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[rjemery]

nanaimo73 wrote:

Nightmare on the high plains
Trains, September 1998 page 50-59
1956 collision between Santa Fe 19, Chief, and 8, Fast Mail
( ACCIDENT, ATSF, COLLISION, "DIVEN, WILLIAM P.", MEXICO, NEW, TRN )

This took place at Robinson, about 40 miles south of Raton.

Dale,

I did manage to get a poor copy of the article you referenced.  Unfortunately, the pictures in the photocopy were too dark to see any detail.

I could understand the confusion in the fireman's mind in throwing that switch.  It was night and the area was not illuminated.  I presume AT&SF eventually put all sidings and switches under CTC to eliminate reoccurrences of such accidents.

• Why did the Fast Mail engineer kill his headlight?
• And why is it prohibited for a train worker to stand near the switchstand?
• Do the rules prohibit the trackworker from unlocking the switch prior to an "all clear" condition (meaning in this case the Chief has passed and the Fast Mail can now resume its e/b route)?

Granted, had the Fast Mail's fireman stood by the clearance point until after the Chief had passed, and then proceeded to the switchstand to unlock and throw the switch, as apparently the rules require, this accident would not have happened.  However, it is not clear to me that these rules were intended to prevent just the type of accident that occurred.  The rules I think were motivated by other concerns.

A further operational question:  Assume the Chief passed the Fast Mail as intended.  Who would have been behind the Fast Mail to have closed the switch for the Chief, and once the Fast Mail moved back onto the main track, who would have reset the last switch?  After the Fast Mail cleared the switch and was back on the mainline, I presume it would have stopped to have allowed the worker who reset the switch to board the train.  Since radios were not in use, how would the conductor of the Fast Mail signaled the engineer to proceed.

[jimrice4449]

First let's get some nomenclature straightened out!   It is common (much to my annoyance) to use meet and pass as if they were synonyms.   They're not.   In the case referenced, no. 19 is w/bound and no 8 is e/bound, therefore what we have is a meet.   To have a passing situation both trains would have to be going in the same direction.

That having been cleared up (I hope), a train approaching an opposing train in the clear in a siding is required to dim it's headlight so as to enable the opposing train to identify it (usually by eng. no.).   The train taking the siding is required to extinguish its headlight to signify that it is actually clear of the main track.

Employees lining switches are required to move to the opposite side of the track after the switch is lined and locked just to prevent this type of situation where somebody suddenly can't remember if he lined the switch correctly.   Illumination is irrelevant since the points are right at the switchstand and even in utter and absolute dark the point position could be determined by Braile if need be.

Both trains were psgr and so the rear end could communicate by "tweeter".   Psgr equipment has 3 hoses between cars, a large one for steam, a smaller one for air brakes and an even smaller one for communication.   Frt trains would rely on hand signals or "by guess and by golly" to the occasional embarresment of sprinting challenged brakemen.

[rjemery]

I appreciate the clarifications.  Yes, I am weak on terminology.

Employees lining switches are required to move to the opposite side of the track after the switch is lined and locked just to prevent this type of situation where somebody suddenly can't remember if he lined the switch correctly.

Why would the fireman even cross the track to the switchstand before the Chief cleared the area?  These being manual switches, presumably there is nothing to set.  I would assume the rules would only require that the fireman check the points to be certain they are set correctly, which they were by default.  Then after the Chief clears, the fireman could remove the locks and open the switch.

If I understand Rule 104(A) correctly, the fireman should have remained on the siding at or near the clearance point and not have approached the switchstand at all until after the Chief rolled by.  The first apparent break in the protocol was the fireman's unlocking of at least one of the two locks on the switchstand, after which he did move to the opposite side of the track as the rules require.

Since the engineer of the Fast Mail perished in the crash, what was he presumably trying to communicate when he blew the whistle and flashed the headlight that made the fireman panic?  The article stated the ICC thought the engineer was advising the fireman to move away from the track, something that seems unnecessary to communicate to an experienced railroad employee.  There certainly was no other rail traffic moving in the area.

The timing was also critical.  The horn must have sounded no more than 30 seconds before the Chief arrived at the switch.  From where the fireman was standing, I would think he would have heard the approaching train if not seen its headlight.

Illumination is irrelevant since the points are right at the switchstand and even in utter and absolute dark the point position could be determined by Braile if need be.

Not so in this case.  The fireman, whether he could see or not, assumed the points were set incorrectly and threw the switch.  With the Chief all but on top of him, he must have felt there was no time to check before acting.

From his vantage point more than 100 yards away from the switch, could the Fast Mail engineer have possibly seen  in darkness how the switch was set?  If not, why would the fireman think the engineer was telling him the switch was set wrong?

-----

Assuming there was no disaster that night, I presume the fireman would have returned to the engine cab.  After the Fast Mail moved out onto the mainline, would it have stopped to allow the rear trainman to close the switch and lock it before moving again?  If the train did not stop, and there was some problem setting or locking the switch, I could see the potential for a crewman being left behind no matter how fast he sprints!

Question:  Assuming there was no collision, and the Fast Mail crew looked at the oncoming train and discovered it was NOT "No. 19 Eng. 30".  With no radio communication, what would have the engineer done?  Obviously, stay put, but for how long?  How would the engineer receive instructions to proceed?

Question:  The article describes the Chief's F3 headlight as a "piercing white light 5 miles distant."  I question the distance.  My own personal experience indicates the distance such a headlight could be seen is two miles tops and probably less.  My experiences were with the El Pasoan, but I do not know what type of locomotive was used on that train.  The headlight is very bright if one is dead center on the tracks, but not as bright if one is twenty feet off to the side, as at a station.

[jimrice4449]

I remember the article from years ago but don't recall all of the specifiics and rather than dig it up I'll assume from what you've written that the firemen on the Fast Mail went ahead of the engine to the switch in order to line it after the Chief went by.   My guess would be that he just absent-minedly threw the switch and the engr on #8 hit the horn and light to warn him to reline the switch but there either wasn't time or he panicked.   At any rate this is a good example of why you're not supposed to be at the switch until the movement is completed.

Since the Fast Mail would have an order reading "no 8 eng 1234 meet no 19 eng 30 at wherever" he would be obliged to stay in the clear at Wherever until a train having eng 30 went by.

While there were certainly cases of brakemen being left behind (when I was working for the SP there was a case of the brakeman on the Coast Mail being left at Carpinteria and getting an auto ride from somebody and getting back on the train at Ventura) w/ a psgr train there is the signal line and on frt the condr could set the air from the caboose.

[rjemery]

... I'll assume from what you've written that the firemen on the Fast Mail went ahead of the engine to the switch in order to line it after the Chief went by.   My guess would be that he just absent-minedly threw the switch and the engr on #8 hit the horn and light to warn him to reline the switch but there either wasn't time or he panicked.   At any rate this is a good example of why you're not supposed to be at the switch until the movement is completed.

A second-by-second timeline we do not have, but you may well have sparked the answer.

According to the article and the fireman's testimony, he first went to the switchstand (which I now have learned he should not have) and unlocked but did not remove the lock from the treadle.  The other switchstand lock he did not touch.  The switch and switchpoints were left as they were.  The fireman then moved across the track to await the Chief.

I now suspect the engineer of the Fast Mail, having seen the fireman's movements traced by the fireman's flashlight, probably thought the fireman had improperly reset the switch and sounded his horn and flashed his headlight as a warning.

Under the intense pressure of time given the proximity of the approaching Chief, the fireman then bolted across the track, and without looking at the switchpoints, removed the two locks and threw the switch just as the Chief roared onto the scene.

That scenario certainly reinforces the rule of not going to the switchstand until after the other train has gone by.  Human error compounded, with tragic results.

Rules or no rules, I probably would have first gone to the switch itself, without crossing the track, just to confirm the points were set correctly, then moved back, and I would have been in violation of the rules.

Since the Fast Mail would have an order reading "no 8 eng 41 meet no 19 eng 30 at Robinson" he would be obliged to stay in the clear at Robinson until a train having eng 30 went by.

When would dispatchers have noted no 8 was "missing" and how would they have gotten new orders to the engineer?  (The same problem would have occurred had no 8 broken down after no 19 eng 30 had passed and no 8 eng 41 could not move off the siding, this in the days without radio communication.)

[jimrice4449]

There would be a couple of ways.   Most sidings had a phone and a crewman could get in touch w/ the dspr there and, if necessary, copy a train order to correct whatever problem had arisen.  Another method, if the phone wasn't readily available,would be to dictate an order at a TO station to be delivered by another train.   Instead of the order address reading to "C&E no 8 at Wherever" it would read to "C&E no 8 at wherever care of engr Extra 1234 East at Elsewhere".   If the location of No 8 was unknown the order would be addressed to "C&E No 8 between Wherever and There care of engr Extra 1234 East Elsewhere"   The order would be issued in suficient copies for the engr of the delivering train and the crew of the train getting the order (in most cases the conductor and engr, but on the Santa Fe the condr, engr, and head brakeman)

[rjemery]

There would be a couple of ways.   Most sidings had a phone and a crewman could get in touch w/ the dspr there and, if necessary, copy a train order to correct whatever problem had arisen.

Jim,

And indeed there was a telephone at the Robinson siding.  It wasn't mentioned in the article, but was shown in the accompanying track diagram.

With the accident, the phone may have been overlooked in the darkness or taken out by the derailed cars.  Help was summoned and word relayed by flagging down cars travelling on US 85 parallel to the tracks.

Thank you for your explanations on operational procedures.  You have been most helpful to me in understanding matters and scenarios.

---

I note your username.  Do you have something to do with SP 4449 or are you just a fan of the steam locomotive?

[jimrice4449]

Just a (BIG) fan.   Living in the PacNW I try not to miss an oportunity to watch 4449 and/or SP&S 700 when they get out to roam.  I generally don't get over to the Coast but try to get out for trips in Eastern Washington, N/E Oregon and Montana.   One of the first things I did when my family moved to SoCal in 1950 was to find a spot w/in bicycle range to check out the 20 car Daylights behind the GS-4s