TH&BThe Santa Fe accident was caused by somebody throwing the switch right in front of the train. Does PTC require electric switch locks ? If not, the GPS thing does nothing against somebody throwing the switch last minute, after the train is cleared by PTC.
The Santa Fe accident was caused by somebody throwing the switch right in front of the train. Does PTC require electric switch locks ? If not, the GPS thing does nothing against somebody throwing the switch last minute, after the train is cleared by PTC.
The FRA preliminary rules for PTC will still require electric switch locks for hand-throw switches in signaled territory if the maximum authorized speed is greater than 20 mph main track or 30 mph on a controlled siding, or a leaving signal in lieu of the electric switch lock. Otherwise switch locks and leaving signals will not be required. The electric switch lock is a device to prevent a hand-throw switch from being opened if there is an occupancy in the circuit, until time has run. It has nothing to do with a power switch.
As an aside to add to MC's comments on GPS:
GPS is a method of approximating a train location to a physical track location. It's an input device, just like a track circuit, a track transponder tag, or an axle odometer that counts off distance. Its good points is that it is cheap and available worldwide (most of the time). Its bad point is that its accuracy is fuzzy and that makes it vastly less valuable than most people imagine in a rail operating environment where inches matter and the operating technology is based on maintaining but not intruding into small distance tolerances between two or more moving trains.
For example, when a train stops at a signal indicating stop, the train is either NOT PAST the signal or PAST the signal. NOT PAST is safe, PAST is not safe. Having the GPS tell you "Dude, I think the train is sort of in the vicinity of the signal" is a singularly useless piece of information because you have absolutely no idea if the condition is safe or unsafe.
I don't know of any technology with so much religious faith and magical powers attached to its efficacy as GPS. Magic doesn't exist and religion doesn't run trains. I have spent six years being looked at like a killjoy by people in the commuter agencies, the states, the feds, and the consulting world, after I have to tell them that just because their GPS box they bought at BestBuy tells them how to find Aunt Bertha's house in Chicago, and just because they watch Modern Marvels on Discovery Channel, doesn't mean that GPS is going to save railroading. I guess I will just have to live with it until people move onto their next magic technology to worship.
RWM
Paul_D_North_Jr Positive Train Control would protect against this - but so could almost any other type of 20th century safety system. The key to that is the INTERLOCKED electric switch lock, which would have physically and mechanically locked and prevented the switch from being thrown after the oncoming train had 'accepted' and passed the previous Clear / Proceed signal. Electric switch locks will still be needed, and soon will be even more essential with PTC for safety in 'dark' / non-signalled territory. That's because there a switch could now be thrown or left in the wrong position for an oncoming train, but the crew would have no warning of that at all until they actually arrived within sight of it. That's apparently what happened to the NS train in the Graniteville, SC disaster several years ago. See if any working rails or RWM add any more to this. - Paul North.
Positive Train Control would protect against this - but so could almost any other type of 20th century safety system. The key to that is the INTERLOCKED electric switch lock, which would have physically and mechanically locked and prevented the switch from being thrown after the oncoming train had 'accepted' and passed the previous Clear / Proceed signal. Electric switch locks will still be needed, and soon will be even more essential with PTC for safety in 'dark' / non-signalled territory. That's because there a switch could now be thrown or left in the wrong position for an oncoming train, but the crew would have no warning of that at all until they actually arrived within sight of it. That's apparently what happened to the NS train in the Graniteville, SC disaster several years ago. See if any working rails or RWM add any more to this.
- Paul North.
PTC, CTC, ACSES, intermittant cab signals, etc., will not prevent an event such as Robinson. Once the switch is put into hand, the switch machine is disconnected and the switch can be thrown. PTC (as well as almost all electronic train-control systems) will detect the open switch, but if the approaching train is closer to the switch than its braking distance to a full stop, the train will run through the open switch.
Some types of electric switch locks prevent the switch from being operated if there is an occupancy in the circuit, but those locks can be disconnected too. Railroads are eliminating electric switch locks as much as possible because they are high-maintenance. Some locations make it difficult to eliminate electric switch locks without expensive rearrangements of track geometry or a lot of money spent on signaling. A typical location where it's hard to get rid of an electric lock is a mid-siding hand-throw crossover between a main track and a siding.
Any switch that can be power-operated makes an event such as Robinson less likely because the switch is almost always in power and there is much less likelihood someone would have the switch out of power and hand-operating it. But it is not impossible to defeat PTC or any other train-control system.
K. P. HarrierYears ago I concluded that IF the engineer of the waiting passenger train in the siding HAD NOT tried to get the attention of the fireman at the UNLOCKED switch stand, everything would have been cool. So, maybe if someone does something stupid, unless his life is in immediate, direct danger, it might be better to let it pass until such a time as the matter can be discussed in a safer situation.
I concluded the same thing looking at it in retrospect, but there was no way that the engineer could have known that no lives were in danger, and that it would have been better to not try to communicate to the fireman.
It seemed that both men were drawn deeper into an error of misunderstanding by the actions of each other. And that error was begun by the fireman. If the fireman had not unlocked the treadle, or if the engineer had not reacted to it, or if the fireman had not reacted to the engineer’s reaction, the accident would not have occurred.
The misunderstanding was driven and energized by the dramatic demand of the approaching train. Putting myself in the place of that fireman worrying about the correctness of the switch, I can imagine myself deciding yes, no, yes, no, etc. a thousand times in the last seconds as time ran out.
and for those of you who think that a electric switch lock will keep you from throwing a switch in front of a train. you are mistaken.
Hey guys, I've actually been to the New Mexico site and it is absolutely eerie. And it looks much as it did in 1956, telephone poles, wires, and all.
The siding is gone, and Automatic Block Signals repositioned accordingly, but everything else seems to be the same.
It should be noted that the head-on occurred in the neighborhood of 2 o'clock in the morning, as I recall, on a new moon situation of pitch blackness in the middle of nowhere.
Years ago I concluded that IF the engineer of the waiting passenger train in the siding HAD NOT tried to get the attention of the fireman at the UNLOCKED switch stand, everything would have been cool. So, maybe if someone does something stupid, unless his life is in immediate, direct danger, it might be better to let it pass until such a time as the matter can be discussed in a safer situation.
The paralleling north-south I-25 is about a quarter of a mile away, plus the old, two-lane roadway is still there about 100 to 200 feet away, both to the west of the track itself. The rail line is on a mild, downward, northward slope in a vast rolling hills area.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- K.P.’s absolute “theorem” from early, early childhood that he has seen over and over and over again: Those that CAUSE a problem in the first place will act the most violently if questioned or exposed.
This is the official ICC report on the accident.
http://ntl1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?browse&rn=3649%22
Pete
I pray every day I break even, Cause I can really use the money!
I started with nothing and still have most of it left!
Very well and completely said, Ed. Thank you for those practical, sobering, and realistic insights.
When not in use, switches must be locked, hooked, or latched if so equipped. Before making movements in either direction over these switches, make sure the switch is latched or secured by placing the lock or hook in the hasp. However, when making train movements in facing point direction, lock the switches equipped with a lock.
Replace any missing or defective switch locks. If they cannot be replaced, report the condition at once to the train dispatcher, yardmaster, or supervisor in charge, and spike the switch if possible.
When an employee lines the switch to let a train enter or leave the main track, the employee must then go to the opposite side of the main track and not return to the switch stand until movement is complete. If unable to go to the opposite side of the track, the employee must stand at least 20 feet from the switch stand.
23 17 46 11
ndbprr A variation of this occured in Harvey, Illinois on the IC about 30 years ago. A southbound freight was waiting to leave Woodcrest and was waiting for a northbound Amtrak train to pass. A rookie on the freight crew was told to throw the tunrouts after the passenger passed and mistook a northbound commuter for the Amtrak train and threw the crossover right in front of it. The lead engine of the freight was cleaned off at the frame. The crew did not survive. There were no major injuries to the Amtrak crew or passengers as I remember.
A variation of this occured in Harvey, Illinois on the IC about 30 years ago. A southbound freight was waiting to leave Woodcrest and was waiting for a northbound Amtrak train to pass. A rookie on the freight crew was told to throw the tunrouts after the passenger passed and mistook a northbound commuter for the Amtrak train and threw the crossover right in front of it. The lead engine of the freight was cleaned off at the frame. The crew did not survive. There were no major injuries to the Amtrak crew or passengers as I remember.
Interesting...wasn't that the same stretch of line that saw the terrible IC commuter wreck in the early Seventies where an older steel E.M.U train rear- ended a new aluminum double decker trainset with many injuries/fatalities? That accident also involved a misaligned switch, although IINM it was an automated switch and the accident resulted from a dispatching error....
"I Often Dream of Trains"-From the Album of the Same Name by Robyn Hitchcock
The ATSF Robinson accident was clearly a case of a trainman panicking to line a switch correctly when it already was lined correctly. So he lined it wrong in his panic. As far as I can tell, this pattern of thinking and action is a common occurrence, and well known to railroad culture. I have read of other examples of the same type of occurrence, and was also told about one on the Milwaukee Road, where a trainman thought a switch was wrong as a passenger train was approaching fast. He panicked and threw it wrong in the face of the train, and then realized that it was wrong, so he threw it back just in time.
Since trainmen throw switches all the time, it is hard to separate one recollection of switch throwing from another. This sense of indefinite recollection can cause a loss of confidence as time runs out with a fast approaching train.
The rule to stay back from a switch during a meet seems to be intended to help reinforce the recollection of the person staying away from the switch, so that he clearly knows that he has not already thrown the switch. Staying away from the switch is a way of preventing a trainman from taking any sense of ownership of the switch before an impending meet. That is my own reasoning on the matter, and I have no other reference to back it up. In fact, I am not sure exactly how the rule reads about standing by the switch during a meet. In other words, is it OK to walk up to the switch, touch it, or look it over during a meet before the opposing train arrives? I am not sure what today’s rule says about it.
I went back and looked over that article on the ATSF wreck at Robinson siding to refresh my memory about what it said about the switch, which I recall as being unique somehow. The article says that the switch was not typical of the other sidings, which had spring switches to allow trains to leave the sidings without opening and closing the switch. East Robinson had a standard manual switch fitted with two locks, one on the switch stand, and one on a foot treadle. The foot treadle was a precaution against the switch points being fouled by wreckage from a collision at a nearby crossing, the article says.
The fireman in the Robinson accident not only walked right up to the switch, but he then proceeded to unlock the treadle lock. I interpret these actions to mean that the fireman was doing everything possible to speed up their impending departure. In other words, if he had not done these things before the meeting train went by, he would have to take the time to walk up to the switch, and unlock the foot treadle padlock after the train passed, and this time consumed for the task would have delayed their departure.
Apparently, the fireman felt that there was no practical reason to wait to unlock the treadle since the switch would remain lined for the main, and that is all that mattered. This reasoning could easily be extended to rationalizing that it would be OK to unlock the switch as well, as long as he did not throw it. I do not know if he did or did not do this, and I also do not know if the official record ever determined this fact. This is a very key area of the story, and I don’t think it was explored as well as it could have been in the article.
Whatever the fireman did at the switch apparently raised the concern of the engineer waiting and watching from some 130 yards or so away in the siding. The engineer clearly was trying to communicate something to the fireman by tooting the horn and then flashing the headlight on and off. He must have seen the fireman doing something at the switch stand, and this concerned him. Three possible things that the fireman could have done when he first approached the switch would be as follows:
1) Unlock the treadle.
2) Unlock the switch stand.
3) Throw the switch.
The article says he only unlocked the treadle, and not the switch stand. And also, according to the article, the fireman did not throw the switch until he ran back to it after he panicked and concluded that it was lined wrong when his confidence failed. But no matter what the fireman did on his first encounter with the switch, the engineer might not have understood exactly what it was that he saw the fireman doing. The engineer might have been concerned about any of the three possible actions at the switch, plus the act of simply walking up to the switch, all of which would be against the rules.
If the second lock and treadle feature of this switch were highly unique (the article does not clarify how unique it was, only that it was unique in this area), the waiting engineer might not have realized that the switch had a treadle with its own lock, and he therefore might not have realized that the fireman had only unlocked the treadle. Instead, he might have thought the fireman unlocked the switch stand, or maybe even thrown it by mistake.
The article does not mention whether the switch alignment could be seen by the waiting engineer by a target. To me, that seems likely. If so, the engineer would have seen that the switch was lined correctly. So that leaves either the unlocking of the treadle and/or the unlocking of the switch stand, and possibly the actual throwing of the switch wrong that would have concerned the engineer enough to make him express concern to the fireman.
Whatever caused the engineer concern, his expression of that concern unnerved the fireman into worrying that the switch was lined wrong. If the fireman had not gone up to the switch and unlocked the treadle, he would have been certain that he had done nothing incorrect with the switch, and also, the engineer would not have seen anything to cause concern and thus would not have expressed any concern to the fireman. The whole thing played out kind of like an episode of Alfred Hitchcock.
May I venture another angle on this matter?
The discussion so far has been interesting and perhaps revealing. To me, the really interesting part of this story is not what might have prevented the accident, but how a person goes on, for years, in a small community where everyone knows the story of what happened. What kind of a person, and a town, can successfully deal with it all? That's the beauty and wonder of this story, as far as I'm concerned.
Perhaps another point would be the legal ramifications of such an accident today. Would it even be possible for this unfortunate man to avoid jail? How many lawyers, and for how many years, would this case involve if it were to happen today? And why didn't it happen then? What would be the likely outcome today?
Again, thanks to everyone for his contributions to this thread.
Paul_D_North_Jr A couple months ago there was a similar thread here, which discussed non-interlocked switches in 'dark' territory, and being thrown by vandals, etc. The FRA's Emergency Order summarized by Nick above goes a long ways towards eliminating the hazard from a forgetful or mistaken train crew member. However, it does not physically prevent a mistake, miscommunication, forgetfulness, distraction, etc. by a crew member - and is of no help at all as against vandalism/ sabotage. Again, in such circumstances an oncoming train crew would have no chance of a warning until they actually arrived at or within sight of the open switch, by which time it is usually too late, of course. - Paul North.
A couple months ago there was a similar thread here, which discussed non-interlocked switches in 'dark' territory, and being thrown by vandals, etc. The FRA's Emergency Order summarized by Nick above goes a long ways towards eliminating the hazard from a forgetful or mistaken train crew member. However, it does not physically prevent a mistake, miscommunication, forgetfulness, distraction, etc. by a crew member - and is of no help at all as against vandalism/ sabotage. Again, in such circumstances an oncoming train crew would have no chance of a warning until they actually arrived at or within sight of the open switch, by which time it is usually too late, of course.
In the Graniteville incident, the crew failed in their responsibilities. No amount of additional 'bureaucracy' will eliminate man failure incidents, it may create more disciplinary 'gotchas', but it will not eliminate the man failure. Graniteville was caused by a crew certifying that they did something they did not do....nothing in EO 24 prevents a crew from certifying that they did something they did not do....like lining a main track switch for main track movement.
Dark Territory is based on rules compliance and trust that all others operating in the Dark Territory are complying with the rules.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
There we go again, GPS - The magic panacea for all that's not understood.Any black box technology instantly converts to GPS.
Sensor - Yes; GIS - Yes; GPS - No. (More like a poor man's CTC with a GIS linked component)
There are now some switches in dark territory monitored by GPS. If the switch is thrown without authorization from DS, or points are gapped, screen in DS office shows switch as "indterminate" and track warrants shortened up just up to the switch in question.
switch7frg Mudchicken; wasn't there a nasty crash at Belen NM. in the mid 50s.?? Is that the same one you talked about here ? time and memory tends to fade like old box car lettering with me. Refresh my memory if you would please. Respectfully, Cannonball
Mudchicken; wasn't there a nasty crash at Belen NM. in the mid 50s.?? Is that the same one you talked about here ? time and memory tends to fade like old box car lettering with me. Refresh my memory if you would please. Respectfully, Cannonball
Scholle?
Robinson is some 230+ miles north....above Las Vegas, out on the flat.
Y6bs evergreen in my mind
Someplace when I first read about this rule requiring moving away from the switch after it had been thrown, etc., the accompanying comment was that a mistaken belief and reaction of the same sort had once also wrecked the 20th Century Limited. I don't know if that's true or not, but that was the justification for it.
I'm also wondering if the few trainmen who have actually done that kind of thing were suffering from the version of 'Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder' - or 'OCD' - mental illness that causes repetitive checking - and re-checking - of things, such as whether the house door is locked, the stove or water is off, etc.
Thank you, gentlemen. This was exactly the information I wanted.
Paul_D_North_JrThat's because there a switch could now be thrown or left in the wrong position for an oncoming train, but the crew would have no warning of that at all until they actually arrived within sight of it. That's apparently what happened to the NS train in the Graniteville, SC disaster several years ago. See if any working rails or RWM add any more to this. - Paul North.
In the Graniteville incident, one crew pulled into a side track. They reported clear to the dispatcher, but never closed the switch. Then the next train comes along...expecting to be lined up and wammo....chlorine gas everywhere.
The result was FRA Emergency Order 24, and the switch position form. Both the crew and the dispatcher must record, the switch name, date/ time use is authorized, person authorized to operate the switch, and the date/time the switch is lined and locked normal and returned to the dispatcher.
Nick
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Bucyrus mudchicken Robinson NM ....north of Las Vegas, NM (almost Onava)...Automatic Block territory with a Hi-Star switch stand. What is a Hi-Star switch stand?
mudchicken Robinson NM ....north of Las Vegas, NM (almost Onava)...Automatic Block territory with a Hi-Star switch stand.
Robinson NM ....north of Las Vegas, NM (almost Onava)...Automatic Block territory with a Hi-Star switch stand.
What is a Hi-Star switch stand?
If it is lubed and the switch points are greased good, easy as can be..if it is dirty, the thing has not seen the MOW guys in a while, and there is sand in the points...a pain in the back.
Seriously, it is a waist high switch stand, often mis labled a harp stand switch.
Even back then, main line switchs were required to be lined and locked/ latched for the intended route.
The rule book now specifies that the crew on the ground either cross to the opposite side of the track from the switch stand or if that is not possible, the crew member must stand more than 20 feet from the switch stand. This is to prevent the crew member from throwing the switch at the last moment.
Easy to get confused here, but if there are humans involved, there is the possibility of error.
Nightmare on the high plains Trains, September 1998 page 50 1956 collision between Santa Fe 19, Chief, and 8, Fast Mail ( ACCIDENT, ATSF, COLLISION, "DIVEN, WILLIAM P.", MEXICO, NEW, TRN )
Bubba, in this instance, under those conditions, not an ice cubes chance in....
As long as there are hand thrown switches.....
Not that this will help you find out anything, but would PTC protect us from that?
The road to to success is always under construction. _____________________________________________________________________________ When the going gets tough, the tough use duct tape.
Some few years ago Trains had an article on a man somewhere in the Southwest, I think on the Santa Fe, whose job it was to throw a switch to allow a passenger train to hurry by his own train which was parked on a siding. At the last moment he second-guessed himself and re-threw the switch, thus causing a horrific crash and wreck. He was not an old man and had to live in the small community for decades after but did so, somehow.
Who can tell me either the article/issue this was in, or enough about this incident that I can Google it? It really was a fascinating story.
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