Are the railroads run along the military model, or does it just seem that way to outsiders?
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Murphy Siding Are the railroads run along the military model, or does it just seem that way to outsiders?
NO!
The Army is far more flexible and innovative. I'm serious.
greyhounds Murphy Siding Are the railroads run along the military model, or does it just seem that way to outsiders? NO! The Army is far more flexible and innovative. I'm serious.
The railroads are run along the Harvard School of Business model. When John Kennedy's Secretary of Defense tried to institute those policies in the military, the result was paralysis by analysis and some very expensive (and downright stupid) blunders. Examples:
OTOH, the Army manual on operating railroads in war zones seems to have been based on the premise that nothing in railroading has changed since WWII. It's full of references to telegraph lines, roundhouses and TTTO operation that has been dead for half a century.
Chuck [MSgt(ret)]
tomikawaTT OTOH, the Army manual on operating railroads in war zones seems to have been based on the premise that nothing in railroading has changed since WWII. It's full of references to telegraph lines, roundhouses and TTTO operation that has been dead for half a century. Chuck [MSgt(ret)]
I would guess that updating the manual on operating railroads in war zones has a relatively low priority.
First, let me say that I was Chuck's worst minor irritant. Kind of like a fly he had to shoo away. I was a 2nd Lieutenant. But I was a 2nd LT in the Transporation Corps and actually served in a rail detachment at Ft. Eustis, home of the Transporation Corps.. (They told me I was in charge of the detachement.)
I'd like to understand what happened with the Army's use of rail. From the Civil War through the Korean War rail transporation was critical to the US Army. Then all emphasis on rail just went away. It's not like somebody on the other side just figured out that rail lines could be attacked. The Union Army in the Civil War operating near Atlanta was dependant on rail supply. The Military Railway Serivce performed this supply. The Rebs knew this and continually tried to cut the rail line with their calvary. So that's not new. (A Union general named Thomas is credited with devising ways to keep the line guarded and open.)
In Korea there were five railway operating battalions. They provided most of the ton-miles. 15 years latter in Viet Nam, Army rail didn't exist. I have no idea what caused the shift. The road convoys sure took attacks, and they continued to do so in Iraq.
In Britain and Europe the British army still uses rail to transport some items, and so does the US Army. Explosives are banned from the Channel Tunnel but within Britain, and on main land Europe they are moved extensively by rail.
When the Chunnel opened for business in 1994 one of the first freight trains to use it was a US Army special conveying a field hospital from Britian all the way to one of the former Soviet republics as part of the relief effort following an earthquake there.
For a long time the British military establishment had opposed the construction of the Channel Tunnel but in the 1950's a study by the Pentagon suggested that in the event of a conventional war between Nato and the Warsaw pact, the Chunnel would enable troops and supplies to get from Britain to the expected front line in Germany a day sooner.
Historically, in Britain at any rate, railway management structure was modelled on military lines because back in the 1830's the army was the only organisation with people in lots of places so the railways copied their command structure.
Murphy:
I like to argue that the military is run on a railroad model. Except we do it much better.
Having just been at an O-6 level reporting to a major general, and with going on 25 years in the railroad industry, I have some experience in the differences and similiarities:
Similar:
Differences:
Or to put it moe simply.
There is the RIGHT WAY,. the WRONG WAY and then ther is the ARMY WAY!!!
This comes from working for the army for many years. VERY buracratic, they do not care what it costs, dont think, just follow orders. We NEVER had enough money for training or new equipment, but comes the end of the fiscal year and WHALA money suddenly appeared for the bosses to take boondoggle trips to germany and the far east. At the end of each fiscal year, IF there was money left over we were told to buy new furniture or anything else that we wanted. DO NOT WANT TO SENT MONEY BACK TO THE TREASURY!!!
Ditto RWM's comments:
(+) Go back and look at the effect of the Civil War Union Army Transportation Corps had on american railroading from titles/ranks down to technical methods. - Huge!
-former ATSF Roadmaster
I had to google porkpie hat, just to figure out what one was! Was that the preferred headgear for management only, or the operating department as well?
If you mean that there was a formal chain of command and discipline form top to bottom, then yes, railroads were designed similar to military form. A lot of military people joined railroads after the Civil War when operation and safety matters, new modes of communication, more trains, multiple tracks, longer track segements (and railroads), everything bigger and faster; it had to be dealt with in a serious manner. And so it evolved. And it was a strict adherence with difinitive divisions of labor and authorities working up and down and not across. Today's railroading is a ghost of such discipline.
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mudchicken Ditto RWM's comments: (+) Go back and look at the effect of the Civil War Union Army Transportation Corps had on american railroading from titles/ranks down to technical methods. - Huge! -former ATSF Roadmaster
Remember that many former Civil War soldiers and officers were involved in building the transcontinental railroads, like Gen. Grenville Dodge etc.
Railroads are set up in divisions, just like the army. In fact the hierarchy of the military is very similar to the way railroads were set up.
Before the Civil War, conductors wore long black coats and top hats. After the war they wore blue coats with gold buttons similar to Union army coats, and wore hats with brims somewhat similar to military uniform hats. BTW in the South, conductors were often called "captain", although the anology was of a ship's captain than an army captain, since the conductor (not the engineer) was the person in charge of the whole train.
Combine the historical responses above from tulyar15 and mudchicken, plus henry6 and wjstix while I was writing this, and for today add in RWM's comments.
Until the U.S. Civil War, railroading was pretty much a local business only - maybe the B&O was the only one longer than a day's trip. That changed when the U.S. Army generals co-opted the fragmented rail system and made it theirs out of necessity*, in the process integrating it and imposing their systems and culture on it. That was partly by default, and partly by accident, because the military model was all they had, and the railroad looked a lot like a civilian version of the military anyway, and it looked like that engrafting would work pretty well, and it did.
After the war, when the first long-distance rail construction started (UP), many of the now-surplus soldiers wound up there as either guards or workers - including the generals, as engineers or managers, etc. Also, much of the territory that was being built through was protected or under the ambit of - yep, the U.S. Army - so there was no getting away from it. At time went on and people rose through the ranks and trained others and moved on, the culture / religion was inculcated in new people and new places. Lo and behold, the resulting uniformity - today we call it compatability or interchangeability - was also a good thing, which just reinforced it all.
* - "Amateurs study tactics; professional soldiers study logistics." - Tom Clancy, in Executive Orders or Red Storm Rising (I think, although I see it's also been attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley, among others). Note that - if I've got the details right - the only 3-star general promotion by General "Stormin' Norman" H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. during or as a result of the 1991 Gulf War was for Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis, who handled all of the logistics and material supplies for the US forces (in 2000 he joined the Board of Directors of RailAmerica) Pagonis has also co-authored a Harvard Business School book about that experience, titled "Moving Mountains", which looks like it might be interesting.
- Paul North.
Paul_D_North_Jr Combine the historical responses above from tulyar15 and mudchicken, plus henry6 and wjstix while I was writing this, and for today add in RWM's comments. Until the U.S. Civil War, railroading was pretty much a local business only - maybe the B&O was the only one longer than a day's trip. That changed when the U.S. Army generals co-opted the fragmented rail system and made it theirs out of necessity*, in the process integrating it and imposing their systems and culture on it. That was partly by default, and partly by accident, because the military model was all they had, and the railroad looked a lot like a civilian version of the military anyway, and it looked like that engrafting would work pretty well, and it did. After the war, when the first long-distance rail construction started (UP), many of the now-surplus soldiers wound up there as either guards or workers - including the generals, as engineers or managers, etc. Also, much of the territory that was being built through was protected or under the ambit of - yep, the U.S. Army - so there was no getting away from it. At time went on and people rose through the ranks and trained others and moved on, the culture / religion was inculcated in new people and new places. Lo and behold, the resulting uniformity - today we call it compatability or interchangeability - was also a good thing, which just reinforced it all. * - "Amateurs study tactics; professional soldiers study logistics." - Tom Clancy, in Executive Orders or Red Storm Rising (I think, although I see it's also been attributed to Gen. Omar Bradley, among others). Note that - if I've got the details right - the only 3-star general promotion by General "Stormin' Norman" H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. during or as a result of the 1991 Gulf War was for Gen. William "Gus" Pagonis, who handled all of the logistics and material supplies for the US forces (in 2000 he joined the Board of Directors of RailAmerica) Pagonis has also co-authored a Harvard Business School book about that experience, titled "Moving Mountains", which looks like it might be interesting. - Paul North.
I'm currently reading Rush Loving's "THE MEN WHO LOVED TRAINS" and one of the points he makes about why the Penn Central merger degenerated the way it did was that the Pennsy's management was of the traditional "Military" style (superiors addressed as Sir, Innovation from the top down) while the NYC's managerial style was considered (at the time) more "modern" (more informality and decentralization). Loving does point out , though,that both the "Red Team" and the "Green Team" contributed to the non success of the new company.
"I Often Dream of Trains"-From the Album of the Same Name by Robyn Hitchcock
When I was in the track construction business, the guys I worked for were (from the top down):
- Ex-US Navy "SeaBee" (Construction Battalion) Captain;
- 2 Ex-US Navy Lt. Commanders, 1 from the Viet Nam era;
- 1 ex- US Army Captain.
EDIT: Forgot to mention - 2 of the top were ex-PRR Track Supervisors, 1 of whom had the Hudson (North) River tunnels in his territory, and the last was an ex-PRR Asst. Division Engineer for the Phila. Division. 'Nuff said about the military-railroad connection ?
The guys I worked with in the field - typically as foremen or equipment operators - were mainly non-commissioned officers ("NCOs") of various grades.
Also, we did a lot of work at, in, or serving various military installations up and down the East Coast of the US. (Security clearances and passes - a whole 'nother delight in life.)
I don't recall that much of what we did or how we did it was explicitly military or the same way, but the style and culture were sure there underneath and in the background.
To add to part of 13 on RWM's list (above) - "Railroads and the military are games played outdoors all over.": I'd add construction to that list, at least the kind I do - the civil, "heavy and highway", site, and building structural stuff (not the indoor fit-out work, of course). On further thought, many of the construction organizations I've been involved with shared most (but not all) of the items in his list, no doubt because there was a principal cadre of military personnel in them, too.
And to add to RWM's list of the differences (and not be too cavalier about it):
3. The risk of being shot at and captured (or worse), for decidedly inferior compensation and "perks" (with apologies to Tom Clancy again).
Finally, I'd be remiss if I didn't take this opportunity to say to all who have been in the military:
"Thank you for your service to our country."
greyhounds tomikawaTT OTOH, the Army manual on operating railroads in war zones seems to have been based on the premise that nothing in railroading has changed since WWII. It's full of references to telegraph lines, roundhouses and TTTO operation that has been dead for half a century. Chuck [MSgt(ret)] I would guess that updating the manual on operating railroads in war zones has a relatively low priority. First, let me say that I was Chuck's worst minor irritant. Kind of like a fly he had to shoo away. I was a 2nd Lieutenant. But I was a 2nd LT in the Transporation Corps and actually served in a rail detachment at Ft. Eustis, home of the Transporation Corps.. (They told me I was in charge of the detachement.) I'd like to understand what happened with the Army's use of rail. From the Civil War through the Korean War rail transporation was critical to the US Army. Then all emphasis on rail just went away. It's not like somebody on the other side just figured out that rail lines could be attacked. The Union Army in the Civil War operating near Atlanta was dependant on rail supply. The Military Railway Serivce performed this supply. The Rebs knew this and continually tried to cut the rail line with their calvary. So that's not new. (A Union general named Thomas is credited with devising ways to keep the line guarded and open.) In Korea there were five railway operating battalions. They provided most of the ton-miles. 15 years latter in Viet Nam, Army rail didn't exist. I have no idea what caused the shift. The road convoys sure took attacks, and they continued to do so in Iraq.
I am not being sarcastic in asking this, but were there even railroads in Vietnam? The very fact I have to ask that quesiton, I think answers some of your question. Also, I think the nature of the war in Vietnam probably did not require railroads as much as Korea.
In Korea, there was a front. On at least two occassions, massive amounts of troops and supplies had to be rushed to the front in order to deal with developments. I would think railroads would be more ideally suited to serve this function. In contrast, in Vietnam, there wasn't really a front that required the massive movement of troops to a concentrated area in a relatively short period of time.
As to the (I assume you mean the second) war in Iraq, I can't speak with certainty, but I can guess.
Altough Iraq had a railroad, I am not sure it was functional in time for it to be much use to the invasion. Moreover, the chief concern in the--major combat portion at least--of the Iraq war was protecting the supply lines, etc. Although railroads are much more immune to sabotage, etc. than say a pipeline, powerline, or phone line, I think it would take much less manpower to protect a road than a rail line--if you cut the rail line, you have to fix it; if you blow a hole in a road in the middle of the dessert, you drive around it for a 20 second delay. Given that our manpower was preceived to be so short that we hired private companies to take care of our supply lines, I could see why the Army would opt for the use of roads.
As it looks as though I "get" to go to Iraq shortly to take some depositions at Quarmat Ali, lucky me, perhaps I might be able to get a first hand account of all of this . . .
Gabe
Yes, Iraq has and had railroads right along. See TRAINS mag from a couple of years ago.
gabeI am not being sarcastic in asking this, but were there even railroads in Vietnam? The very fact I have to ask that quesiton, I think answers some of your question. Also, I think the nature of the war in Vietnam probably did not require railroads as much as Korea. In Korea, there was a front. On at least two occassions, massive amounts of troops and supplies had to be rushed to the front in order to deal with developments. I would think railroads would be more ideally suited to serve this function. In contrast, in Vietnam, there wasn't really a front that required the massive movement of troops to a concentrated area in a relatively short period of time. As to the (I assume you mean the second) war in Iraq, I can't speak with certainty, but I can guess. Altough Iraq had a railroad, I am not sure it was functional in time for it to be much use to the invasion. Moreover, the chief concern in the--major combat portion at least--of the Iraq war was protecting the supply lines, etc. Although railroads are much more immune to sabotage, etc. than say a pipeline, powerline, or phone line, I think it would take much less manpower to protect a road than a rail line--if you cut the rail line, you have to fix it; if you blow a hole in a road in the middle of the dessert, you drive around it for a 20 second delay. Given that our manpower was preceived to be so short that we hired private companies to take care of our supply lines, I could see why the Army would opt for the use of roads. As it looks as though I "get" to go to Iraq shortly to take some depositions at Quarmat Ali, lucky me, perhaps I might be able to get a first hand account of all of this . . . Gabe
The railway in Iraq could have functioned for the military, had they needed it for the invasion. They didn't. The railway was activated shortly after the invasion for resupply for the military, and was highly effective in that role during 2003-2004.
The man who made this happen was LtCol Bob Pelletier, who in his day (or night!) job is a corridor manager for UP. Bob used a small team of non-railroaders drawn from the military to build a communications team that coordinated U.S. military activity with the railway itself. The operating and management of the railway was performed 100% by the Iraqis. No U.S. expertise or participation was needed. Bob's role was to get the U.S. out of the way so the railway could do its thing, and to line up traffic for them to haul.
U.S. military traffic on the IRR ended when the U.S. military lost interest and disbanded the rail cell that Bob built. This came about because I think of two primary reasons. First, the U.S. military has very little direct experience with railways any longer, due to the general invisibility of railways in the U.S. culture as a whole. Fifty years ago, everyone "knew about railroads," and the military, which draws its personnel from the general public and not from Planet Mars, thus always had a built-in familiarity with what railways can do, how they do it, and how to make it happen. After Bob left there was no one left to market the railway from within the U.S. military structure. Second, the U.S. military was not particularly interested in working directly with Iraqis. They continually entangled themselves in tortured planning that held out as a goal wanting to make use of the railway but stumbled on not wanting to trust the railway. How on earth you can do business with someone you won't trust is beyond me. This led to silliness such as the military insisting it conduct all its discussion of the railway with me on SIPRNET (secure e-mail), in which it would ask me to conduct discussions with the railway. I would reply, "How do you want me to discuss a classified operations plan in an un-class environment? I never did get an answer to that one.
There was a common thread in Iraq when I was there, and before and after, that arrogantly assumed that only U.S. personnel could possibly be smart enough, organized enough, and ambitious enough to run a railway. And this was amplified in Iraq due to U.S. preconceptions about Arabs. This type of attitude (hardly limited to the railway, it was pervasive throughout the oil, electric, and other sectors of the Iraqi economy and government), greatly harmed our mission. In fact, the Iraqi railroaders were as good as, if not better than, your average American railroader. They didn't have much use for doing maintenance, due to inherent cultural reasons, and they'd never been allowed to run the railway as a business, because Iraq's economy and government had been constructed on the Soviet model, but when it came to day-to-day sheer operating agressiveness, ability to get things done in horrendous conditions, and teamwork across a far-flung, hostile environment, they could do it. Because we came in with our bad attitude, we never could figure out how to accomplish one of our primary goals, which was to set up the Iraqi state as a functioning market economy and government. It's more than unrealistic to expect people to act like adults when you treat them like children.
Gabe, you asked if railways are more vulnerable than highways. The answer is actually no. The key vulnerabilities are bridges and tunnels, and highways have them too. Tunnels are fairly easy to secure. The problem with a highway is that it's a public conveyance, and unless you plan to close them to the public (and thus kill the state's economy deader than a dodo bird) the highway becomes a fertile field for the IED and the ambush. The railway in contrast can be an exclusion zone. You secure the grade-crossings and close as many as possible. You shoot anyone who wanders into it.
But we never had much interest in doing that kind of a security set-up. First, we didn't like to have U.S. military in fixed positions outside of FOBs, because they were highly vulnerable to ambush while traveling back and forth to their FOBs. Second, we didn't have much interest in training people to speak Arabic before the war, so we couldn't put people into the field in order to yell "Halt, don't go there or we'll shoot! to Iraqi sheepherders and kids who would wander onto the right-of-way. Third, we didn't have much interest in handing back the country to the Iraqi military, because we didn't like their methods. Their methods are, of course, tribal. Tribes control regions and business is conducted in that region at the direction and indulgence of the tribe. We imagined it was all going to be a happy democracy and everyone was going to be equal. Of course, to do that, we were asking the Iraqis to undo overnight 2,000 years of culture, social mores, commercial relationships, family relationships, and foreign relationships.
Railways are extremely resilient to track damage, too. The bad guys regularly blew up track in a few places, and the IRR just as regularly had it back in service in a few hours, too. It might have been ugly track with a 10-mph slow order, but it worked. Power lines, pipelines, and telecom, in contrast, are all-or-nothing technologies; they don't have slow orders.
We could have moved all the material supply needs for the Army -- food, water, fuel, construction materials -- by rail, at a cost of about 1/100th what it took to truck it. The savings to the U.S. Government would have been far in excess of $1 billion. I may have that number too small by a factor of 10 or more. But measuring that against the fundamental changes that would have to occur in our attitudes, in the way we interacted with the Iraqi government, and our willingness to change the way we do things, I ultimately determined it was a quixotic use of my limited time.
gabe I am not being sarcastic in asking this, but were there even railroads in Vietnam? The very fact I have to ask that quesiton, I think answers some of your question. Also, I think the nature of the war in Vietnam probably did not require railroads as much as Korea. [snip]
Gabe - Yes, there were, and are (apparently quite nice, too !) For example, see: http://www.seat61.com/Vietnam.htm
But back in the Vietnam war days, it was inherited from the French, and apparently a favorite target of the Viet Cong guerrillas. From time to time in the 1960's the Trains "Newsphoto" section would have a photo from there, unfortunately usually of a GE diesel or an armored railcar that had hit a mine (or similar) and blown off the tracks into the ditch or jungle and overturned, etc.
Also, someone - William Middleton, most likely - wrote a 2-part series that also appeared in Trains titled "Railroads of Vietnam", if I recall correctly. I'll see if I can find the cite for it.
I'd say your analysis of the role of the railroad in that war, and in that society and economy at that time, with respect to the military situation and tactics, is right on. It was essentially irrelevant to the mission and methods selected.
However, I think you underrate the durability of railroad technology and railroads as supply lines in combat situations, as a general proposition. Someplace recently I read that in Korea (and maybe even Vietnam), the problem for the US was that the enemy could always repair the lines enough to resume some traffic pretty quickly - there didn't seem to be a "knockout blow" that could be delivered and would stick. In Iraq, I don't know if the rail line went where we needed or wanted it to go - if not, then a major truck move would be needed anyway, so why bother with the railroad as well ? But that's a result of and hence specific to the situation, geography, and route, not the technology in general.
EDIT: See the MWHemphill post immediately above, which showed up while I was putting this one together ! "What he said" !
MWHemphill -
Not to get too far "Off-Thread", but your commentary reads like the book The Ugly American, only about 50 years later. Familiar with it ? Concur ?
EDIT: Maybe we should have asked the Russians to show us how to secure railroad lines, esp. post-9/11. [sarcasm] Rail lines were state secrets to them, with attendant consequences to anyone who tried to even photograph them without permission (Ron Ziel notwithstanding). Somehow I think they would have got the job done . . .
Paul_D_North_Jr Also, someone - William Middleton, most likely - wrote a 2-part series that also appeared in Trains titled "Railroads of Vietnam", if I recall correctly. I'll see if I can find the cite for it.
OK, I was "close" - it was Jerry A. Pinkepank instead. Here're the cites:
Trains, March 1969, pg. 20, "Rails through Viet Nam - 1, The Conveyance Which Runs by Fire", Pinkepank, Jerry A.;
Trains, April 1969, pg. 36, "Rails through Viet Nam - 2, Railroading Where the Competition is a War", Pinkepank, Jerry A.
henry6 Yes, Iraq has and had railroads right along. See TRAINS mag from a couple of years ago.
American railroader with the Iraqi Republic Railways Trains, July 2004 page 28 railroading in Iraq under war conditions ( "DEGMAN, RICK", IRAQ, RAILROADER, WAR, TRN )
Reflections on my brief career Trains, September 2004 page 52 railroading in Iraq under war conditions ( "DEGMAN, RICK", IRAQ, RAILROADER, WAR, TRN
Crisis in Iraq: a two-edged sword Trains, December 1990 page 24 rail freight traffic is up; price of diesel fuel is up ( IRAQ, "SCHNEIDER, PAUL D.", WAR, TRN )
I thought this 2nd article was more informative about the region in general.
Logistics is critical to everything the military does and railroads play an important role in that. Nearly every deployment of a large Army unit involves the use of rail logistics to move armor to a port of embarkation and back. Rail is used to move units to and from training areas in the states as well as vehicles to and from maintenance facilities. Ammuntion, POL and other items are carried by rail all the time. In Europe, rail is used frequently ..more so back when there was a larger presence..but still is to get stuff around to where it needs to go.
The nature of war has changed however, and starting with Vietnam, they have been fought in places where rail never was as dominant in the culture (Middle East) or had geographical limitations. The front..as was known in Korea or WWII doesn't exist in the current nature of operations. Also the fluidity and speed of advance has changed the dynamics of resupply and staging of supplies. If it's going to be used the infrastructure has to be in place already though. Logisiticians realiaze that efficient heavy lift of bulk commodity is either by rail or sea or some combination.....if the facilities are..available, sufficient, defendable, and reliable. If not, then air or convoy will have to be used and material will come at a reduced rate.
Dan
In my view, the most apparent similarity between the railroads and the military is the high degree of importance that people in both occupations attach to the physical safety of the people with whom they work.
gabe I am not being sarcastic in asking this, but were there even railroads in Vietnam? The very fact I have to ask that quesiton, I think answers some of your question. Also, I think the nature of the war in Vietnam probably did not require railroads as much as Korea. In Korea, there was a front. On at least two occassions, massive amounts of troops and supplies had to be rushed to the front in order to deal with developments. I would think railroads would be more ideally suited to serve this function. In contrast, in Vietnam, there wasn't really a front that required the massive movement of troops to a concentrated area in a relatively short period of time. Gabe
I think Mark has answered this question far better than I ever could, but I'll add what I think I can add.
I just missed Viet Nam. The Army had a whole lot of us future 2nd lieutenants in the pipeline when Nixon got elected and determined to put an end to the foolishiness. By the time I reported to Ft. Riley, KS between my junior and senior year at the U of IL they were trying to jetison ROTC cadets. I give Nixon credit with saving my life. I'm not kidding. I don't think I would have lasted very long.
In '72 I went on active duty and was first sent to the Transportaiton Officers Basic Course at Ft. Eustis. What I was told there was that there had been a plan for the US Army Transportation Corps to take over operation of the S. Vietnamese rail system. This was to hae been the 48th Transportation Group. The officers that were to be assigned to this group were said to have "freaked out" because none of them knew anything about operating railroads. The plan was killed due to political reasons. It was feared that the Vietnamese would resent the take over of their railroad.
It really didn't matter that there was no front. Supplies still had to be moved in large quantities from the ports to supply depots. To do this the Army resorted to huge (hundreds of trucks) convoys. These convoys were part of a logistics/support system that produced a 9:1 "tail to teeth" ratio in Viet Nam. That means there were nine logistics/support soldiers for every combat soldier. The convoys were wonderful targets. They were often shot up. Use of rail could have helped reduce the "tail to teeth" ratio, but nobody knew how to use rail.
I had a platoon Sgt. who told of a Army truck company that was so decimated that it was "Struck from the Roles". The Army didn't send it replacements, it simply took the unit off its books because there were so few people left alive. Transportation is not considered a combat branch of the Army. But it's probably the most dangerous non-combat branch. The truck dirvers have to go out beyond the perimiter on a regular basis, just like the infantry. And the trucks make good targets.
Another thing that turned the Army away from rail was the danged pilots. The Air Force was seperated from the Army around 1948. The AF didn't want the Army flying after that. The Army knew it had to have its own aircraft. So where do you put the Army pilots? Back then, a lot of them were assigned to the Transporation Corps. The reasoning being that the helicopter was a means of transportation. These guys wound up in charge of non-flying transportation units. They couldn't have cared less. They were pilots and they wanted to fly. I remember a training exercise where we were to plan the unloading of a ship. I thought it was interesting. The pilots were bored to tears and grew frustrated and irritated with the details. Today the Army has an Aviation branch, which, I'm sure, the Air Force hates. But you were never going to get a pilot intersted in operating a railroad and there were a lot of pilots in the Transporation Corps.
Anyway, I would like to thank Mark for his answer. Rail outisde the US is just not on the Army's radar. It's too bad, but I don't think it's going to change.
I have read the above posts with interest, particularly MW Hemphill's. Just as an aside, my grandfather fought with Laurence of Arabia in WW1 and no doubt helped him blow up a few railways in what is now Iraq!
I'm surprised the US Army doesn't use rail much. The British Army certainly does and has training facilities to teach its rail operators what they need to know. There is also at least one Territorial Army (our volunteer reserve force) unit made up of people from the railway industry.
Tulyar15 -
One of the cites to an earlier Trains magazine article that I posted above (repeated below) had a tie-in with Lawrence of Arabia and his exploits, as well as at least 1 photo of a railcar that in all likelihood was blown off the tracks by his men - note the "T. E. Lawrence" in the sub-title. It's been a few years since I read or perused that article, so my memory is a little hazy, but you might want to see if you can get a copy of that issue - or at least those pages - from the Trains customer service staff if you're interested - I would, anyway, if it was my grandfather who'd had that experience. I doubt that you'll think your time and effort to do that was wasted.
The Hijaz: Saudi Arabia's other railway Trains, March 1991 page 54 Ghots of the Turks and T. E. Lawrence [sic - in original - probably should be "Ghosts" instead] ( ARABIA, "GRANGER, KEITH", TRN )
Tulyar15I'm surprised the US Army doesn't use rail much.
More than you might think.
Most deployed units of any size spend the last days before they depart on airplanes loading vehicles and containers on flatcars. With the number of deployments that have occured over the past few years, a lot of military equipment has moved by rail.
The runaway at Watertown, NY was two such container flats.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Tulyar15 I'm surprised the US Army doesn't use rail much.
Maybe not overseas, but as tree68 (Larry) states above, rail is used quite a bit for moves domestically (within the U.S.), such as between bases or from bases to ports of embarkation, etc. I've seen photos of whole trainloads of M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles loaded 2 to a flatcar. I can't find one of those right now, but here's a link to one of 4 flatcars of 2 tanks each from just earlier this month:
http://www.railpictures.net/viewphoto.php?id=267226&nseq=0
There were both Transportatin Corps and Terminal Commands in the Army and Army Reserve at least. My father was a PM in both. The two week summer training exercises were often at Pine Camp (Camp Drum), NY and Fort Eustis, VA. Fort Eustis was home to several steamers and early diesels in the 50's. As a side note, Tobyhanna, PA once a Signal Corps post or depot had a railyard filled with Pullman cars. Two week excercise for those recruits and reserves was to spend one week setting up a signal command post aboard the cars and the second week to pull down and reset on terra firma base.
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