question that comes up for me from this thread and some other ones in the past is, what might be "demonstration" or "seed" project that could make incremental additions feasible? Something like the Pennsy started out with-once New York to Philly was strung, Baltimore and Washington were logical extensions. With that done, Harrisburg was added to the system. If it had all stayed under one ownership, we might be talking about juice to Pittsburgh right now.
If, say, lines to Joliet, Aurora, Elgin and Kenosha were already electrified, both UP and BNSF would have shop facilities, motive power, etc. already in place. Even if it had all passed to Metra by now, it might be still make stringing wire to Galesburg, Milwaukee or Indianapolis (to pull some places out of my brain) manageable. From there-someday-Omaha, Minneapolis or Louisville?
Since Chicago isn't already wired, then, might we focus/limit our efforts to providing the beginning now? Something like the LA Basin area? Perhaps as far as San Diego, Colton, Santa Barbara, Bakersfield and Barstow? A lot of traffic and mountains seem to make it attractive from an operating standpoint for UP and BNSF. Covering the whole area doesn't ask either company to assume any risks (or risk missing any benefit) that the other isn't. It also spreads part of the costs to Metrolink and Amtrak. Emissions reduction (from mobile sources, at least) and/or a boost to area employment might bring in the outside money needed to tip the scales-grants, loan guarantees or something like that.
I missed Paul's comment on wiring the BNSF.
First, my understanding is that 25kV is much more efficient for transmission and for delivering the power needed for both HSR and mainline freight.
I've heard 1.5kV DC may be possible for metra; but not the 25kV AC given the clearances at Union Station. This includes the Milwaukee West and North hosting CP, the North Central and Heritage Corridor (Alton) tenancy on the CN, and the Southwest (Wabash) where it interfaces with other railroads. In addition, reconstruction of overhead structures would be needed for catenary clearance for double stacks.
The exceptions would be the Metra lines out of La Salle and Ogilvie which still have overhead clearance issues. The plan is for the Southwest Service to be rerouted to La Salle Station. The UP West still contends with significant host UP intermodal and auto traffic. The UPNW had auto traffic to Janesville until the GM plant closed last year.
The proposed West Loop Transportation Center would barely have the capacity for the current BNSF peak service, limited more by boarding dwell time. "California Cars" may facilitate speedier boarding, but I wonder if the lost seating capacity would offset the additional train.
I'm not saying electrification can't be done; just that the devil is in the details.
Paul_D_North_JrKevin, we're thinking very much alike - although my starting point was the Powder River Basin lines. More next week. - Paul.
A question that comes up for me from this thread and some other ones in the past is, what might be a "demonstration" or "seed" project that could make incremental additions feasible? Something like the Pennsy started out with-once New York to Philly was strung, Baltimore and Washington were logical extensions. With that done, Harrisburg was added to the system. If it had all stayed under one ownership, we might be talking about juice to Pittsburgh right now.
Paul_D_North_Jr...B. - Revise downwards my $4 Million per Route-Mile est. cost, to reflect no Amtrak high-speed needs, economies of scale, competition among suppliers and contractors, better site and working conditions, improvements in the state of the art, etc. Generate Capital Recovery 'Per $Million Per Mile Per Month' or similar such as Per Year to help understand likely costs for evaluating alternative and adding routes, etc. 3. - Decrease likely Route-Miles to 10,000 to 12,000 range, to reduce total investment needed. 5. - Revise annual cost to railroads to reflect above accordingly. Deduct estimated fuel savings / cost difference of electric from diesel, from added costs. Evaluate and recognize that current annual cash flows and CAP-EX levels - if mostly diverted to electrification - might be enough to self-fund electrification installation each year, without any or much external borrowing or aid needed. Revise annual costs to reflect same STB 'Cost of Capital' rate of return, but only on internal capital - not adding compounded interest on borrowed money, if there is none. Anything else that comes to mind. - Paul North.
B. - Revise downwards my $4 Million per Route-Mile est. cost, to reflect no Amtrak high-speed needs, economies of scale, competition among suppliers and contractors, better site and working conditions, improvements in the state of the art, etc. Generate Capital Recovery 'Per $Million Per Mile Per Month' or similar such as Per Year to help understand likely costs for evaluating alternative and adding routes, etc.
3. - Decrease likely Route-Miles to 10,000 to 12,000 range, to reduce total investment needed.
5. - Revise annual cost to railroads to reflect above accordingly. Deduct estimated fuel savings / cost difference of electric from diesel, from added costs. Evaluate and recognize that current annual cash flows and CAP-EX levels - if mostly diverted to electrification - might be enough to self-fund electrification installation each year, without any or much external borrowing or aid needed. Revise annual costs to reflect same STB 'Cost of Capital' rate of return, but only on internal capital - not adding compounded interest on borrowed money, if there is none. Anything else that comes to mind.
B) Even with HSR, additional costs should be absorbed by Amtrak in partnership with the respective railroad.
3) Information on national rail traffic by level of density was published recently. The actual tonnage would provide a more exact threshold level for determining which lines should be electrified and the resulting mileage.
5) The tonnage is also needed to approximate the locomotives and power needed to move the trains over the route and revenue generated unless you can get actual information. The operating performance can be fed back to determine at what volume of traffic electrification would be commercially viable to screen which routes would be viable and which would be questionable or unprofitable.
As a follow-up to my lengthy post from yesterday in response to Bucyrus' questions, I intend to revise it next week along the following lines to make it more relevant and useful:
A. and 2. - Update values; add in KCS and US operations of CN and CP.
Paul_D_North_Jr • 12 locations identified at estimated cost of $366 million • I-81 profile shows long, steep grades in these locations The profile is also on that slide, and shows major grades at 2 locations - over 1,000 climb southbound from Roanoke, and around 700 ft. northbound from Lexington - and lesser ones at the others. But if they are steep and long enough to need a typically $30+ million Truck Climbing Lane'', they would be an even worse problem for a railroad in the same R-O-W. Better to stay with the railroad's current location and grades, I expect. - Paul North.
• 12 locations identified at estimated cost of $366 million • I-81 profile shows long, steep grades in these locations The profile is also on that slide, and shows major grades at 2 locations - over 1,000 climb southbound from Roanoke, and around 700 ft. northbound from Lexington - and lesser ones at the others. But if they are steep and long enough to need a typically $30+ million Truck Climbing Lane'', they would be an even worse problem for a railroad in the same R-O-W. Better to stay with the railroad's current location and grades, I expect. - Paul North.
• 12 locations identified at estimated cost of $366 million
• I-81 profile shows long, steep grades in these locations
The profile is also on that slide, and shows major grades at 2 locations - over 1,000 climb southbound from Roanoke, and around 700 ft. northbound from Lexington - and lesser ones at the others. But if they are steep and long enough to need a typically $30+ million Truck Climbing Lane'', they would be an even worse problem for a railroad in the same R-O-W. Better to stay with the railroad's current location and grades, I expect.
Thanks again.
I'd agree improving the NS seems to be the better solution between Lexington and Christiansburg. Like you say, it's fuzzy and hard to evaluate; but the other bumps in the profile don't seem too bad and may offer a viable alternative over the rest of the line with a finer-scaled study. 15,000-t unit trains run on the South Shore's roller-coaster. In other more severe cases, a deep cut, tunnel, or trestle may be needed to smooth out a longer grade for 182 55' car, 26,000-t trains.
HarveyK400 While RAIL Solutions may be a State interest, I thought the I-81 proposal - I can't find the link - extended from Knoxville, TN to Harrisburgh, PA. The Roanoke, VA-Knoxville segment would entail the Appalachian crossing.
http://www.railsolution.org/
It does - from the bottom left column [emphasis added - PDN]:
''Campaign for Steel Interstate Pilot Project Begun in I-81 Corridor1/18/09RAIL Solution has begun work to secure grassroots support for a steel interstate demonstration in the I-81 Corridor between Knoxville and Harrisburg.''
I can't readily find a description or plan that says anything about that crossing or a tunnel, etc. Perhaps either by using existing lines it won't need one - or else none of the studies or reports have gotten into that level of detail yet.
Here's what it does say about the ''Pilot Project'', from:
http://www.railsolution.org/projects/steel-interstate/rationale-for-resolution.html
“Steel Interstate” rail characteristics:
· Entirely dual track with additional sidings allowing slower bulk and carload freight trains to operate in concert with faster high-performance passenger and open intermodal trains from Knoxville to Harrisburg,
· All grade crossings eliminated, replaced by frequent cross-overs, tracks buried in trenches with streets above, or relocated to bypass congested areas,
· Curves smoothed for speed increases, alignments re-engineered for higher average speeds (not to exceed 110 mph),
· Positive train control signaling,
· Regional intermodal terminals,
· Average train speed 60 mph with all trains scheduled and operated with 98+ percent on-time reliability [snipped]
HarveyK400 Does the NS "Heartland Corridor" incorporate the Roanoke-Knoxville or Roanoke-Portsmouth, OH routes? There was a N&W line from Portsmouth to Cincinnati that might offer an alternative to the Harrisburg-Pittsburgh route for East Coast-Midwest traffic.
No; and, Yes, looks like it. Doubtful - it looks like that line is now severed at a point some distance east of Cincinnati, closer to Portsmouth. For details, see:
NS ''Corridor Capacity Projects'' on slide 27 of 28 of the BB&T Annual Transportation Conference - February 12, 2009, by Jim Squires - EVP Finance & CFO, Norfolk Southern Corporation [28 pages, approx. 1.16 MB in size], at:
http://www.nscorp.com/nscportal/nscorp/Investors/Executive%20Speeches/2009/pdf/jas021209.pdf
And the NS System Map [ 1 page, approx. 1.23 MB in size] at:
http://www.nscorp.com/nscportal/nscorp/pdf/systemmap2008.pdf
HarveyK400 Setting Harrisburg-Knoxville as the I-81 proposal's scope seems short-sighted when Atlanta, Birmingham, and the Gulf to the south and Philadelphia and New York to the north are the major terminals and destinations. Furthermore, this incures the dreaded engine change.
Harrisburg - Knoxville does not seem to be the scope limits for NS - just for Rail Solutions and the Virginia DOT's portion of the project. NS clearly has set its sights wider, on the ''Crescent Coridor''. See the pages 23 - 32 of the NS Intermodal & Automotive presentation by Mike McClellan, Vice President – Intermodal & Automotive Marketing, as available from/ on the Rail Solutions website- esp. pp. 24, 25, and 29 - at this link:
http://www.railsolution.org/articles/Articles_Top_level/NS_2007_Presentation.pdf
Also: http://www.railsolution.org/archive/what-was-new/ns-i-81-strategy.html
http://www.railsolution.org/archive/what-was-new/crescent-corridor-response.html
http://www.nscorp.com/nscorphtml/galleries/ns/crescent-corridor-map.jpg
Virginia Official State Transportation Map is at this website:
http://virginiadot.org/travel/maps-state.asp
It's divided into 10 panels or pages as separate 'PDF' files, and it looks like I-81 is on 5 of them - from South to North, 6, 7, 8, 2, and 3. Each file is 1 page in size, contains about 2 MB, and shows the freight railroad lines in black as well as highways and the names (only - also in black) of the principal mountains, though no 'relief' shading as I had remembered.
More importantly, I also found a fuzzy and mostly just graphical image - no grade %'s, and just a few elevation values - of a recent summary of the Virginia portion of I-81's profile 'on-line' - i.e., VDOT's PowerPoint prsentation of "Interstate 81 Safety and Operational Improvements" dated November 7, 2007 - 14 pages, approx. 860 KB in size, at:
http://www.ctb.virginia.gov/resources/kr_3E_81SafetyFinal1107.pdf
While RAIL Solutions may be a State interest, I thought the I-81 proposal - I can't find the link - extended from Knoxville, TN to Harrisburgh, PA. The Roanoke, VA-Knoxville segment would entail the Appalachian crossing.
Does the NS "Heartland Corridor" incorporate the Roanoke-Knoxville or Roanoke-Portsmouth, OH routes? There was a N&W line from Portsmouth to Cincinnati that might offer an alternative to the Harrisburg-Pittsburgh route for East Coast-Midwest traffic.
Setting Harrisburg-Knoxville as the I-81 proposal's scope seems short-sighted when Atlanta, Birmingham, and the Gulf to the south and Philadelphia and New York to the north are the major terminals and destinations. Furthermore, this incures the dreaded engine change.
10,000' sidings seem moot if yards aren't long enough to assemble such monsters. That said, considerations need to be given to where such yards and sidings would fit, where public and private crossings are not blocked or could be closed or grade-separated. The same considerations are needed for crossover locations with two main tracks where trains are held at these control points or at control points in advance of the crossovers.
HarveyK400 At some point, NS crosses the Appalachians, so there will be grades and/or a new tunnel.
I concur with your 1st paragraph.
As to the above - the worst of the Appalachian crossing is to the west of Roanoke, and hence already dealt with by the time this traffic gets to Roanoke - wherever it might be coming from (which I'm not sure that I undertand the rationale of or for anyway). Some portion of the ''Heartland Corridor'' project may address that, though I understand it is chiefly a clearance improvement project for double-stacks, etc. The I-81 corridor is mainly along the Shenandoah River valley, between the 'Blue Ridge' mountain to the southeast, and a collection/ chain of other shorter mountain ridges to the west (which don't have a commonly-accepted name as far as I know). Within that valley and along that route, I'm sure there are some grades and a few tunnels, but nothing of the magnitude of crossing a major Appalchian ridge. I don't have a Virginia Dept. of Transportation Highway Map with me, but as I recall it has topography as well as all rail lines on it. If I can find one on-line I'll post a link to it below.
Bucyrus Paul_D_North_Jr B. Total asset value of electrification: Approx. $80 Billion = 73.7 % of the above total asset value. Did you include the cost of new locomotives in your cost of electrification?
Paul_D_North_Jr B. Total asset value of electrification: Approx. $80 Billion = 73.7 % of the above total asset value.
Essentially yes - for the following reasons/ rationales:
1. 'Easy answer' version - They are 'wrapped into' the 4 Million per Route-Mile estimated cost.
2. The locomotives are only a small portion of that estimated cost anyway. Five thousand straight-electrics at $2 Million each = $10 Billion of the $80 Billion; that would be enough to have a locomotive unit for every 4 Route-Miles on average, which would be the same as a 3-locomotive train at 12 mile spacing either way, or such a train at 24-mile spacing on each of double tracks. Few main lines have that density today, and the existing loco fleet is something like 25,000 units as I recall - and electrics are often thought to be able to replace diesels on the basis of 1-electric-for-2-diesels - so that figure of 5,000 electric units is likely in the general ballpark.
3. Also, railroads even today are replacing a significant portion of their power fleet almost every year, such that it is essentially completely replaced every 15 to 20 years. Electrification would mean about the same spending - just for straight electrics instead of as many diesel-electrics - thus there would not be much of an increase or difference in the CAP-EX due to that, and so no major additional financial requirements.
4. Straight electrics in quantity are expectedto cost no more than equivalent diesels, and possibly as little as 90 of same - per Max Ephraim, Jr., former Chief Engineer of EMD, and Merton D. Meeker, Jr. of GE, in a 1977 publication.
Thanks Paul.
The first-hand impression of I-81 is invaluable - it confirms my fears that a combined rail-interstate corridor concept was unrealistic in this instance. The railroad and I-81 are widely separated for the most part; so changing from one alignment to the other where highway grades were minimal would be impractical without facing severe realignment issues on the existing railway. Such connections at both ends of a bypass would incur purchases of new row; and this may be blocked by existing development.
At some point, NS crosses the Appalachians, so there will be grades and/or a new tunnel.
Paul_D_North_JrB. Total asset value of electrification: Approx. $80 Billion = 73.7 % of the above total asset value.
Paul_D_North_Jr4. Does not include cost of wind farms - I have no idea what they cost. And why those, instead of coal/ nuclear/ gas/ hydro/ solar or whatever other type of generating plant that could be used ?
Did you include the cost of new locomotives in your cost of electrification?
You asked why I stipulated wind farms. There are two distinct roads to electrification. One is the private road and the other is the public road. The public road is the only viable option, and it requires wind power as a fundamental premise. Nuclear is the second choice. The other fuels may play a role. In any case, there would need to be an capital investment in the power source.
HarveyK400 blue streak 1 This route has many problems. . . . [snip] Bristol to Roanoke to Hagerstown (old N&W) is a curvy, hogback. To electrify this portion before a major realignment and then double tracking would be a waste. [snip] I should go to the reference; but did you get a sense that the I-81 row was considered for a relocation? [snip] The greater problem for freight would be the profile and grades along the Interstate row. Hard to follow the Interstate row if oxbows are needed to reduce the grade. [snip]
blue streak 1 This route has many problems. . . . [snip] Bristol to Roanoke to Hagerstown (old N&W) is a curvy, hogback. To electrify this portion before a major realignment and then double tracking would be a waste. [snip]
I should go to the reference; but did you get a sense that the I-81 row was considered for a relocation?
It's been a few years since I was down that far, but my main recollection of I-81 in the southern half of Virginia is that there are a lot of steep grades for trucks - in the range of the maximum allowed for Interstates of 5 % to 8 % - to the extent that many 3rd uphill lanes for the slower-moving trucks had been installed. There must be a reference someplace that quantifies that better than my memory, though.
Nevertheless, those existing I-81 R-O-W grades are so far from a desirable railroad maximum grade of 0.3 to 0.5 % - even the 3 % that works for the electrified TGVs in France - that the existing I-81 R-O-W would be useless because of the massive cuts, fills, and retaining walls that would be needed to shoe-horn a double-track railroad in there. Pending a through on-site examination, I expect that it would be far better and easier to upgrade the existing route in the usual railroad manner - double-tracking, additional R-O-W acquisitions as needed for minor relocations, major earthwork to level out the hogbacks, though nowheres near as much as would be needed along I-81. Part 1 of that would be to grade and construct most of the 2nd track at the 25+ ft. track center spacing away from the existing track, which would reduce intereference to about nil. Then reconstruct the 2nd track, salvaging as much of the earthwork as possible - for example, a 1.5 % down grade in the prevailing direction of traffic could maybe left 'as-is', since only rarely would a train have to ascend it.
An interesting example of this kind of approach - but in the highway context - can be seen in Virginia on U.S. 29 between Charlottesville and the Manassas area. The 'old side' - mainly the southbound lanes, as I recall - 'humps' up and down and pretty much just follows the surface of the ground. The 'new side' - the northbound lanes - is nearly dead flat by comparison, and can easily be seen to slice through the hills and fill over the lower areas the other side has to climb up and drop down into, respectively - it kind of looks like the last stretch of a roller-coaster ride in contrast.
HarveyK400 These figure would seem to be for total assets, not just all mainlines or only major freight corridors.
Correct.
HarveyK400 The CN has strategic mains from Canada to the Gulf that should be included. Is the US component separated out of the corporate total for CNA?
Agree. Not that I've seen or am aware of in the normal reports that I get from CN. A quick review of same on CN's website this morning did not find that data there, either.
However, on the STB's website is the annual R-1 report by Grand Trunk Corporation - 'GTC' for 2008, which certainly looks like CN's US assets from a quick perusal of the mileage operated in each state, etc. On page 5 of that report - Page 14 of 112 of the 'PDF' version that is linked below - is ''Schedule 200. - Comparative Statement of Financial Position - Assets'', which states that the Total Assets value is $9.7 Billion.
Surface Transportation Board - Annual Report Financial Data
http://www.stb.dot.gov/econdata.nsf/f039526076cc0f8e8525660b006870c9?OpenView&Start=1&Count=300&Expand=1#1
Grand Trunk Corporation - R-1 Report - 2008 [112 pages, approx. 1.8 MB in size]
http://www.stb.dot.gov/econdata.nsf/f039526076cc0f8e8525660b006870c9/0b7bf492a0ec732f852575a6005163d5/$FILE/Grand%20Trunk%20Corporation%20R-1%20Report%202008.pdf
When I have more time I'll do the same for the Soo Line Railroad Company - which is probably CP's US subsidiary, and KCS. But I don't expect including those to alter the overall results much.
blue streak 1This route has many problems. From Bulls Gap ( NE of Knoxville ) to Bristol (old SOU) is a curvy, street running only single track ROW that takes almost 2-3/4 hours to traverse averaging less than 30 MPH. Bristol to Roanoke to Hagerstown (old N&W) is a curvy, hogback. To electrify this portion before a major realignment and then double tracking would be a waste. There are hardly any 10,000 ft sidings along that route and Bristol does not have facility to stage a 10,000 Ft train for crew change.
This route has many problems. From Bulls Gap ( NE of Knoxville ) to Bristol (old SOU) is a curvy, street running only single track ROW that takes almost 2-3/4 hours to traverse averaging less than 30 MPH. Bristol to Roanoke to Hagerstown (old N&W) is a curvy, hogback. To electrify this portion before a major realignment and then double tracking would be a waste. There are hardly any 10,000 ft sidings along that route and Bristol does not have facility to stage a 10,000 Ft train for crew change.
Understandable that railroads were reluctant to undertake such a financial burden and need a rich uncle motivated with interests in energy and environment.
These figure would seem to be for total assets, not just all mainlines or only major freight corridors.
The CN has strategic mains from Canada to the Gulf that should be included. Is the US component separated out of the corporate total for CNA?
HarveyK400 The existing NS in the I-81 Corridor is no speedway between Harrisburg and Knoxville, especially for those intermodals in the conceptual drawing. Is a plan for relocation to take advantage of half the grading done for I-81; and what kind of profile and alignment does I-81 offer?
The existing NS in the I-81 Corridor is no speedway between Harrisburg and Knoxville, especially for those intermodals in the conceptual drawing. Is a plan for relocation to take advantage of half the grading done for I-81; and what kind of profile and alignment does I-81 offer?
Further thoughts:
BNSF market capitalization today - down to $26.1 Billion
CSX market capitalization today - down to $17.0 Billion
NSC market capitalization today - down to $17.3 Billion
UPC market capitalization today - down to $28.5 Billion
Total Market Cap = Asset Value = $88.9 Billion, down $19.7 Billion = 18.1 % from the $108.6 Billion in the STB Decision referenced and linked above. So now the $80 Billion electrification would be 90.0 % of Total Asset Value = much more of a 'bet the entire company' gamble . . .
I wonder what the comparable figures and percentages were for the PRR during its various electrification phases, especially the last big push during the Great Depression of 1928 - 1938 ? I'll have to look that up sometime . . . most likely it's in Bezilla's book, I think.
Hey, you're welcome. As you can tell, this has become my little obsession, for the time being.
A couple more cynical and 'wise-guy' observations:
As to the 74 % figure: Has there ever been a new gadget/ tool/ toy - including cars and computers - that doesn't cost almost as much or more than the one it's replacing ? Even if the new one is so much more capable and powerful ?
As to ''soaking up all the money there is'': I always thought that while Bill Gates of MicroSoft fame seemed to be really rich to most people - that would only last until he encountered the monstrous capital needs of a serious full-size railroad - then maybe not so much. [This is where I usually insert the quotation from Everett Dirksen about ''A billion here, a billion there - pretty soon you're talking about some real money.'']
Looking forward to your follow-up questions - I think.
Paul,
Thanks for putting some deep thought into my question. Your answer gives me at least a rough idea of what I was looking for, given all the necessary qualifications to the answer to such a question. With the number of 74%, it places into perspective just how much of an improvement this would be to the overall plant.
If you add in all the extras that I excluded from my question, plus HSR, and rolled it all into an extreme fast-track project with the government financing and managing it; well, that might be enough to soak up all the money there is. I am putting some more thoughts together on this topic.
Bucyrus Here is a number crunching question: 1) Assuming the electrification of a majority of railroads in the U.S., what is the total asset value of those railroads today? 2) What would be the asset value of the new locomotives, catenary wire, distribution lines, and wind farms that would be needed to electrify the majority of railroads included in the first question? You can go ahead and round off your answers. Leave out other improvements that might be related to electrification such as line improvements, PTC, ECP brakes, grade separation, new rolling stock, and new terminal facilities.
OK - I want to get this thread back on track, and this question - and its unstated implications and issues - is important enough to deserve at least an attempt at a serious - and seriously approximate - answer. So I'll stick my neck out yet again, as follows:
A. Total asset value of 4 Class I's - from ''Table 13 - 2008 Average Market Value'' of the STB's 'Railroad Cost of Capital - 2008' decision on Sept. 25, 2009, Docket No. EP_558_12, STB Ex Parte No. 558 (Sub-No. 12): $108.6 Billion
[BNSF $31.6 B, CSX $21.3 B, NSC $21.7 B, UPC $33.9 B]
B. Total asset value of electrification: Approx. $80 Billion = 73.7 % of the above total asset value.
[20,000 Route-Miles at $4 Million per Route-Mile = 2 tracks, typically; based on Amtrak's 1997-2000 155 Route-Mile electrification from New Haven to Boston for $321 Million = $2.1 Million per Route-Mile, x 2.0 to allow for inflation since then, contingencies, misc. stuff, etc.]
Significant comments and caveats - in no particular order:
1. RWM often tells me my estimated costs are too low. He's usually right, too - or at least has a legitimate basis for his difference of opinion.
2. Total asset value does not include KCS, nor US routes of CN and CP. Doing that would add maybe 20 % to the total asset value ? - reducing electrification percentage commensurately. Also, these are the STB's figures from 2008 = recession year - I want to check what they are currently.
3. Electrified route-mileage estimates vary from 8,000 to 10,000 to 20,000 to 50,000 or so. I find the 20,000 range to be the most credible = 4 transcontinental routes or equivalent at 3,000 miles each = 12,000 miles, plus 5 north-south routes at 1,000 miles each = 5,000 miles, plus 3,000 miles for contingencies, duplication, errors, etc. As always with these exercises, 'YMMV' = ''Your Mileage May Vary'' [and hey - that term is really applicable here, too !]
4. Does not include cost of wind farms - I have no idea what they cost. And why those, instead of coal/ nuclear/ gas/ hydro/ solar or whatever other type of generating plant that could be used ?
5. The total electrification cost may look to be scary and to be a 'bet the ranch' kind of proposition. However:
a. I believe it will take at least 20 years to implement - that's 1,000 miles per year, or 10 times what either Amtrak did in '97-'00 or the best of what the PRR did from 1928-1938 - because I think that will be about the maximum practical economic production capacity limit of the suppliers and contractors, consulting engineers, FRA review, etc., etc.
b. So, the annual investment would be on the order of only $4 Billion per year, or about 3.7 % of the total asset value per year. Although that is about roughly equal to the current CAPEX = CAPital EXpenditures of those 4 railroads - in other words, their annual CAPEX budget would have to be doubled - it's less intimidating when viewed that way. Some of that CAPEX for electric locomotives and other improvements would take the place of other CAPEX that would have occurred otherwise - such as new diesels, which may not be needed as much because the newest ones can be 'cascaded' down to lesser services.
c. This is more like a 'paying as you go' arrangement. As an analogy - If you've ever bought a house - say, a $200,000 one - you probably had no more than $40,000 = 20 % down payment - if that, plus a couple cars with values - net of their financing - of less than $10,000 each = $20,000 total, plus misc. assets such as furniture, clothing, misc. savings, life insurance cash values, etc. - I'll be generous and say all of that might be worth another $40,000, for your total asset value of $100,000. So you're committing to buying and paying for the next 30 years for another asset that's 200 % of your total present asset value - and of which 160 % [$200,000 price - $40,000 down payment = $160,000 to be borrowed to pay the rest of the purchase price] is going to be borrowed/ mortgage money. Next to that, the railroads' investment in electrification looks pretty prudent - their percentages are less than half of yours. And you'll be paying off that $160,000 at the rate of around $960 per month for the next 30 years at a 6.0 per cent interest rate.
However, each of those $4 Billion annual investments will cost the railroads around $48 Million per month = $600 Million per year for the next 30 years at a 12.0 per cent interest rate, per the STB decision referenced and linked at the top. So a major legitimate concern is that figure is in the ballpark of the railroad's total annual profits. Worse yet, the next year's $4 Billion investment will require an additional similar series of payments, and so on in an ever-increasing linear escalation. At the end of those 20 years, these railroads would be paying $960 Million = $1 Billion per month, or about $11.5 Billion per year. Unless they find a major source of new revenue in this operation or other changes in market conditions elsewhere, that's not possible on a sustained basis, and the railroad has a substantial risk of default on its financial obligations. So that's why there's presently no widespread rush to electrify, in my estimation - unless government aid and subsidies, etc. are involved.
6. But why the METRA's Chicago-Aurora commuter line 'Racetrack' hasn't been electrified before or even now is inexplicable to me . . .
Comments, questions, and constructive criticisms invited, as usual.
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