7j43kWho would have received that order, and what would they have done if they had received it?
A long freight coming off the Graham Line was routed onto what would normally be 50's track, so orders were issued to allow 50 to operate against current of traffic and to hold 53 until 50 had passed. The order to 53 was not delivered "because the agent was distracted by a telephone call and forgot' and the actions required by the Erie to set signals for 53 were not correctly followed.
There were multiple attempts to use the train radio, which every train involved in this had, and even thoughts of phone-patching from the dispatcher's office in Hoboken through the facilities at SF interlocking. It was all just a bit too late.
I'm not sure what type of engine 859 was. The engine crew went back into the engine room but I don't believe it helped them. 53 I believe was running one of the passenger Geeps. It was irritating trying to convert railroad east/west into actual train movements as the railroad is substantially north-south at that point.
OvermodThere were multiple attempts to use the train radio, which every train involved in this had
The main issue with the radios that I've read was this occurred in the Ramapo Mountains which have a very high concentration of iron which created a radio dead zone. Conventional radios still have problems there as I understand it.
There was a lot of iron mining and smelting there in the 18th and 19th Centuries until the Mesabi Range ores were discovered and the Ramapo mines couldn't compete.
OvermodI'm not sure what type of engine 859 was.
An Alco PA. Geep 1402 was running long hood forward which saved the head-end crew. The PA was able to be repaired and put back in service but the Geep was eventually scrapped.
I examined the report some more.
The operators at SF Interlocking and NJ Interlocking and the dispatcher failed to follow the rules. It appears that, if they had, the crash would not have happened.
"In the instant case the operator at SF Interlocking Station failed to block the lever controlling signal 36 in a position to cause that signal to display a Stop aspect, and to display a red flag or red light as required by the rules when he received the signal "31 West" from the train dispatcher. He did not give the stop-displayed signal until after the order was transmitted although the rules require that the signal be given after the signal "31 West" has been given by the train dispatcher and before the order is transmitted. He gave the stop-displayed signal without fulfilling the requirements of the rules regarding the blocking of the signal lever and the proper display of train order signals. The operator at NJ Interlocking Station did not give the stop-displayed signal at any time while handling the form 19 train order involved although the rules require that that signal be given after the signal "19 East" has been given by the train dispatcher and before the order is transmitted. The train dispatcher failed to require both operators to give the stop-displayed signal at the time specified by the rules. Both the night chief train dispatcher and the train dispatcher said that it has been the practice to give the stop-displayed signal after transmitting the order when a form 31 train order is involved. Further, the train dispatcher said that it is not the usual practice to require the operator at NJ Interlocking Station to give the stop-displayed signal when a form 19 train order is involved."
I am guessing that the list of rules violations from Greece will be a good bit longer.
Ed
7j43kThe operators at SF Interlocking and NJ Interlocking and the dispatcher failed to follow the rules. It appears that, if they had, the crash would not have happened.
Seems like I've read in accounts of towers and operators that the first thing to be done when getting such a train order was to set the signal. As noted, this wasn't done before or after the TO was dictated.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACD As of yet - no one has identified what the method of train control was being used on the track segment involved in the incident. Without knowing the method of train control being used, it is not possible to accurately assess blame.
"some" information can be found here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_railway_signalling
I've had a decades long interest in Greece, though don't know much in particular about thier rail system. I've been reading any number of articles in the English language Greek press and have never yet found a clear technical description of what signalling system was intended to be in place, working or not. This article is about as clear as I've found.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1206447/etcs-awaiting-signaling-system-of-rail-network/
There has been plenty written in the Greek press that unions have been warning for years about safety issues and that whatever the stationmaster did or didn't do, he wasn't well trained or experienced, and much of the systems were not working.
Never yet read if either or both trains went through red signals or this was a failure of train orders or something else.
ORNHOO BaltACD As of yet - no one has identified what the method of train control was being used on the track segment involved in the incident. Without knowing the method of train control being used, it is not possible to accurately assess blame. "some" information can be found here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_railway_signalling
Does not explain what system was in effect on the line involved and what the rules of operation are for that line.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Not clear if it was single or double-track territory.
If double tracked, may have been ABS for current-of-traffic with manual block rules for movements against the current of traffic.
But reports said the signal system wasn't working. Nothing as to WHY it wasn't operative.
So I'll take a guess that signals were out for even ABS operation on the track the trains were operating on.
In that case, may have been manual block operation of some sort (don't know how they handle control of the blocks over there) for BOTH trains.
In other words, operating on "dark" track, both ways, with nothing more than "paper" authority (or perhaps not even that much).
Somehow communication between the operators broke down (or were ignored by one of the operators), and the two trains got turned loose against each other on the same track. Engine drivers had no idea until it was too late.
Audio recordings of radio contact:
STATIONMASTER: Proceed through red traffic light exit until traffic light entry of Neon Poron.
TRAIN DRIVER: Vasilis, am I good to go?
STATIONMASTER: Go, go.
RAILROAD EMPLOYEE: Shall I turn it now?
STATIONMASTER: No, no, because 1564 is on this route.
What strikes me is the informality of the communication.
I believe the stationmaster's boss has been arrested, plus also two other stationmasters who went home early.
Meanwhile, it appears that the appropriate reaction by Greeks to this event is to riot in the streets.
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