tdmidgettdmidget wrote the following post 4 minutes ago: And you have absolutely none that he wasn't worried. Apparently there some short memories here. This was not his first trip. He had years of experience. He had previously been reprimanded for securing with air.
Why do I need evidence that Harding was not worried about his securement of the train? I have never said he was not worried about it. I don't know whether he was worried or not. You have said he was worried about his securement.
I had never heard that Harding was previously reprimanded for securing trains with air. Can you provide your source for that information? That would be interesting to see.
The discussion astonishes me. It sounds to me as if there never had been published a TSB Canada Investigation Report. It was linked before: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp#3.0
There is no question for me that Mr. harding was the only person who could have secured the train securely.
Under Findings the report shows a number of shortcomings in MMA's safety environment. If the court considers them as mitigating we'll see.Regards, Volker
1. I disagree about Dispatcher's knowledge concerning securing trains. I believe they all know that information on Class I Railroads.
2. It will come out in the trial that without any fire the locomotive would have shut down because of low oil. Most of the oil had already gone up in smoke by the time of the fire because of the specific damage in the engine.
3. I thoroughly agree that it is entirely possible that there will be a guilty verdict for Harding, since "He was the only one who could have scured the train." However, the judge in passing sentence may consider that:
a. He was doing what the Dispatcher told him to do.
b. Lack of training
c. General lack of safety culture on the MM&A, inlcuding parking a train on a donwgrade without derail protection and keeping a badly smoking locomotive on line. See a prior post of mine regarding lack of safety culture.
Or the Jury may decide: Harding was following orders and had no choice but to do what the Dispatcher clearly told him to do.
"Or the Jury may decide: Harding was following orders and had no choice but to do what the Dispatcher clearly told him to do."
It is beyond comprehension that a Jew, who lived during World War II, would grasp at that as an excuse. That has not been acceptable for 70 years, y'know.
Take your meds, Dave. Get some sleep.
daveklepper1. I disagree about Dispatcher's knowledge concerning securing trains. I believe they all know that information on Class I Railroads. 2. It will come out in the trial that without any fire the locomotive would have shut down because of low oil. Most of the oil had already gone up in smoke by the time of the fire because of the specific damage in the engine. 3. I thoroughly agree that it is entirely possible that there will be a guilty verdict for Harding, since "He was the only one who could have scured the train." However, the judge in passing sentence may consider that: a. He was doing what the Dispatcher told him to do. b. Lack of training c. General lack of safety culture on the MM&A, inlcuding parking a train on a donwgrade without derail protection and keeping a badly smoking locomotive on line. See a prior post of mine regarding lack of safety culture. Or the Jury may decide: Harding was following orders and had no choice but to do what the Dispatcher clearly told him to do.
Dave - you have been across the pond too long. Dispatchers dispatch - they don't secure trains, they are hundreds of mile removed from a individual train and can't operate the brake wheels from where they are.
If Harding's mind felt that he had not secured the train - of his own initiative he should have returned to the train, knowing it was unattended and applied further hand brakes.
Securing the train was Harding's job and his alone. He failed.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The Dispatcher who has not had any operating experience, far more likely today than when I was active, does have the Rule Book to refer to in case he has to request a non-operating employee to secure a train because the crew is not available for some reason.
I agree with you about what Harding should have done. And the chances are the jury will weigh that as important. But there is the possibility that they will conclude he was following orders.
And in regarding what he should have done, there is the mitigation of the general culture of the railroad which seems not to have been "Safety First."
The lack of sufficent oil to keep the loomotive running, even if the fire had not broken out, is in the trial evidence.
So in addition to securing the train properly, Harding should have also shut down the polluting and dangerous locomotive.
RD: I did not need your reminder. But the German soldiers who were in a line to fire on a row of Jews were not brought to trial at Nurenburg or later. Their commanders were brought to trial. The concentration camp guards were generally not brought to trial, unless they were specifically and unusually distinguisned by the visciousness and active part in killing and torturing.
The Jury will decide the question. In a safety-first culture, Harding would not have even discussed the locomotive question; he would have shut it down at the first opportunity and then reported it. And he would have throughouly understood what securing a train involved and done the push-pull test with hand-brakes only.
And there would have been a derail.
TD, one needs to remember that the camp guards didn't necessarily have the option to disobey orders. Doing so may have lead to a fate worse than court-martial. Poor example on your part.
Also not relevant to the topic.
Modeling the Cleveland and Pittsburgh during the PennCentral era starting on the Cleveland lakefront and ending in Mingo junction
If the prosecution can produce three reliable MM&A locomotive engineers who can state that under the specific conditions faced by Tom Harding, they would have secured the train properly, then the prosecution can be assured of success.
If the defense produces three MM&A locomotive engineers that will state that under the specific conditions faced by Tom Harding, there is a strong possibility that they would have made the same error in securing the train and would not have returned after learning of the fire, then acquital is a possibility.
KEY POINT:
I believe the only way that the dispatcher (RJ) gets blamed is if he had refused to authorize Harding to return to Nantes to start another engine; if Harding had informed him that he had relied on air for part of the securement.
If that were the case, then both men would have been aware of the faulty securement and taken no action to remedy it. So in that case, it is not just a simple matter of blaming the guy with the brake wheel, as so many here insist on doing. Instead, it is one guy with the brake wheel and his supervisor that ordered him not to use it.
All it would have taken is a few words from Harding to RJ to make RJ fully aware of the reasons to return to Nantes at once. So it is not a farfetched scenario. In fact, it is the reason trials are held. If everyone was so sure that only Harding was to blame because he is the only one responsible for the brakes, then they would not have charged two other people with the same crime.
In the very real possibility that I have outlined here, both Harding and RJ would be at fault; maybe not to the same extent, but both would bear blame. It should not be that hard to understand.
daveklepper RD: I did not need your reminder. But the German soldiers who were in a line to fire on a row of Jews were not brought to trial at Nurenburg or later. Their commanders were brought to trial. The concentration camp guards were generally not brought to trial, unless they were specifically and unusually distinguisned by the visciousness and active part in killing and torturing. The Jury will decide the question. In a safety-first culture, Harding would not have even discussed the locomotive question; he would have shut it down at the first opportunity and then reported it. And he would have throughouly understood what securing a train involved and done the push-pull test with hand-brakes only. And there would have been a derail.
Dave, I think you have made excellent points. midget was out of line as well as off-target in terms of history. And Balt's perseverative and biased zeal to defend fellow dispatchers from any partial blame is understandable but his comment (take your meds) is out of line.
Correction: Midget said take your meds. Balt said you had been out of the US too long, as though that were relevant.
EuclidIt should not be that hard to understand.
That's why there are three people on trial. Apparently the prosecution feels the blame extends beyond Harding. Still, he's the one who didn't set enough brakes. The jury may decide that Harding alone is to blame and the other two might get off scott free. Or they may decide that one or both of the other two share a portion of the blame.
We'll know when they render their verdict.
There are all sorts of "what-ifs" here. We've discussed most of them.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Euclid It should not be that hard to understand. That's why there are three people on trial. Apparently the prosecution feels the blame extends beyond Harding. Still, he's the one who didn't set enough brakes. The jury may decide that Harding alone is to blame and the other two might get off scott free. Or they may decide that one or both of the other two share a portion of the blame. We'll know when they render their verdict. There are all sorts of "what-ifs" here. We've discussed most of them.
Euclid It should not be that hard to understand.
When I say it should not be that hard to understand, I am addressing people here who insist that Harding and Harding alone has to be guilty of the crime.
You are right that three people on trial ought to be a hint that the court has considerd that others besides, or instead of Harding might be at fault.
EuclidWhen I say it should not be that hard to understand,
I feel Harding and Harding alone is responsible. Any other's responsibility amounts to oversight or a lack thereof.
While they may share some blame for the incident, it still falls on Harding.
tree68 Euclid I feel Harding and Harding alone is responsible. Any other's responsibility amounts to oversight or a lack thereof. While they may share some blame for the incident, it still falls on Harding.
Euclid
Larry,
Like most posters here I can only arm-chair quarterback. Some of us have declared Harding guilty based on the evidence that has been shown us and discussed ad finitum here.
Were there mitigating circumstances that involved his supervisors? That remains to be seen.
I'm waiting for the outcome of the trial but have a gut feeling Harding is going to be the scapegoat. The low hanging fruit gets picked first.
Norm
Was not aware of this exchange until checking moderated posts today. I think the "take your meds" line is, indeed, enough of a personal attack to invite moderation, and the historical reference was certainly ill-advised.
I think there's some excellent discussion going on this thread, and I understand this is a hotly debated topic. But please, discuss the topic and not the personalities involved in the discussion.
Norm48327Were there mitigating circumstances that involved his supervisors? That remains to be seen. I'm waiting for the outcome of the trial but have a gut feeling Harding is going to be the scapegoat. The low hanging fruit gets picked first.
I would opine that any mitigating circumstances would come back as a condemnation of MM&A operating practices (and fodder for civil lawsuits, if there's anything left to sue). Inasmuch as the other two on trial did not (and could not) place a hand on the consist, they are more likely accessories to the (at this point alleged) crime than anything else.
Everything we've seen here indicates that Harding failed to properly secure the train. Whether that was of his own volition or due to an accepted practice is a significant question.
Something I don't recall seeing is whether the same technique had been used previously in the same place, by Harding, and especially by others. Again, this could reflect back on MM&A, well beyond the RTC and first level supervisor.
From the TSB report:
“The TSB’s investigation revealed that the LE’s [Harding] use of the independent brakes at Nantes on previous occasions influenced his perception of the force provided by the hand brakes, leading him to conclude that just 10% was sufficient. The LE was not alone in this belief; some other MMA LEs also did not release the independent brakes when securing trains, which is indicative that poor train securement practices were not isolated to this accident.”
Why does TSB conclude that other engineers not releasing independent brakes when securing trains is indicative that poor train securement practices were not isolated to this accident?
Not releasing the independent brakes when securing trains does not mean that the securement was tested with independent brakes set. It also does not mean that there were insufficient handbrakes set to hold the train without the independent brakes being set.
As far as I know, engineers were free to set the independent brakes after properly securing the train with sufficient handbrakes and testing that securement with no air brakes set.
EuclidAs far as I know, engineers were free to set the independent brakes after properly securing the train with sufficient handbrakes and testing that securement with no air brakes set.
You highlighted the problem - Harding tested his securement with the independent set, not with the independent released. Had the independent been released when he pull tested he would have started moving down the hill.
That is true, but my point is the part in red stated by the TSB. I believe the TSB's conclusion is faulty. What they cite as practice by other engineers does not indicate anything about improper securement practices. I don't expect the TSB to make mistakes in their report, but there is one.
Which part of "which is indicative that poor train securement practices were not isolated to this accident." did you not understand?
tree68 Which part of "which is indicative that poor train securement practices were not isolated to this accident." did you not understand?
I understand all of that which you quote in red. There is nothing preceding it (in the full quote a few posts above) that indicates anything about poor train securement practices by the other MM&A engineers. Read it very carefully. It depends on what is meant by “when securing trains,” and there is no indication that the other MM&A engineers provided that information.
If those other engineers left the independent set while winding up handbrakes, that would not indicate poor train securement practices.
If they left the independent brakes set while doing the push/pull test, that would indicate poor train securement practices.
If they left the independent brakes set to supplement securement with inadequate handbrakes set, that would indicate poor train securement practices.
If they left independent brakes set as a backup measure to full securement being provided by sufficient handbrakes set, that would not indicate poor train securement practices.
But all they tell us is that some other MM&A locomotive engineers also did not release the independent brakes when securing trains. That alone does not prove or even indicate that their securement was poorly done. It does not go into enough detail to support such a conclusion, as the TSA says it does. It fails Logic 101.
From TSB report 1.22.3:
TSB conducted a survey of LEs and conductors to determine train securement practices at Nantes, and it showed that the number of hand brakes applied to trains varied. Two-person crews would consistently apply at least the minimum number of hand brakes specified in MMA’s GSIs. Some single-person train operators reported applying less than the minimum number of hand brakes.
To perform a hand brake effectiveness test, some LEs would release the automatic and independent brakes and attempt to move the train, while others would not release the independent brakes and would not attempt to move the train. When a proper hand brake effectiveness test was performed, additional hand brakes would be applied, if required.Regards, Volker
MMA locomotive mechanic Randy Stahl was the Crown's 32nd - and last - witness, and the only American to testify at the Lac-Mégantic criminal trial.(Marie-Hélène Rousseau/Radio-Canada)
The 32nd — and last — Crown witness in the trial for the three men charged with criminal negligence causing death in connection the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster finished his testimony at the Sherbrooke courthouse Tuesday.
Randy Stahl, a former Montreal, Maine and Atlantic (MMA) locomotive mechanic based in Derby, Maine stood in the witness box addressing Superior Court Justice Gaétan Dumas and the jury in a hushed, barely audible voice.
Stahl, the only American to testify in the trial so far, described his responsibilities as supervisor of the maintenance shop where the MMA locomotives used to be repaired and maintained before a 74-car fuel train derailed and exploded, setting downtown Lac-Mégantic ablaze in the early hours of July 6, 2013.
Standing trial in connection with that disaster are three former MMA employees: locomotive engineer Thomas Harding, 56, rail traffic controller Richard Labrie, 59, and operations manager Jean Demaître, 53. Each faces 47 counts of criminal negligence causing death, one count for each of the victims of the tragedy.
Stahl told the court he trained the mechanics who repaired locomotives at the shop in Derby and worked alongside them.
He said his employees worked from 6:30 a.m. until 2:30 p.m., but he was available around the clock to speak with locomotive engineers on both sides of the border about mechanical issues and help them find solutions.
Locomotive 5017 was leading the 73-tanker car train that derailed and exploded in Lac-Mégantic, Que.(Richard Marchi/RRPictureArchives.net)
Under cross-examination by Demaître's lawyer, Gaétan Bourassa, Stahl told the court the shop had been closed for Independence Day on July 4, two days before the rail disaster.
Earlier in the trial, former MMA locomotive engineer François Daigle testified he'd driven the ill-fated lead locomotive 5017 on July 4 — two days before it was involved in the derailment. Daigle told the court he'd reported mechanical problems to Demaître, his boss, and sent a fax to the Derby maintenance shop to alert them to the problem
VOLKER LANDWEHR From TSB report 1.22.3: TSB conducted a survey of LEs and conductors to determine train securement practices at Nantes, and it showed that the number of hand brakes applied to trains varied. Two-person crews would consistently apply at least the minimum number of hand brakes specified in MMA’s GSIs. Some single-person train operators reported applying less than the minimum number of hand brakes. To perform a hand brake effectiveness test, some LEs would release the automatic and independent brakes and attempt to move the train, while others would not release the independent brakes and would not attempt to move the train. When a proper hand brake effectiveness test was performed, additional hand brakes would be applied, if required.Regards, Volker
Volker,
Thanks for posting that part of the report (1.22.3 Securing of Trains (MMA-002) At Nantes). That part does indeed indicate a pattern of poor train securement practices.
The part I posted (2.3.1 Number of Handbrakes) claims to indicate poor train securement practices, but of course, it does no such thing.
What I do find interesting in the part you posted is that the pattern of poor train securement correlated with one-man crews. So, while many will say that one-man crews is no excuse, it does definitely correlate with poor train securement practices as a pattern at MM&A. Therefore, despite the fact that Harding was the only guy with the brake wheel, the established MM&A pattern of insufficient train securement cannot help but diminish the culpability of Harding in failing his train securement at Nantes.
What is really surprising is that any engineer would admit to not adequately securing his train in the past where there is no record to discover this deficiency.
Randy, thank you for your comments. This can't be easy for you.
Best wishes.
Randy, thanks
I am not the judge or jury in this case, but supposing I was?
NorthWest Randy, thank you for your comments. This can't be easy for you. Best wishes.
I second that.
To add to earlier post, I hope the remainder of the trial answers the following questions:
Why was a locomotive slated for repair put back into service? Was nothing else available?
Why wasn't Tom Harding told to do the logical thing to shut it down and start a good one?
Why was he told not to return at the time of the fire?
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