diningcar wrote: What and where is this Choctaw line? It was never ATSF nor connected to Santa Fe to my knowledge.
What and where is this Choctaw line? It was never ATSF nor connected to Santa Fe to my knowledge.
No, it belonged to RI. It is my understanding that ATSF/BNSF really wish the line had been preserved for the purpose of Memphis access.
Occassionally, some one will ask, what lines that are now gone/have disappeared do we really wish we had kept. To my understanding, the Choctaw might be the exception, as it probably would be reasonably viable today.
Gabe
gabe wrote: diningcar wrote: What and where is this Choctaw line? It was never ATSF nor connected to Santa Fe to my knowledge. No, it belonged to RI. It is my understanding that ATSF/BNSF really wish the line had been preserved for the purpose of Memphis access. Occassionally, some one will ask, what lines that are now gone/have disappeared do we really wish we had kept. To my understanding, the Choctaw might be the exception, as it probably would be reasonably viable today.Gabe
I'm rather certain UP wishes it could have the former MILW Pacific Extension Seattle-Tacoma east to St. Paul, MN. I would have connected to the UP system at both endpoints, as well as in Spokane, WA and Butte, MT. If the UP could have picked up the SD core lines it would have further connected to the former CNW trackage in Sioux City too.
It would have been a "cheap" way to buy in to challenge BN(SF)s stranglehold in the North-Western states (James Hill territory). As it is right now shippers in the far western Dakotas, Montana and northern Idaho-Washington State have only one game in town - BNSF Railway. Alas, the poor Milwaukee went down so poorly maintained and during the era of "who needs all this track?" that hindsight would have truly proven golden.
As it is now, UP is stuck with trackage rights to Portland on BNSF, with congestion and weather issues plaguing both landlord and tenant each and every year - all the while the Port of Seattle/Tacoma is bursting at the seams. It will only get worse, since it is almost an impossibility to relay the former MILW.
DC:
Sunbelt & Santa Fe ring any bells (from Oklahoma City to Little Rock to Memphis)????.....on the engineering side, Holman, Pottorff and Autrey had some involvement....Briscoe, Banion and some of the old Cena clique left on Eastern Lines (can't remember all the operating names anymore)....after that, they looked at KC to St. L until SSW/SP quashed that with MoPac's help.
(I still remember the horror stories about some of the hi-rail trips, shoo-flys around long abandoned derailments, etc.)
MC
Yes MC I remember but It was quickly dead in the water. And I susoect in retrospect the same answer would be reached. The Avard connection is very adequate.
BNSF has their routes well established and are adding capacity where justified, as you are aware.
mudchicken wrote: diningcar wrote: What and where is this Choctaw line? It was never ATSF nor connected to Santa Fe to my knowledge. DC:Sunbelt & Santa Fe ring any bells (from Oklahoma City to Little Rock to Memphis)????.....on the engineering side, Holman, Pottorff and Autrey had some involvement....Briscoe, Banion and some of the old Cena clique left on Eastern Lines (can't remember all the operating names anymore)....after that, they looked at KC to St. L until SSW/SP quashed that with MoPac's help. (I still remember the horror stories about some of the hi-rail trips, shoo-flys around long abandoned derailments, etc.)MC
MC - Can you tell us more about what went on with the Choctaw Route? I lived near it at the time and remember hearing SF was interested, but wanted/needed Government $ to make it happen (funding wasn't forthcoming). Thanks.
This is verbatim from John Shedd Reed to me a few years ago:
1. He was interested in the Choctaw Route but wasn't sure of the strategic value of the line and he did not feel he had anyone at the railway to advise him adequately.
2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.
3. He was frustrated and tired by the experience with the TP&W and did not want to distract management with another potentially similar situation.
4. He was not sure about the regulatory hurdles that would be encountered and did not want to distract management to deal with them.
5. He regarded in hindsight letting the Choctaw Route disappear as a large strategic mistake.
6. He mentioned nothing about seeking or wanting government financing for the purchase or rehabilitation.
RWM
Railway Man wrote: This is verbatim from John Shedd Reed to me a few years ago:3. He was frustrated and tired by the experience with the TP&W and did not want to distract management with another potentially similar situation.RWM
Was there something wrong with the TP&W acquisition other than it just didn't get a good ROI?Gabe
Railway Man wrote: This is verbatim from John Shedd Reed to me a few years ago:1. He was interested in the Choctaw Route but wasn't sure of the strategic value of the line and he did not feel he had anyone at the railway to advise him adequately. 2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.3. He was frustrated and tired by the experience with the TP&W and did not want to distract management with another potentially similar situation.4. He was not sure about the regulatory hurdles that would be encountered and did not want to distract management to deal with them.5. He regarded in hindsight letting the Choctaw Route disappear as a large strategic mistake.6. He mentioned nothing about seeking or wanting government financing for the purchase or rehabilitation. RWM
Many thanks - always good to hear from someone who was directly involved. My statement was from memory, and don't remember the original source, so thanks for the correction on the financing. Would have been a lot of fun to watch the rehab and then the trains, if Santa Fe had gotten the line.
Railway Man wrote: 2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.
The numbers back then must have been daunting, with higher interest rates and lower margins on TOFC/COFC.
In the 1974 ICC UP/CRI&P merger decision, they awarded this line to the ATSF, if it also acquired the MKT.
I wasn't involved or present. This was told to me after the fact.
nanaimo73 wrote: Railway Man wrote: 2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.This would be financially, or physically as well?6. He mentioned nothing about seeking or wanting government financing for the purchase or rehabilitation.The numbers back then must have been daunting, with higher interest rates and lower margins on TOFC/COFC.In the 1974 ICC UP/CRI&P merger decision, they awarded this line to the ATSF, if it also acquired the MKT.
The Choctaw Route's physical condition must have been the thing that made Mr. Reed hesitate - the Rock's financial condition would have been irrelevant, it had already ceased service at that point. I never did take a close-up look at the track, but my understanding is the track was in rough shape. Somewhere around Danville, AR (west of Little Rock), there had been a derailment at some time that was never completely cleaned up - the remains of 2-3 cars were left to rust beside the track. If the Rock didn't completely clean up a wreck, it's hard to imagine they maintained the track to a high level, and they were in awful financial shape toward the end also.
In a TRAINS article after the demise of the Rock Island, a former employee from somewhere down south said the southern lines made money year-round, while the Midwestern lines only made money during grain shipping season. Can anyone confirm or deny this?
JOdom wrote: nanaimo73 wrote: Railway Man wrote: 2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.This would be financially, or physically as well?6. He mentioned nothing about seeking or wanting government financing for the purchase or rehabilitation.The numbers back then must have been daunting, with higher interest rates and lower margins on TOFC/COFC.In the 1974 ICC UP/CRI&P merger decision, they awarded this line to the ATSF, if it also acquired the MKT.The Choctaw Route's physical condition must have been the thing that made Mr. Reed hesitate - the Rock's financial condition would have been irrelevant, it had already ceased service at that point. I never did take a close-up look at the track, but my understanding is the track was in rough shape. Somewhere around Danville, AR (west of Little Rock), there had been a derailment at some time that was never completely cleaned up - the remains of 2-3 cars were left to rust beside the track. If the Rock didn't completely clean up a wreck, it's hard to imagine they maintained the track to a high level, and they were in awful financial shape toward the end also.In a TRAINS article after the demise of the Rock Island, a former employee from somewhere down south said the southern lines made money year-round, while the Midwestern lines only made money during grain shipping season. Can anyone confirm or deny this?
The idea was to purchase an asset of the company, not the company. The asset would come with a clean title -- no debt.
You've selected one point (physical condition) as the most important factor. No offense, but I didn't say that. They were all important factors.
Railway Man wrote: The idea was to purchase an asset of the company, not the company. The asset would come with a clean title -- no debt.You've selected one point (physical condition) as the most important factor. No offense, but I didn't say that. They were all important factors.
Was this was for JOdom, or my question?
I was thinking Mr. Reed would have been looking at if the extra business would have paid the acquisition and rebuilding costs, plus interest. I was wondering if he thought the rebuilding might have been too large of a project for his railway, engineering wise, as well?
JOdom's.
As for your question, I would be speculating beyond what I was told.
Put another way, what I was told was this: an opportunity was at hand, the opportunity was declined, the opportunity was lost, and in hindsight the opportunity if taken had substantial potential to significantly change strategic position.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murph: You have to look at this from another 100 miles up, where you can see the entire U.S. network and the business relationships between all of the carriers. There weren't any other possible purchasers. The idea hinged on the ability of the Santa Fe to develop traffic moving to/from the Memphis gateway. At Memphis Santa Fe could exchange with either of the eastern carriers -- the point being it could interchange with both so neither one controlled the rate. Any carrier choosing to purchase and rehabilitate this line in place of the Santa Fe would in effect be acting as a proxy of the Santa Fe, which either meant it would subjugate its interests to the Santa Fe or risk the investment becoming stranded.
Both of eastern carriers were in a financial position to purchase the line and rehabilitate it, but to do so one of them would be leaping far beyond the boundary of its "natural territory" and deep into the western roads' "natural territory," which would have had greatly disruptive effects on interchange arrangements all through the Southwestern territory. Of the western carriers, any one that wanted to do it would either be subordinating its entire rate structure to Santa Fe, or Santa Fe could conversely find itself propping up the proxy carrier in order to protect the line.
Railway Man wrote: Murph: You have to look at this from another 100 miles up, where you can see the entire U.S. network and the business relationships between all of the carriers. There weren't any other possible purchasers. The idea hinged on the ability of the Santa Fe to develop traffic moving to/from the Memphis gateway. At Memphis Santa Fe could exchange with either of the eastern carriers -- the point being it could interchange with both so neither one controlled the rate. Any carrier choosing to purchase and rehabilitate this line in place of the Santa Fe would in effect be acting as a proxy of the Santa Fe, which either meant it would subjugate its interests to the Santa Fe or risk the investment becoming stranded. Both of eastern carriers were in a financial position to purchase the line and rehabilitate it, but to do so one of them would be leaping far beyond the boundary of its "natural territory" and deep into the western roads' "natural territory," which would have had greatly disruptive effects on interchange arrangements all through the Southwestern territory. Of the western carriers, any one that wanted to do it would either be subordinating its entire rate structure to Santa Fe, or Santa Fe could conversely find itself propping up the proxy carrier in order to protect the line. RWM
Murphy Siding wrote:Interesting...That's not the first time I've read where something didn't happen, because the railroads were afraid to rock the boat, as far the status quo was concerned.
If by "not rock the boat" you mean "don't step over a dollar to pick up a dime" then I agree. A railroad is never afraid to rock the boat when it has the upper hand. But railroads are interdependent to a degree almost never seen in all other industries because they exchange traffic with each other and are entangled in tens of thousands of commercial relationships. A railroad has to be very careful in how it goes about changing strategic balance even in one limited area because it upends thousands of other existing relationships and can have far-reaching and monumentally bad consequences. A good analogy is that if you are married and you decide to start dating the neighbor on the side, you probably shouldn't be surprised if your spouse serves you with divorce papers and takes the house, the car, and the dog.
Think of it this way: if you have a relationship with a vendor, and you then distribute the vendor's products to 1,000 customers, and one day your vendor reaches around you to serve 20 of those 1,000 customers directly and cuts you out, wouldn't you at least make a phone call to your vendor's competitor? At that point, what do you have to lose? Your vendor has just told you he doesn't care if you fall over and die, in fact, he'd probably appreciate it.
Railway Man wrote: Murphy Siding wrote:Interesting...That's not the first time I've read where something didn't happen, because the railroads were afraid to rock the boat, as far the status quo was concerned. If by "not rock the boat" you mean "don't step over a dollar to pick up a dime" then I agree. A railroad is never afraid to rock the boat when it has the upper hand. But railroads are interdependent to a degree almost never seen in all other industries because they exchange traffic with each other and are intangled in tens of thousands of commercial relationships. A railroad has to be very careful in how it goes about changing strategic balance even in one limited area because it upends thousands of other existing relationships and can have far-reaching and monumentally bad consequences. A good analogy is that if you are married and you decide to start dating the neighbor on the side, you probably shouldn't be surprised if your spouse serves you with divorce papers and takes the house, the car, and the dog. RWM
If by "not rock the boat" you mean "don't step over a dollar to pick up a dime" then I agree. A railroad is never afraid to rock the boat when it has the upper hand. But railroads are interdependent to a degree almost never seen in all other industries because they exchange traffic with each other and are intangled in tens of thousands of commercial relationships. A railroad has to be very careful in how it goes about changing strategic balance even in one limited area because it upends thousands of other existing relationships and can have far-reaching and monumentally bad consequences. A good analogy is that if you are married and you decide to start dating the neighbor on the side, you probably shouldn't be surprised if your spouse serves you with divorce papers and takes the house, the car, and the dog.
snagletooth wrote:Good point. Looked at what happened to the balance in the west when UP took over D&RGW connections MP and WP in one swoop. That started a rash of mergers that's just recently simmered down.
Dates back way before that. The modern merger era started circa 1896 but was frozen almost rigid for 60 years by the ICC. The key merger was SP and UP's failed attempt to buy and split the Rock Island. Had that merger occurred we would likely have a three-system west today instead of a two-system west.
Railway Man wrote: The key merger was SP and UP's failed attempt to buy and split the Rock Island. Had that merger occurred we would likely have a three-system west today instead of a two-system west.RWM
The key merger was SP and UP's failed attempt to buy and split the Rock Island. Had that merger occurred we would likely have a three-system west today instead of a two-system west.
Murphy Siding wrote: If it looked like a good opportunity for one railroad, who declined, wouldn't it look just as good to the competitors? Did any other road consider jumping in?
There was a lot going on at the time.
Memphis had 3 eastern railroads. SCL/L&N was busy at the time merging with Chessie. Southern was fighting that merger, and talking with N&W. ICG had too many miles of track, too much defered maintenance, and was up for sale by IC Industries.
BN was merging with the Frisco, and adjusting to the CMSP&P retrenchment from the Northwest. UP was merging with Missouri Pacific and WP. SP/SSW was buying the Golden State route from New Mexico to St. Louis and looking for the cash to finance the rebuilding of that line. Apparently SP was also exploring the purchase of the CRI&P running south from Little Rock into Louisiana to create a Memphis-New Orleans route. SP and the ATSF were also exploring a merger at that time, in answer to the UP-MP-WP combination.
SP could have picked up the Choctaw line, as it would have shortened their California-Memphis route by 200 miles, although additional traffic picked up would have been minimal. SP was also trying to win trackage rights over the T&P across Texas, a route that would have been even shorter than using the Choctaw.
Railway Man wrote: Think of it this way: if you have a relationship with a vendor, and you then distribute the vendor's products to 1,000 customers, and one day your vendor reaches around you to serve 20 of those 1,000 customers directly and cuts you out, wouldn't you at least make a phone call to your vendor's competitor? At that point, what do you have to lose? Your vendor has just told you he doesn't care if you fall over and die, in fact, he'd probably appreciate it. RWM
Railway Man wrote: JOdom's.As for your question, I would be speculating beyond what I was told.Put another way, what I was told was this: an opportunity was at hand, the opportunity was declined, the opportunity was lost, and in hindsight the opportunity if taken had substantial potential to significantly change strategic position.RWM
RWM - No, I was responding to nanaimo's question whether it was the physical or financial condition that made Santa Fe pass on the line. Since the financial condition of RI was irrelevant, it must have been the physical condition (of the two he mentioned) that made the choice.
I have no doubt that all the factors mentioned by Mr. Reed in your post had their effect on his and Santa Fe's decision, and would certainly not presume to put words in his mouth or say what was in his mind.
JOdom wrote: RWM - No, I was responding to nanaimo's question whether it was the physical or financial condition that made Santa Fe pass on the line. Since the financial condition of RI was irrelevant, it must have been the physical condition (of the two he mentioned) that made the choice.
JOdom, you misunderstood my question.
nanaimo73 wrote: Railway Man wrote: 2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.This would be financially, or physically as well?
I was thinking Mr Reed would have been considering the purchase and rebuilding costs, and whether the additional revenue gained would cover these costs. For the second half of my question, by "physically", I was wondering if the ATSF had the required manpower and equipment on hand to do the rebuilding in-house.
Railway Man, would you know if that interview be available anywhere online, or in print?
nanaimo73 wrote: JOdom wrote: RWM - No, I was responding to nanaimo's question whether it was the physical or financial condition that made Santa Fe pass on the line. Since the financial condition of RI was irrelevant, it must have been the physical condition (of the two he mentioned) that made the choice. JOdom, you misunderstood my question. nanaimo73 wrote: Railway Man wrote: 2. The inspection of the line revealed it to be in very poor condition and he wasn't sure Santa Fe could take on its rehabilitation.This would be financially, or physically as well?I was thinking Mr Reed would have been considering the purchase and rebuilding costs, and whether the additional revenue gained would cover these costs. For the second half of my question, by "physically", I was wondering if the ATSF had the required manpower and equipment on hand to do the rebuilding in-house.Railway Man, would you know if that interview be available anywhere online, or in print?
Sorry about that. Wasn't the first time, probably won't be the last. Finally found something I'm good at!
nanaimo73 wrote: I was thinking Mr Reed would have been considering the purchase and rebuilding costs, and whether the additional revenue gained would cover these costs. For the second half of my question, by "physically", I was wondering if the ATSF had the required manpower and equipment on hand to do the rebuilding .....
I was thinking Mr Reed would have been considering the purchase and rebuilding costs, and whether the additional revenue gained would cover these costs. For the second half of my question, by "physically", I was wondering if the ATSF had the required manpower and equipment on hand to do the rebuilding .....
ATSF, at that point in time, could have handled the project better than any of the other western lines...the question was the capital involved and that was Mr. Reed's call.
Railway Man wrote:If by "not rock the boat" you mean "don't step over a dollar to pick up a dime" then I agree. A railroad is never afraid to rock the boat when it has the upper hand. But railroads are interdependent to a degree almost never seen in all other industries because they exchange traffic with each other and are entangled in tens of thousands of commercial relationships. A railroad has to be very careful in how it goes about changing strategic balance even in one limited area because it upends thousands of other existing relationships and can have far-reaching and monumentally bad consequences...
If by "not rock the boat" you mean "don't step over a dollar to pick up a dime" then I agree. A railroad is never afraid to rock the boat when it has the upper hand. But railroads are interdependent to a degree almost never seen in all other industries because they exchange traffic with each other and are entangled in tens of thousands of commercial relationships. A railroad has to be very careful in how it goes about changing strategic balance even in one limited area because it upends thousands of other existing relationships and can have far-reaching and monumentally bad consequences...
Every railroad thinking about aquiring the Chocktaw line was very sensitive to this isssue. It came of the heals of the Rock Island merger fiasco. Everyone was very focused on the impossiblity of getting anything done without the concurance of your connections.
nanaimo73 wrote:Railway Man, would you know if that interview be available anywhere online, or in print?
Other than what you have here, not at present.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.