Euclid mvlandsw Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck. If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device. Thank you for that information. I understand your point about stopping the train with slack stretched by initiating an emergency application from the rear end. In so doing, even if the truck had broken up, the stretched train might have ridden it out without buckling. It could have prevented the entire pileup and spills. But apparently, the engineer relied exclusively on dynamic braking. In any case, rather than the alternative of initiating an emergency air brake application starting at the rear of the train; is it possible to initiate dynamic braking only on the rear DPU, if there is one? If that is not possible, and DPU provides only equal dynamic braking on all units; how much dynamic braking force is possible or allowed? How is that controlled? Is it just a matter of the engineer’s discretion; or is there some type of automatic control that factors train makeup, tonnage, speed, and DPU location, in order to prevent excess buff force? Or is the safe level of dynamic braking just controlled by rules? Besides the doorbell video near or at East Palestine showing fire and sparks, there was a similar display of fire and sparks shown at the surveillance video taken earlier, maybe 20-30 miles before reaching East Palestine. To my eye, the fire/sparks at that location is identical to what is shown at or very near to East Palestine. That suggests that if the cause was a derailed dragging car truck, it dragged 30 miles. It would be amazing if that did occur without any mention of it in the news or by the NTSB. With 30 miles of busted up track and grade crossings, I don’t see how such an event could be kept quiet.
mvlandsw Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck. If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device.
Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck.
If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device.
"To the best of my knowledge, Initiating an Emergency Brake Application has never been a APPROVED braking method when responding to Dragging Equipment indication from a Defect Detector."
mvlandsw
An emergency application in response to a dragging equipment alert would not be wise in most situations. Note that I said if the engineer knew exactly what the situation was in the train. That will almost never be the case unless some additional information is somehow available.
I have no experience running DPU's but I believe that the rear units can be put into dynamic braking independent of the lead units. Doing that would probably be a good response to a dragging equipment alarm. Generally keeping a train stretched will prevent jack knifing better than putting it in buff.
Other than some automatic controls to prevent wheel slide or overloading of the dynamic brake equipment ,the amount of braking force applied is left to the engineer to control, within limits established in the train handling rules of individual railroads..
mvlandsw Euclid mvlandsw Almost all hot bearing detector locations also include a dragging equipment detector. If the East Palestine detector had one it should have alarmed for a dragging truck. If the engineer knew exactly what the situation in the train was he probably could have reduced the severity of, or maybe even prevented the pileup by making an emergency application of the brakes from the rear end using the end of train device. Thank you for that information. I understand your point about stopping the train with slack stretched by initiating an emergency application from the rear end. In so doing, even if the truck had broken up, the stretched train might have ridden it out without buckling. It could have prevented the entire pileup and spills. But apparently, the engineer relied exclusively on dynamic braking. In any case, rather than the alternative of initiating an emergency air brake application starting at the rear of the train; is it possible to initiate dynamic braking only on the rear DPU, if there is one? If that is not possible, and DPU provides only equal dynamic braking on all units; how much dynamic braking force is possible or allowed? How is that controlled? Is it just a matter of the engineer’s discretion; or is there some type of automatic control that factors train makeup, tonnage, speed, and DPU location, in order to prevent excess buff force? Or is the safe level of dynamic braking just controlled by rules? Besides the doorbell video near or at East Palestine showing fire and sparks, there was a similar display of fire and sparks shown at the surveillance video taken earlier, maybe 20-30 miles before reaching East Palestine. To my eye, the fire/sparks at that location is identical to what is shown at or very near to East Palestine. That suggests that if the cause was a derailed dragging car truck, it dragged 30 miles. It would be amazing if that did occur without any mention of it in the news or by the NTSB. With 30 miles of busted up track and grade crossings, I don’t see how such an event could be kept quiet. "To the best of my knowledge, Initiating an Emergency Brake Application has never been a APPROVED braking method when responding to Dragging Equipment indication from a Defect Detector." mvlandsw An emergency application in response to a dragging equipment alert would not be wise in most situations. Note that I said if the engineer knew exactly what the situation was in the train. That will almost never be the case unless some additional information is somehow available. I have no experience running DPU's but I believe that the rear units can be put into dynamic braking independent of the lead units. Doing that would probably be a good response to a dragging equipment alarm. Generally keeping a train stretched will prevent jack knifing better than putting it in buff. Other than some automatic controls to prevent wheel slide or overloading of the dynamic brake equipment ,the amount of braking force applied is left to the engineer to control, within limits established in the train handling rules of individual railroads..
DP remote consists can be put into dynamics, but only if the lead is in dynamics or idle. If the lead is in power remotes won't go into dynamics.
Jeff
Jeff,
Can the lead units be put into power after the DPU is put into dynamic braking? That could be useful when the headend is starting uphill while the rearend is still on a downgrade.
Mark
EuclidIn the case of the East Palestine wreck, I understand that that the train was applying dynamic braking to slow down for another train they were following. At that point, the crew knew nothing about the status of the overheated bearing. Suddenly, they were warned and commanded by a detector, apparently on the south edge of East Palestine, to stop immediately. So the engineer increased dynamic braking and the train immediately buckled and piled up. That buckling caused an Emergency air brake application, which added to the deceleration already occurring due to dynamic braking and the resistance of the developing pileup. QUESTION: When the crew received that warning from the detector; how long would it have taken them to reconfigure dynamic braking controls so that only the rear DPU would respond to engineer- initiated, control calls for dynamic braking? It seems to me that the Company would have had a formal protocol in place, calling for that action in a situation where the train is extremely likely to experience a mid-train buckling. Converting to rear-DPU-only dynamic braking seems like the perfect solution that might have prevented the disastrous pileup that occurred. So far, all I have heard from the NTSB is a tiny, simple explanation that they refer to as “preliminary.” Is that speculation? What is the highest resolution video available online that shows the flaming train entering East Palestine? I cannot see any detail in this one: https://www.wpxi.com/news/local/new-video-shows-what-may-have-happened-cause-east-palestine-train-derailment/2WRBKZNMUNDABHX7OJ3Q4YBEGY/
If one only knew the unknowable there would be perfection in the world. ANY condition in the middle of a train is UNKNOWABLE except for the very limited information that a Defect Detector can announce.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDIf one only knew the unknowable there would be perfection in the world. ANY condition in the middle of a train is UNKNOWABLE except for the very limited information that a Defect Detector can announce.
That is exactly what happened. There was nothing unknowable about it. The known trend exceeded the maximum temperature before the train reached the final (third) detector; and the train derailed before it could stop for that third detector as it actively warned them to stop.
Euclid BaltACD If one only knew the unknowable there would be perfection in the world. ANY condition in the middle of a train is UNKNOWABLE except for the very limited information that a Defect Detector can announce. I don’t think it required perfection in the world to know enough to be very careful with this train. They chose to pass two detectors that were below the threshold of a required stop, but were each showing relatively elevated temperatures on the same bearing. What they surely must have known, but freely ignored, was that the two detectors, in sequence, also showed a progressing trend of rising temperature. They also would have known that if that trend were to continue, the temperature could be easily exceed the maximum permissible limit before the train would arrive at the third detector. That is exactly what happened. There was nothing unknowable about it. The known trend exceeded the maximum temperature before the train reached the final (third) detector; and the train derailed before it could stop for that third detector as it actively warned them to stop.
BaltACD If one only knew the unknowable there would be perfection in the world. ANY condition in the middle of a train is UNKNOWABLE except for the very limited information that a Defect Detector can announce.
The Train Crew - DID NOT KNOW - they had passed two detectors with elevating temperatures. That data was 'back office' data and back office personnel had to make decisions on it, not the crew operating the train.
BaltACDThe Train Crew - DID NOT KNOW - they had passed two detectors with elevating temperatures. That data was 'back office' data and back office personnel had to make decisions on it, not the crew operating the train.
Euclid BaltACD The Train Crew - DID NOT KNOW - they had passed two detectors with elevating temperatures. That data was 'back office' data and back office personnel had to make decisions on it, not the crew operating the train. When I say “They chose to pass two detectors…” I am not necessarily referring to the train crew as “They.” I am referring to whoever was in charge of decision making. But your point does raise further questions as to the timeliness of the response of the train operation when facing a life or death emergency such as the one that unfolded. So you are saying that the crew does not hear any transmission of information from the detectors, when a detector detects it? What about the stop order they received from the East Palestine detector? Did the crew not hear that until it was first sent to the back office for review? How much time elapsed between time that the East Palestine detector found the failing bearing and the time the crew was notified to stop? News reports make it sound like that was just a matter of seconds. It seems to me that all of the necessary technology was in place, in perfect operation, and was fully capable of preventing this disaster, if only it had been allowed to do its job.
BaltACD The Train Crew - DID NOT KNOW - they had passed two detectors with elevating temperatures. That data was 'back office' data and back office personnel had to make decisions on it, not the crew operating the train.
I have no idea of NS practices and procedures.
On CSX, Detectors announce the start of their inspection and the conclusion of the inspection either by announcing 'No Defects' or announcing up 5 defect locations by axle number - and if more than 5 defects are noted the detector announces 'Multiple Defects - Inspect Entire Train'. This applies to all the combination Hot Box Detectors that are also coupled with Dragging Equipment Detectors. In the event the Results transmission is not heard by the train, they are to stop and inspect the entire train.
As of the time of my retirement, the CSX WILD detectors reported to the Mechanical Desk in Jacksonville who would review the data and issue formal instructions via the CADS system to the Train Dispatcher and Chief Train Dispatcher currently handling the train.
The Mechanical Desk would also follow 'trending' issues of trains moving over multiple detectors and if a trend was noticed issue instructions via CADS to the Train Dispatcher and Chief Dispatcher that are operating the train with the instructions to stop the train in inspect the specific car(s).
Other railroads practices and procedures may vary.
mvlandsw Jeff, Can the lead units be put into power after the DPU is put into dynamic braking? That could be useful when the headend is starting uphill while the rearend is still on a downgrade. Mark
I think the DPs are supposed to go to from dynamics to idle if the head end is placed in power. I've never tried to do it on purpose. The only time the DPs would stay in dynmaics is during a communication loss between the consists. This I have had some experience with.
Current thinking, by those in charge of our operating practices, is that the train needs to be bunched up as much as possible. We're even to operate the lead and remote consists in independent mode all the time, no matter what the train make up actually is. I've always believed in using the "fence" but not necessarily all the time or on all trains. Even if the remotes could be placed in dynamics, I doubt they would allow it.
jeffhergert mvlandsw Jeff, Can the lead units be put into power after the DPU is put into dynamic braking? That could be useful when the headend is starting uphill while the rearend is still on a downgrade. Mark I think the DPs are supposed to go to from dynamics to idle if the head end is placed in power. I've never tried to do it on purpose. The only time the DPs would stay in dynmaics is during a communication loss between the consists. This I have had some experience with. Current thinking, by those in charge of our operating practices, is that the train needs to be bunched up as much as possible. We're even to operate the lead and remote consists in independent mode all the time, no matter what the train make up actually is. I've always believed in using the "fence" but not necessarily all the time or on all trains. Even if the remotes could be placed in dynamics, I doubt they would allow it. Jeff
I feature running with DPU in continuous rolling terrain is akin to playing three dimensional chess. What part of the train is going upgrade, what part is going downgrade and where is the DPU in that equation an don't forget curvature within the train can have some effects too.
The multi-defect type of detectors on my territories only announce an entrance message. Otherwise they only talk if a defect is detected. If one is detected, they will give a defect tone, but won't announce the type of defect or location until the train is clear of the detector or stopped on the detector. Once clear we are to stop and inspect for the given defect. If no specific information is given, the entire train needs to be inspected.
While a hot box/hot wheel detector may send specific axle temperature information to a central office, it does not give such specifics to train crews. If the parameters to trigger a defect alert to the crew is reached, the detector does so. If the parameters aren't reached, the detector stays silent.
We also have specific dragging equipment only detectors. These tend to be at block signal locations where concrete ties have been installed. They talk on defect only. They will give a defect tone and announce a defect and the detector's location. All detector locations are listed in the time table. One needs to know that the defect message is for them by keeping track of what mile post they are at. An immediate stop is required for dragging equipment, using good train handling techniques. There's a good chance that dynamics are going to be used because it's stressed so much that dynamics are the preferred method for slowing a train. (They have backed off in recent years, realizing that in some situations air brakes are needed. In both emergency and normal train operations.) Once stopped it will give an axle count to the defect.
Probably not known but what number of defects have now been found causing mitigation measures?
blue streak 1 Probably not known but what number of defects have now been found causing mitigation measures?
I'd imagine that some amount of defects are a daily fact of life. I wonder if anyone actually tracks that.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 blue streak 1 Probably not known but what number of defects have now been found causing mitigation measures? I'd imagine that some amount of defects are a daily fact of life. I wonder if anyone actually tracks that.
I am certain such statistics exist - on each Class 1 carrier, however, it is most likely considered proprietary information and will never see the light of day in public world.
They may get discussed in generalities in specific trade group conferences.
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