Yes, I am looking forward to my beloved Cardinals playing the Royals and seeing the Royals' new phenom pitcher, but, that is not what I am referring to.
Everytime I go to a Cardinals game in Saint Louis, I take part of the usual pregame efforts to imbibe and enjoy the general pub surroundings south of the ballpark. In addition to being a great time, it is an awesome place to watch trains. There really is quite a bit more activity as compared to watching action in Indianapolis or Cincinnati. Anyway, everytime I go there, it always makes me wonder why Saint Louis, as a hub, plays second fiddle to Kansas City.
Saint Louis hosts more railroads, it is a better river port, and it is more central to other hubs like Memphis and Chicago. For that matter, given its location farther to the south and more centrally located in the United States, I have always wondered why it hasn't give Chicago more or a run for its money.
Gabe
P.S. If this thread should devolve into a tangent as to why Peoria never got off the ground to avoid Chicago congestion, I will not be too upset about it.
Gabe, I'm not sure I understand your question, so do you mind if I offer definitions and measurements that I do understand.
By hub, let's say that means both "interchange point" between line-haul railroads and "crossroads" within long-haul railroads.
Kansas City is only an interchange point to/from KCS and NS, neither of which are very large carriers in/out of Kansas City with only single-track railroads. BNSF and UP are through lines. IC&E is not (yet) a line-haul railroad; it's a gathering and distribution network. Kansas City, however, is a major crossroads on UP and BNSF, principally for PRB coal.
St. Louis in contrast is a major interchange point between CN, CSX, NS, UP, and BNSF, as well as a major crossroads for UP (MP-west, SSW, MP-south, SPCSL).
Perhaps you got this impression because most of what happens railroad-wise at KC is all visible in a very small area whereas at St. Louis it's much more spread out.
So, I don't see how you can say that St. Louis is less of a hub than KC. In fact, St. Louis is vastly more important for Gulf Coast (chemical, paper, agricultural) traffic than KC.
As to why St. Louis has always been lesser than Chicago, look at the traffic patterns. More traffic wants to go through Chicago than St. Louis because Chicago is:
All this stuff accretes and reinforces rail traffic. Rail traffic loves economy of scale. I wouldn't look to historical happenstance that Chicago grew and St. Louis didn't; geography was much more favorable to Chicago than it was to St. Louis, and the railways simply followed geographic logic as did the businessess that generated the traffic that demanded the rail service.
RWM
Another factor to consider is that most of the interchange in the St. Louis Switching District takes place on the Illinois side of the River.
In addition to Railway Man's comments, I understand that mergers, the railroads' desire to avoid paying for the use of TRRA's Mississippi River Bridge and also TRRA intermediate switching charges moved St. Louis down from #2 to #3 after 1980.
As for the former, N&W+NKP+WAB diverted some traffic away from St. Louis (and Peoria) and sent it through Kansas City. MP+C&EI and subsequently UP+MP gave a major western system a direct connection (Salem) with Conrail that avoided St. Louis. I suspect the 1999 Conrail Transaction also took traffic away from St.Louis. Mergers also reduced the volume of interchange between carriers at St. Louis - BN+Frisco, ITC+N&W, UP+C&NW, etc.
Still, geography and traffic flows favor some interchange via the St. Louis Switching District: BNSF with CSXT/NS and KCS with CSXT.
As for Peoria, I'm game (since I live there, and have dug up much history on the subject).
DPJ
I would think that one of the major issues would be the geographical ease of access for these locations. Go back 125 years and try bridging the Mississippi at St Louis versus further north for access to Chicago. I assume that would be a controlling factor. You can also see that the most direct routes to Northern California and the Oregon/Washington areas favor more northerly lines that make Chicago a natural point.
I was thinking much the same as Chuck Hawkins (above). Once the Eads Bridge was across at St. Louis and that bridgehead established, it would have given St. Louis a huge advantage over other Mississippi River towns without a railroad bridge crossing, at least until such towns got a bridge of their own. But then, the playing field would be more level as between those corssings and the towns on either side.
In contrast, KC does not have such a both compelling and limiting geographic feature / obstacle as the Mississippi River, or such an attractive response to it as a bridge, which would make it a "go to" location for a railroad. Connections and interchanges can be accomplished at other locations out that way nearly as well as at KC.
Similarly, because the Mighty Miss becomes smaller / narrower as it goes north, it would be easier to bridge further to the north than to the south.
It might be instructive to list all of the railroad bridges across the Mississippi River, from New Orleans up to the Twin Cities area, and then rank them in order by the dates when they were opened to traffic. See if a pattern forms as to when the St. Louis bridges were rendered "less essential" by - just for instance - the bridge at Thebes, the bridges at Memphis (3 of them ?), and the various bridges to the north into Iowa, and so on.
Finally, you might want to take a look at the oft-cited here James E. Vance Jr.'s The North American Railroad: Its Origin, Evolution, and Geography, Johns Hopkins University Press (1995), ISBN-10: 0801845734, ISBN-13: 978-0801845734. Although I don't have a copy with me and I can't recall what he had to say on this point, he was clearly devoted to analyzing such "articulation points". I would be surprised if he does not have a discussion of both cities.
- Paul North.
Railway Man Gabe, I'm not sure I understand your question, so do you mind if I offer definitions and measurements that I do understand. By hub, let's say that means both "interchange point" between line-haul railroads and "crossroads" within long-haul railroads. RWM
Good point. I, apparently incorrectly, assumed that when Kansas City was named America's number 2 railroad city--suprassing Saint Louis--it was referring to hub interchange traffic. If the reason Kansas City is now number 2 is based largely on the fact that a large volume of Powder River Basin Coal moves through it, that more or less shatters my previous undestanding.
Thanks,
bn13814 In addition to Railway Man's comments, I understand that mergers and railroads' desire to avoid paying for the use of TRRA's Mississippi River Bridge, and also intermediate switching charges moved St. Louis down from #2 to #3 after 1980. DPJ
In addition to Railway Man's comments, I understand that mergers and railroads' desire to avoid paying for the use of TRRA's Mississippi River Bridge, and also intermediate switching charges moved St. Louis down from #2 to #3 after 1980.
When I initially posted this topic, I suspected that this was going to be one of the conclusions. There are currently two active main railroad bridges in Saint Louis, right--not counting the now defunct McKinley Bridge and Metra-used Edes?
Does the TRRA rates apply to both active bridges?
I always wondered why the IT was not able to use its bridge accross the Mississippi more to its advantage in getting bridge traffic--no punn intended. I am sure there is an obvious answer here that will betray my novice-understanding. But, I would have to think having your own bridge accross the Mississippi wherein you do not have to pay TRRA rates would be a big advantage. As it was, I think the IT did all of its interchange on the east side.
Does KCS-CSX Saint Louis interchange have any advantage given it has its own--new, thanks to the floods of 1993--bridge north of Saint Louis? Or, is it pretty much on even footing, because NS does too?
ChuckHawkins I would think that one of the major issues would be the geographical ease of access for these locations. Go back 125 years and try bridging the Mississippi at St Louis versus further north for access to Chicago. I assume that would be a controlling factor. You can also see that the most direct routes to Northern California and the Oregon/Washington areas favor more northerly lines that make Chicago a natural point.
Mr. Hawkins, my long-lost brother, distant cousin, or person who just happens to share my last name, I certainly agree with your premise. But, time can change things. I can certainly understand why Chicago started out as number one. And, the factors that Railway Man mentioned makes me understand why Chicago continues to have such volume. But, now that the bridges are there and there are plenty of tracks leading to Saint Louis, it leaves me to wonder why a box car traveling from Salt Lake City to New York would not go through Saint Louis as opposed to Chicago. In addition to everything else mentioned, we are constantly reminded how congested Chicago is with rail traffic.
gabe...it leaves me to wonder why a box car traveling from Salt Lake City to New York would not go through Saint Louis as opposed to Chicago.
If we're talking an entire train of boxcars travelling from SLC to NYC, an alternate route might make sense, and I believe some unit trains PRB-SE US are taking such routes. But one boxcar destined for NYC in a train otherwise filled with boxcars bound for Chicago-area destinations might better go through Chicago.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68gabe...it leaves me to wonder why a box car traveling from Salt Lake City to New York would not go through Saint Louis as opposed to Chicago. If we're talking an entire train of boxcars travelling from SLC to NYC, an alternate route might make sense, and I believe some unit trains PRB-SE US are taking such routes. But one boxcar destined for NYC in a train otherwise filled with boxcars bound for Chicago-area destinations might better go through Chicago.
Yes! Larry has it right.
It's inventive to consider the bridge problem but it would not have made any meaningful difference had God Himself plopped one down in 1840 and sent gilded invitations to railways to come to St. Louis. The problem St. Louis had, looking at it in the 1840-1870 period, is that it was a destination, not a gateway, and not a really big destination at that: it had no big manufacturing presence, no big market for grain, hogs, cattle, or lumber
Chicago, in contrast, was the only gateway to a vast, fertile farming belt as well as the entire Northwest Territory. St. Louis, in stark contrast, led to an agriculturally sterile, rocky, deep-ravined wilderness, which had to be crossed at very high construction expense to reach farmland in Oklahoma and Kansas, which to this day cannot generate the economic rents of Iowa, Illinois, southern Minnesota and Wisconsin, and northern Missouri itself. And, upon emerging from its gloomy wilderness to arrive in Kansas City, a railroad from St. Louis would then find itself competing with a railroad from Chicago, which had arrived there at much lower cost, could haul the freight more cheaply, and unlike our poor struggling railway from St. Louis, had vast amounts of local traffic at every station.
gabeBut, now that the bridges are there and there are plenty of tracks leading to Saint Louis, it leaves me to wonder why a box car traveling from Salt Lake City to New York would not go through Saint Louis as opposed to Chicago. In addition to everything else mentioned, we are constantly reminded how congested Chicago is with rail traffic. Gabe
But, now that the bridges are there and there are plenty of tracks leading to Saint Louis, it leaves me to wonder why a box car traveling from Salt Lake City to New York would not go through Saint Louis as opposed to Chicago. In addition to everything else mentioned, we are constantly reminded how congested Chicago is with rail traffic.
Plenty of tracks? There is one good route between the articulation point at Kansas City and St. Louis, which is the former MoPac, and it is full-up with coal traffic.
There's a tendency to look at a big yard or a busy mainline and think, "Wow, there's a lot of traffic there." But in reality, as Larry pointed out, that is aggregate traffic comprised of thousands of O-D pairs, most of which are quite thin. Take a region the size of, say, Texas, and look at the traffic, and you'll find that more than 90% of the O-D pairs generate less than 2 cars per day.
Very few hump yards that generate trans-Mississippi cars have the kind of volume that can justify a St. Louis train as opposed to a Chicago train, unless the yard is going to accumulate cars for two or more days, which has rather expensive effects on car-hire and yard infrastructure costs. Suppose you go to one of the big western hump yards and look at it closely. Say the yard processes 2,400 cars per day. Half of those will go east, half west. That breaks down to 12 trains each way daily. Now subtract all the cars that are not destined for Chicago and St. Louis, and the long-easts that could go through Chicago and St. Louis. That will be roughly one-third to two-thirds of the cars, leaving us 6 trains per day worth of Chicago's, St. Louis's, and long-easts. Now subtract out the Chicagos, and we have maybe 3 trains per day left of St. Louis and long-easts. Now subtract the long-easts and we have maybe 1 train per day left of St. Louis cars. Now think about having to have another 2 bowl tracks in the yard to hold the long-easts for another St. Louis train every day, that we could otherwise just lump into the Chicagos and get rid of them. In other words, instead of averaging 4 hours dwell time on a long-east by putting it into a Chicago train, we've mandated 12 hours average dwell time. Now multiply 8 hours dwell time, times 100 cars per day, times 365 days per year, times $4/hour, and we've got a cost of about $1.2 million/year extra to avoid Chicago. Add onto that the allocated cost of $10 million for two bowl tracks, amoritized in (rough numbers) over 10 years at $3 million/year. Add onto that the loss of traffic because we've put a 10% hit into the travel times of the long-easts.
I'm just glad to see the Royals playing good ball, atleast for now. Don't know how long it will last, its been a long drought since that '85 season. Grenkie is certainly impressive. I watched the guy pitch in AA Wichita a few yrs back. Not only do they have the best pitcher right now, but the best play-by-play radio guy.Denny Matthews has been there since day one 40 yrs ago. During one sided games, he has in the past yaked on trains while growing up near the GM&O in IL. Railroad history & baseball, can't get any better than that.
Railway ManPlenty of tracks? There is one good route between the articulation point at Kansas City and St. Louis, which is the former MoPac, and it is full-up with coal traffic.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Carl, I hope to make a Chicago trip in 2010 to see a Cubs game @ Wrigley and yes I should not complain compared to the last Cubs World Series title way back in "08 (thats 1908 for those who may not have a knowledge of Cubs history).
I think that the Civil War had a huge impact on St Louis as a transportation hub. Although it remained in Union hands during the Civil War, the war retarded its importance.Union Pacific started from Omaha not St Louis. We have always been an east west economy also and that gives Chicago and Kansas City a huge advantage. Even if the Civil War had not happened; it is easier to build across Iowa to Omaha than across Missouri. Both the CB&Q and Rock Island lines between St Louis and Kansas City were secondary main lines. Santa Fe saw the importance of Chicago when it built east from Kansas City.
Gabe:I strongly second the endorsement of Paul North and RWM in the reading of Vance's North American Railway. Not only is Vance's book a railroad history, but it places the railroad in proper perspective regarding geography and economics. Think of it as the book that explains all of those lines on the 36x48 wall map....well at least most of the lines.
I am currently racing against the clock to finish North American Railway, as it needs to be returned to the library by Thursday. It is on loan (Interlibrary loan) from the Indianapolis Public Library. You should find it and read it.
Currently I am "in Chicago" in the book. Vance describes Chicago as an articulation point in which all eastern railroads tended to arrive at. He briefly discusses why consolidation of railroading interests did not pass Chicago. It basically came down to Chicago being a major destination point for lumber, grain, and animals (for slaughter). With the vast midwest grain and hog/beef markets nearby, Chicago became a point of trading of those commodities (and still is). Prior to the excellent communications systems we enjoy, physical delivery was made of these commodities.
So, Chicago was a destination for many products and an origin for many finished products. It became a funnel for the movement of those products from one railroad to another. The Eastern financial people had investment interests in western roads, but didnt want to operate them. RWM...was this perhaps due to the distance and communication issues involved?
I have always enjoyed trips to St. Louis. The east side of the river is fascinating with all of the terminals, both rail and barge and the bridge always seems to have a train moving slowly across. But, as previously stated, the Ozarks seemed to create an investment problem (and operations) for the railroads.
Perhaps another point is Lake Michigan. Not only was it an early intermodal partner with railroads, but in effect all train traffic for several hundreds of miles must circumnavigate the lake, by dropping south to the foot of the lake, or Chicago.
Not only does St. Louis have a lack of agriculture west (and southwest), but there is limited agriculture south of say...Mt. Vernon/Centralia. The landscape changes drastically.
Also, take a look at the flows of traffic in the US. Lots of raw materials move from west to east. There are not many strong eastern lines out of St. Louis, one could argue only the CSX ex Conrail line. The CSX line to Cincy is weak and the former L&N line is chopped up. The NS line (ex Southern) has never been strong. Memphis pretty much handles the south. With only one good line from KC (ex Mopac) and only two good lines east of St. Louis, it is pretty much at it's potential.
I am really rambling now and will sign off, but Vance's book really locks in the concept of railroad developement in the US. Normally, I tend to find historical books a bit dry for my tastes, this one is on the money.
ed
Railway Man [snip] Very few hump yards that generate trans-Mississippi cars have the kind of volume that can justify a St. Louis train as opposed to a Chicago train, unless the yard is going to accumulate cars for two or more days, which has rather expensive effects on car-hire and yard infrastructure costs. Suppose you go to one of the big western hump yards and look at it closely. Say the yard processes 2,400 cars per day. Half of those will go east, half west. That breaks down to 12 trains each way daily. Now subtract all the cars that are not destined for Chicago and St. Louis, and the long-easts that could go through Chicago and St. Louis. That will be roughly one-third to two-thirds of the cars, leaving us 6 trains per day worth of Chicago's, St. Louis's, and long-easts. Now subtract out the Chicagos, and we have maybe 3 trains per day left of St. Louis and long-easts. Now subtract the long-easts and we have maybe 1 train per day left of St. Louis cars. Now think about having to have another 2 bowl tracks in the yard to hold the long-easts for another St. Louis train every day, that we could otherwise just lump into the Chicagos and get rid of them. In other words, instead of averaging 4 hours dwell time on a long-east by putting it into a Chicago train, we've mandated 12 hours average dwell time. Now multiply 8 hours dwell time, times 100 cars per day, times 365 days per year, times $4/hour, and we've got a cost of about $1.2 million/year extra to avoid Chicago. Add onto that the allocated cost of $10 million for two bowl tracks, amoritized in (rough numbers) over 10 years at $3 million/year. Add onto that the loss of traffic because we've put a 10% hit into the travel times of the long-easts. RWM
RWM, whatever the mathematical disease is that I've got, it looks like it's contagious . . . spreads via close forum contact, perhaps.
I see and concur with your point above about the first St. Louis bridge not being determinative in attracting railroads - even with an invitation from on high - due to the disadvantage of the intervening territory beyond, in comparison with alternative routes around that territory to the north directly from Chicago.
Next, with respect – because I might begin to look “nit-picky” here - a couple of clarifications, questions, and quibbles with regard to the above:
1. The "delta" / increase in the dwell for the long-east cars via St. Louis is more like 1.6 hours average, not 8, because those trains will leave more often than just the St. Louis cars (only) trains, as follows:
My understanding of your hypothetical eastward train volume is 6 per day, of which 3 go to Chicago only (6 - 3), 2 are long-easts only (3 - 1), and 1 to St. Louis only. Keeping the same implied (unstated) assumptions / basis, such as inbound cars arriving at a uniform or constant rate per day with a proportionate distribution of destinations, and outbound trains also leaving at a uniform rate with no unbalanced destinations:
Long-easts via Chicago scenario: If we route all the 2 trains of long-easts via CHI in addition to the 3 CHI trains, then there's 5 trains a day (24 hrs.) going that-away at a 4.8 hours average interval, or 2.4 hours average dwell for those cars. St. Louis gets its 1 train (only) per day, with 12 hour average dwell. The weighted average dwell is then [(5 x 2.4 = 12) + (1 x 12 = 12) = 24] / 6 = 4 hrs. per car.
Long-easts via St. Louis scenario: If we route all the 2 trains of long-easts via St. Louis instead, then there's 3 trains (1 St. Louis + 2 long-easts) a day (24 hrs.) going that way at a 8 hours average interval, or 4 hours average dwell for those cars. Chicago now also gets its 3 trains (only) per day, likewise with 4 hour average dwell. The weighted average dwell is then [(3 x 4 = 12) + (3 x 4) = 12) = 24] / 6 = 4 hrs. per car again. But the dwell for the 3 trains of Chicago (only) cars has increased from 2.4 hrs. to 4 hrs. (+ 1.6 hrs.), as has the dwell for the 2 trains of long-east (only) cars increased from 2.4 hrs. to 4 hrs. (+ 1.6 hrs.), while the 1 train of St. Louis (only) cars have benefited from a decreased dwell from 12 hours to 4 hours (-8.0 hrs.). [Note that this checks: the aggregate of the increases in dwell times = 5 trains (3 Chicago + 2 long-east) x 1.6 hours increase = 8.0 hrs. equals the sum of the decrease in dwell times for the 1 train of St. Louis (only) cars at 8.0 hrs.]
2. 2 trains of long-east cars per day would be 200 cars per day that are affected by the increased dwell, not 100 cars.
3. $4 per hour for car hire ? That’s $96 to $100 per day, around $3,000 per month or $35,000 per year. Seems high to me unless there are other components or aspects there that aren’t stated, it’s a special car, or has unusually high daily expenses - such as a refrigerator car that uses fuel all the time as well, etc. I thought about half that - $2 per hour, $40 to $50 per day was more typical ?
4. Redoing the multiplication, but with my figures instead: Multiply 1.6 hours increase in average dwell time, times 200 cars per day, times 365 days per year, times $2/hour, is about $235,000/ year extra for the long-east cars (only) to avoid Chicago. Breaking it down a little: 1.6 hours increase in per-car dwell at $2 per hour = $3.20 per car, times 200 cars per day is $640 per day, times 365 days = $235,000 per year in increased car-hire costs. Note that the $640 per day in increased car hire isn’t near enough to justify even another crew/ train start and locomotives to avoid it by sending out a train sooner.
If we also look at the 3 trains of Chicago cars (300, of 50 % more), whose average dwell is also increased by 1.6 hours, the annual increase in car hire cost from that is about $350,000.
Balanced against that is the savings in car hire for the 100 St. Louis (only) cars – 8 hours x $2/ hr. = $16 per car x 100 cars per day = $1,600 per day x 365 = $584,000 – exactly the same as the total of the increased car hire costs for the Chicago (only) and long-east cars (only) ! (Or, as my father-in-law likes to say, “Save on the bread – lose on the cheese.”) So, it’s really more of a question as to which traffic route gains, and which one loses.
5. The $10 million for the 2 bowl tracks and the amortization of same at $3 million per year sounds way high to me, as follows:
For a 6,500 ft. long (roughly 100 cars at 60 ft. each = 1 of these train lengths, plus a couple hundred feet back to each of the clearance points, etc.) bowl track, the track (only) at $100 per foot is $650,000. Add a pair of turnouts (switches) at $50,000 each and allow $100,000 for the retarder to serve that track plus something for signals and controls takes it up to $850,000.
For land, use a 20 ft. wide average strip x 6,500 ft. long including the turnouts and distance to the clearance point = 130,000 sq. ft. = 3.0 acres. At $200,000 per acre (informed guess), that’s $600,000.
The capital recovery factor for the amortization over 10 years at an internal rate of return (“IRR”) of 10 % per annum is 0.16275, or $162,750 per $1 million; the stated $3 million per year for $10 million over 10 years would be an IRR in the range of 27.5 %. Even accepting that, the $4 million of allocated yard infrastructure investment will cost about $1.2 million additional; if the 10 % IRR is used instead, it would be more like $650,000 added per year for those 2 additional bowl tracks.
Certainly if I have misunderstood or made a mistake in any of the above, please feel free to point that out.
CShaveRRThat could be literal, buddy! Just heard about a wreck on the Jeff City Sub with lots of coal cars blocking both tracks.
When I saw this on the noon (MT) news, I saw a brief shot of an NS engine, which made me wonder until I saw more description and then I knew it was on the former MP. Way to go, TV news reporting!
Johnny
Umm, that's more math than I want to deal with today. No offense, but ...
A couple of points I can tease out:
Blocking has several issues that confound a simple analysis. The big one is that the smaller the block, the higher the costs, and the lower the volume, the higher the costs. A bowl track can build two 45-car blocks daily (two turnovers daily) or it can build one 20 car block every other day (one turnover every other day); which is cheaper? Thus the idea in yards is to accrete volume, and because Chicago has higher volume, it tends to sweep up the long easts and keep dwell and costs low on the long easts, whereas St. Louis increases costs. Some other factors:
Thanks for the thoughtful and detailed response, the preceding plethora of numbers notwithstanding (and fortunately not too much of a deterrent).
I can readily see that the value of the bowl tracks is driven more by the "zero-sum game" aspects of the land/ yard infrastructure/ and available blockings, than by a simple replacement or addition acquisition and construction cost estimate. In that context of being a part of a "unique" asset of fixed or limited size, assigning the higher "opportunity cost" value makes more sense.
Your other comments about the principles and nuances of blocking practice are of course most informative and insightful from experience, as usual. I want to digest them further before responding - there may not be anything more for me to say on that.
Thanks again.
Is it safe to assume that "long easts" refer to interlined freight from a western carrier to an eastern carrier (such as UP to NS)? Quite a bit of that type of freight seems to be built at North Platte and Galesburg for direct movement thru Chicago to Elkhart, Williard, Conway, and Selkirk. How much of it is actually humped in Chicago? Does Clearing Yd provide that much service? Proviso probably does.
The entire routing/blocking is something we have discussed earlier and seems very dynamic. Systems seem to have been developed which will handle any possible O/D combination, yet the system remains fluid for change. The information driving these systems must be very detailed and powerful. Case in point....with the sudden reduction in traffic the past year, railroads seem to be able to reblock traffic flows and cancel trains.
How quickly are the railroads able to make such adjustments? What drives these adjustments...in other words at what point does an operations dept in conjunction with marketing decide that this train will be cancelled and therefore we will add 48 hours to transit time?
On a micro level, the past two years has seen the Chicago Ft Wayne and Eastern drop from daily runs to and from Chicago to every other day and now down to 2x weekly. Granted, the CFE is not nearly as complex a system as say the NS or CSX, but 2x weekly is a very severe drop in service. Of course with daily service there were operations issues and most trains were recrewed.
RWM, are there any indications that StL might become a more important railroad junction point in the future? Or has the Meridian Speedway eliminated that possibility? Granted, the M/S handles Southeastern traffic primarily that wouldnt go thru StL, but prior it passed thru New Orleans or Memphis, which would seem to open more capacity at either of those locations.
Anyway you look at it, Chicago seems to be the sticking point, unless there is something in the works.
Great discussion.
Just add what I can.
When the Santa Fe really began to emphasize intermodal with trains such as the #188 50 hour schedue from Chicago to LA, St. Louis was really left in the dust for that growing business.
The rate structure had a lot to do with it. The intermodal rates to/from the west coast were "equalized" between midwestern/southern terminals in Chicago, Danville, St. Louis, Memphis and New Orleans to/from west coast points such as LA, Oakland, Portland and Seattle. The charge to ship two trailers (it had to be two) from any origin to any destination was the same.
Trailers moving between eastern points and the west coast moved on combination rates, generally a seperate rate applying east of the junction point and the equalized rate west of the junction point. The rates to/from the east were higher to/from St. Louis than they were to/from Chicago. This meant the total through charges to/from the west were higher via St. Louis than Chicago. The result was obvious, the trailers went through Chicago.
And St. Louis couldn't compete for this traffic on service either. Santa Fe set the standards for intermodal service and they didn't go to St. Louis. On a route not involving the Santa Fe, Yellow Freight would pig its hot LTL loads from St. Louis to the Pacific Northwest thrrough Chicago routed either ICG-Chicago-CNW-Fremont-UP or ICG-Chicago-BN. The more direct service from St. Louis wasn't good enough. (Although the MoP kept trying and would temporarily get the business back from time to time.)
greyhound:What about the BSM out of St Louis? It was single line service between StL and LA...and on a pretty darned hot schedule.
As an aside, if you want to read a great railroad book, pickup Fred Frailey's Blue Streak Merchandise. It is an interesting look at modern railroading, post depression, thru the eyes of one train.
Is there any barge to railroad, or railroad to barge shipping done at St. Louis?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy Siding Is there any barge to railroad, or railroad to barge shipping done at St. Louis?
Lots of coal from the PRB and Colorado to barge for downriver use or export, at Cahokia Marine at Sauget, Illinois.
RWM, and others -
I re-thought some of our exchange of posts yesterday, and now add these further thoughts:
1. Your $10 million for the 2 bowl tracks to sort and hold long-east cars for via St. Louis is probably much closer to the mark as the "value to the enterprise" of them, as opposed to my replacement construction cost estimate. I got to thinking along the lines of accomplishing the same task by other means - namely a container sorting yard. I believe it was greyhounds who in the RoadRailer thread a week or so ago stated that intermodal lifts cost around $50 each. Using that as a base, and allowing for at least 1 container at 20+ tons each to replace each railcar at 100+ tons each (and that's for just for 263K cars- and could well be 4 to 6 containers instead), that means it would cost around $50 for each railcar to substitute the class yard's sorting function at a container yard. So, for those 200 long-east cars per day, the 2 bowl tracks in that class yard is providing 200 x $50 = $10,000 per day of value, x 365 days per year = $3,650,000 per year, which is comfortably close to and still above your figure, to capitalize out at $10 million.
And now, just for the heck of it: Figuring it takes 5 containers to equal 1 railcar at $250, that's $50,000 in sorting value per day ==> $18.25 million per year of value, at a Cap Rate of 0.16275 per annum (10 years, 10 %) would yield a capitalized value of $112+ million for just those 2 bowl tracks ! (If each track is 6,000 ft. long, that's around $9,300 per LF.) I would hope the local highway dept. would think twice about the possible amounts it might have to pay as and for "fair and just compensation and market value" before its decide to condemn those bowl tracks for its next Interstate highway project. Maybe I should be in the appraisal business instead ???
2. Others above (MP173 ?) have mentioned that the geography and terrain for the rail lines to the east of St. Louis were and are just as challenging as those to the west. That point seems to have merit and be equally important to me. For the long-east cars, where did and do such easterly lines go to, that aren't just as easily reached by the other routes ? Pretty much just the Carolinas, I think. Everything Atlanta and south can be reached via the Deep South routes well enough. More importantly, there's nothing that goes from St. Louis more directly to the MidAtlantic and NorthEast U.S. than from Chicago. However, from Chicago itself there were and are at least 3 good routes that provide pretty much direct single-line access to everything on the Atlantic seaboard north of Norfolk - B&O (now CSX) to Balt. and Wash. and points north, PRR's (now NS) line to the same and to NYC (don't forget the carfloat from Cape Charles to Norfolk, too), and NYC (now CSX) to New York and points northeast.
3. "Upon this point, a page of history is worth a volume of logic." - U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Whatever we might think of as being the best route today, as it actually happened 125 years or so ago the fact is that Chicago developed for this function and got there first. As a result, the entire infrastructure - both physical and organizational - subsequently developed in a way to best serve the consolidated traffic flow through Chicago, and as a result everybody has followed that pattern and now pretty much has Chicago as their "mind-set" (kind of like the principal emigrant trails going out West). Just like NYC is the nation's (and maybe the world's) financial hub and has a "lock" on that despite its disadvantages, no one wants to risk totally discarding Chicago interchange, as it is now a known and comfortably accepted quantity. Also, no one has enough money to route through St. Louis as a commercial experiment - other than perhaps NS's "Heartland Corridor" ?
4. The tools here are not the equipment such as railcars, locomotives, trains, tracks, yards, etc., nor even the resulting routes. Those are just the conceptual nuts-and-bolts that are assembled into functional units that are commercially sustainable - i.e., fill an important economic need and make enough profit to continue as a "going concern". The real tools are the entire integrated networks that connect between Vance's various "articulation points" (gateways), and especially the dynamic abilities of those systems to quickly adjust and respond to changing external economic and market conditions with revised schedules, alternate routes, etc. In their own way, they are each living, interacting, self-sustaining organisms, aren't they ?
Just some thoughts, that's all. 'Til another time.
gabe P.S. If this thread should devolve into a tangent as to why Peoria never got off the ground to avoid Chicago congestion, I will not be too upset about it.
I see the reference about Peoria being the non-railhub from time to time. What about Peoria made people ever think it had a chance as a contender? Didn't one of the eastern trunklines, like B&O, PRR even have a line to Peoria?
I often wondered why the RRs did not get together and make a multiple RR owned double (or more) track RR out of the old TP&W from Fort Madison to Ft Wayne and some connection to the old NYC route to avoid Chicago for all the long west to long east traffic. This type of connection would provide connection to the BNSF, UP, and KCS on the west end and the NS, CSX, CP, CN on the east end. A large yard somewhere around Webster, Il could handle what switching would be necessary.
I know: Every RR will be afraid of loosing some revenue.
Some railroads took advantage of Chicago congestion and delays to market their Peoria Gateway routes, namely the M&StL (following its merger with the Iowa Central on New Year's Day 1912), the Nickel Plate (following merger with LE&W in 1922) and the TP&W (George P. McNear bought this railroad in 1927 and then promoted it as a bridge route between the ATSF at Lomax and the PRR at Effner). Interurban Illinois Terminal gained a connection with the P&PU in 1914, and thus a connection to steam roads (and as industries sprang up, so did Peoria Gateway business). The Peoria Gateway also handle north-south traffic flows between the Rock Island and the Chicago & Alton/GM&O, Illinois Central and Illinois Terminal. After acquiring the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis into Pekin in 1926, the C&IM solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Springfield or Taylorville (B&O and Wabash connections). The Peoria & Eastern (leased to the Big Four and later, New York Central) solicited bridge traffic between Peoria and Indianapolis.
Other carriers, such as the CB&Q, C&NW and PRR did interchange business at Peoria because some shippers preferred to route their traffic that way, or in some cases Peoria was the only logical point of interchange.
Through the 1950's, the Peoria Gateway handled much east-west transcontinental interchange business.Then, the Gateway began to decline. The C&NW took over the M&StL in November 1960, and discouraged Peoria routings by downgrading Minneapolis - Peoria freights 19 and 20. Leasing the Wabash at the same time it purchased the Nickel Plate in October 1964, Norfolk & Western convinced shippers to give it the longer hauls via Kansas City (N&W reduced Peoria freight schedules in 1965). Around the same time, Peoria & Eastern eliminated its two pair of scheduled manifests and replaced them with one pair of daily extras (service deteriorated and shippers on the CB&Q for example diverted their traffic, when possible, away from Peoria). The Rock Island's liquidation in 1980 closed a major north-south flow of interchange traffic with ICG and IT. At least the TP&W retained its east-west bridge traffic, that is until 1981 when Conrail canceled interline rates which involved a Logansport routing.
A sort of "Peoria Gateway Revival" came in October 1995 when Burlington Northern and Norfolk Southern shifted most of their Chicago interchange traffic via Peoria. Unfortunately, the Conrail Transaction gave NS a direct connection to BNSF at Streator and also a major classification yard at Elkhart and this"revival" ceased in June 1999.
Peoria never really compared to Chicago or St. Louis regarding traffic volume but in 2009 remains a major interchange point for unit coal and some grain trains, and also a small volume of carload freight.
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