wjstix OK, I'm missing something here.... The Milwaukee Road's western extension was making money hand over fist right up until it was abandoned? GN-NP-CB&Q-SP&S, with all their traffic, natural resources (timber, iron ore, etc.), were on the edge of total collapse c. 1968 if they hadn't merged? They tried merging for more than half a century before that, from what I've seen/heard/read they were doing OK in the 1960's I thought?
TRR Milwaukee's high value traffic surge began in 1968 with the Kent Auto Facility, which virtually cornered that market, and then with the Stacy Street Intermodel Facility, which captured the bulk of THAT business. THEN, the merger conditions began their benefits 1-2 years LATER. Because of the explosion of high priority business, two things happened, the XL Special had increased from one train per day to two, and the tonnage limits on each of those trains had increased from 3,000 tons to 5,000 tons, AND they were inserted into a matrix that also included an ADDITIONAL section of the eastbound #262, which had also had their tonnage limits increased from 3,000 tons to 5,000 tons. Had the tonnage limits NOT increased, Milwaukee would have required THREE sections of #261 and three sections of #262 each day. Not to mention that the former "Hotshots," #263 and #264, ALSO began running multiple sections on their former "Hotshot" schedules.
Milwaukee's high value traffic surge began in 1968 with the Kent Auto Facility, which virtually cornered that market, and then with the Stacy Street Intermodel Facility, which captured the bulk of THAT business. THEN, the merger conditions began their benefits 1-2 years LATER. Because of the explosion of high priority business, two things happened, the XL Special had increased from one train per day to two, and the tonnage limits on each of those trains had increased from 3,000 tons to 5,000 tons, AND they were inserted into a matrix that also included an ADDITIONAL section of the eastbound #262, which had also had their tonnage limits increased from 3,000 tons to 5,000 tons. Had the tonnage limits NOT increased, Milwaukee would have required THREE sections of #261 and three sections of #262 each day. Not to mention that the former "Hotshots," #263 and #264, ALSO began running multiple sections on their former "Hotshot" schedules.
It’s interesting that Mr. Sol thinks this is a big deal, when it actually shows the inherent weakness of the Milwaukee Road. The 3,000-ton XL Special (operated at 3.0 horsepower per ton) was an exceptionally small train with an exceptionally large amount of locomotive power, but necessary for a train operating on a demanding profile with a slow track speed. But even a 5,000-ton train was not considered large (at least by Burlington Northern standards), though such a train was in some cases at or over the trailing tonnage limit for some of the Milwaukee’s steep grades.
At the peak of these multiple-section “Hotshot” schedules on the Milwaukee (even though they were slowed significantly in 1972, while BN maintained their faster trains), frequency was three to four trains daily each way. Starting in 1974, Burlington Northern began publishing “for information only” (as in they had no timetable authority) freight train schedules in its timetables. Here are some links:
It’s interesting to note that while 3-4 trains smallish trains on the Milwaukee is considered something significant by some, Burlington Northern scheduled five trains westbound (3, 81, 83, 97, 197) and 7 eastbound (4, 80, 82, 88, 90, 172, and 182) on its Northern Transcontinental line. Not all these trains operated daily, but most did (train 90 was actually very rare, but extra sections of other trains as well as extra symbols were commonplace). Also, many of the intradivisional trains are not shown (such as the train from Laurel to Whitefish, which could continue all the way to Spokane or beyond). All things considered, 7 to 8 trains each direction was not uncommon, and BN was also operating 3 to 4 trains daily each way on the ex-NP line east of Sandpoint. Additionally, BN was generating 1 to 4 trains daily along the coast line from Vancouver, BC to Portland moving tonnage to and from the SP interchange at Portland or the WP interchange at Bieber, California. Given the day of the week, BN was dispatching 12 to 15 trains daily from the Seattle and Portland divisions.
Vermontanan2Obviously, Interstate Highways were more developed in the East earlier than in places like Montana, but they were coming. By 1969, I-94/I-90 was just about complete across North Dakota and much of Minnesota, about a third of Montana and nearly all of Washington; by 1979 it was complete just about the entire way from Chicago to Seattle, except for a few short stretches in Montana, and the well-known holdouts at Wallace, Idaho and east of Coeur d’Alene.
In the summer of 1973 (when I was 14) I went with my folks on a car trip from the Twin Cities to Seattle. As I recall, at the Montana border it noted that Montana didn't have speed limits - and soon thereafter, the interstate became a gravel road!
wjstix In the summer of 1973 (when I was 14) I went with my folks on a car trip from the Twin Cities to Seattle. As I recall, at the Montana border it noted that Montana didn't have speed limits - and soon thereafter, the interstate became a gravel road!
Oh, come on, it wasn't that bad. The Montana portion was paved - all two lanes of it! And Montana DID have a speed limit: "Reasonable and prudent."
https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a14511978/montana-was-once-the-last-bastion-of-hot-nasty-bad-ass-speed-feature/
"Reasonable and prudent" was a Catch-22 law, and actually could work both ways. After it was reinstated in 1995, I recall meeting a Highway Patrolman on a two-lane road north of Great Falls doing 92 MPH on a clear day with dry pavement. Didn't get stopped. But that next winter, a friend who was driving a crew van for the railroad on a Forest Service road in Northwest Montana had the vehicle slide into the ditch after she was stopped - it was THAT icy. She was subsequently ticketed for going "faster than the conditions allowed."
TRRAll of the passenger services on the Northern Tier lost money. That was, recall, the argument behind creating Amtrak in the first place. The Northern Pacific, running the route comparable to the Milwaukee Olympian Hiawatha, was losing $2 million a year. The ICC, rejecting an NP plea to abandon half of its transcontinental passenger services said "Nope! You're not losing ENOUGH!" "NP, Discontinuance of Trains," Finance Docket 25718, Interstate Commerce Commission.
The argument behind creating Amtrak was keeping passenger service. If not for some behind the scenes palyers. Amtrak would not be in existence today.. Most of Nixons staff didn't care about passenger service. They were banking on subsidized air transport and buses..
TRRReviewing anything Mr. Meyer writes is always worth the effort, or, at least, the entertainment! From some time "back," Mark Meyer “Michael Sol When there are 31 derailments in 28 days, ANY railroad would have business "backed up." That usually happens when the railroad is closed.” In his usual fashion, complete ignorance of the Milwaukee Road, a railroad he knew nothing about, and proves it daily, shows there.I am very familiar with the portion that had “31 derailments in 28 days.” For the record – something Mark Meyer desperately needs – the Avery Hill was virtually completely rebuilt 1971, 1972 and 1973, and then, in October, 1973, the derailments “hit.” The record of that rebuild can be found here: Milepost 1750 to 1773. Track Profile, Montana Division, 1976. https://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Construction/Milwaukee%20Profiles/TrackChartMontanaDivision1976.pdfThe Avery Hill had substantial additional 132 lb steel added, new ties, and 4" of new “Clinton Crushed Quartzite” which was the very high grade quartzite purchased from BN’s excellent source at Clinton, Montana – crushed quartzite ballast. It was, in fact, the “best part of the entire system.”After two years of rebuilding the entire section, why, in October, 1973, did “the trains start falling off the track,” as Bill Brodsky pointed out, “31 derailments in 28 days?”The Joes had been taken off as motive power for a “trial” for the month of October, 1973. The timing looked ... like that HAD to have something to do with it. Dynamometer car 5000 went up and down the Avery Hill, trying to find out ... why? It couldn’t be the “track,” that was virtually brand-new, and the heaviest rail on the system. Locotrol? Well, it had been in use; but not with those results. The Milwaukee put their best people on it. That didn’t include Mark Meyer for reasons known only to Groucho Marx.It was a mystery. Excellent track. New rebuild. But why “October, 1973?”Milwaukee had taken delivery of the new 4,750 cu ft PS-2 covered hopper grain cars over the summer. A newer, higher capacity design, those were the “America’s Resourceful Railroad” cars. Still a “100 ton car,” the new cars were distinctive by the extra 250 cu yds of grain they could carry. They began arriving in August, 1973. They began moving “West” – previously most railroad wheat moved East – after the Russian grain deal in the Fall of 1973. October was harvest season.The ominous, unknown flaw? The extra capacity had been added “up top.” As did several railroads that experienced the same problem, those particular cars were particularly susceptible to “harmonic rock,” AND, the exacerbated transition differential between the 4" inches of brand new crushed quartzite ballast from BN’s Clinton facility. To maintain the clearances for the tri-level Autoracks, new ballast had not been added to the tunnel floors. The new PS-2 4750 Covered Hopper cars, just arriving at the Milwaukee, then, had three distinct features; 1) the cars measured 57ft. 4in. over strikers and 45ft. 9in. between truck centers, 2) the added capacity had been added on the new PS-2 design “up top” making those cars more “top heavy” than their predecessors, and 3) they were encountering the results of a virtually complete rebuilding that exacerbated the transition between 4" of brand new quartzite ballast, and the lowered tunnel floors resulting from the 1961 auto-rack capacity project. Now, those new PS-2 Hopper Cars were giving the same problems to all the railroads that had them: harmonic rock, wherever they operated over standard length jointed rail. On the Milwaukee, that problem was significantly exacerbated by the artificial transitions between the new ballast and the tunnel floors. The “problem” was so widespread and severe, that AAR commissioned a formal study of it. “Track-train dynamics Harmonic Roll Series Torsional and Flexural Car Stiffness Characteristics”https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/18364/Harmonic_Roll_Vol4.pdfAnd, on the Avery Hill, there were three key factors: the lowered tunnel floors from the 1961 increase in tunnel capacity had installed transitional rail entering and leaving the tunnels. A train entering a modified tunnel would pass through a grade transition, and then another one when leaving the tunnel. That series of prolems, on virtually brand-new track, exacerbated a problem occuring eveywhere with those specific cars, only on jointed, 39 foot rail sections, that created the harmonic with the specific 45'9" centers of those cars. And, as the Milwaukee finally discovered after extensive dynamometer tests, that harmonic existed only at certain track speeds, which happened to be the standard speed of the diesel-electric powered trains on the Avery Hill. Change the speed? Problem solved. But, related to that "change in speed" was a specific motive power problem. The heavy trains carrying the new grain cars were ... Locotrol. As the X-5000 Dynamometer Car observed, with the tunnels and curvature on the Avery Hill, the Locotrol units were losing contact with the head end units. They were attempting to work at different speeds. Wham! Derailment on curve!But, then reread Mark Meyer’s explanation. Yet another key point that he not only “got wrong,” but out of sheer ignorance, got entirely backwards.As usual. Reading the American Association of Railroads' research report on precisely that issue will add additional illumination. Brand new railcars, new design, virtually brand new heavy rail, change in motive power, what could possibly go wrong? Mark Meyer will try and tell you! AAR's evaluation is far more useful. Best regards, Michael Sol
From some time "back," Mark Meyer
“Michael Sol When there are 31 derailments in 28 days, ANY railroad would have business "backed up." That usually happens when the railroad is closed.”
In his usual fashion, complete ignorance of the Milwaukee Road, a railroad he knew nothing about, and proves it daily, shows there.I am very familiar with the portion that had “31 derailments in 28 days.” For the record – something Mark Meyer desperately needs – the Avery Hill was virtually completely rebuilt 1971, 1972 and 1973, and then, in October, 1973, the derailments “hit.”
The record of that rebuild can be found here: Milepost 1750 to 1773. Track Profile, Montana Division, 1976. https://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Construction/Milwaukee%20Profiles/TrackChartMontanaDivision1976.pdfThe Avery Hill had substantial additional 132 lb steel added, new ties, and 4" of new “Clinton Crushed Quartzite” which was the very high grade quartzite purchased from BN’s excellent source at Clinton, Montana – crushed quartzite ballast. It was, in fact, the “best part of the entire system.”After two years of rebuilding the entire section, why, in October, 1973, did “the trains start falling off the track,” as Bill Brodsky pointed out, “31 derailments in 28 days?”The Joes had been taken off as motive power for a “trial” for the month of October, 1973. The timing looked ... like that HAD to have something to do with it. Dynamometer car 5000 went up and down the Avery Hill, trying to find out ... why? It couldn’t be the “track,” that was virtually brand-new, and the heaviest rail on the system. Locotrol? Well, it had been in use; but not with those results. The Milwaukee put their best people on it. That didn’t include Mark Meyer for reasons known only to Groucho Marx.It was a mystery. Excellent track. New rebuild. But why “October, 1973?”Milwaukee had taken delivery of the new 4,750 cu ft PS-2 covered hopper grain cars over the summer. A newer, higher capacity design, those were the “America’s Resourceful Railroad” cars. Still a “100 ton car,” the new cars were distinctive by the extra 250 cu yds of grain they could carry. They began arriving in August, 1973. They began moving “West” – previously most railroad wheat moved East – after the Russian grain deal in the Fall of 1973. October was harvest season.The ominous, unknown flaw? The extra capacity had been added “up top.” As did several railroads that experienced the same problem, those particular cars were particularly susceptible to “harmonic rock,” AND, the exacerbated transition differential between the 4" inches of brand new crushed quartzite ballast from BN’s Clinton facility. To maintain the clearances for the tri-level Autoracks, new ballast had not been added to the tunnel floors. The new PS-2 4750 Covered Hopper cars, just arriving at the Milwaukee, then, had three distinct features; 1) the cars measured 57ft. 4in. over strikers and 45ft. 9in. between truck centers, 2) the added capacity had been added on the new PS-2 design “up top” making those cars more “top heavy” than their predecessors, and 3) they were encountering the results of a virtually complete rebuilding that exacerbated the transition between 4" of brand new quartzite ballast, and the lowered tunnel floors resulting from the 1961 auto-rack capacity project. Now, those new PS-2 Hopper Cars were giving the same problems to all the railroads that had them: harmonic rock, wherever they operated over standard length jointed rail. On the Milwaukee, that problem was significantly exacerbated by the artificial transitions between the new ballast and the tunnel floors. The “problem” was so widespread and severe, that AAR commissioned a formal study of it.
“Track-train dynamics Harmonic Roll Series Torsional and Flexural Car Stiffness Characteristics”https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/18364/Harmonic_Roll_Vol4.pdfAnd, on the Avery Hill, there were three key factors: the lowered tunnel floors from the 1961 increase in tunnel capacity had installed transitional rail entering and leaving the tunnels. A train entering a modified tunnel would pass through a grade transition, and then another one when leaving the tunnel. That series of prolems, on virtually brand-new track, exacerbated a problem occuring eveywhere with those specific cars, only on jointed, 39 foot rail sections, that created the harmonic with the specific 45'9" centers of those cars. And, as the Milwaukee finally discovered after extensive dynamometer tests, that harmonic existed only at certain track speeds, which happened to be the standard speed of the diesel-electric powered trains on the Avery Hill. Change the speed? Problem solved. But, related to that "change in speed" was a specific motive power problem. The heavy trains carrying the new grain cars were ... Locotrol. As the X-5000 Dynamometer Car observed, with the tunnels and curvature on the Avery Hill, the Locotrol units were losing contact with the head end units. They were attempting to work at different speeds. Wham! Derailment on curve!But, then reread Mark Meyer’s explanation. Yet another key point that he not only “got wrong,” but out of sheer ignorance, got entirely backwards.As usual. Reading the American Association of Railroads' research report on precisely that issue will add additional illumination.
Brand new railcars, new design, virtually brand new heavy rail, change in motive power, what could possibly go wrong? Mark Meyer will try and tell you! AAR's evaluation is far more useful.
Best regards, Michael Sol
B&O/Chessie System had restrictions on train's handling Hi Cube covered hoppers on 6 degree or greater curves.
Trains containing them had to EITHER maintain a speed of 25 MPH or greater or 10 MPH or less in the particular territory. Speeds between 10 & 25 MPH permitted the harmonic rock off.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
TRR From some time "back," Mark Meyer “Michael Sol When there are 31 derailments in 28 days, ANY railroad would have business "backed up." That usually happens when the railroad is closed.” Etc....
Etc....
For those having a "WTF" moment here, you're not alone. It's from another thread altogether, somewhere else, and completely irrelevant. But then the point is character assassination rather than any attempt to convey information.
But to clarify: The AAR's explanation is correct.
My input that was that 31 derailments in 28 days was not desirable thing, and it was self-inflicted: The tunnels were lowered to increase clearance, but instead of lowering them sufficiently to accommodate the new ballast, the Milwaukee didn't do that, they just didn't put ballast in the tunnel.....so there was a dip in the track at each end of the tunnel causing the problem. While other railroads did experience some problems with the cars, the criticality was nowhere near the better-than-one-per-day on the Milwaukee Road. In other words, you get what you pay for.
Also, for clarification: BN didn't have a "Clinton facility" claimed by Mr. Sol. On Burlington Northern (and Northern Pacific), the ballast pit was always known as McQuarrie (3.7 miles west of Clinton). Clinton was best-known for its annual (since discontinued) Testicle Festival. (As long as we're focusing on nothing to do with this thread.)
It also shows that when the Milwaukee needed first class ballast, it looked to the competition that had it and used it: Burlington Northern. Or, as Fred Hyde described the Milwaukee Road in Montana: "the finest dirt track mainline in the west."
Thanks again to Mr. Sol for, as always, pointing out another Milwaukee Road Lines West deficiency.
TRR "B. Passenger Train Operation. The so-called "City" trains are presently being operated jointly with the Union Pncific and the Southern Pacific by the Milwaukee betweon Chicago and Omaha. These operations are covered by a oontract which provides for a one-year termination notice from either party. As shown in the following Table IX, during the year 1962 the Milwaukee realized a net gain of $1,604,086 based on out-of-pocket expenses in the operation of the City trains between Chicago and Omaha. Revenues on these trains were $5,590,478, and out-of-pocket operating expenses were $3,986,392. If the Union Pacific were to acquire its own line into Chicago, it ispresumed that the City trains would be transferren to that line. The result will be an annual loss of $1,604,086 to the Milwaukee based on 1962 operations." P. 21.
"B. Passenger Train Operation. The so-called "City" trains are presently being operated jointly with the Union Pncific and the Southern Pacific by the Milwaukee betweon Chicago and Omaha. These operations are covered by a oontract which provides for a one-year termination notice from either party. As shown in the following Table IX, during the year 1962 the Milwaukee realized a net gain of $1,604,086 based on out-of-pocket expenses in the operation of the City trains between Chicago and Omaha. Revenues on these trains were $5,590,478, and out-of-pocket operating expenses were $3,986,392. If the Union Pacific were to acquire its own line into Chicago, it ispresumed that the City trains would be transferren to that line. The result will be an annual loss of $1,604,086 to the Milwaukee based on 1962 operations." P. 21.
This is the second time Mr. Sol has mentioned the anecdotal 1962 “net gain” in this thread (and numerous times on others). But again, Mr, Sol offers nothing on the other 14 ½ years because all he has is this one “Merger Committee Report.” Moreover, this report does not (and by its nature cannot) address the $10 million or so spent by the Milwaukee to ready the Chicago-Council Bluffs route to handle the (initially) five extra UP streamliners (each way). But the mere fact that consolidations in the service happened immediately after the 1955 takeover and continued (along with some discontinuances of service) until 1971 is a pretty good indication that the services were not profitable. For about a year starting in late 1969 through most of 1970, the state of Illinois wouldn’t allow the Milwaukee to discontinue the Illinois portion of the City of Denver/City of Portland train when it was consolidated into the City of San Francisco/City of Los Angeles/Challenger. That year of running a stub Chicago-Savanna train with one car likely sucked up much of the 1962 “net gain” right there.
As always, anecdotal observations (like the short-lived “fast” schedule of the XL Special) are meaningless, but in the case of the 1962 “net gain” theory it’s especially ridiculous because the whole fiasco didn’t have to be. Since UP could not show preference to interchange partners at Council Bluffs (as it could at Fremont or Grand Island), there is every indication that even without the infrastructure enhancements (for passenger trains) on the Milwaukee’s Council Bluffs route the Milwaukee would have received the same amount of freight traffic (one to three trains daily).
Prior to 1955, the Milwaukee already had the Midwest Hiawatha as a day train as well as the overnight Arrow. It’s interesting to note that the Midwest Hiawatha was carded (in 1953 as an example) for 8 hours, 45 minutes between Chicago and Omaha with 12 intermediate stops (one of which was Madrid, with a dedicated connecting bus to Des Moines) including setting out cars for its Sioux Falls section in Manilla, IA. (Pretty impressive, considering on the parallel C&NW, the Cities trains made the Chicago-Omaha trek in 7 hours, 45 minutes to 8 hours, but had as few as 5 and as many as 9 stops.) After the 1955 reroute, the Midwest Hiawatha was consolidated with the Challenger from Chicago to Omaha (it really was reduced to just Sioux Falls cars adding and setting out at Manilla) and the number of stops cut in half. But, as stated earlier, this “bonanza” of passenger traffic was short-lived, and with the Challenger being consolidated into the City of Los Angeles in April of 1956 (just 6 months into the reroute, though the trains could be separate seasonally for a few more years), the Midwest Hiawatha was discontinued on April 28,1956, and with it went the convenient, fast daytime service on the route.
So, recapping, this is what the Milwaukee Road got for the millions spent on CTC, additional trackage in the Chicago commuter zone, new locomotives, adding reservations and station personnel, and repainting rolling stock to UP colors:
*No more freight business than they would have received regardless;
*Loss of daytime passenger service earlier than would have been the case without the reroute;
*Capacity for money-losing passenger service which quickly eroded from 6 daily trains to one over 15 ½ years;
*A passenger route considered not worthy of Amtrak service starting in May, 1971.
*The distinction of being the only trans-Iowa freight route to be mostly abandoned in the late 1970s and into 1980.
The epitomization of “Failure”, indeed.
TRR In fact, between 1968 and 1977 the Milwaukee Road's Lines East, in concert with all other Midwest railroads, lost 35% of its traffic, mostly high revenue. During that same time period, despite the completion of the Interstate Highway System, Milwaukee Road Lines West gained 41% in traffic, virtually all high revenue, long haul.
In fact, between 1968 and 1977 the Milwaukee Road's Lines East, in concert with all other Midwest railroads, lost 35% of its traffic, mostly high revenue. During that same time period, despite the completion of the Interstate Highway System, Milwaukee Road Lines West gained 41% in traffic, virtually all high revenue, long haul.
Percentages are irrelevant. With regard to “Lines West”, when you have a railroad which runs only one or two trains a day, pretty much ANY increase in traffic would be noticeable. That’s the way math works. As for “Lines East” and the repetitive claim of the burden it was on the Milwaukee Road, it’s amazing how much of it endures 41 years after the demise of “Lines West.”
TRR And why should he know anything about the Milwaukee Road? Railroad history and economics was never his railroad job, nor part of his education.
And why should he know anything about the Milwaukee Road? Railroad history and economics was never his railroad job, nor part of his education.
And Mr. Sol knows this how?
TRR And Appendix K was controversial. When first submitted, it showed heavy losses for Lines West. Well, that made sense if they were trying to abandon it. But, the ICC's Office of Rail Public Counsel -- which had been set up to safeguard the "public's interest" in railroad matters -- through their auditor, David Smith, found out, "oops," the Milwaukee had been able to show losses ONLY by double-entering expenses. In that fashion, and after that correction, Appendix K showed ... profitability, right through 1977.
And Appendix K was controversial. When first submitted, it showed heavy losses for Lines West. Well, that made sense if they were trying to abandon it. But, the ICC's Office of Rail Public Counsel -- which had been set up to safeguard the "public's interest" in railroad matters -- through their auditor, David Smith, found out, "oops," the Milwaukee had been able to show losses ONLY by double-entering expenses. In that fashion, and after that correction, Appendix K showed ... profitability, right through 1977.
Except that the “profitability” didn’t include the hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of deferred maintenance over the two previous decades which ensured the railroad’s demise, nor did it included similar amounts that would be necessary to achieve long-term sustainability, such as infrastructure improvements to be competitive with all the other railroads providing service in the Upper Midwest-to-Pacific Northwest corridor. Since the Milwaukee Road never made these expenditures, they logically could not be considered a liability until it all came crashing down after the 1977 bankruptcy. Profitable? Not a chance.
TRR At the ICC Hearings for the Northern Lines merger, the Northern Lines testified as follows: "Anticipated improvements in freight schedules are based mainly on the consolidation of terminal facilities at common points and the use of the shortest of most efficient internal routes available to the unified company. Applicants indicate that the New Company would establish through transcontinental freight routes over the shortest available lines and the most favorable grades. Applicants gave numerous examples of improved freight schedules that could be established following consummation of the mergers. For example, applicants indicated that the fastest schedule of the Great Northern from Seattle to Chicago would be reduced by the New Company from 94 hours and 15 minutes to 82 hours and 30 minutes or 11 hours-~d45 minutes faster than the present schedule. The fastest transcontinental eastbound train of the Northern Pacific leaves Seattle at 9:00 p. m. and arrives Chicago 12:15 p. m. on the 5th day, a total elapsed time of 97 hours and 15 minutes. After unification, the departure time would beE':30 p.m. and arrival time at Chicago would be 10:30 a.m. on the morning of the 8th day, a total elapsed time of 84 hours, or 13 hours less than present schedule" 328 ICC 474 (1966) https://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/ICC/NothernLinesDecision1966.pdf At that time, on that date, the Milwaukee was running #261 on a 55 hour schedule, and #262 on a 59 hour schedule. The ICC denied the merger. The Northern Lines panicked. Absolutely panicked. And, just a glance at what was happening to, for instance, the Northern Pacific shows why. It was in full "failure" mode, and all of its land grants had been tied up, ultimately for the duration of J.P. Morgan's "NP Bonds" -- 100 years. They HAD TO HAVE THAT MERGER! In desperation, the Northern Lines Merger Committee quickly agreed to the Milwaukee Road's proposed conditions. Warren Ploeger had put together those conditions in his Seattle Office, as Western General Counsel. They were designed to transform the West, and they did.
At the ICC Hearings for the Northern Lines merger, the Northern Lines testified as follows:
"Anticipated improvements in freight schedules are based mainly on the consolidation of terminal facilities at common points and the use of the shortest of most efficient internal routes available to the unified company. Applicants indicate that the New Company would establish through transcontinental freight routes over the shortest available lines and the most favorable grades. Applicants gave numerous examples of improved freight schedules that could be established following consummation of the mergers. For example, applicants indicated that the fastest schedule of the Great Northern from Seattle to Chicago would be reduced by the New Company from 94 hours and 15 minutes to 82 hours and 30 minutes or 11 hours-~d45 minutes faster than the present schedule. The fastest transcontinental eastbound train of the Northern Pacific leaves Seattle at 9:00 p. m. and arrives Chicago 12:15 p. m. on the 5th day, a total elapsed time of 97 hours and 15 minutes. After unification, the departure time would beE':30 p.m. and arrival time at Chicago would be 10:30 a.m. on the morning of the 8th day, a total elapsed time of 84 hours, or 13 hours less than present schedule" 328 ICC 474 (1966)
https://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/ICC/NothernLinesDecision1966.pdf
At that time, on that date, the Milwaukee was running #261 on a 55 hour schedule, and #262 on a 59 hour schedule. The ICC denied the merger. The Northern Lines panicked. Absolutely panicked. And, just a glance at what was happening to, for instance, the Northern Pacific shows why. It was in full "failure" mode, and all of its land grants had been tied up, ultimately for the duration of J.P. Morgan's "NP Bonds" -- 100 years. They HAD TO HAVE THAT MERGER! In desperation, the Northern Lines Merger Committee quickly agreed to the Milwaukee Road's proposed conditions. Warren Ploeger had put together those conditions in his Seattle Office, as Western General Counsel. They were designed to transform the West, and they did.
As a point of reality, CB&Q and GN were operating train 97 from Chicago to Seattle in 61.5 hours starting in early 1964, not the 94.25 hours stated in the testimony. By 1968, CB&Q/GN matched the running time of the XL Special, and in 1971 offered a schedule 5.5 hours shorter, while the Milwaukee gave up and lengthened its schedule. Again, service sustainability was something that was hardly a Milwaukee Road trademark in later years. So, the document is questionable in its accuracy or whether it was contemporary. It is interesting that the document that does note “expedited schedules require the use of shorter and lighter trains,” a fact that made the XL Special much more costly to operate than the competition on GN and later, BN.
The “Northern Lines” were hardly panicking. After all, in the end, the CB&Q, GN, NP, and SP&S were permanently liked with joint-ownership of most of the assets, and few doubted it would be consummated eventually – unlike the Milwaukee Road, which was such an unpalatable piece of real estate (until the albatross of Lines West was jettisoned) that no one wanted to merge with it or purchase it. And we all know that this, too, had been an ongoing project.
And, transform the West? Hardly. Even at its apex in 1973, the Milwaukee was dispatching a faction of the trains that BN routinely did and still an insignificant percentage of overall traffic from the Pacific Northwest and Canadian Southwest considering all the carriers. But given the lengthening of the Milwaukee’s schedules and continued non-investment in infrastructure, the modicum of additional business did have a negative affect on the Milwaukee Road.
TRR Actually you did say there was no plan, that no one stepped forward with one, and no one had any proposal. That claim was another complete fabrication. At the insistence of the general public, shippers, employees and the States, the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act provided explicity for the creation of an umbrella organization to represent those interests. http://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Bankruptcy/MilwaukeeRoadRestructuringAct.pdf
Actually you did say there was no plan, that no one stepped forward with one, and no one had any proposal. That claim was another complete fabrication. At the insistence of the general public, shippers, employees and the States, the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act provided explicity for the creation of an umbrella organization to represent those interests. http://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Bankruptcy/MilwaukeeRoadRestructuringAct.pdf
TRR The Plan was detailed. The Chair was Paul Schmechel, a friend of mine, who was President of the Montana Power Company, and of the Western Energy Company. The President was Bill Brodsky, who had been on the plannng staff at the Milwaukee, knew it well, and later was the founding President of Montana Rail Link. His able assistant was Fred Simpson, who was also on the Milwaukee's planning staff and who confronted Trustee Stanley Hill who had asserted, early on, that the "Pacific Extension must go." Simpson pushed back. That was NOT what the "numbers said." Hillman just sat there. Few people dared to challenge Stanley E.G. Hillman. At one point the Company joke was the the "E.G." stood for "Everything Goes!" But, confronted, Hillman just sat there. Finally, he mumbled "Better minds than yours have looked at this!" By whom he meant Worthington Smith and Paul Cruikshank. Simpson got up, walked out the door, and returned to Bainbridge Island to practice law. To his credit, and his own dismay, when Hillman got his "outside studies" back, he saw that Simpson had been correct. Hillman ruefully, but publicly, conceded, "It turns out that the Milwaukee Road is a relatively wealthy company!" And, for the most part, stopped speaking to WLS and PFC. The way PFC phrased it to me was "Mr. Hillman became difficult to work with." I'll bet he did! But it was too late to turn back the Pacific Extension abandonment. Hillman got an ulcer and promptly quit.
The Plan was detailed. The Chair was Paul Schmechel, a friend of mine, who was President of the Montana Power Company, and of the Western Energy Company. The President was Bill Brodsky, who had been on the plannng staff at the Milwaukee, knew it well, and later was the founding President of Montana Rail Link. His able assistant was Fred Simpson, who was also on the Milwaukee's planning staff and who confronted Trustee Stanley Hill who had asserted, early on, that the "Pacific Extension must go."
Simpson pushed back. That was NOT what the "numbers said." Hillman just sat there. Few people dared to challenge Stanley E.G. Hillman. At one point the Company joke was the the "E.G." stood for "Everything Goes!" But, confronted, Hillman just sat there. Finally, he mumbled "Better minds than yours have looked at this!" By whom he meant Worthington Smith and Paul Cruikshank. Simpson got up, walked out the door, and returned to Bainbridge Island to practice law.
To his credit, and his own dismay, when Hillman got his "outside studies" back, he saw that Simpson had been correct. Hillman ruefully, but publicly, conceded, "It turns out that the Milwaukee Road is a relatively wealthy company!" And, for the most part, stopped speaking to WLS and PFC. The way PFC phrased it to me was "Mr. Hillman became difficult to work with." I'll bet he did! But it was too late to turn back the Pacific Extension abandonment. Hillman got an ulcer and promptly quit.
Well, if the Milwaukee was “relatively” wealthy, then there are numerous disconnects between the company losing hundreds of millions of dollars at the end, its wealth, and the need for handouts from the government.
What’s really unimpressive about the NewMil proposal is how few people were actually involved in creating it. Simpson is on record as claiming a conspiracy, which is fine, but the reality is that when one looks at the scores and scores of Milwaukee Road, Burlington Northern, and Union Pacific company officers (as well as hundreds of other railroaders throughout the years) that intimately knew the Milwaukee Road, the only logical conclusion is that IF the Milwaukee’s Lines West was this lurking railroad powerhouse touted ad nauseum by Mr. Sol and suggested in the NewMil document, there would certainly be many, many more who signed up and signed on. The list of members of the Board of Directors and Officers is quite unimpressive considering the breadth of the project and the number of states it would impact. An example: Arthur Kane, the president of the Knife River Coal Mining Company: With the Milwaukee serving the mine at Gascoyne, ND, his interest is obvious. But from a coal standpoint (touted in the document), the president of a LIGNITE coal company does not inspire confidence. The Gascoyne-Big Stone coal train was an anomaly of sorts since lignite is rarely hauled any distance (and coal source was replaced with sub-bituminous coal from Montana and Wyoming later and to this day). For a railroad that would stretch from Louisville to Pacific Coast, one would expect much more prestigious people on the list, as well as others from the Milwaukee Road. Seriously, why should we believe that people like Messrs. Simpson and Brodsky were right and all the many, many, many others not? (I mean, other than the conspiracy, but even then there needs to be a reason for one.) And by the way, who were the others in the “consortium of experienced railroad executives” (as stated by Mr. Sol) who authored the NewMil plan but who were not mentioned?
TRR The ICC had observed, in its ultimate 1968 approval of the Burlington Northern Merger, that "the elimination of intercarrier routing barriers and the strengthening of Milwaukee were sin qua non elements in our approval of the merger." 348 ICC 132. "Spokane, Portland and Seattle -- Control" July 28, 1975.
The ICC had observed, in its ultimate 1968 approval of the Burlington Northern Merger, that "the elimination of intercarrier routing barriers and the strengthening of Milwaukee were sin qua non elements in our approval of the merger." 348 ICC 132. "Spokane, Portland and Seattle -- Control" July 28, 1975.
Maybe. Indeed, the Burlington Northern merger hurt the Milwaukee, but there’s no reason to believe that the Milwaukee would have survived without the BN merger. Without the BN merger, the Milwaukee would not have seen an uptick in business and would have likely continued at its 1 or 2 trains-per-day traffic level. New traffic to and from Portland, as an example, was a Catch-22 for the Milwaukee. Had the BN merger not happened, the Milwaukee would have been shutout of this critical gateway location. As it was, it likely didn’t make any money on what it did receive due to the circuity and poor operating profile of its route. The question is not whether the NP “Had to have that merger;” rather, it’s whether the Milwaukee did and if it mattered.
Regardless of a BN merger or not, trains would have continued to get longer and heavier, and this would have had a negative affect the Milwaukee which made almost no improvements on its infrastructure to accommodate, and had the high-cost operating profile. The Roberts Bank coal port would still be accessed by GN trackage (and not the Milwaukee) and more and more grain would gravitate to Columbia River ports, as is the case today. The NP and GN would have water-level access to these ports as well as Seattle and Tacoma via their SP&S subsidiary. The GN route would certainly capture much of the grain business in Montana (as is the case today) due to its superior profile, and likely would even make more inroads in Milwaukee territory in South Dakota. Other than Seattle and Tacoma, the Milwaukee didn’t serve many important traffic origination stations or served them badly. Great Northern, specifically, would be least affected by no BN merger as it had by far the superior transcontinental profile in the Western U.S., and through its subsidiaries had single-carrier service from Vancouver, BC to California for the interchange to the WP/ATSF.
TRR There is a documented, well-developed record available. The Final Proposed Reorganization Plan, that Meyer denied existed, can be found here. http://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Bankruptcy/NewMilwaukeeLines.pdf They had four weeks to put the thing together, and, frankly, did a yeoman job of it. But, it was not enough. As Tom Ploss pointed out, "for the first time, the ICC established a required prediction of profitability exceeding 10%." Only one railroad in the country met that brand-new criteria. The Chair if the ICC, Darius Gaskins, conceded to Bill Brodsky, that "It was the most difficult decision we had to make while I was at the ICC."
There is a documented, well-developed record available.
The Final Proposed Reorganization Plan, that Meyer denied existed, can be found here. http://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Bankruptcy/NewMilwaukeeLines.pdf
They had four weeks to put the thing together, and, frankly, did a yeoman job of it. But, it was not enough. As Tom Ploss pointed out, "for the first time, the ICC established a required prediction of profitability exceeding 10%." Only one railroad in the country met that brand-new criteria. The Chair if the ICC, Darius Gaskins, conceded to Bill Brodsky, that "It was the most difficult decision we had to make while I was at the ICC."
Again, thanks to Mr. Sol for making these documents available at his website to prove that the demise of the Milwaukee’s Lines West was a logical end to its existence.
Hand-in-glove with the NewMil proposal is this one from the ICC that documents its many flaws:
https://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Bankruptcy/NewMilICC%20Opinion.pdf
TRR After Milwaukee opened its Stacy Street Container facility, Milwaukee had over 50% of the Container traffic, as against BN's three mainlines, and the UP.
After Milwaukee opened its Stacy Street Container facility, Milwaukee had over 50% of the Container traffic, as against BN's three mainlines, and the UP.
TRR Mark Meyer: "Examples: Grain train Great Falls to Longview, 100% more expensive via NewMil; Chicago to Portland, five major grades on NewMil versus zero on BN); Seattle to Chicago, four major grades on NewMil versus two on BN).: We don't actually know that. You made it up. What we DO know is that no shipper would make a decision the way that Mark Meyer proposes. Why would they? Mark Meyer has never "shipped" an ounce of freight in his entire life.
Mark Meyer: "Examples: Grain train Great Falls to Longview, 100% more expensive via NewMil; Chicago to Portland, five major grades on NewMil versus zero on BN); Seattle to Chicago, four major grades on NewMil versus two on BN).:
We don't actually know that. You made it up.
What we DO know is that no shipper would make a decision the way that Mark Meyer proposes. Why would they?
Mark Meyer has never "shipped" an ounce of freight in his entire life.
The same could be said about you as well... CP for example had a thing called the Rogers Pass Project back in the 80's for a reason... A key role in moving freight is using the least amount of assets to move as much as possible from point A to B. Which requires a low grade efficient routing... Facts say the Milwaukee did not have that..
TRR These were Train #261's running times, with its fast, high value, freight. "District Mileage Avg. MPH (incl. work) (excl. work) Bensenville - Aberdeen 700 42.2 52.2 mph Aberdeen - Harlowton 629 44.7 46.3 mph Harlowton - Avery 438 39.8 43.0 mph Avery - Tide Flats 419 28.2 31.8 mph "You will note, this is a train in mountain territory that is averaging 43 mph in the Rocky Mountains between Harlowton and Avery, over three mountain ranges. A truck would be pushing it to achieve that average. "The 10 mph difference between "includes work" and "excludes work" on the Bensenville-Aberdeen portion -- the largest such difference -- is due to four pickups and the St. Paul fill set-off -- the most "work" of the entire trip, and the blocking done on # 261 flat switching at Aberdeen which took about an hour. This got the train out of Bensenville quickly, and gave it to a yard for which nothing else got in the way." The "longest hauls in the country," with the premium freight. So popular that, in addition to #263 and #264, the pre-existing Hotshots, that beat GN's offerings by 17 hours, the new hotshots, #261 and #262, beat GN's "Best" by over a day. At 3,000 tons, the traffic was so popular that Milwaukee had to add an additional section, each, of #261 AND #261. After that, Milwaukee had to start adding tonnage. From a strict limit of 3,000 tons, to handle the demand, tonnage increased to 4,000 and 5,000 tons AND two additional trains, AND additional sections of #263 and #264.
TRR "These were the 8-10 trains per day that the PCE averaged for the remainder of the time before bankruptcy. These were trains that were up to 60% heavier than the trains run during the 1960s, and had MILW stayed with those tonnage limits, the PCE would have been running 14-16 trains per day."
TRR After Milwaukee opened its Kent Auto Facility, GN's auto traffic was so depleted, it finally shut down its Seattle auto facility. After Milwaukee opened its Stacy Street Container facility, Milwaukee had over 50% of the Container traffic, as against BN's three mainlines, and the UP.
TRR Mr. Miller has, in past, simply fabricated a claim, his one of many, that Milwaukee Road's Lines West "lost money."
TRR That was false, and the extant documentation proves it conclusively. In the years 1975, 1976, and 1977, it was the only part of the railroad that made a profit, as compared with the Lines East that was, along with ALL if its Midwestern counterparts, losing money hand-over-fist, hence the desperation in the 3R and 4R Acts. Milwaukee Road System Net Operating Income 1976: -$8,834,000 1977: -$29,3920,000 1978: -$49,331,000 Lines West 1976: +$10,581,000 1977: +$8,051,000 1978: +3,556,000 Documentation: Milwaukee Petition to Abandon, Exhibit K. https://www.milwaukeeroadarchives.com/Bankruptcy/ApplicationtoAbandonLinesWestFullDocument.pdf Lines East alone: 1976: -$19,451,000 1977: -$37,444,000 1978: -$52,887,000 Lines West, Cumulative Net Operating Income, 1976-1978 +$22,187,000 Milwaukee Road, Net Operating Income, 1976-1978, WITHOUT Lines West: -$109,746,000
TRR Mr. Meyer: "But I believe the ICC didn’t go far enough. For instance, it should have also asked, ...". Initially, you denied any such proposal to save Lines West had ever been profitable, or that ANY efforts to save it had happened, at all. What happened to THAT?
TRR Mark Meyer: "Examples: Grain train Great Falls to Longview, 100% more expensive via NewMil; Chicago to Portland, five major grades on NewMil versus zero on BN); Seattle to Chicago, four major grades on NewMil versus two on BN).: We don't actually know that. You made it up.
TRR What we DO know is that no shipper would make a decision the way that Mark Meyer proposes. Why would they? Mark Meyer has never "shipped" an ounce of freight in his entire life.
SD60MAC9500 The same could be said about you as well... CP for example had a thing called the Rogers Pass Project back in the 80's for a reason... A key role in moving freight is using the least amount of assets to move as much as possible from point A to B. Which requires a low grade efficient routing... Facts say the Milwaukee did not have that..
This thread has too many personal attacks, allegations, and insults to be feasibly cleaned up. Therefore, it's being locked. Next time, try to discuss trains without insulting those you're discussing them with.
--Steven Otte, Model Railroader senior associate editorsotte@kalmbach.com
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