Railway Man I have never in my life read an article more filled with outright lies. I sent the NY Times ombudsman several letters at the time expressing my dismay but none were answered. RWM
I have never in my life read an article more filled with outright lies. I sent the NY Times ombudsman several letters at the time expressing my dismay but none were answered.
RWM
Back around 1994, I wrote a letter to CBS regarding their clip on "Eye to Eye" with Connie Chung about railroad crossing accidents. They basically made it look like crossing accidents were the fault of the railroads, showing people going around lowered gates as well as telling about and showing accidents. They even had a camera crew on a crossing as the gates were coming down so they could film a train coming at the camera. I think my letter wound up at seven pages long with everything I had issues with on the show.
Kevin
http://chatanuga.org/RailPage.html
http://chatanuga.org/WLMR.html
cx500Generally the design requirement for crossing circuits is that the flashing lights and bells be activated at least 20 seconds before a train traveling at the maximum permitted speed fouls the crossing. Another couple of seconds are added to allow for the system to activate. The gates start dropping several seconds after the lights.So if there is less than 20 seconds, it may mean the engineer was speeding. Some crossings have speed prediction (with various levels of intelligence) so that slow trains are not triggering the system too far in advance, or so a stopped train will release the warning system. In this case I suppose it is possible the designers may not have properly allowed for an accelerating train.And another time when the warning could be short is if a train reverses direction before completely clearing the end of the circuit. Simple circuit logic doesn't realize the train is not going away and will only activate the warning system when the lead car reaches the insulated joint right by the crossing. But in this case speeds are usually slow and there should be a crew member protecting the point. Single RDCs were sometimes unreliable when it came to triggering CTC track circuits, especially when travelling fast. Dispatchers didn't like it when they failed to drop an OS circuit and they had to wait for it to time out, or the train disappeared for a while on their board. I suspect that certain CTC installations may have had lower sensitivity, since the problem did not seem to be universal.On very rarely used lines, rusty rails can prevent the system sensing the presence of a train and crews are ordered to be prepared to stop and flag the crossing if necessary.Complete failure is generally due to a major blackout that lasts longer than the back-up batteries can handle. But anything built by man can fail although the safeguards built into railroad signals make such incidents vanishingly rare (I know of none). Such safety does not come cheap, and the cost of even a simple crossing warning system is many, many times that of a traffic light.John
Generally the design requirement for crossing circuits is that the flashing lights and bells be activated at least 20 seconds before a train traveling at the maximum permitted speed fouls the crossing. Another couple of seconds are added to allow for the system to activate. The gates start dropping several seconds after the lights.
So if there is less than 20 seconds, it may mean the engineer was speeding. Some crossings have speed prediction (with various levels of intelligence) so that slow trains are not triggering the system too far in advance, or so a stopped train will release the warning system. In this case I suppose it is possible the designers may not have properly allowed for an accelerating train.
And another time when the warning could be short is if a train reverses direction before completely clearing the end of the circuit. Simple circuit logic doesn't realize the train is not going away and will only activate the warning system when the lead car reaches the insulated joint right by the crossing. But in this case speeds are usually slow and there should be a crew member protecting the point.
Single RDCs were sometimes unreliable when it came to triggering CTC track circuits, especially when travelling fast. Dispatchers didn't like it when they failed to drop an OS circuit and they had to wait for it to time out, or the train disappeared for a while on their board. I suspect that certain CTC installations may have had lower sensitivity, since the problem did not seem to be universal.
On very rarely used lines, rusty rails can prevent the system sensing the presence of a train and crews are ordered to be prepared to stop and flag the crossing if necessary.
Complete failure is generally due to a major blackout that lasts longer than the back-up batteries can handle. But anything built by man can fail although the safeguards built into railroad signals make such incidents vanishingly rare (I know of none). Such safety does not come cheap, and the cost of even a simple crossing warning system is many, many times that of a traffic light.
John
In the U.S. the standard warning time is 25 seconds. To this we add 5 seconds for equipment activation times, 1-5 seconds for vehicle clearance times if more than one track is inside the signals (depending on # of tracks and track centerline spacing), and additional time for traffic signal intertie pre-empt time, if such is included. The approach circuit is established at the distance calculated for that total time for the maximum authorized train speed limit on the subdivision. Thus, if the warning time is less, it is because the train is either in excess of the maximum authorized subdivision speed, or the train did not shunt the circuit, or the equipment malfunctioned.
There are few remaining signalized crossings in the U.S. without a Grade Crossing Predictor (GCP), which provides a constant warning time regardless of the train speed, direction, acceleration, deceleration, or reversal of direction. Similarly, there are few remaining crossings without event recorders that provide information about the warning time, the apparent speed of the train entering the approach circuit and any train speed changes, battery health, and so forth.
Bucyrus I have read an article in the NY Times that discusses failure to activate as being a big problem nationwide. They cite several cases of complete failure and also something they call “short signal,” meaning failure to provide at least 20 seconds of warning before the train reaches the crossing. They concentrate a lot of scrutiny on Amtrak trains, and make the case that their different type of braking can render the locomotive incapable of activating grade crossing signals. Here it is, but the link may not work for long unless you register: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E1D61739F933A05751C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E1D61739F933A05751C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
Bucyrus That is the hidden danger of false activation. That is, that it is like crying wolf. It does not justify or excuse ignoring the signals, but it does encourage it. I would suggest that a crossing signal that commonly false activates has a relatively higher probability of being ignored or violated than a signal that operates properly most of the time.
For me I have seen a couple of false activations near where I work but due to background noise of the area and the fact to track curves on either side, I won't risk crossing. However I did get out of my car once after waiting 15 minutes and no sign of train (I always have an "emergency" train camera available) walk up to the gate (I was the first car in line) to get the 800 number and called them. They asked for the gate designation and my phone number, and then called me back in ~2 min to tell me no train was in the area. Whether you would consider this smart and/or legal or not is debatable but at least people get notified of a possible gate malfunction and I felt safe driving across without getting killed.
ungern
PS if I do see someone driving around gates when I am also waiting I sometimes get a good picture just in case. My work depends on the railcars getting through to/from my place of employment so I have a vested interest in not having a branchline get shut down due to lawsuits.
spokyone Yesterday I was in Davenport IA, crossing the Iowa Interstate tracks at Marquette St, when I saw a distant grade crossing lights activate. Having my camera with me, I drove around the block to get my first pic of a IAIS train at that location. Then I saw it was a false activation. I waited around for a few minutes, then another activattion for about a minute. During that time, some drivers drove through without stopping, sight lines are good. Two city buses stopped & proceeded. Then later, false activation happened again. After I left, a car was hit by a train, & that was the third accident at that location recently. Luckily, no fatalities. Comments in the local paper suggest that faulty activations are common. I have no idea if IAIS is aware of the problem. A question. May school buses stop & proceed through false activation of lights? How about gates?
Yesterday I was in Davenport IA, crossing the Iowa Interstate tracks at Marquette St, when I saw a distant grade crossing lights activate. Having my camera with me, I drove around the block to get my first pic of a IAIS train at that location. Then I saw it was a false activation. I waited around for a few minutes, then another activattion for about a minute. During that time, some drivers drove through without stopping, sight lines are good. Two city buses stopped & proceeded. Then later, false activation happened again. After I left, a car was hit by a train, & that was the third accident at that location recently. Luckily, no fatalities. Comments in the local paper suggest that faulty activations are common. I have no idea if IAIS is aware of the problem. A question. May school buses stop & proceed through false activation of lights? How about gates?
That is the hidden danger of false activation. That is, that it is like crying wolf. It does not justify or excuse ignoring the signals, but it does encourage it. I would suggest that a crossing signal that commonly false activates has a relatively higher probability of being ignored or violated than a signal that operates properly most of the time.
I don’t know what the rules are pertaining to school buses needing to cross against signals that are falsely activating. The rules for this may be different than for cars, and those rules probably vary from state to state. Likewise, there may be special rules for trucks carrying flammable materials in the same circumstances. However, as Kevin has mentioned above, cars are permitted to proceed through a crossing against the flashing signals, after stopping, if there are no trains approaching, or if a train is stopped clear of the crossing, in some, if not all states.
But if there are gates, and they are down, the road is considered to be closed. It is not permissible to go around the gates in many, if not all states.
Here's what we were told in driver's ed back in 1990. If you come up to a crossing that just has lights (no gates), the lights are flashing, and no train is approaching or is stopped, you can proceed across after coming to a complete stop and determining that no train is approaching. If you come up to a crossing that has gates, the lights are flashing, the gates are down, and no train is approaching or is stopped, you cannot go around the gates unless flagged around by a railroad employee or law enforcement.
When we were doing the driving part of driver's ed, I was driving, and we came up to a crossing that just had lights and no gates. The lights were flashing, and I stopped the car. Our instructor told me to go across once we turned off the radio, rolled down the windows, and determined that no train was approaching. I was hesitant to go across since it was just a few months after a friend of mine was killed on his way to school when he ran the stop signs at an unprotected crossing south of our high school and went into the side of the westbound Capitol Limited (http://chatanuga.org/HOL.html).
Railway Man Bucyrus Quick question: In the U.S., what is the highest speed that trains pass over roadway grade crossings? 124 mph is the legal maximum speed. See 49CFR213.347 and 49CFR213.307 RWM
Bucyrus Quick question: In the U.S., what is the highest speed that trains pass over roadway grade crossings?
124 mph is the legal maximum speed. See 49CFR213.347 and 49CFR213.307
Al, Tyler, and RWM,
Thanks for your input on maximum speeds over grade crossings.
John,
Regarding your point about the signal triggering problems with RDCs, I have heard of this. Not only were the problems due to relatively lightweight of RDCs, but also due to the fact that they have disc brakes. Without brakes acting upon the wheel treads, a buildup of dirt and oil would develop. The self-cleaning nature of the wheel running on the rails was not sufficient to prevent this buildup.
The article linked above, refers to signal triggering inadequacy that seems to be associated with Amtrak locomotives, and specifically related to the braking systems on those locomotives, which is said to be different than on other locomotives. But they stop there and don’t describe the difference in braking systems. Do some Amtrak locomotives have disc brakes?
BucyrusQuick question: In the U.S., what is the highest speed that trains pass over roadway grade crossings?
al-in-chgo Bucyrus Quick question: In the U.S., what is the highest speed that trains pass over roadway grade crossings? Routinely? Just a WAG: The Acela in Connecticut, 125 mph. - a.s.
Routinely? Just a WAG: The Acela in Connecticut, 125 mph. - a.s.
Yes, there is trackage in CT that the Acela and Regionals travel on that has crossings, but I think the speed there is (only) 90 MPH...
Quick question:
In the U.S., what is the highest speed that trains pass over roadway grade crossings?
blue streak 1BucyrusThey cite several cases of complete failure and also something they call “short signal,” meaning failure to provide at least 20 seconds of warning before the train reaches the crossing I have observed a short signal several times on Miami's Tri-Rail between Metro - Rail and Airport station.
BucyrusThey cite several cases of complete failure and also something they call “short signal,” meaning failure to provide at least 20 seconds of warning before the train reaches the crossing
I have observed a short signal several times on Miami's Tri-Rail between Metro - Rail and Airport station.
wabash1 Bucyrus It is interesting to consider that in the final analysis, according to traffic laws, a driver would be at fault in any collision with a train at an active grade crossing, even if the signals had failed to activate. But I guess that, in a civil case, the negligence of a failed signal can outweigh the failure to obey the traffic law. The reality of it is if somebody does something stupid at a railroad crossing such as drive around gates never stop walk down the tracks with headphones on or jump on a moving train and fall under it and in any of these or countless other ways to get hurt or killed by the railroad it is not their fault it is the railroads fault. at least in the eyes of the court system
Bucyrus It is interesting to consider that in the final analysis, according to traffic laws, a driver would be at fault in any collision with a train at an active grade crossing, even if the signals had failed to activate. But I guess that, in a civil case, the negligence of a failed signal can outweigh the failure to obey the traffic law.
It is interesting to consider that in the final analysis, according to traffic laws, a driver would be at fault in any collision with a train at an active grade crossing, even if the signals had failed to activate. But I guess that, in a civil case, the negligence of a failed signal can outweigh the failure to obey the traffic law.
The reality of it is if somebody does something stupid at a railroad crossing such as drive around gates never stop walk down the tracks with headphones on or jump on a moving train and fall under it and in any of these or countless other ways to get hurt or killed by the railroad it is not their fault it is the railroads fault. at least in the eyes of the court system
I can understand the reason why railroads would be a tempting target for lawsuits. They have deep pockets, and everybody on a jury knows they are notoriously dangerous. So all the plaintiff has to do is convince a jury that a little bit of that danger was negligence. But surely the industry does not lose every case to grade crossing violators, do they?
When I suggested that railroads might need a different kind of presentation to convince a jury that the signals were working, I was thinking of a video recording. It seems to me that if BNSF could have gone into court with an unambiguous video showing the gates and lights working, the car maneuvering around the lowered gates, and the point of impact, I don’t think a jury could be persuaded that it was the railroad company’s fault. Does every locomotive have a video camera recording the track ahead these days that would make such a crash witness video possible?
I have never seen crossing signals fail to activate, but I have seen them falsely activate many dozens of times. But I do understand that is it possible for them to fail to activate even though it is apparently rare. It would be interesting to know the specific instances where signals have been known to fail to activate. But there are reasons why this information is not forthcoming. Victim advocacy groups would have you believe that failure to activate happens very often, and often leads to grade crossing crashes. Are they exaggerating for their own interest? Does the railroad industry exaggerate the infrequency of crossing signal failure to activate?
I can certainly understand the motive of victims to falsely claim that the signals had failed to activate. But in this day and age, you would think that signal activation could be clearly established by either a trackside or locomotive mounted device or a combination of the two. For as important as the signal activation event is, it ought not be left to accounts from eyewitnesses who have a stake in the legal outcome.
I have read an article in the NY Times that discusses failure to activate as being a big problem nationwide. They cite several cases of complete failure and also something they call “short signal,” meaning failure to provide at least 20 seconds of warning before the train reaches the crossing. They concentrate a lot of scrutiny on Amtrak trains, and make the case that their different type of braking can render the locomotive incapable of activating grade crossing signals.
Here it is, but the link may not work for long unless you register:
Bucyrus In this Anoka case, it is ironic that the BNSF lost the case because of the signals and gates, when those safety measures are expected to prevent crashes and lower the railroad company’s liability compared to their liability for passive or un-signalized crossings. Could the families have won this case if there were no signals and gates at this crossing? Is a signalized crossing with failed signals more dangerous to drivers than a crossing that is not equipped with signals?
Could we see a return to "Stop, Look, Listen"? Imagine the ears being part of that sensory field we would use to protect us" If Only We Had A Brain". Imagine the possibility that we could use the dang thing for more than a hat rack----
I really think the problem comes back to the issue that we give up responsiblity when we come to rely on equipment to the work for us. The crossings were only as good as the protecting devices were used as an adjunct to, and not the replacement of, self discernment.
Any argument carried far enough will end up in Semantics--Hartz's law of rhetoric Emerald. Leemer and Southern The route of the Sceptre Express Barry
I just started my blog site...more stuff to come...
http://modeltrainswithmusic.blogspot.ca/
The onus is now on the corporate side to prove their case. The unfortunate thing is that we are now seeing the result of what happens when we turn everything up on its ears. Common sense no longer is here--it is in the shadows, in the underground now----
The plaintiff's lawyers poisoned the evidence pool through the media and then whined and played the equity card. Nothing new - sad to see they found a judge gullible enough to go along with the jury. As for the appeal, hope they can find a flaw to appeal on. (We saw the same outcome with the assinine Missy Martin/Castle Rock court case here.)
Innocent until proven guilty applies only to criminal law. This was a civil case.
Dave
Lackawanna Route of the Phoebe Snow
the key is that nobody carries a desk top into the field and most officials are not carring laptops into the field either, with out these you will not see what is recorded. and the police does not have the soft ware to run the programs for reading the tapes. hence they wont get a copy of this. Now if they want to go to the yard office they will get to see all they need to see. The truth is someone made it sound like they would not give up the info, when they really dont have the means to read it. the card readers are totally differant from what the public gets in older engines its a 8 track tape cartage. and in the newer engines its the size of a credit card and in the bungalo its the same size if i recall as the newer engines( same type) and for the railveiw cameras they just bring a new box out and swap them. The law says that you are innocent til proven guilty in a court of law ( exception is unless your a railroad or employee of railroad then your guilty automaticly, )
In this Anoka case, it is ironic that the BNSF lost the case because of the signals and gates, when those safety measures are expected to prevent crashes and lower the railroad company’s liability compared to their liability for passive or un-signalized crossings.
Could the families have won this case if there were no signals and gates at this crossing?
Is a signalized crossing with failed signals more dangerous to drivers than a crossing that is not equipped with signals?
On appeal the ENTIRE verdict will be thrown OUT. In the END the Family will get NOTHING.
Revenge was looked for---and achieved---by lawsuit.
Re: "Then they charged that the inaccuracy was motivated by BNSF trying to cover up the truth about the signals not working. This charge fell on very fertile ground with general societal perception these days that large corporations are evil and greedy. They simply buried BNSF with the stigma of dishonesty, and then the premise that the signals did not work was the only explanation for the crash that fit the picture."
I think you're right. Lawyers have a term for this kind of verdict: the railroad got "hometowned." - a.s.
cx500 Bucyrus If I had to guess what happened, I would guess that the gates were down and the driver tried to beat the train. That was what was reported after the crash in 2003. That is what the police concluded. But still, the signals could have failed. It is a possibility, no matter how remote. I would even tend to dismiss the possibility of signal failure because it is so remote, and at least one witness said the signals were working. But here is the biggest problem that I have in dismissing signal failure: If BNSF had data that would establish that the signals were working, how could they have possibly failed to produce it? I can’t get around that point. If you read the original story, BNSF apparently did produce the recording that the signals were working during the trial. It appears they did not, however, provide it to the police at the scene. I have no way of knowing if it was in the form of a trace graph, or digital storage. Presumably a smooth lawyer convinced a gullible jury that since an opportunity may have existed, the big bad railroad had taken advantage of the gap to tamper with the recording. Digital raw data is often not user friendly, a great advantage when it comes to confusing the ignorant. It also tends to highlight the reality that the police can be unwilling to admit their own limitations when it comes to investigating accidents. I am not another cop-basher, merely observing that they sometimes don't have all the specialized knowledge required, and certain arrogant ones refuse to acknowledge this. Obviously they should have immediately asked the railroad personnel on the scene for the recording, but like many in the general public, didn't realize such a thing existed. Meanwhile the local signal tech followed normal procedure and forwarded it through internal railroad channels to the Claims department. No doubt the scene was gruesome enough that not many people were thinking in dry legal terms at the time. John
Bucyrus If I had to guess what happened, I would guess that the gates were down and the driver tried to beat the train. That was what was reported after the crash in 2003. That is what the police concluded. But still, the signals could have failed. It is a possibility, no matter how remote. I would even tend to dismiss the possibility of signal failure because it is so remote, and at least one witness said the signals were working. But here is the biggest problem that I have in dismissing signal failure: If BNSF had data that would establish that the signals were working, how could they have possibly failed to produce it? I can’t get around that point.
If you read the original story, BNSF apparently did produce the recording that the signals were working during the trial. It appears they did not, however, provide it to the police at the scene. I have no way of knowing if it was in the form of a trace graph, or digital storage. Presumably a smooth lawyer convinced a gullible jury that since an opportunity may have existed, the big bad railroad had taken advantage of the gap to tamper with the recording. Digital raw data is often not user friendly, a great advantage when it comes to confusing the ignorant.
It also tends to highlight the reality that the police can be unwilling to admit their own limitations when it comes to investigating accidents. I am not another cop-basher, merely observing that they sometimes don't have all the specialized knowledge required, and certain arrogant ones refuse to acknowledge this. Obviously they should have immediately asked the railroad personnel on the scene for the recording, but like many in the general public, didn't realize such a thing existed. Meanwhile the local signal tech followed normal procedure and forwarded it through internal railroad channels to the Claims department. No doubt the scene was gruesome enough that not many people were thinking in dry legal terms at the time.
What you are suggesting does seem like the most plausible explanation of what happened in the trial. I assume that BNSF presented the data that proved that the signals were working. The families’ lawyers pretended that they doubted the accuracy of the evidence. Then they charged that the inaccuracy was motivated by BNSF trying to cover up the truth about the signals not working. This charge fell on very fertile ground with general societal perception these days that large corporations are evil and greedy. They simply buried BNSF with the stigma of dishonesty, and then the premise that the signals did not work was the only explanation for the crash that fit the picture.
I have often thought of a long pointed wedge car mounted at the front of each train. Maybe with this wedge, cars and other obstructions on the tracks would be pushed aside or up in the air over the loco instead of being impacted by the loco like a giant sledgehammer. I think more and then I wakeup back to reality. You can't fix stupid.
Modeling the "Fargo Area Rapid Transit" in O scale 3 rail.
BucyrusIf I had to guess what happened, I would guess that the gates were down and the driver tried to beat the train. That was what was reported after the crash in 2003. That is what the police concluded. But still, the signals could have failed. It is a possibility, no matter how remote. I would even tend to dismiss the possibility of signal failure because it is so remote, and at least one witness said the signals were working. But here is the biggest problem that I have in dismissing signal failure: If BNSF had data that would establish that the signals were working, how could they have possibly failed to produce it? I can’t get around that point.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.