Overmod Euclid We already have that emergency whistle signal. It is exactly as what Joe said he would have done. This is part of every reference to train whistle/horn signals, going way back in history. But the 'new thing' that we have to consider adding is the effect of directional echo on the emergency signal. For that, we need longer, or differently-spaced, gaps of silence between the 'blasts' -- and to me, this means that the shorter blast clusters need to be decided as something unambiguously meaning not just "proximity danger" but "look around you danger". This might be as simple as the MTA's long-short repeated three times ... then delayed for a second, the whole thing being sent with as distinctive a 'hand' on the button as possible. Just as wireless telegraphers could recognize two signals as different, this optimizes the different ways a human ear in a multipath reflection field might discriminate two signals essentially trying to send the same priority message in the same few seconds. I would note that a considerable amount of work on high-criticality alerts was done in ITU R10 and other working groups. One example was the stall alert in heavy aircraft, which instead of blaring in your ear calls your attention (calmly, to non-pilots, considering the importance!) speech-synthesizing something directed toward relieving the dangerous condition, or alerting to do something (pull up) or what's becoming a potential problem (terrain). It would be delightful if we could provide a PA function via some terrifying auxetophone that would allow voice alerts at substantial distance ... but I'd certainly settle in the short run for unambiguous alerting.
Euclid We already have that emergency whistle signal. It is exactly as what Joe said he would have done. This is part of every reference to train whistle/horn signals, going way back in history.
But the 'new thing' that we have to consider adding is the effect of directional echo on the emergency signal. For that, we need longer, or differently-spaced, gaps of silence between the 'blasts' -- and to me, this means that the shorter blast clusters need to be decided as something unambiguously meaning not just "proximity danger" but "look around you danger".
This might be as simple as the MTA's long-short repeated three times ... then delayed for a second, the whole thing being sent with as distinctive a 'hand' on the button as possible. Just as wireless telegraphers could recognize two signals as different, this optimizes the different ways a human ear in a multipath reflection field might discriminate two signals essentially trying to send the same priority message in the same few seconds.
I would note that a considerable amount of work on high-criticality alerts was done in ITU R10 and other working groups. One example was the stall alert in heavy aircraft, which instead of blaring in your ear calls your attention (calmly, to non-pilots, considering the importance!) speech-synthesizing something directed toward relieving the dangerous condition, or alerting to do something (pull up) or what's becoming a potential problem (terrain). It would be delightful if we could provide a PA function via some terrifying auxetophone that would allow voice alerts at substantial distance ... but I'd certainly settle in the short run for unambiguous alerting.
EuclidWe already have that emergency whistle signal. It is exactly as what Joe said he would have done. This is part of every reference to train whistle/horn signals, going way back in history.
Overmod As noted, we need an emergency code, to be learned by heart along with the other horn signals, for "emergency look around you" rather than just "emergency". That would consist of enough 'dead time' between signals to allow any echoes to die to the point other horns sounding emergency could be heard and distinguished. Such is my non-operator's opinion, as learned in part from wiser people with running experience.
As noted, we need an emergency code, to be learned by heart along with the other horn signals, for "emergency look around you" rather than just "emergency". That would consist of enough 'dead time' between signals to allow any echoes to die to the point other horns sounding emergency could be heard and distinguished.
Such is my non-operator's opinion, as learned in part from wiser people with running experience.
We already have that emergency whistle signal. It is exactly as what Joe said he would have done. This is part of every reference to train whistle/horn signals, going way back in history. I assume it was chosen precisely for the reasons you suggest. Leave some gaps of no tone for a better chance of hearing a tone from another whistle. The gaps also tend to give a punch feeling of urgency which is a fundamental part of emergencies. Note that it is exactly opposite of the "laying on the horn" described by the engineer of 175, and was possibly also done by the engineer of 66. That signal readily makes two horns sound like one.
Along with making a punchy horn signal, an engineer should watch for clues that a person in harms way may not realize that fact. This should have been apparent to the engineer of 175. From her viewpoint, the action of the two victims either meant they were not aware of 175 because they were distracted by 66, or they were playing chicken. Then one would need to ask themselves how often do men in green safety vests play chicken?
Particularly the fact that the two men moved away from the path of 66, but remained in the path of 175, should have made it clear that they were unware of 175 despite the laying on of the horn. They were unaware of 175 because they thought they were hearing only the horn of 66.
Something that has been 'added' since the beatings stopped is the datum that the conductors were said to be walking in the gauge, and moved to the tie ends when hearing and seeing 66. Properly-conducted testimony would have revealed this as part of the interviews for "the NTSB record" more directly, and perhaps it could have been asked of Sahara either directly or as a 'callback'.
It does change the picture of what to do ... slightly ... if she saw them move over and thought they were about to go further. Still doesn't change putting it in emergency some time ... even a few milliseconds ... before the actual impact.
charlie hebdo Your comments on the current discussion about the horns would be helpful.
Your comments on the current discussion about the horns would be helpful.
Were I the engineer on Train 175 I would have used a succession of short sounds on the horn to indicate impending disaster and I would have applied the emergency brake far sooner than Ms. Reese did.
Overmod Euclid Depending on the horn signal structure and timing, it was possible at any moment for the signal of #66 to cease and open up a space in which the signal from #175 would have been recognized as coming from behind them, and thus alerted them to jump into the clear. Note that reflection from the CSX train could have the effect of delaying echoes of 66's horn to make them appear to come 'from behind' with about the same timing and perhaps imaging as anything that would have been coming directly from 175. We haven't discussed the effect of Doppler shift on resolving the two-train issue; it applies in many situations, but perhaps not here. It appears the conductors were alert enough to move from the gauge to the tie-ends upon seeing 66... but not all the way out of fouling Amtrak's line. Perhaps I'm missing something, but I note pointedly that the event-recorder data for the locomotive on 66 was neither provided nor analyzed. There is a very important datum there -- did the engineer lay on the horn continuously, or nearly so? That plus the echoes would mask anything from 175... and is consistent with their behavior to get further from what they thought was the 'active' rail.
Euclid Depending on the horn signal structure and timing, it was possible at any moment for the signal of #66 to cease and open up a space in which the signal from #175 would have been recognized as coming from behind them, and thus alerted them to jump into the clear.
Note that reflection from the CSX train could have the effect of delaying echoes of 66's horn to make them appear to come 'from behind' with about the same timing and perhaps imaging as anything that would have been coming directly from 175. We haven't discussed the effect of Doppler shift on resolving the two-train issue; it applies in many situations, but perhaps not here. It appears the conductors were alert enough to move from the gauge to the tie-ends upon seeing 66... but not all the way out of fouling Amtrak's line.
Perhaps I'm missing something, but I note pointedly that the event-recorder data for the locomotive on 66 was neither provided nor analyzed. There is a very important datum there -- did the engineer lay on the horn continuously, or nearly so? That plus the echoes would mask anything from 175... and is consistent with their behavior to get further from what they thought was the 'active' rail.
A shoddy investigation would be an understatement.
EuclidDepending on the horn signal structure and timing, it was possible at any moment for the signal of #66 to cease and open up a space in which the signal from #175 would have been recognized as coming from behind them, and thus alerted them to jump into the clear.
Electroliner 1935 Euclid I don’t believe their fate was sealed until the point of impact. Had #175 been there earlier or significatly later you might be correct, but with the sequence as it occured. the only thing that I can conjur up would have been if 175s horn had sounded first and given them enough sound to overcome the noise of #66. It is possible that had they had something alert them to #175 approach, they might have been able to react but at 75 ft/sec there wasn't IMHO enough reaction time to savethemselves. BaltACD Sully was fully engaged in his situation - mentally and physically as well as having his co-pilot fully engaged in what was taking place. I agree. Have you ever played the game where someone holds a dollar bill between your thumb and index finger and says if you catch it when I let go, you can keep it. Most of the time, it will clear your fingers before you can can close them on it. That is a demonstration of reaction time.
Euclid I don’t believe their fate was sealed until the point of impact.
Had #175 been there earlier or significatly later you might be correct, but with the sequence as it occured. the only thing that I can conjur up would have been if 175s horn had sounded first and given them enough sound to overcome the noise of #66.
It is possible that had they had something alert them to #175 approach, they might have been able to react but at 75 ft/sec there wasn't IMHO enough reaction time to savethemselves.
BaltACD Sully was fully engaged in his situation - mentally and physically as well as having his co-pilot fully engaged in what was taking place.
I agree. Have you ever played the game where someone holds a dollar bill between your thumb and index finger and says if you catch it when I let go, you can keep it. Most of the time, it will clear your fingers before you can can close them on it. That is a demonstration of reaction time.
Depending on the horn signal structure and timing, it was possible at any moment for the signal of #66 to cease and open up a space in which the signal from #175 would have been recognized as coming from behind them, and thus alerted them to jump into the clear. It was also possible that one of them would have just spontaneously turned to check behind, which they have have done several times prior to the approach of the two trains.
Your dollar bill example is a demonstration of reaction time, but the potential reaction time available in this accinent was far longer than what is available in the dollar bill trick. I recall that the engineer of #175 said she was the two conductors walking on the track 15-20 seconds prior to striking them.
What sealed the fate of the two victims more than any other factor was the fact of the two opposing trains approaching simulaneosly. What was second in sealing their fate was the two engineers "laying on the horn" during their approach.
People always talk about how trains can be very quiet when approaching, even at high speed. That is true. But that had nothing to do with this very unique event. With this event, the two trains were not quiet at all. Both probably could have been heard easily from a mile away.
EuclidI don’t believe their fate was sealed until the point of impact.
Since this is sneaking back into a general discussion of the accident, let me remind everyone that the original 'source material' is not in the defectively written report, but in NTSB docket DCA17MR010, which you can access here, for reference.
I see that in the BLET account the issue of where the conductors were has been resolved: they were walking in the gauge, and some time after they saw 66 approaching they moved across to the "tie butts." If you look at the pictures of the train relative to the two Amtrak mains in the pictures, you can quickly see the possibility of sound from 66 reflecting from the freight consist interfering with anything coming from #175 behind.
It is in this primary material, not a cobbled-up excuse of a summary, that any insight about this accident ... or actual material used for prosecution or defense ... would come. The effect on the press and, through them, the general public, which will never see the detail material and may see only a highly colored interpretation of a flawed piece of expository writing, is quite different, and I have to wonder if the 'spin' implied by the error was intended to act there for some purpose.
BaltACD Euclid The complex decision you describe with Sully landing his plane is far more complex and time consuming than what would have been needed in the case of these two conductors. Their fate was in a precarious position where any little detail may have changed the outcome. Those details were entirely possible, but none happened in time. But most certainly, their fate was never sealed until they were hit. And a very small amount of extra time may have saved them. Once the birds took out the engines - Sully was fully engaged in his situation - mentally and physically as well as having his co-pilot fully engaged in what was taking place. The CSX employees were never 'engaged' in their situation as it related to train #175 - as they were focused on train #66. Their lack of reaction to #175 was the cause of their demise.
Euclid The complex decision you describe with Sully landing his plane is far more complex and time consuming than what would have been needed in the case of these two conductors. Their fate was in a precarious position where any little detail may have changed the outcome. Those details were entirely possible, but none happened in time. But most certainly, their fate was never sealed until they were hit. And a very small amount of extra time may have saved them.
Once the birds took out the engines - Sully was fully engaged in his situation - mentally and physically as well as having his co-pilot fully engaged in what was taking place.
The CSX employees were never 'engaged' in their situation as it related to train #175 - as they were focused on train #66. Their lack of reaction to #175 was the cause of their demise.
EuclidThe complex decision you describe with Sully landing his plane is far more complex and time consuming than what would have been needed in the case of these two conductors. Their fate was in a precarious position where any little detail may have changed the outcome. Those details were entirely possible, but none happened in time. But most certainly, their fate was never sealed until they were hit. And a very small amount of extra time may have saved them.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Electroliner 1935 I agree with the premise of what I believe to be a fact that the two were unable to discern that there were TWO trains approaching them. And I believe that at the point when #175's engineer saw them, it was too late to save them. Unlike the movies, people cannot launch themselves off a ROW in three or four seconds. There is a discrete period of time to: 1 Sense a danger; 2 Comprehend a danger; 3 Determine a needed action; and 4 execute that action. If they had seen #175 as soon as it became in sight, I doubt they could have reacted in time. As it was they were focused on the train they saw on the other track. It matered not whether #175's engineer applied the brake as soon as she saw them or when the train struck them. Their fate was sealed by them being on a active track without protection. If you have seen the movie SULLY, you may recall that one of the ideas that made his defense was the time it took to determine where to safely land his plane. The "experts" said they had time to return to Laguardia with their simulations but did not include the time required to determine the problem and determine what action to take. After they added the reaction time, it became clear the Huson River was the ONLY choice and the correct choice for Sully's plane. The two men were in the wrong place. Hopefully, this will be a teachable moment that can be used to prevent future deaths. Does anyone know whether CSX and Amtrak have established rules and/or practices to prevent future events like this?
I agree with the premise of what I believe to be a fact that the two were unable to discern that there were TWO trains approaching them. And I believe that at the point when #175's engineer saw them, it was too late to save them. Unlike the movies, people cannot launch themselves off a ROW in three or four seconds. There is a discrete period of time to: 1 Sense a danger; 2 Comprehend a danger; 3 Determine a needed action; and 4 execute that action. If they had seen #175 as soon as it became in sight, I doubt they could have reacted in time. As it was they were focused on the train they saw on the other track. It matered not whether #175's engineer applied the brake as soon as she saw them or when the train struck them. Their fate was sealed by them being on a active track without protection.
If you have seen the movie SULLY, you may recall that one of the ideas that made his defense was the time it took to determine where to safely land his plane. The "experts" said they had time to return to Laguardia with their simulations but did not include the time required to determine the problem and determine what action to take. After they added the reaction time, it became clear the Huson River was the ONLY choice and the correct choice for Sully's plane.
The two men were in the wrong place. Hopefully, this will be a teachable moment that can be used to prevent future deaths. Does anyone know whether CSX and Amtrak have established rules and/or practices to prevent future events like this?
I don’t believe their fate was sealed until the point of impact. I see no outcome that I believe had to have occurred. Why would I believe something that is simply unknowable unless I just did not want to imply that the engineer acted improperly? All I believe is that it was not a certainty that they were beyond saving themselves. It happens every day. Their decision to walk on the track did not lock them into the outcome that occurred. They were not prohibited from walking on the track without protection. They were not required to constantly look back as they walked forward.
They only had to move about 3 feet, and would have acted without any hesitation at the slightest inkling of a train behind them; without even turning to look at the train. 1-2 seconds would have been more than enough time. They most certainly would not have needed time to think about what action they would take, time to think where they would jump to, make calculations, consult experts, etc.
The complex decision you describe with Sully landing his plane is far more complex and time consuming than what would have been needed in the case of these two conductors. Their fate was in a precarious position where any little detail may have changed the outcome. Those details were entirely possible, but none happened in time. But most certainly, their fate was never sealed until they were hit. And a very small amount of extra time may have saved them.
To the victims, the sound was deafening with both trains simultaneously bearing down on them and blowing their horns. Their attention was riveted on the train they were facing. But while the sound was deafening, they were unable to discriminate that it was coming from two trains instead of one.
Electroliner 1935 Euclid where a train is "sneaking up" on someone, I don't believe that a train doing 75 mph can be considered "sneaking up". More like it's "barrelling down" on them.
Euclid where a train is "sneaking up" on someone,
I don't believe that a train doing 75 mph can be considered "sneaking up". More like it's "barrelling down" on them.
My comment has nothing to do with the train speed. It refers to the fact that the people fouling the train's path have no awareness of the train approaching behind them.
Euclidwhere a train is "sneaking up" on someone,
Overmod Euclid Also, the way they conduct the interviews; their questions, and the resulting answers create an almost childlike narrative that seems to address what each other are thinking as much as what they actually say. To a reader, much of the interview is incomprehensible. In my opinion, the ambiguity encountered in reports like this is intentional,... I had the very strong impression that there were factors other than performance, affecting Amtrak concerns that I'm not prepared to discuss on this forum (as they likely involve either permanent moderation or banning even in context), which may or may not be geared as I think they were in Bostian's case toward letting crew out of 'personal' liability ... or sticking them with blame ... depending on the 'secret woids' they've been told to keep in mind. In this particular case, it seems pretty clear that Sahara kept from applying the independent until after the actual impact, and then says she only did so because she'd 'have to'. ...So instead we have a report that tells 'all and sundry' who don't have access to, say, further discovery that she did, in fact, apply the emergency 'right away'... or appears to do so by using confusing language.
Euclid Also, the way they conduct the interviews; their questions, and the resulting answers create an almost childlike narrative that seems to address what each other are thinking as much as what they actually say. To a reader, much of the interview is incomprehensible.
In my opinion, the ambiguity encountered in reports like this is intentional,...
I had the very strong impression that there were factors other than performance, affecting Amtrak concerns that I'm not prepared to discuss on this forum (as they likely involve either permanent moderation or banning even in context), which may or may not be geared as I think they were in Bostian's case toward letting crew out of 'personal' liability ... or sticking them with blame ... depending on the 'secret woids' they've been told to keep in mind.
In this particular case, it seems pretty clear that Sahara kept from applying the independent until after the actual impact, and then says she only did so because she'd 'have to'.
...So instead we have a report that tells 'all and sundry' who don't have access to, say, further discovery that she did, in fact, apply the emergency 'right away'... or appears to do so by using confusing language.
I understand, and agree with you 100%. Apparently, this agenda kicks in whenever NTSB investigates an Amtrak accident.
They did use confusing language in much of the report, and especially in the development of probable cause and in their recommendation.
But in this point about when the engineer made the emergency application, the problem is not due to confusing language. The language is quite clear. In one part, it establishes that the engineer made the emergency application immediately upon seeing the two conductors walking on the track.
The report clearly establishes that the engineer first saw the victims when the train was still at least 540 feet from striking them. Depending on the engineer's estimate of time, it may have been as much as 1,500 feet.
Then later in the report, the engineer states that she made the emergency application immediately after striking them.
This is significant because in a situation where a train is "sneaking up" on someone, the closer it gets, the more likely the person will suddenly recongnize cues such as sound and/or ground vibration. And once this happens, it takes very little time for the person to move into the clear.
EuclidAlso, the way they conduct the interviews; their questions, and the resulting answers create an almost childlike narrative that seems to address what each other are thinking as much as what they actually say. To a reader, much of the interview is incomprehensible.
In my opinion, the ambiguity encountered in reports like this is intentional, often mimicking the spurious attempts at 'imprecise precision' found when speaking or writing Military-Industrial.
It's pretty clear that these guys were running the 'we're from the government and we're here to help you' type of fact finding: where they're acting all concerned about potential PTSD and so on, but slipping in their careful little lawyers' questions to see who might trip up whom. It pays to watch for this when evaluating what government inspectors of any 'stripe' do: they are only "your" friends when it suits their agency's, or their agency's friends or superiors, perceived wants. At the time. (But what you say is just as 'applicable' after they change their minds or their tune...)
In this particular case, it seems pretty clear that Sahara kept from applying the independent until after the actual impact, and then says she only did so because she'd 'have to'. Especially after Midnight Rider that's really going to sit badly with victims' counsel, and likely with any judge or jury. So instead we have a report that tells 'all and sundry' who don't have access to, say, further discovery that she did, in fact, apply the emergency 'right away'... or appears to do so by using confusing language.
I do wish that a supposedly impartial 'finder of fact' agency would avoid using typical Government techniques. But I'm not such a fool as to expect that anymore.
Besides the blatant controdiction about when the engineer of #175 made the emergency application, that report contains some of the most ambiguous writing I have ever seen. The problems are in their analysis of the factors affecting the two victims, the recommendations, and the probable cause. That portion raises many questions that the NTSB report seems to be unaware of. Also, the way they conduct the interviews; their questions, and the resulting answers create an almost childlike narrative that seems to address what each other are thinking as much as what they actually say. To a reader, much of the interview is incomprehensible.
Overmod Euclid I mention court, just to indicate how important the issue is, and how important it is that the NTSB appears not to care about their flawed report, at the same time they take their work so seriously that it takes years to get the report out. That's all I'm saying. They certainly made a monkey out of me after I praised their impartiality and implicit professionalism. Ah well: the Newcomen Society isn't what it used to be in this country, either.
Euclid I mention court, just to indicate how important the issue is, and how important it is that the NTSB appears not to care about their flawed report, at the same time they take their work so seriously that it takes years to get the report out. That's all I'm saying.
They certainly made a monkey out of me after I praised their impartiality and implicit professionalism. Ah well: the Newcomen Society isn't what it used to be in this country, either.
NTSB's professionalism has been trending toward the political for the past 20 years or more.
Overmod In the interests of avoiding hippoerythritic splatter to a greater degree: Remember the NTSB proceedings are not admissible per se in court, and I believe that includes civil as well as criminal proceedings. Assuredly Ms. Sahara will be put on the stand at any trial, and the contradiction more or less definitively resolved ... that is, if Amtrak's counsel is better than what CSX used for the Midnight Rider business. It won't matter if the government agency made stupid mistakes or showed how far off their 'aircraft' standards that report actually was. In my opinion we should take it as what it is: a mistake, possibly intentional but certainly incorrect, and 'leave it to heaven'. And I say this as a grammar and rhetoric nut who gets irritated every time I think of the situation. Game to get it fixed, or even acknowledged, is not worth the candle; in any case, I doubt even with Bella gone they'd have learned anything about careful correctness instead of furthering perceived or putative agendas, for the next time.
In the interests of avoiding hippoerythritic splatter to a greater degree:
Remember the NTSB proceedings are not admissible per se in court, and I believe that includes civil as well as criminal proceedings.
Assuredly Ms. Sahara will be put on the stand at any trial, and the contradiction more or less definitively resolved ... that is, if Amtrak's counsel is better than what CSX used for the Midnight Rider business.
It won't matter if the government agency made stupid mistakes or showed how far off their 'aircraft' standards that report actually was.
In my opinion we should take it as what it is: a mistake, possibly intentional but certainly incorrect, and 'leave it to heaven'. And I say this as a grammar and rhetoric nut who gets irritated every time I think of the situation. Game to get it fixed, or even acknowledged, is not worth the candle; in any case, I doubt even with Bella gone they'd have learned anything about careful correctness instead of furthering perceived or putative agendas, for the next time.
I don't think that contacting the NTSB about this amounts to having an ax to grind. Their report contains two conflicting statements which are both presented as fact. One of them has to be wrong. And if this accident ends up on court, the issue of whether the engineer of #175 did everything possible to prevent or mitigate the accident will be important. One of the NTSB statements indicates the engineer did do everything possible, and the other indicates that she did not.
Furthermore, the issue of how this detail is presented in two conflicting ways in the report is not difficult to explain or to understand.
I suggest writing a letter to them. I have contacted them by phone in the past and the person answering always says they will have some higher authority call me back. But they never do.
CSSHEGEWISCHBy statute, NTSB reports are not admissible in a court of law.
Didn't know that...very interesting....thanks
You motivated me to dig deeper, and not surprisingly there is a specific protocol to be followed when making corrections to errors in the factual reports
And a few gray areas that might allow admissability of portions of the report, or complete review by expert witnesses otherwise involved in a civil proceeding
http://olsonbrooksby.com/blog/tag/admissibility-of-ntsb-fact-reports/
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/159518/Marine+Shipping/Using+Accident+Reports+In+Casualty+Litigation
By statute, NTSB reports are not admissible in a court of law.
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