OK, I think I see the problem now. I think you are mistaking items (i) and (ii) for alternatives. They are not; they are sequential steps, or ought to be, whether or not distinguished with 'or' in the language.
FIRST you ensure that when you release the air (and the slack action or other forces 'frozen' by the application relax) the cut doesn't keep moving once slack forces stop. (That gets rid of surprises)
THEN you apply power and ensure that the cut stops when the music does. (This confirms you have an added margin of safety over jostling)
Technically, part of (ii) is actually expressed as part of (i), which I think you missed in its intent; note the language 'or cause' in the discussion of slack there? this is necessarily done with the power if the slack fails to move out completely on brake release, and how would you know from the cab?
Now, this does open the question of how hard do you pull or push, and how far do you go, before idling the power and watching for movement? Either forward or back, the power move would move the draft gears involved to their stops relatively smoothly, and your concern ends at the end of the 'secured' block(since the remaining cars have had their brakes released, and must remain so during the balance of (ii) for the issues potentially present in (i) to have been resolved.)
Now, what (ii) doesn't say is how far you pull or push to perform the test: I would surmise it is far enough to move all the secured cars and the draft gears between them, but might just involve a certain amount of throttle for a certain time if there is little physical movement. The general consensus is that applied handbrakes won't exert enough physical force on the wheelrim to induce flat-spotting wheelslide, but the 'worst case' would be compressing the train 'downhill' until you reach the effective node between the compression due to the set and the force of the trailing consist pulling the rest of the 'set' downhill, after which things would stabilize. I would then pull the set back uphill to stretch it again, and idle the power to see if anything moves; both (i) and (ii) then say it should not move.
If I understand the current Canadian rules, locomotives only 'secure themselves'; they don't count toward the minimum recommended set, and probably shouldn't based on what I have read about their handbrake efficacy.
And yes, if it KEEPS moving after you finish with either step, you have to go set more brakes...
Overmod,
I am looking over your comments, and have a few observations at this point. I don’t see any basis to conclude that (i) and (ii) are sequential steps. It says “or” between them. I don’t see how that can be dismissed as not meaning that there is a choice between the two alternatives.
I do understand your point that (ii) might be part of (i) because causing slack to adjust in (i) requires moving the train, and moving the train seems to be a part of (ii). However, (ii) actually says nothing about moving the train. It only says to apply tractive force, and that could mean just pushing against the stationary train to see if it moves. That is why I say that (ii) needs to be rewritten to say what it means.
In any case, let’s consider that (i) requires moving the train in order to cause the slack to adjust if simply allowing it to adjust will not work. I wrote about that in my analysis of Procedure (i). I could not see any way to cause slack to adjust. How would you do it?
The only way I can think of is to shove the whole train up-grade; that is 20 cars of handbrakes and all of the remaining tonnage; then set the independent to cause all slack to run out. Once it seems that all slack has run out, then immediately release the independent. At that point, the only brakes applied are the 20 cars of handbrakes next to the engine.
Then wait a moment and all the stretched slack on the grade will run back down and bunch against the cars with handbrakes. If the cars with handbrakes set stop the rolling train, then that would amount to causing the slack to adjust. Although one might argue that the slack may still have some surprises introduced by all the un-braked cars running up against the obstacle of 20 cars of handbrakes. There is going to be a lot of compressed draft gear in those un-braked cars. How would you cause the slack to adjust with the grade and train of my example?
I am going to write a letter to the TSB and ask them to explain the meaning of their handbrake effectiveness test instructions.
and who was it that allowed one man trains? Stephen "the ***" Harper.
Thers your answer - zero redundancy on a rolling bomb!
EuclidI do understand your point that (ii) might be part of (i) because causing slack to adjust in (i) requires moving the train, and moving the train seems to be a part of (ii). However, (i) actually says nothing about moving the train. It only says to apply tractive force, and that could mean just pushing against the stationary train to see if it moves. That is why I say that (ii) needs to be rewritten to say what it means.
Here's the thing: the first occurrence when the air brakes are released is that any trapped slack is going to try to equilibrate, both in the sections that have handbrakes applied and those that aren't. The question in (i) is what happens when it doesn't (which is almost sure to happen to some degree in an effectively handbraked portion) and that is why 'or cause' is there. "Causing" slack to adjust is not a matter of stretching it; it seems obvious from the language "when slack runs in or out" that the securement is equally assured with any level of buff as long as it is equilibrated. We have discussed the induction of unbalanced buff and draft a number of times - look at the examples of trains breaking in two when stopping as an extreme example. It is those sorts of in-train disparity that must be allowed to relieve, or be helped along a bit, to satisfy the rule. On a heavy downgrade, equilibrium in buff is fine as long as constant; likewise, on an upgrade (as likely at Nantes) equilibrium in draft is fine. The point you made about disparate draft forces that might have been locked into the set by heavy application of handbrakes is the issue of concern, and I am pretty sure this could be obtained by sequential release and reapplication of some of the set handbrakes if it proved (through inspection of the train) to be present -- this being part of the 'cause' language.
I think you have a typo in the response; it is not (i) but (ii) that speaks of "sufficient" tractive force. And I hate weasel words like 'sufficient' because it (probably purposely) tries to conflate movement and high buff or draft force into one simple little order. One way to read (ii) is that 'prevent the equipment from moving when tractive effort is terminated' includes that it was moving with the other-sufficient tractive effort applied; however, the language also contains the original idea of 112, that 'the handbrakes provide sufficient force to prevent the equipment from moving' once the push or pull test has been done, saying nothing about whether the push or pull was actually strong enough to move cars in the set.
My own somewhat simplistic interpretation of this is nowhere as complex as yours, but it still includes two parts: first, doing whatever is necessary to adjust out any slack imbalance, and second, testing that the train stops after it has been pushed/pulled in the direction of expected roll. That second item is a matter of concern to me precisely because it doesn't contain any reference to a margin of safety; in my opinion "management expectations" of true securement go beyond merely 'sufficient to prevent any movement' -- and the language in (ii) is grossly 'insufficient' to provide even a slight margin of safety as written. I would definitely write and request clarification of this point, especially in light of comments elsewhere that 'management expectations' cannot be met via a push or pull test on high grades.
With respect to the Tinker Bell procedures: remember that you don't care whether the slack is 'all the way in' or 'all the way out' -- just as long as it's all reasonably equilibrated in the train. Gravity force is not really different from DP in that the train is perfectly happy in balanced buff or balanced draft; it is only motion of a node that causes slack action (as you will have noted if you watch handling of some of these unit coal trains). Accordingly, going downgrade, you need to wind on enough handbrakes to hold the train without dynamic (but with the independent set) then release the air, and (working from the back of the set) release and reapply handbrakes to relieve any unbalanced slack that might have been 'locked in' during something like a UDE application. Let the weight of the train compress any undesired extension; excessive compression will balance itself out. The goal is to prevent any shock propagation of sequential slack adjustment through the train when the air brakes are released.
Once the set has been 'equilibrated' you would release the independent (at which point the train will be in compression against the set, and reasonably equilibrated between cars in the set) and presumably stopped. If it started rolling as the independent came off, you have a guide as to how many more brakes need to be set, and now you're working happily back in the section with compressed draft gear. When you get the whole shebang to where it does not move with all the air brakes off [the 'release all air brakes' before either (i) or (ii)] you would then do a pull test corresponding to a load of so many pounds or newtons on the front drawbar. This may or may not involve some of the cars moving, and eventually all of the train moving, downhill; the point is that as you decrease TE the train should, in a nonbureaucratic world, stop moving long before the power goes back to idle. As the rule is written, 'sufficient force' might only represent a few lb/n above moving, with 'sufficient tractive effort' representing almost nothing; I can see why bureaucrats might judge this 'appropriate' (there being no strain gage TE meters on some locomotives) but I really don't.
my trailer needs chocks - not deadly train?
I am of the belief that no matter how many words are posted Bucky will have a rebuttal. It Harkens back to "yes. but"and will never been finished till he has the last word.
This discussion has gone far beyond what was discussed in the origional thread on the Lac Megantic thread and is getting into the minutate of detail Bucky prefers to discuss.
That said, I refuse to debate hm on the subject. Someone did of his volition or because of obeying orders was at fault. It's that simple, yet one indvidual has to spread blame.
Norm
Norm48327This discussion has gone far beyond what was discussed in the original thread on Lac Megantic and is getting into the minutiae of detail Bucky prefers to discuss.
That is true, and I think the discussion should be taken up in a new thread distinct from the Harding/Labrie trial if it continues, but there is still some relevance to 'what constitutes adequate assurance of security' -- which is really the thing that Harding is on criminal trial for, assuming as I do that the trial is reasonably fair to him.
I do not expect to find out, until the trial transcript is issued, whether Harding intended to leave the independent brake set while performing his testing, or what he might have thought he was doing that night. Evidently TC felt guilty enough over insufficient rule provisions that it revised the relevant one in some detail ... which we are now discussing.
I suspect Euclid isn't going to get any answers he considers adequate from people here, but then again I don't see anyone actually trying to provide him with them. The short answer, which he has self-provided, is that he will have to ask TC or TSB for direct confirmation of what they meant in the rule. And I frankly look forward to finding out what they tell him ... and perhaps the specific way they tell him.
The issue of assured securement of a 'stretched' train parked on an upgrade has still really not been completely answered -- the precise sequence of operations Harding should have performed to assure the train's security. Is it possible that a 35-year railroader assumed that a full independent set was the same, mechanically, as applying emergency brakes on the locomotive consist, and therefore did his test thinking independent and handbrake application accomplished the same thing on locomotives? Only time and transcript will tell.
I will say to anyone who is concerned that there is no conflict here. I am not in any particular disagreement with Overmod in this discussion. I am not arguing with him and insisting on having the last word. I have no position to argue in this case. All I have is questions, and I do not know the answers. So I welcome Overmod’s comments as they are well focused on exactly the questions that I am asking. He understands exactly what my concerns are regarding this topic. I wrote those posts analyzing Procedures (i) and (ii) of Rule 112 to create a framework for discussion about several points that I think are in need of clarification.
In one of my Lac Megantic threads, I recall the topic was something about securing parked trains with handbrakes. There was considerable discussion about the push/pull test, and how it is the essential ingredient in assuring that the train will have enough brakes set to keep it from running away. That is when I found the quote by the TSB saying that it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades. I was thunderstruck not only by the facts of their statement, but also by the fact that they made the statement publically, and also by the fact that they made such a blockbuster statement without offering any explanation for what the statement asserts.
The lynchpin of freight train securement is IMPOSSIBLE? And this is from the foremost rail safety authority in Canada. They write railroad rules. They had made this comment before the Lac Megantic derailment and published it in an accident investigation report. I called the TSB to ask them about this statement, but I got a recording saying that the TSB will not respond to questions about train air brakes.
So now we have three people facing life in prison for criminal negligence surrounding the push/pull test that is defined in Rule 112. That is the very same push/pull test that the TSB says does not work on steep grades. Now granted, Harding did specifically violate one element of the push/pull test aside from the question of whether or not the test would have worked, as introduced by the statement made by the TSB. But it seems that the test itself has been damaged by the TSB and their comment alleging its unreliability.
So once again, I am very interested in learning why the comment was made, and one way to approach that question is to understand exactly what the rules of the test say. And that has been a second surprise because frankly I think the rules are very poorly written for such a critical operation.
I confirm that there is no conflict here, and that I don't see a particular degree of yes-butry in what he is asking in this present exchange.
Until I see a definitive explanation, from one of the railroaders or experts here, that says precisely why a normal push or pull test will not give a reliable indication of securement on a high grade, I think the subject is still open, and to the extent it concerns what Tom Harding thought he was doing, that is still a relevant question regarding the trial and its potential outcome.
It has seemed idiotic all this time to conduct a securement test with the independent brake applied, and indeed that controverts both the MM&A rule and the CROR rules that call for release of all air and then some form of tractive-effort test. The revised procedure in CROR 112 continues, in my decidedly non-'expert' opinion, to be lacking in important particulars, most particularly in that it contains no 'factor of safety' in determining the effective strength of a handbrake securement; I can't help but conclude that this includes at least some assumption on TC's part that a tractive-effort test applying excess force to the consist will not provide an effective indication of such a margin of safety. This is in my opinion highly related to what Euclid's expressed concern is, and I think we should all be at least a little concerned, in this thread, with the idea that the very test Harding is accused of flubbing would not, even if 'correctly' executed, have guaranteed securement.
If Harding's counsel was reasonably like its counterpart in United States defense-attorney practice, they will have sprung upon this fact and brought up the issue both in terms of alleged 'negligence' and in cross of expert-witless Callaghan. So I expect to see some mention in the trial transcript, even if the TSB is dodging the whole issue as Euclid indicates.
EuclidI called the TSB to ask them about this statement, but I got a recording saying that the TSB will not respond to questions about train air brakes.
I am sorely tempted to have you call them back to note that these are questions about train HAND brakes, and revisions of Canadian rules, and explanation of statements in TSB reports, not matters concerning 'air brakes' (which CROR 112 as revised explicitly notes have to be released completely before any substantial part of a tractive-effort test is conducted...)
If one is to believe the TSB's stated inability to secure trains with hand brakes, it is time to remove the hand brakes from cars as a cost cutting measure.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
wreckofthe old my trailer needs chocks - not deadly train?
How many "chocks" do you propose?
RSS
BaltACDIf one is to believe the TSB's stated inability to secure trains with hand brakes, it is time to remove the hand brakes from cars as a cost cutting measure.
The Canadians aren't saying you can't secure trains with handbrakes, they're saying you can't get reliable-enough securement on high grades merely by applying their tractive-effort test after applying handbrakes ... a 'sufficient' number of handbrakes or not.
It is relatively obvious from context in the various threads that railroads like CP have evolved approaches to approximate train securement on heavy grades, involving what may be very large numbers of applied handbrakes. It is also clear to me from the LIM/QNS&L accident report from 2011 that such an approximation is ridiculously, dangerously lacking in actual securement efficiency if there is any reasonably common-mode problem with handbrake maintenance or with 'incorrect' application procedure - in a context where Canadian authorities refuse to define what 'correct' application is.
That leaves us with the idea of a tractive-effort test of securement, which to me is a common-sense test whether on the highest possible grade or merely over a couple of undulating grades. The Canadians say you take residual slack out of the train, and then ensure that after you push or pull on it 'sufficiently' it comes to a stop afterward. That's common sense, but not enough common sense in at least a couple of respects. Since the Canadians appear to be fobbing off an actual definition of set onto "management expectations" it would appear that the actual ball has been passed to individual railroad securement rules ... which, again in my opinion, ought to include a reasonable factor of safety in applied force.
What ARE the correct ways of relieving differential slack 'frozen' in a consist on a heavy downgrade by intentional or UDE application? And is this done at the same time securement testing for the train is being finalized?
BaltACD If one is to believe the TSB's stated inability to secure trains with hand brakes, it is time to remove the hand brakes from cars as a cost cutting measure.
I should clarify that when I called the TSB, it was right after the Lac Megantic wreck, and there was no human answer. It answered with a recording that seemed to assume that the only reason anyone would call is to ask questions about air brakes in the wake of the oil train runaway. I had the feeling that there were indeed a lot of people calling them with questions inspired by the disaster. But with this new contact, I will write a letter to pose well written questions.
EuclidEither that or it is time to spend the money to implement a proper securement brake system
The problem being that, as we have discussed in other threads, the time, cost, and 'interworkability' of introducing a "proper securement brake system" any better than properly-maintained handbrakes is far in excess of what it would cost. That money would be far better expended in ECP or other braking conversions that would, among other things, preclude 'islanded' slack runout or compression in emergency applications.
I have in the past argued for providing crews with some sort of power torque device and trains with sensors that display (with colored secondary indicators) the amount of actual shoe pressure applied to wheels; that still involves a certain amount of heavy capital expense but gets the job done as well as one of the 'powered parking brake' proposals does. It makes little sense to use available capital to put expensive motors or valves/cylinders on every car for 'just those times' a train needs to be tied down unattended, and even if crews only carried a large Li-ion array to plug sequentially into motored handbrakes, they would still have to confirm that the brakes were fully applied physically, and were fully released afterwards.
EuclidBut with this new contact, I will write a letter to pose well written questions.
As a recommendation: Look around the structure of the agency, choose a logical person to contact, and send them a DIRECT e-mail indicating your concerns and questions, saying you intend to follow up with a letter, and having them advise you precisely who to send that letter to. You can then ask them to e-mail that person INTERNALLY and have them look out for the letter when it arrives, and respond to it seriously rather than whisking it straight to File 13.
Then put the well-reasoned letter with questions together, and send it.
https://www.thestar.com/amp/news/canada/2017/12/12/defence-calls-no-witnesses-at-trial-for-three-men-charged-in-lac-mgantic-disaster.html
I know this article is out of date but thought I'd post it in the interest of bumping this thread. Looks like the jury will begin deliberating on or about January 5.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
According to Thomas Walsh, the lawyer for Engineer Harding, The Crown had to establish all the essential ingredients of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He said that the essential ingredients of this case involve a departure from a proven norm of conduct which is so great that it constitutes criminal negligence.
So while, Harding violated train securement Rule 112, was that a departure from the proven norm of conduct on the MM&A Railroad? Several other trainmen had admitted to improperly securing their trains according to the rule. An opposing train was found by investigators near Lac Megantic right after the wreck, and that train was not secured per Rule 112. Clearly the violation of the rule was “norm of conduct” on the MM&A.
In reference to a “proven” norm of conduct, I do not know if this means proven in court to have occurred, or proven to have prevented trains from rolling away when left standing.
If it was the former, then I suspect the prosecution would have had to prove that MM&A trains were normally properly secured according to Rule 112.
EuclidAccording to Thomas Walsh, the lawyer for Engineer Harding, The Crown had to establish all the essential ingredients of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He said that the essential ingredients of this case involve a departure from a proven norm of conduct which is so great that it constitutes criminal negligence.
Just what every defendant needs; a lawyer who's in collusion with the prosecution.
Had my attorney said that he would have been fired on the spot.
Norm48327 Euclid According to Thomas Walsh, the lawyer for Engineer Harding, The Crown had to establish all the essential ingredients of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He said that the essential ingredients of this case involve a departure from a proven norm of conduct which is so great that it constitutes criminal negligence. Just what every defendant needs; a lawyer who's in collusion with the prosecution. Had my attorney said that he would have been fired on the spot.
Euclid According to Thomas Walsh, the lawyer for Engineer Harding, The Crown had to establish all the essential ingredients of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He said that the essential ingredients of this case involve a departure from a proven norm of conduct which is so great that it constitutes criminal negligence.
I agree that it seems strange that Walsh would have annonced that the Crown has failed to prove its case before the trial is over.
Euclid Norm48327 Euclid According to Thomas Walsh, the lawyer for Engineer Harding, The Crown had to establish all the essential ingredients of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He said that the essential ingredients of this case involve a departure from a proven norm of conduct which is so great that it constitutes criminal negligence. Just what every defendant needs; a lawyer who's in collusion with the prosecution. Had my attorney said that he would have been fired on the spot. I agree that it seems strange that Walsh would have annonced that the Crown has failed to prove its case before the trial is over.
Any defense lawyer worthy of be paid a nickle or more will argue that the prosecution has failed to prove their case. The arguments they use may not be all that they should be, and the argument won't be made until the prosecution has closed their case so the prosecution can't pick out some element of the defense's argument and then develop more evidence to rebut what the defense has stated.
BaltACDAny defense lawyer worthy of be paid a nickle or more will argue that the prosecution has failed to prove their case. The arguments they use may not be all that they should be, and the argument won't be made until the prosecution has closed their case so the prosecution can't pick out some element of the defense's argument and then develop more evidence to rebut what the defense has stated.
I misread tour post Euclid. My initial reaction was that Harding's lawyer was agreeing with the prosecution.
Sorry 'bout that.
David LassenSome people here are very close to moderation or forcing the thread to be locked. PLEASE discuss the topic, not what you think of each other. Thank you.
When someone makes a statement(s) that are questionable or obviously false and others cannot call them out on it this forum becomes little more than a mutual admiration society. Put on your big boy panties, take off the rose colored glasses and welcome to the real world.
tdmidget David Lassen Some people here are very close to moderation or forcing the thread to be locked. PLEASE discuss the topic, not what you think of each other. Thank you. When someone makes a statement(s) that are questionable or obviously false and others cannot call them out on it this forum becomes little more than a mutual admiration society. Put on your big boy panties, take off the rose colored glasses and welcome to the real world.
David Lassen Some people here are very close to moderation or forcing the thread to be locked. PLEASE discuss the topic, not what you think of each other. Thank you.
There is no rule here that prohibits disagreement, debate, or argument. The rules prohibit resorting to personal attack and insults when you feel that the logic of your argument is not prevailing.
As the saying goes, "Disagree, just don't be disagreeable about it."
Aside from some of the factual exchanges between Overmod and Euclid, this lengthy and repetitive thread is largely "sound and fury, signifying nothing" as the bard said. Or, paraphrasing Sir Winston, "Never was so little said by so many to nobody."
selectorAs the saying goes, "Disagree, just don't be disagreeable about it."
Yes, but ...
Excerpt from Global News, Jan. 8
https://globalnews.ca/news/3951583/lac-megantic-trial-closing-arguments-train-conductors-lawyer-expected-to-address-court/
Charles Shearson told the 14 jurors in his closing arguments today Tom Harding did not perfectly comply with the rules...But Shearson says the company...didn’t inform Harding of the latent risks...“Although Harding’s conduct was not perfect, it was reasonable. When you look at the entirety of the evidence, you have the image of a very reliable man.”
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