Qutoing Balt: "College education and practical experience are two different things."
Yes, indeed--unless the college education included intensive hands-on instruction over several years.
Johnny
Proably the answer was already stated that in the days when I was familiar with any of these supervisory people, they were experienced, while now they are less experienced. So I may indeed be wrong about a Roadmaster or Road Foremen capable of doing an engineer's job. Apologies.
But anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture?
+1 to zug's comments above. (fun with titles and pay grades causes no end of confusion and is a function of beancounter and adult supervision egoes in various organizations / managerial fiefdoms)
Roadmasters in most places are corporate supervisors. As such, they are trained in the operating rulers and the M/W rules. (I was and diningcar was (probably electroliner as well))... and yes there was considerable training on that before you were ever turned loose.) We only were placed into operating service in an extreme emergency or a work stoppage. With the tweeking of the FRA operating rules from the mid-1990's onward, the number of cross trained individuals as supervisors is on its way down. Regardless, you did not venture into another craft's (discipline's) area of control unless there was damn good reason and you got permission from the powers that be. Track guys don't make judgements on operating equipment cars/movement and train service guys don't make track judgements (broken rails and other track defects). No one side of the holy trinity, operating/maintenance of way/mechanical, has the right to step on another side's judgement. People get hurt (or worse) when that does and the outcome here is proof of that - I still want to see ALL the facts here, especially about the upper management and management culture. Was it as disengaged as some are making it out to be or is the smoke & mirrors game in play with the lawyers?
All craft training vs all school trainining... Better be a good mix of both. You're asking for trouble if it's skewed one way or the other. For that matter, how the Class Ones use their college trained new-hires is different for each railroad. No two do it the same way. Instant emersion with guidance is certainly different than sink or swim without a life jacket. People skills and communication skills really make a difference and some of that cannot ever be taught in a classroom.
daveklepper But anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture?
I think the MM&A culture was to spend as little money as possible. It is a culture that everyone understands without any training. It is something entirely different from any Class 1 railroad culture. Unfortunately, the MM&A culture is not on trial.
At some point in this torturous process, I would like to hear Harding explain why he violated Rule 112. The TSB report says it was a frequent practice for other MM&A engineers to secure trains with the independent brake left set. I don't recall if it also said those engineers did the push/pull test with the independent set.
I'll take a stab with my take on these. Disclaimer: My opinions are mine and are not based on Class 1 experience.
daveklepperIf MM&A had a Class-I standard of safety culture: Would a train be allowed be left unattended under any circumstances on a downgrade without derail protection?
Would a train be allowed be left unattended under any circumstances on a downgrade without derail protection?
We chock our trains if they are parked on a grade, but do not use a derail. I feel this goes back to the proper securement issue, in which case someone would normally have to tamper with the train in order to cause it to move. This is what happened to the runaway covered hopper in Utica, NY. The car was held in place by the handbrake - until it wasn't, due to a 13 YO releasing it. I believe they are now using a skate at that location. That car ran parallel to a busy arterial, over several crossings (including a busy 4 lane street) and even included some street running in its travels. It stopped when it hit a NYS steam switcher and pushed that into Utica Union Station...
daveklepper Would a locomotive be kept in service with the problems Harding experience with his lead locmotive?
daveklepper Would such a locomotive be left in operation unattended?
daveklepperAfter a fire, would not someone more responsible than a trackwalker visit the train and the site before a train would be left unattended?
daveklepperWould not the dispatcher question the fireman with a series of questions to determine all the details of the fire and what the firemen did?
daveklepper Would not a new Safety Officer, having such a responsibity for the first time, be expected to consult with more experienced safety officers, working at other railroads, to learn how they look at their responsibilities and work?
I have to admit - I was laboring under the incorrect conclusion that the engineer had set brakes on seven cars, exclusive of the locomotives. Nonetheless, given the circumstances, I'm not sure that seven cars would have held the train anyhow.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
daveklepperBut anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture?
A similar illustration of the problem occurs when investigating the Deepwater Horizon fire. There you had an intrusive and all-encompassing safety program with all kinds of consequences made, and enforced, on employees who were drilled into following procedure, documenting things properly, etc.
All of which was undone by a couple of arrogant corporate people who wanted results outside what the system called for -- with dismissal or career ruination being the likely consequence of any disagreement. This goes beyond 'even the most foolproof procedures can be circumvented by a clever or determined enough fool' -- I think it indicates that no safety procedure that can be defeated by people with partial information can really be safe. (In the military there is a need for systems that can be told, as someone once related colorfully to me, "RUN NOW -- no backchat" but in normal life, especially in the railroad context of enormous kinetic energies, it's MUCH more likely you should trust the indications of what you have.
I am still upset thinking about the 'chain of command' that launched Christa McAuliffe in a vehicle commonly understood not to be flyable in temperatures colder than about 41 degrees F. In an organization that had a hard enough time with objective safety in systems with high-energy propellants and 'a million moving parts all supplied by the lowest bidder'.
My view of the situation at Megantic is that the Stooges undercut most, if not all, of any safety procedures (both MM&A's or as understood in their considerable preceding railroad experience) to produce the tragic result. It does little good to claim Labrie is more culpable than Harding in this situation, but it also does little good to look for much of anything claiming that some kind of 'safety culture' in the MM&A organization itself had any bearing on how the folks working that night behaved and acted. It also does little to claim after the fact that 'the company should not have hired people like that' -- who, in fact, could they have found in that area who would know more about running trains properly than the three men now on trial? And what do you think the three would have accepted by way of additional safety practices, no few of them including some recommended by TC and noted in the TSB report being little more than 'Mickey Mouse' compliance, from 'American' sources?
These are not 'green' new hires, and railroading is not (at least, not yet) like working at Burger King where the management teaches you everything you need to know about the latest operating model, or it's the highway and they bring in the next group of literature grad students. For someone with many years' experience in railroading on Canadian grades to claim 'well, the company said 7 brakes' is disingenuous at best ... unless and until, as I said previously, we find something in company policies and explicit orders that said the equivalent of 'don't set more than 7 brakes on a train, no matter how heavy, or we'll find someone else'. And perhaps such a thing will come to light, despite (so far) all the evidence being to the contrary when you dig it out of the morass of news coverage and opinions.
As noted, Burkhardt can be called 'the Hunter of short lines' and I think much of the expedient shoestringery involved at MM&A can be traced back to his lead. However, I keep coming back to the three on trial as where the stupidity originated and where the effective chain of command in such an emergency ended. Note that neither Busque nor the firemen are defendants in this trial, which for purposes of this thread properly excuses them from criminal complicity. Absent more specific revelations, the "safety culture" developed in the offices at MM&A has little more applicability per se.
daveklepperProably the answer was already stated that in the days when I was familiar with any of these supervisory people, they were experienced, while now they are less experienced. So I may indeed be wrong about a Roadmaster or Road Foremen capable of doing an engineer's job. Apologies.
Fortunately Road Foreman of Engines are not hired off the street without experience. In the US they must possess a Engineers Certification Card as they are responsible for certifying the Engineers that they qualify and supervise.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Glad for that information. Thanks.
And Overmod, are you saying that "The HH of shortlines" was essentially responsible for the lack of "safety culture" at MM&A? As opposed to my earlier thought that he was not more than a Warren Buffet, investor but keeping hands off? That is an important question. At least importan to me.
Before the tragedy, I had a lot of respect for Burkhardt, and I guess I have been trying to keep that respect. Is that making any sense?
But also before he asumed command of CSX, I had a degree of respect for HH. I said a the outset, if it's all slash and burn, he won't be successful, but if he makes his main goal growing the business, which is what CSX needed most, then he will be successful. And we all know which path he chose, at least up to recently.
Overmod, you made the comparison. Is it really valid?
daveklepperGo to the Saluda thread and see a Roadmaster operating the train.
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got that message. thanks please see other comments, thanks.
And compared to CN and CP?
If Harding’s previous mountain railroad experience caused him to believe that 7 hand brakes were insufficient, and that testing and leaving the train secured with the independent brakes was not permissible; then the court needs to ask him why he departed from proper practice with the MM&A oil train. Note that sometimes Safety Officer Michael Horan, testified that the proper number of handbrakes was 9 instead of 7. That number of 9 handbrakes is incorrect just as the number of 7 handbrakes is. I think this is significant, considering that Horan is the safety culture in past MM&A existence.
Add to this, the fact that other MM&A engineers secured trains with the independent brake supplementing handbrakes. If Harding and those other engineers all had the necessary experience to know the proper procedures, they would have known the reasoning behind those procedures. Therefore, it is inexplicable as to why these engineers ignored this experience and knowledge while working for MM&A.
If Harding were to testify that the company in any way influenced him to cut corners; and assured him that proper securement was unnecessary overkill; and implied that the company would take the responsibility—then I think this trial is over without a conviction.
EuclidIf Harding were to testify that the company in any way influenced him to cut corners; and assured him that proper securement was unnecessary overkill; and implied that the company would take the responsibility—then I think this trial is over without a conviction.
I am not sure that the 'in any way' ought to be in your sentence, as it's been extensively demonstrated there were all sorts of ways MM&A cut corners to save money ... just not ways that seem to have contributed meaningfully to this particular accident. But your point about the company possibly encouraging him to think 'proper securement was unnecessary overkill' is one of the critical things here that I hope will come out, one way or another, in the trial transcript.
I am not sure about why you say 'this trial [would be] over without a conviction' even if it turns out the company said the equivalent of 'who will rid me of these troublesome automatic applications' (which it seems they in fact did). They still never came off insistence that the train be properly secured BY PULL TEST, with the note that NO air be applied when that test was done whether or not there was subsequent intent to apply the independent to the train. That is why in part this trial has to end in a conviction for someone other than 'the company'.
And I have my own suspicions of why 'these engineers' may have ignored their previous experience and knowledge while working for MM&A, but it would be worthless for me even to speculate about it here. It is certainly possible that some ex-CP employees might not wonder about exactly how to expand a recommended-minimum-number-of-brakes chart based on the proportion of a train on a given grade (which I believe, given just the information in the TSB report, would have given a number corresponding to about 40% of the effective axles on the train for the specific location involved at Nantes). Hopefully this was asked and an answer elicited in testimony.
It would be a grim thing indeed to find that "other MM&A engineers routinely PULL TESTED trains with the independent brake supplementing handbrakes". I would have no particular quarrel with engineers 'securing' trains with a combination of independent on top of adequate handbrake securement, but notice how cleverly you conflated the two ideas into one statement as if it were a smoking gun showing slipshod MM&A safety enforcement. Now, another significant question is whether MM&A even tolerated the practice of doing pull tests, contrary to their own published and stated procedures, with the independent applied. I expect testimony on this was also taken and will need some independent corroboration and consideration against available sources...
Now, if the trial demonstrates that Harding was explicitly told to cut corners on securing the train -- something that doesn't really go beyond the Stooge skit -- and it does turn out that the company "implied the company would take the responsibility" (I will wait for you to show me where that implication would be documented once we determine the company had done so) then I think a jury would be less inclined to call Harding personally to full account for his part in the 47 deaths. But there are still reasons for convictions in the trial at hand.
Over--- Don't you mean "in addition to the company" rather than "other than the company."? There seems to be general agreement that a "safety culture" was lacking, and that certain violations of what normal safe railrioading would demand did contribiute to the tragedy, if not the direct last minute-cause. So the railroad seems to me to be in-part responsible. But the question of Burkhart's responsibility has not been resolved for me. Was he an HH or a Buffet?
OvermodNow, if the trial demonstrates that Harding was explicitly told to cut corners on securing the train -- something that doesn't really go beyond the Stooge skit -- and it does turn out that the company "implied the company would take the responsibility" (I will wait for you to show me where that implication would be documented once we determine the company had done so)
The implication would not be documented. That is why I call it an implication. It would have been in some form of a comment from one person to another.
EuclidThe implication would not be documented. That is why I call it an implication. It would have been in some form of a comment from one person to another.
That is so, but it would still have to be demonstrated to be admissible as trial evidence, perhaps in an e-mail or other communication. The question I had was whether Harding could have reasonable grounds for thinking 'the company' would 'take the responsibility' for his violating their stated rules ... something I generally advise anyone to get written confirmation for if it ever is even suggested to them! ... when even a small amount of railroad experience would tell him the inadvisability of cheating on a securement test.
daveklepper And compared to CN and CP?
I also meant to clarify that not being documented, the alleged request from the company to not fully comply with rule 112, (as I have suggested) would be only based on Harding's testimony in the trial. Especially if this and other testimony indicated that the company encouraged cutting corners on safety to save money, this hypothetical allegation about rule 112, might be persuasive in court due to the labor intensiveness of rule 112.
OvermodI am not sure that the 'in any way' ought to be in your sentence, as it's been extensively demonstrated there were all sorts of ways MM&A cut corners to save money ... just not ways that seem to have contributed meaningfully to this particular accident
I think flawed repairs to the locomotive and modifications to the braking system (the battery feed to the brake valve) etc DID contribute to this particular accident.
BigJim daveklepper But anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture? Sure! It appears to me there was absolutely NONE! At least by U.S. rail standards.
Sure! It appears to me there was absolutely NONE! At least by U.S. rail standards.
You mean they didn't have a program that is safety in name, but in practice is more about liability mitigation?
Jeff
jeffhergert BigJim daveklepper But anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture? You mean they didn't have a program that is safety in name, but in practice is more about liability mitigation? Jeff
BigJim daveklepper But anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture?
Or disciplining crews?
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
jeffhergertYou mean they didn't have a program that is safety in name, but in practice is more about liability mitigation? Jeff
Isn't that what SAFETY is really all about - Don't undertake an action that creates a injury risk - No Injury = No Liability for making the injured whole.
SD70M-2Dude jeffhergert BigJim daveklepper But anyone wish to respond to my questions regarding safety culture? You mean they didn't have a program that is safety in name, but in practice is more about liability mitigation? Jeff Or disciplining crews?
I had that originally, but edited it out.
Electroliner 1935 Overmod I am not sure that the 'in any way' ought to be in your sentence, as it's been extensively demonstrated there were all sorts of ways MM&A cut corners to save money ... just not ways that seem to have contributed meaningfully to this particular accident I think flawed repairs to the locomotive and modifications to the braking system (the battery feed to the brake valve) etc DID contribute to this particular accident.
Overmod I am not sure that the 'in any way' ought to be in your sentence, as it's been extensively demonstrated there were all sorts of ways MM&A cut corners to save money ... just not ways that seem to have contributed meaningfully to this particular accident
No it didn't. There weren't any flawed repairs .
No modifications were done to impair the correct operation of the brakes.
First, again apologies to Overmod. At 85+, my memory may not be that good, and some of the excellent people that I remember as "roadmasters" may have been engine road foremen. You know the business, that is for sure.
REgarding Harding, one could say that personal responsibility is all-important, regardless of culture or directions from a supervisor. He expressed "reservations"in the taxi, and so he should have acted on those reservations, and then also he did not even come up to the number of handbrakes, 9, setting 7 instead.
On the other hand the general safety culture was lacking, and the supervisor did tell him not to go back.
So the jury could go either way for him. The supervisor seems in greater trouble, and the railroad in general in still greater trouble.
Thar is my current take.
But a new thought:
Did not one inspector state: "There is no evidence of ANY of the car handbrakes having been applied?"
Moving a handbraked car in a yard operation inveriably results in wheel flat-spots. Harding said he set handbrakes on seven cars. I trust Harding's statement. It is inconceivable to me that, with his prior experience, he would have left the train with air only. It should be possible to see if any of the seven forward cars have the flat spots that indicate they had handbrakes set during the runaway.
Others may believe it not possible that someone released the handbrakes. But a person with a certain mischeivous or destructive mind, passing by on a nearby highway, may have had a sudden thourght to engage in what such a perverted mind might consider "fun."
The buffer car had a handbrake set, no other cars in the train were applied. There was a TOTAL of 7 handbrakes counting the five locomotives and the remote car. NONE of the tank cars had handbrakes applied
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