TRAINS Newswire of this date DEC.24TH, 2023: Headlines a couple of tales
[ will be a total of 10 (?) ] of AMTRAK's, seemimg, self-inflicted injuries.
A.) By David Lassen linked @ https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/top-10-stories-of-2023-no-8-new-acela-delays/
FTA:(in part) "...A Wall Street Journal report in November placed the cost of the delays in launching next-generation service at $140 million and counting. That figure includes the increasing expense of maintaining the aging first-generation Acela fleet, as well as lost revenue from reduced Acela capacity on two fronts. The new trainsets will have about 25% more seating than the trains they replace, and fewer Acela trips are currently being offered, with four of the original 20 trainsets sidelined. They are being cannibalized for parts to keep the others running.
The Journal report was based in part on an unredacted version of a report by the Amtrak Office of Inspector General that was highly critical of manufacturer Alstom’s process for building the new trainsets. The public version of that report had dollar figures moved “due to [their] sensitive nature,” but offered plenty of other insight into the problems that have led to the mounting delays..."
B.) And linked also: BY David Johnston, @
https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/top-10-stories-of-2023-no-9-amtrak-leadership-and-governance-issues/
The second linked arrticle not only points 'the finger' at LD operations, but lays blame upon management.
FTA:"...The perception that company leaders had figured out a way to generously pay themselves incentive bonuses while running a “money-losing” company was explored by a U.S. House rail subcommittee grilling Amtrak CEO Stephen Gardner in June.
In a letter to House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Republican leadership in late 2022, board Chairman Anthony Coscia explained, “Incentive payments to management is entirely contingent upon the success of the company in meeting challenging performance goals approved by Amtrak’s Board of Directors and informed by external compensation consultants. … Simply put, if Amtrak does not meet these challenging expectations, then our executives are not rewarded.”
The factors involved in those “challenging performance goals” remain hidden behind an Amtrak barrier protecting what it calls “commercially-sensitive information.” That left plenty of room for Republican lawmakers, in charge thanks to a slight House majority, to attack the CEO’s nearly $500,000 annual compensation and $766,000 bonus haul over a five-year period.
Gardner implied the ball for sustaining national-network operations is solely in Congress’ court when he quoted Northeast Corridor “per rider” costs of $11 per passenger, compared with $148 for long-distance trains. State-supported and long-haul trains are saddled with a heavy dose of allocated costs — formulas for which also not been disclosed — while Northeast Corridor trains are charged only a fraction of the substantial expense of running and maintaining the extensive Amtrak-owned physical plant..."
It seems that when the 10 articles are completed; there iss going to be plenty of blameto be sread around...From Congress, to Amtrak management, to other points of collaterally damaged entities......
[Note:] The two currently running, linked stories, contain, at their ends; a list of other TRAINS stories, that FURTHER EXPLAIN ANTRAK's woes....
The THIRD episode dropped on December 28th,2023. See Linked @https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/top-10-stories-of-2023-no-4-amtraks-ongoing-capacity-issues/
"Top 10 stories of 2023, No. 4: Amtrak’s ongoing capacity issues"
By Bob Johnston | December 28, 2023
FTA:[in part] "WASHINGTON": ...Here’s why: Compared to 2019 and even the summer of 2020, each Superliner-equipped trains except the City of New Orleans operated with either one less sleeping car or transition sleeper and one less coach, even as the busy summer travel season approached The shortfall translates to 60 fewer sleepers and coaches to generate revenue and provide mobility. Particularly harmful to network connectivity was the assignment of only one coach to the Chicago-Washington Capitol Limited until a second was added in mid-November.
The situation was entirely foreseeable, according to former Amtrak president David Gunn. He was remarkably prescient in predicting exactly what happened if service was scaled back, employee expertise was allowed to walk out the door, and equipment was sidelined [see “Former Amtrak President Gunn sees perils in service cuts,” Trains News Wire, Sept. 8, 2020].
Equipment necessary to maintain daily capacity was stored in 2020 when all long-distance trains except Auto Train were trimmed to triweekly operation. Four-year brake inspections and renewal (known as COT&S: Clean, Oil, Test, and Stencil) ground to a halt and other maintenance functions were curtailed while the Superliners sat in the Beech Grove Heavy Maintenance Facility and single-level Amfleet II coaches and Viewliner sleeping cars were stored in Miami..."
The story detai,ls whe WHY's, HOW's and where the equipomnent was;l 2023 was a comedy of errors, on the part of management and its failure to judge needs and use patterns.
It seems that IMHO the major accomplishment iof AMTRAKJ Management was their ability to argue their ';successes' to maintain their management BONUS status? And then, their was their California issues'...... Just sayin'
"Top 10 stories of 2023, No. 4: Amtrak’s ongoing capacity issues'
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.