Railway ManIt's absolutely a railway term
From NS's home page, referring to the Mem Day shutdown: "Interline gateways will remain open for traffic delivered from connecting carriers..."
The term is used all the time on the operating side of the house.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Kevin C. SmithMurphy Siding How does/did a gateway function? To get approval from the Milwaukee Road for the BN merger, Milwaukee Road was given new gateways in, I *think* Louisville, and in Montana(?). So before that, if Milwaukee wanted to exchange westbound cars with NP or GN in Montana, they were just out of luck, if the Northern lines didn't want to ? Let's see if I read/remember this correctly... Somewhere, buried in the many Milwaukee Road and Pacific Coast Extension threads, I believe it was said that the Milwaukee was limited to interchanging westbound traffic to the GN & NP at the Twin Cities. That meant that a car originating in Chicago on the MILW to, say, Maple Valley, WA, on the GN would have to be turned over to the GN in Minneapolis/Saint Paul, rather than the MILW carrying it to Seattle on its own rails and delivering it to the GN there. Opening up additional "gateways" allowed the MILW to carry westbound traffic farther along its lines before surrendering it (and its cut of the rate) to BN. Did I understand correctly? If so, how on earth did the MILW agree to such a remote western traffic gateway as the Twin Cities in the first place?
Murphy Siding How does/did a gateway function? To get approval from the Milwaukee Road for the BN merger, Milwaukee Road was given new gateways in, I *think* Louisville, and in Montana(?). So before that, if Milwaukee wanted to exchange westbound cars with NP or GN in Montana, they were just out of luck, if the Northern lines didn't want to ?
How does/did a gateway function? To get approval from the Milwaukee Road for the BN merger, Milwaukee Road was given new gateways in, I *think* Louisville, and in Montana(?). So before that, if Milwaukee wanted to exchange westbound cars with NP or GN in Montana, they were just out of luck, if the Northern lines didn't want to ?
Let's see if I read/remember this correctly... Somewhere, buried in the many Milwaukee Road and Pacific Coast Extension threads, I believe it was said that the Milwaukee was limited to interchanging westbound traffic to the GN & NP at the Twin Cities. That meant that a car originating in Chicago on the MILW to, say, Maple Valley, WA, on the GN would have to be turned over to the GN in Minneapolis/Saint Paul, rather than the MILW carrying it to Seattle on its own rails and delivering it to the GN there. Opening up additional "gateways" allowed the MILW to carry westbound traffic farther along its lines before surrendering it (and its cut of the rate) to BN. Did I understand correctly?
If so, how on earth did the MILW agree to such a remote western traffic gateway as the Twin Cities in the first place?
There was/is no legal barrier to interchange between two Class 1s at almost all locations, but there might be a rather large financial disincentive. The shipper can specify any route he wishes through any interchange. However, there may not be a "through" or "interline" rate available at that location for the commodity offered by the shipper, only a combination of two local rates. That's because no Class 1 is obligated by law (so far) to short-haul itself.
For example, if a car was originating on NP at Auburn, Washington, in 1955, and waybilled to Chicago, the NP was under no obligation to quote a through rate via the Milwaukee Road interchange at Miles City, Montana, only via the Milwaukee Road interchange at St. Paul, Minnesota (and the same rate via the CB&Q or the C&NW), because otherwise it would be short-hauling itself. If the shipper insisted, "No, I want to get Milwaukee Road service east of Miles City," the agent would quote a combination of two local rates instead, raising the transportation price by maybe 2 or 3 times. That did happen sometimes.
Thus when someone says, "such and such gateway was opened," that means that the ICC required the long-haul carrier to quote a through rate at an intermediate gateway enabling the short-haul carrier to participate in the through rate. The ICC was thus requiring the long-haul carrier to short-haul itself, if requested by the shipper. The long-haul carrier would accept this condition in order to get something more important it wanted from the ICC, such as approval for a merger.
Some shipper groups today such as CURE are asking the STB to invalidate the short-hauling prohibition to remove what are termed "bottleneck rates," which is the refusal of a long-haul carrier to short-haul itself. For example, suppose coal originates in the PRB on Railroad A and moves to a power plant in Texas served by Railroad A. Railroad B also serves the PRB, but only gets within 20 miles of the power plant in Texas. Railroad A does the move at present at $22/ton. The power plant asks Railroad B to quote it a rate. Railroad B offers, say $18/ton from the PRB to its nearest interchange to the power plant with Railroad A, and asks Railroad A for a rate for the last 20 miles. Railroad A quotes $22/ton -- the same rate as its long-haul rate, because it has no desire to short-haul itself. At present, that is legal.
RWM
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
wjstixMurphy Siding Can someone explain the meaning and use of the term *gateway*, as it pertains to this, and other discussions? Thanks It may be more an advertising / marketing term than an actual railroad term. M-Saint-L promoted itself as "The Peoria Gateway" meaning that cars going say west to east could use the M-St.L's connections in Peoria to go around Chicago rather than thru it, thereby saving about a day's worth of time (and money) to get where they were going. It was a 'gateway to the east coast' I guess.
Murphy Siding Can someone explain the meaning and use of the term *gateway*, as it pertains to this, and other discussions? Thanks
Can someone explain the meaning and use of the term *gateway*, as it pertains to this, and other discussions? Thanks
It may be more an advertising / marketing term than an actual railroad term. M-Saint-L promoted itself as "The Peoria Gateway" meaning that cars going say west to east could use the M-St.L's connections in Peoria to go around Chicago rather than thru it, thereby saving about a day's worth of time (and money) to get where they were going. It was a 'gateway to the east coast' I guess.
It's absolutely a railway term not a mere marketing term in my 30 years in the business. Beyond its generic use -- a location where routes come together and a new route can be selected -- it also had a technical term to refer to the location where lines passed through rate territory boundaries. Thus, at a gateway, rates changed, route choices appeared, and things happened.
BTW the M-St.L used to pick up Santa Fe reefer blocks going to the Twin Cities and take them north from western Illinois (somewhere around Galesburg), allowing the fruit to get there much faster than if they had to go to Chicago and then go back northwest to get there.
greyhounds Paul_D_North_Jr I'll try to go easier on the Kneiling quotes and references in the future. But other than you, who else is there to look to for incisive commentary ? Anyway, have a good one. - Paul North. Aw, go ahead and stick with Kneiling. Yes, he did poke people in the eye. Most of 'em needed poking. It was his job to stir things up. He was good at that. I don't know what specifically RWM objects to about Kneiling - but during my time with the railroad I found Kneiling to be more right than wrong.
Paul_D_North_Jr I'll try to go easier on the Kneiling quotes and references in the future. But other than you, who else is there to look to for incisive commentary ? Anyway, have a good one. - Paul North.
I'll try to go easier on the Kneiling quotes and references in the future. But other than you, who else is there to look to for incisive commentary ?
Anyway, have a good one.
- Paul North.
Aw, go ahead and stick with Kneiling.
Yes, he did poke people in the eye. Most of 'em needed poking.
It was his job to stir things up. He was good at that. I don't know what specifically RWM objects to about Kneiling - but during my time with the railroad I found Kneiling to be more right than wrong.
This reminds me that while John was often substantively right - more often than he was given credit for, I think - he was nevertheless a real "bull in a china shop" when it came to communicating with people and persuading them, and did not "get along well with others" in other settings, such as the several political and governmental forums and bodies with which railroads are inextricably intertwined. He may have had good or excellent ideas, concepts, and proposals, but it is a truism in the engineering business (and others) that those great ideas are worthless if you can't communicate them effectively. John was just scary at how he went about that - some of that may have been merely for dramatic effect (I recall that he was an amateur thespian) - but if not, then he was dangerously naive about how some of society's generally accepted and hallowed institutions function (or don't), and how to work within their limitations to nevertheless achieve the desired goal. If he were in my shop, I would not have let him attend - let alone speak at - any meeting on other than purely technical matters, and maybe not even those. The risk of him inflaming people whose cooperation was needed would be too great.
A little personal story might illustrate this better: One of my professors at Lafayette College - the now late Dr. William G. McLean, P.E., then Chair of the Mechanical Engineering Dept. - knew John through a professional society in New York City. While I was taking a sophomore year 2nd semester course (Spring 1973) in Dynamics from Dr. McLean, he learned of my interest in railroads, and at my request, asked John for any advice he might have for me regarding a career in railroading. John told Dr. McLean to tell me to - in just about these exact words, too - "Forget about dynamics - study economcs instead !" Perhaps needless to say, that advice wasn't too popular with the messenger, but it was nevertheless faithfully conveyed back to me by Dr. McLean, and led to an interesting discussion as I recall. Now, 30 years later, the best I can say is that I did finish the Dynamics course with an A, and also went on to take and "ace" 3 Economics Dept. courses (including 1 in Antitrust) and the Engineering Science Dept.'s course in Engineering Economics (interest rates, the various time values of money, etc.), as those of you here could probably already tell. I continued to read John's writings - much more critically, though - and following the advice of the Marquis de Lafayette, “I read, I study, I examine, I listen, I reflect, and out of all of this I try to form an idea into which I put as much common sense as I can.”
Railway Man Dakguy201 To change railroads, isn't this a description of the reason for a large hump yard at a place like North Platte? It allows the western ports to build trains with little care as to the final destination of the boxes other than at the single car level. North Platte then sorts the incoming train into its destinations -- Selkirk, Global III, interchange at St. Louis or whatever. That's exactly what it is! Further: Paul and I are not debating purpose and need for such a facility. We are debating whether it's more economical for railways to supply their own facility made out of rail and ties instead of the facility supplied by the City of Chicago Department of Public Works made out of asphalt and concrete. RWM
Dakguy201 To change railroads, isn't this a description of the reason for a large hump yard at a place like North Platte? It allows the western ports to build trains with little care as to the final destination of the boxes other than at the single car level. North Platte then sorts the incoming train into its destinations -- Selkirk, Global III, interchange at St. Louis or whatever.
To change railroads, isn't this a description of the reason for a large hump yard at a place like North Platte? It allows the western ports to build trains with little care as to the final destination of the boxes other than at the single car level. North Platte then sorts the incoming train into its destinations -- Selkirk, Global III, interchange at St. Louis or whatever.
That's exactly what it is!
Further: Paul and I are not debating purpose and need for such a facility. We are debating whether it's more economical for railways to supply their own facility made out of rail and ties instead of the facility supplied by the City of Chicago Department of Public Works made out of asphalt and concrete.
RWM -
Ahh so - now I see ! Well said, between this and the previous longer post regarding same (above).
May I suggest adding this to the list of "Ways to Make Your Railroad Income Statement More Fluid" in your post of 05-16-2009 at 10:01 AM over on the "Fluidity?" thread at : http://cs.trains.com/trccs/forums/t/153111.aspx?PageIndex=2
Unless you think that it's already covered under 5. there ("Have someone else spend money on key terminals, use on toll basis that will never amortize the cost", etc.), that'll make 9 ways. So you only need 1 more for a "Top 10" list on David Letterman's TV show ! Fame and fortune are yours to be had ! Go for it, man !
Seriously, I'll have something more substantive on this later on. For the moment, it seems that:
1.) The external economies of having all of greater Chicago serve as the de facto intermodal terminal for everybody trumps (exceeds) the internal dis-economies of running the "not bound for Chicago" boxes there as well, which would be incurred possibly by extra handling (lift & reload), circuitous mileage, and adding to congestion at places those boxes don't otherwise need to be.
2.) All this is fine for the status quo of present traffic levels. But looking ahead strategically: If we accept that far more truck and IM traffic ought to be on the rails - like everything over 500 miles, and maybe a doubling of volume as projected by various studies by 2030 (or whenever) - how do we get the infrastructure from here there in a rational manner ? Not only will main line capacity have to be increased greatly, but also the IM terminals. Can the streets of Chicago handle any more ? Or, should the railroads start to plan for their own terminals to handle the increases in volume ? If so, how can that be accomplished with acceptable economics in the meantime ? What I'm concerned about is what I refer to as the "step" (or "quantum" or "increment" problem) - once capacity of an existing facility (such as an IM terminal) has been exceeded, the next small increase in volume can't yet support or justify a large new facility all by itself (such as a whole new IM terminal), so how do you scale up or make the transition between 1 of something to 1+ of it and then to 2 of it, etc. After that, of course, the subsequent steps are proportionately smaller as a fraction of the whole operation.
3.) Since that's how North Platte functions for carload traffic, does Proviso have a significant role in sorting inbound to Chicago / eastbound carload traffic ? Or is Proviso mainly for westbound / outbound cars ?
Railway ManWe are debating whether it's more economical for railways to supply their own facility made out of rail and ties instead of the facility supplied by the City of Chicago Department of Public Works made out of asphalt and concrete.
I think you're getting to the answer to the original question here. Why Chicago, rather than...
"Chicago" knew/knows that as long as everything has to stop there, the city holds competitive advantage. And by hook or by crook, that's what Chicago has always succeeded at doing.
Regarding CREATE. What do you think the chances are that the connection (NKP?) will actually be restored at Grand Crossing? Wouldn't that cut a half hour off every Amtrak schedule to the south on CN(IC), and free up track space?
Dakguy201To change railroads, isn't this a description of the reason for a large hump yard at a place like North Platte? It allows the western ports to build trains with little care as to the final destination of the boxes other than at the single car level. North Platte then sorts the incoming train into its destinations -- Selkirk, Global III, interchange at St. Louis or whatever.
Paul_D_North_Jr And the point about dock space being too valuable (beause it is in limited supply and high demand already at those tightly constricted locations) is also well-taken. So I'll ask this: Why not build an intermodal station stop on the TransCon lines somewhere out the cornfields (cheap land) in western Illinois (startegic location, way west of Chicago), where the container trains would stop and the "not- Chicago" (only) boxes would be stripped off and put on and into their own blocks or train for other points east ?
And the point about dock space being too valuable (beause it is in limited supply and high demand already at those tightly constricted locations) is also well-taken.
So I'll ask this: Why not build an intermodal station stop on the TransCon lines somewhere out the cornfields (cheap land) in western Illinois (startegic location, way west of Chicago), where the container trains would stop and the "not- Chicago" (only) boxes would be stripped off and put on and into their own blocks or train for other points east ?
RWM - Thanks again for your time and interest to respond intelligently to my little essays / editorials.
I hear what your saying about the "one big solution". Wasn't it E. H. Harriman who said, "I'm tired of building monuments to engineers ?" - meaning over-designs or mistakes, etc.
Continuing the Greek sub-theme here: Just last week I reminded one of my colleagues that after Hercules cleaned out the Augean stables (supposedly 3,000 oxen for 30 years' worth of manure, as one of his 12 penitential tasks) - by diverting 2 rivers through them, he then killed the guy who asked him to do it (because that guy went back on his word in some way - he didn't like how Hercules did it, I believe). Anyway, point well taken there, too - not all tasks are worth doing in terms of effects on career and reputation, as well as the other more usual considerations. This too from Robert Townsend in Up the Organization.
Paul_D_North_JrUpon further consideration: What this would be is a belt line (like the BRC or IHB) writ large or on steroids. As to the 3 reasons repeated above, they may not be all that formidable. Before CREATE, I would have a hard time making that argument, and would have to rely on the examples of joint facilities such as interlockings and grade separations (at the small end), to flyovers and trackage and haulage rights (in the middle range), to the recent corridor agreements (NS and CN, for example), exchanges of rights as part of merger agreements, and the Alameda Corridor (at the larger end), as precedents to make my case. But CREATE trumps all of them - since that was accomplished (somehow) and is being implemented, it does seem that many larger-scale coordination and cooperation projects are at least feasible. The most uncertain one is revisiting the ICC Termination Act - depending on "whose ox is being gored" and their reception in the current Congress and/ or Administration (keep in mind the more aggressive antitrust enforcement policies announced earlier just this week), I can't rule that out. As to the Strategic and shareholder's legal matters, as long as each railroad received something of benefit in return that its Board of Directors could reasonably find to be worthwhile for whatever they give up or advantage is conferred on another railroad as a "business decision" (similar to the contract law concept of "consideration"), that should immunize them from a shareholder lawsuit succeeding. It's only when there's a complete one-sided giveaway, corruption, or loss of a nature that "What were they thinking ?" is asked that such a "derivative suit" (the technical term for it) could succeed - I'm not aware of any such suit succeeding on the sole basis of a competitor receiving an advantage, without a corresponding loss to the subject corporation. Also, if STB approval were obtained, that would be a major practical (though not legal) obstacle to such suits. Whether a specific proposal is in fact reasonable and strategically acceptable to the railroad is another question entirely, and surely one that the railroad has to be persuaded is in its overall and long-term best interests, with all things considered. But for the railroads, the common enemy here is congestion - not each other - and the consequent waste and higher costs in crews, fuel, and lost business opportunities because the capacity isn't there due to delays, etc. (plus the community effects). There's an organizational saying something about how much fire is directed at each other instead of the common enemy. And for the Economic aspects, as John G. Kneiling used to say, "The loot shouldn't get away because of an inability to figure out how to divide it" - this is of like kind. - Paul North.
Upon further consideration:
What this would be is a belt line (like the BRC or IHB) writ large or on steroids.
As to the 3 reasons repeated above, they may not be all that formidable. Before CREATE, I would have a hard time making that argument, and would have to rely on the examples of joint facilities such as interlockings and grade separations (at the small end), to flyovers and trackage and haulage rights (in the middle range), to the recent corridor agreements (NS and CN, for example), exchanges of rights as part of merger agreements, and the Alameda Corridor (at the larger end), as precedents to make my case. But CREATE trumps all of them - since that was accomplished (somehow) and is being implemented, it does seem that many larger-scale coordination and cooperation projects are at least feasible.
The most uncertain one is revisiting the ICC Termination Act - depending on "whose ox is being gored" and their reception in the current Congress and/ or Administration (keep in mind the more aggressive antitrust enforcement policies announced earlier just this week), I can't rule that out.
As to the Strategic and shareholder's legal matters, as long as each railroad received something of benefit in return that its Board of Directors could reasonably find to be worthwhile for whatever they give up or advantage is conferred on another railroad as a "business decision" (similar to the contract law concept of "consideration"), that should immunize them from a shareholder lawsuit succeeding. It's only when there's a complete one-sided giveaway, corruption, or loss of a nature that "What were they thinking ?" is asked that such a "derivative suit" (the technical term for it) could succeed - I'm not aware of any such suit succeeding on the sole basis of a competitor receiving an advantage, without a corresponding loss to the subject corporation. Also, if STB approval were obtained, that would be a major practical (though not legal) obstacle to such suits. Whether a specific proposal is in fact reasonable and strategically acceptable to the railroad is another question entirely, and surely one that the railroad has to be persuaded is in its overall and long-term best interests, with all things considered.
But for the railroads, the common enemy here is congestion - not each other - and the consequent waste and higher costs in crews, fuel, and lost business opportunities because the capacity isn't there due to delays, etc. (plus the community effects). There's an organizational saying something about how much fire is directed at each other instead of the common enemy.
And for the Economic aspects, as John G. Kneiling used to say, "The loot shouldn't get away because of an inability to figure out how to divide it" - this is of like kind.
Kneiling's arch smugness as he doled out his prescriptions is still grating. It's easy to be prescriptive for others, and even easier to be moralistic in the delivery -- "You'd find a way if you just applied yourself harder." I think the more I am reminded of Kneiling, the more I dislike him. There's lots of Kneilingesque consultants today, sucking the air out of the room. I don't even want to even be in the same room with them because my life is too short to have my time wasted so uselessly.
I think there are easier, more remunerative, and more fruitful opportunities for the railroad investment dollar and the young, bushytailed railroader, than trying to create a belt railway to bypass Chicago. I'm not even sure the problem is so onerous on its merits that it justifies the herculean effort to solve it, nor that the purpose and need would persist long enough to pay for the solution. There is bad precedent: a number of high-cost, elaborate, engineered-to-death "This will finally fix that problem" railroad solutions, that by the time they got built had been overcome by events. It would be embarassing if this solution turned out to be another "Now, tell me again, why did we spend all of our management time and all or our free cash flow for five years on this?" solution.
All I can do is point out the hurdles as to why no one has already found a bypass for Chicago; indeed if these hurdles are able to be vaulted, someone with more energy than I, and the proper attitude, will quickly find a way to do it, and I'll be proven short-sighted and conservative.
Paul_D_North_JrSo I'll ask this: Why not build an intermodal station stop on the TransCon lines somewhere out the cornfields (cheap land) in western Illinois (startegic location, way west of Chicago), where the container trains would stop and the "not- Chicago" (only) boxes would be stripped off and put on and into their own blocks or train for other points east ? I wonder if anyone has ever done a study of this kind of thing ? - Paul North.
I wonder if anyone has ever done a study of this kind of thing ?
Yes, it's been studied. It won't even come close to paying for itself. I doubt it ever will because by the time the volumes grow high enough to make it viable, the volumes have grown so high that the problem that's trying to be solved can be more economically solved by other means. Namely, with very high volumes it now becomes economical to fill a ship with single-destination boxes at origin point(s). The sort is taking place in the city streets of Shenzen and Shanghai (on someone else'e nickel) instead of where it take place now on the city streets of Chicago (on someone else's nickel) instead of internalizing the costs with a rail-owned facility. Frankly, even if the externalized costs of Shenzen and Chicago were internalized to railroads -- their incremental cost -- I think it would still be much, much cheaper to pay that toll charge than a dedicated en route sort facility.
There is some sorting that takes place already at the ICTF and other West Coast ports to get the cats and dogs sorted out into blocks of like. Blocks are swapped en route at locations such as Belen, Clovis, and middle-of-line sidings. A train departing LA with Cicero, Alliance, Memphis blocks ends up with all Cicero blocks, for example. This is a fairly rough sort, however, not a fine sort. However, the new wide-span gantry cranes that are being installed at the very newest intermodal facilities (what I would call "third generation" intermodal facilities) will economically enable a much finer sort, reducing block swaps and enabling more steel-wheel interchange.
I think you might be thinking that intermodal facilities in Chicago are performing a sort function within the facility fence. For the most part they are not. They are simply unloading the boxes off the well cars as fast as possible, throwing them onto a chassis, and a yard goat carries them over to another well car, where they are reloaded. The difference between this method and your en-route facility is the other well car happens to be at another yard on the other side of the city, and the yard goat is street-legal and the brakes and lights are hooked up, and the dolly cranked up. The cost savings for doing it this way are tremendous, because now there's no need to purchase all the rail infrastructure it would take to get those well cars across the city in addition to all the other trains already on those tracks.
In other words, Chicago already is the facility you propose. Think of Chicago not as a collection of isolated yards but as one big yard that just happens to be kind'a spread out with some houses and schools and 7-Elevens in between, and the yard goats happen to use a public street to get one from one "side" of the yard to the other "side" of the yard. The only inefficiency is that it takes extra driver time and diesel fuel because the yard is so spread out. That is the negative cost opportunity basis you have to work with, against which you have to think about construction costs of the facility, and buying a lot of rail infrastructure across Chicago (or some other gateway) so the trains actually can get in, through, and out of the city faster than the current in, rubber across, and out.
Railway Man [snips] Economic: The biggest problem of all. There isn't enough economic incentive to go around Chicago to justify any sort of major investment in a bypass, since so much of the traffic is moving just to Chicago. Especially with intermodal freight, which moves "mine run" off the docks; to sort it out on the docks into "Chicago" and "not Chicago" chews up too much high-cost dock space and inserts too much delay into the travel times. [snip] RWM
Economic: The biggest problem of all. There isn't enough economic incentive to go around Chicago to justify any sort of major investment in a bypass, since so much of the traffic is moving just to Chicago. Especially with intermodal freight, which moves "mine run" off the docks; to sort it out on the docks into "Chicago" and "not Chicago" chews up too much high-cost dock space and inserts too much delay into the travel times.
[snip]
The point about "mine run" off the docks is well-taken - in other words, how the boxes get loaded onto the big container ship - and hence unloaded - is pretty much random. No one at that end of the supply chain is "pre-blocking" the groups of boxes for each specific destination. All of the boxes from Port A or Shipper A are on the bottom, and all those from Port B or Shipper B are loaded above, regardless of their destination. And even if the whole ship is loaded at one port, there are probably so many different manufacturers/ shippers on it to so many different destinations - and the ship's own need to remain balanced during the loading process to maintain in trim, etc. - that pretty much any attempt to organize it better is precluded or frustrated. So be it.
Well, that would raise the "too much delay in the travel times" problem. Fair enough - all the Chicago boxes would have to sit and wait while the non-Chicago boxes are unloaded. I have 3 responses to that:
1. If there are truly only a few "not Chicago" boxes on board, then it won't take long to do this, particularly if the facility is designed for this function and set-up as a run-through instead of as a stub-end yard (see below for more on that).
2. If there are a lot of "not Chicago" boxes on board - well, they have to be sorted out anyway, sooner or later. Why not do it here and avoid them getting in the way of the Chicago (only) boxes later on at the in-close Chicago terminals, where they don't belong anyway ? That would indirectly benefit the Chicago boxes. But because the Chicago boxes could nevertheless be unloaded from a regular unsorted or "unstripped" train immediately upon arrival anyway, this scheme would still introduce a transit delay for the pure Chicago boxes. The only way to compensate for that is a high and fast processing speed (see below), and perhaps taking advantage of this opportunity to simultaneously pre-block for sub-Chicago destinations - say, east side Class I interchange vs. west side, or CN vs. NS vs. CSX NorthEast and CSX SouthEast, etc. That way, sorting work that would have to be done at Choicago anyway could be done in advance out to the west.
3. Unlike class yards - which can basically sort 1 or at most several cars at a time - at an intermodal terminal several cars can be unloaded simultaneously. To an extreme, the picture I have in mind is like a mob of army ants attacking a carcass - say, 10 or 12 (or more) Piggy-Packers or TraveLifts (or whatever) poised to work the train as soon as it arrives, jump on it, get the boxes off (and maybe reload a few from other trains or wherever), and then get on it's way again. No uncoupling, no air test - just a long station stop - kind of like re-icing the refrigerator cars, or providing the required watering and exercising of the cattle from the stock cars at the 1,000-mile intervals back in the day. Thus, the delay could be kept down to an hour or so - insignificant in a 40 or 50 hour transit time.
Like many things, this has a "chicken-and-egg" aspect to it. If the volume of "not Chicago" traffic isn't there, then the cost of the facility and delay to the trains woudl be incurred speculatively in the hopes that "If you build it, they will come". If it isn't built or attempted, then there's no way to get out of the rut of the present mode of operations.
Railway Man blue streak 1 I often wondered why the RRs did not get together and make a multiple RR owned double (or more) track RR out of the old TP&W from Fort Madison to Ft Wayne and some connection to the old NYC route to avoid Chicago for all the long west to long east traffic. This type of connection would provide connection to the BNSF, UP, and KCS on the west end and the NS, CSX, CP, CN on the east end. A large yard somewhere around Webster, Il could handle what switching would be necessary. I know: Every RR will be afraid of loosing some revenue. Four reasons: regulatory, economic, strategic, and traffic. Regulatory: Under the ICC it would have required a complete "Rock Island sized" application and we all know how long that took and how well it worked out. Under the STB it would probably trigger a revisit of the ICC Termination Act by Congress because it has such broad affects on railway competition and service. Economic: The cost to do this is imponderable because costs are shared and making cost allocations are like grabbing jello with your fist. Who pays what? The guy who saves the most mileage? The guy who moves the most cars? The guy who moves the heaviest cars? The guy who moves the highest value cars? Strategic: This would invariably benefit some railways more than other. Why would a railway with a good position want to help a railway with a bad position? That's a license for a stockholder lawsuit. [snips] RWM
blue streak 1 I often wondered why the RRs did not get together and make a multiple RR owned double (or more) track RR out of the old TP&W from Fort Madison to Ft Wayne and some connection to the old NYC route to avoid Chicago for all the long west to long east traffic. This type of connection would provide connection to the BNSF, UP, and KCS on the west end and the NS, CSX, CP, CN on the east end. A large yard somewhere around Webster, Il could handle what switching would be necessary. I know: Every RR will be afraid of loosing some revenue.
I know: Every RR will be afraid of loosing some revenue.
Four reasons: regulatory, economic, strategic, and traffic.
Regulatory: Under the ICC it would have required a complete "Rock Island sized" application and we all know how long that took and how well it worked out. Under the STB it would probably trigger a revisit of the ICC Termination Act by Congress because it has such broad affects on railway competition and service.
Economic: The cost to do this is imponderable because costs are shared and making cost allocations are like grabbing jello with your fist. Who pays what? The guy who saves the most mileage? The guy who moves the most cars? The guy who moves the heaviest cars? The guy who moves the highest value cars?
Strategic: This would invariably benefit some railways more than other. Why would a railway with a good position want to help a railway with a bad position? That's a license for a stockholder lawsuit.
[snips]
I'd add "between 2 or more railroads, or 1 or more markets". Pretty tough to call something a "gateway" without some change in the traffic - either a connection or an origin or destination, etc. - occurring at least from one side of it to the other. Otherwise, it's just another point along the line.
Pretty much synonymous with what Vance liked to designate as "articulation points".
EDITED at 10:05 PM: ADD: - Of national or at least regional (multi-state) importance to the railroad network;
- With significantly large traffic flows - say, > 10 % of the railroad's volume; and,
- At or as a result of natural or man-made "relief" - i.e., the absence of - an otherwise significant geographic or topographic obstacle or feature, such as a route through a mountain pass, a port, a bridge over a major river, etc.
- PDN.
I'd define it as any strategic interchange point (Chicago, Peoria, St. Louis, Kansas City, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Maybrook, NY, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Memphis, Birmingham, Potomac Yard/Alexandra, VA, New Orleans, etc.), past or present.
DPJ
Does both NS and CSX still serve Peoria directly?
Jeff
CSXT never served Peoria (it came as close as Henry until IAIS took over that portion in February 2006). Most area CSXT business is handled by TP&W, but CN, IMRR and IAIS handle some as well.
Norfolk Southern makes a run to East Peoria from Bloomington-Normal about five nights a week.
bn13814 I see the reference about Peoria being the non-railhub from time to time. What about Peoria made people ever think it had a chance as a contender? Didn't one of the eastern trunklines, like B&O, PRR even have a line to Peoria? Some railroads took advantage of Chicago congestion and delays to market their Peoria Gateway routes, namely the M&StL (following its merger with the Iowa Central on New Year's Day 1912), the Nickel Plate (following merger with LE&W in 1922) and the TP&W (George P. McNear bought this railroad in 1927 and then promoted it as a bridge route between the ATSF at Lomax and the PRR at Effner). Interurban Illinois Terminal gained a connection with the P&PU in 1914, and thus a connection to steam roads (and as industries sprang up, so did Peoria Gateway business). The Peoria Gateway also handle north-south traffic flows between the Rock Island and the Chicago & Alton/GM&O, Illinois Central and Illinois Terminal. After acquiring the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis into Pekin in 1926, the C&IM solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Springfield or Taylorville (B&O and Wabash connections). The Peoria & Eastern (leased to the Big Four and later, New York Central) solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Indianapolis. Other carriers, such as the CB&Q, C&NW and PRR did interchange business at Peoria because some shippers preferred to route their traffic that way, or in some cases Peoria was the only logical point of interchange. Through the 1950's, the Peoria Gateway handled much east-west transcontinental interchange business.Then, the Gateway began to decline. The C&NW took over the M&StL in November 1960, and discouraged Peoria routings by downgrading Minneapolis - Peoria freights 19 and 20. Leasing the Wabash at the same time it purchased the Nickel Plate in October 1964, Norfolk & Western convinced shippers to give it the longer hauls via Kansas City (N&W reduced Peoria freight schedules in 1965). Around the same time, Peoria & Eastern eliminated its two pair of scheduled manifests and replaced them with one pair of daily extras (service deteriorated and shippers on the CB&Q for example diverted their traffic, when possible, away from Peoria). The Rock Island's liquidation in 1980 closed a major north-south flow of interchange traffic with ICG and IT. At least the TP&W retained its east-west bridge traffic, that is until 1981 when Conrail canceled interline rates which involved a Logansport routing. A sort of "Peoria Gateway Revival" came in October 1995 when Burlington Northern and Norfolk Southern shifted most of their Chicago interchange traffic via Peoria. Unfortunately, the Conrail Transaction gave NS a direct connection to BNSF at Streator and also a major classification yard at Elkhart and this"revival" ceased in June 1999. Peoria never really compared to Chicago or St. Louis regarding traffic volume but in 2009 remains a major interchange point for unit coal and some grain trains, and also a small volume of carload freight.
I see the reference about Peoria being the non-railhub from time to time. What about Peoria made people ever think it had a chance as a contender? Didn't one of the eastern trunklines, like B&O, PRR even have a line to Peoria?
Some railroads took advantage of Chicago congestion and delays to market their Peoria Gateway routes, namely the M&StL (following its merger with the Iowa Central on New Year's Day 1912), the Nickel Plate (following merger with LE&W in 1922) and the TP&W (George P. McNear bought this railroad in 1927 and then promoted it as a bridge route between the ATSF at Lomax and the PRR at Effner). Interurban Illinois Terminal gained a connection with the P&PU in 1914, and thus a connection to steam roads (and as industries sprang up, so did Peoria Gateway business). The Peoria Gateway also handle north-south traffic flows between the Rock Island and the Chicago & Alton/GM&O, Illinois Central and Illinois Terminal. After acquiring the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis into Pekin in 1926, the C&IM solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Springfield or Taylorville (B&O and Wabash connections). The Peoria & Eastern (leased to the Big Four and later, New York Central) solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Indianapolis.
Other carriers, such as the CB&Q, C&NW and PRR did interchange business at Peoria because some shippers preferred to route their traffic that way, or in some cases Peoria was the only logical point of interchange.
Through the 1950's, the Peoria Gateway handled much east-west transcontinental interchange business.Then, the Gateway began to decline. The C&NW took over the M&StL in November 1960, and discouraged Peoria routings by downgrading Minneapolis - Peoria freights 19 and 20. Leasing the Wabash at the same time it purchased the Nickel Plate in October 1964, Norfolk & Western convinced shippers to give it the longer hauls via Kansas City (N&W reduced Peoria freight schedules in 1965). Around the same time, Peoria & Eastern eliminated its two pair of scheduled manifests and replaced them with one pair of daily extras (service deteriorated and shippers on the CB&Q for example diverted their traffic, when possible, away from Peoria). The Rock Island's liquidation in 1980 closed a major north-south flow of interchange traffic with ICG and IT. At least the TP&W retained its east-west bridge traffic, that is until 1981 when Conrail canceled interline rates which involved a Logansport routing.
A sort of "Peoria Gateway Revival" came in October 1995 when Burlington Northern and Norfolk Southern shifted most of their Chicago interchange traffic via Peoria. Unfortunately, the Conrail Transaction gave NS a direct connection to BNSF at Streator and also a major classification yard at Elkhart and this"revival" ceased in June 1999.
Peoria never really compared to Chicago or St. Louis regarding traffic volume but in 2009 remains a major interchange point for unit coal and some grain trains, and also a small volume of carload freight.
Railway Man A fundamental fact of human expansion across the globe during the 2000 BC to 1900 AD time frame is it was simple for people to expand their range east-west and difficult for people to expand their range north-south. Moving east-west they didn't have to change their agricultural, animal husbandry, or housing practices, because they stayed within a fairly constant climate band. Moving north or south required radical change of practices, which in that era, where knowledge of anything other than what your predecessors had done was extremely limited, would be like asking a horse to become a zebra, or a woolly mammoth to become a gazelle. It was a recipe for starvation. Accordingly U.S. expansion was preponderantly east-west. Farming practices that worked in Pennsylvania translated to Ohio, to Indiana, to Illinois, to Iowa, to Nebraska, until the rain quit west of the 100th Meridian. Railways followed the plow. RWM
Another - even shorter - history of the world !
RWM, I presume you're familiar with Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water, by Marc Resiner (1986, rev. 1993) ?
That's where I first read about the promoters belief and settlers' delusion that "the rain will follow the plow" also, and the 100th Meridian being the western limit of dependable rainfall for arable land. Also where I first saw the quote about "perpetual growth being the ideology of the cancer cell".
To keep this post at least somewhat "on topic" for this Forum then: Do you have any thoughts that you can share about either the current or future effects on U.S. railways of: 1) the increasing population in the drier portions of the U.S. West - where there is clearly not enough naturally available water to sustain those populations without importing that water from another watershed basin a long distance away (e.g., Phoenix, AZ); and, 2) the apparent continuing decrease in annual precipitation in many of those basins over the past several years ?
I happen to share in the belief that "Water will be to the 21st Century what oil was to the 20th Century", but am fully prepared to be disabused of that notion.
Thanks in advance for whatever you care to expound upon regarding this.
Railway Man [snips] What I see, from my point of view, is far too much hand-wringing by us over how trains get through Chicago, when the crux of the problem is how trains just get into and out of Chicago. Chicago is a giant terminal, the world's largest. It's being made out to be something like a giant interlocking where trains don't stop, they just change tracks. If the problem was that simple it wouldn't exist. The problem is that the trains are going to and from yards that aren't all neatly laid out on a rim but are messily intertwined. Worrying only about the cross-city traffic is like fixing up the R/D tracks in a hump yard and ignoring the condition and arrangement of the pull-backs, the trim, and the bowl. It won't fix the yard at all, but it will look nice from the street. CREATE understands this problem and is working to resolve it; but since the usual ancedotal illustration is about "how long it takes a train to cross Chicago" and not "how long it takes a train to land at its yard" it is understandable that this is the message that's received. RWM
I view the Chicago "problem" from a broader holistic or "systems" perspective, starting with everything that's inside of a circle with a radius of about 100 miles from the Loop. Which is not to say that's a "black box" concept and that the nuts-and-bolts inside of it can be ignored. To the contrary, for me that's a rough gauge as to the limits of how far out all of the components need to be examined and analyzed to see if and how they are contributing to the problem, and what changes can and should be made up to that far out to contribute to the solution.
Once those components are identified, then the micro-analysis of each of the individual "hubs" (yards and junctions) and "spokes" (lines) - or whatever other analogy you prefer to use - inside that circle to optimize the functioning and performance of the metro Chicago sub-network can begin. To do otherwise risks overlooking possible alternative solutions that may help improve it. My understanding is that's what has been done by CREATE to come up with its list of proposed projects. For their details, see: http://www.createprogram.org/index.html
http://www.createprogram.org/PDF/corridors_map.pdf and
EDIT - 05-15-2009 at 5:00 PM: A better map - with the project status, and more importantly, the IDs for each project so than it can be correlated with the printed matter - is titled "Construction Status of CREATE Projects" and can be found at:
http://www.createprogram.org/PDF/CREATE_projects_v6_2009_03_19.pdf
[end EDIT]
http://www.createprogram.org/pdf/final_feasibility_plan.pdf - the "Final Feasibility Plan and Preliminary Screening" (August 2005), esp. the "List of Component Projects" on Pages 47 - 54 inclusive (Pages 47 through 54 of 358 of the PDF version), and the "Project Summary Table" on Pages 6 through 16 inclusive (Pages 114 through 124 of 358 of the PDF version).
As is often the case, a lot of these problems and projects are interactive and inter-dependent - some can "stand alone", but some are dependent on others being implemented to yield their maximum benefit.
The rest of this post by RWM [the portion that I snipped] is elegantly structured and quite rich in content despite its brevity, and well worth contemplating at length. Thank you !
bn13814 Paul, That Kankakee Belt article appeared in February 1969 TRAINS. DPJ
That Kankakee Belt article appeared in February 1969 TRAINS.
Thank you !
The Kankakee Belt is back in business Trains, February 1969 page 20 Penn Central's Chicago bypass ( DIVISION, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, PC, "PINKEPANK, JERRY A.", TRN )
I'll try to pull it and read it again sometime this weekend - and look for any follow-up articles that might shed some light on it.
Originally I got the Vance book from an inter-library lending program. However, after I had returned it, occasionally I found myself wanting to go back and read some specific section again. I found several copies were available from the on-line used booksellers for $10-$15. I'd recommend getting your own copy that way. ,
I just want to reiterate...reading Vance's book was an awakening. Just finished the western part of the book with details on most of the transcontinental lines to the west coast. Along with the book I used the Wikimapia service....the terrain view was great to actually see the geography which Vance described so well.
Unfortunately the book is due back tomorrow (inter library loans dont allow more than 14 days) and the chapter on Canada wont be read. Tomorrow is a 500 mile plus day (Lafayette, Indy, and Central Illinois) so the book wont be finished.
Great discussion here on St. Louis, Chicago, and the US railroad system. Thanks to all.
ed
ChuckHawkinsAt St. Louis, the eastern direct connection is the M&O to Cincinnati at 6 foot.
I'm sure that Chuck is referring to the Ohio and Mississippi, and not the Mobile and Ohio. I was not aware that it was six foot and not the standard of the East.
Johnny
MP173 greyhound:What about the BSM out of St Louis? It was single line service between StL and LA...and on a pretty darned hot schedule. As an aside, if you want to read a great railroad book, pickup Fred Frailey's Blue Streak Merchandise. It is an interesting look at modern railroading, post depression, thru the eyes of one train. ed
greyhound:What about the BSM out of St Louis? It was single line service between StL and LA...and on a pretty darned hot schedule.
As an aside, if you want to read a great railroad book, pickup Fred Frailey's Blue Streak Merchandise. It is an interesting look at modern railroading, post depression, thru the eyes of one train.
Ed,
I've got Frailey's BSM book. I really like the photo of the ten wheeler with the wooden boxcars when the BSM was created to handle LCL from St. Louis.
In the "TOFC Era" the BSM only went to LA and SP couldn't maintain a 50 hour schedule with the train. (Page 99) They gave 4th morning delivery out of St. Louis while ATSF was 3rd morning out of Chicago. Santa Fe was the service route to everywhere they went, and they went a lot more places than LA. When everyone was charging the same regulated freight rates west of Chicago and St. Louis, there was little reason not to route intermodal ATSF out of Chicago.
Heck, ATSF could compete with the BN from Chicago to Denver.
CNW-UP could compete with the Santa Fe to LA and the Bay Area. Santa Fe didn't go to the Pacific Northwest and CNW-UP was the service route up thata' way. BN took a while to get its Pacific Northwest TOFC act together. Anyway, the good service was out of Chicago, not St. Louis.
SP just got the "leavins". The service route from Chicago to Tucson was ICG-St. Louis-SSW/SP. Big deal. I was once interviewed with the SP. I actually made one of their guys mad when I mentioned that the ICG-SP route was the service route to Tucson. He wanted to know why other SP routes weren't "Service Routes". I had to point out that ICG-SP was the only real intermoal route from Chicago to Tucson. On other routes the trailers would move through yards and on boxcar trains.
I got the job offer anyway. But the ex-wife went back on her word and refused to relocate. I made a very bad decision when I decided to stay with her instead of taking the SP intermodal job.
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