If the Amtrak engineer did not apply braking until after striking the two workers, the lawyers will say that was negligence because braking as soon as the engineer saw the two workers would have given them some amount of very precious extra time. That would be time to possibly recognize the danger they were in and get out of the way.
Euclid If the Amtrak engineer did not apply braking until after striking the two workers, the lawyers will say that was negligence because braking as soon as the engineer saw the two workers would have given them some amount of very precious extra time; in which to possibly recognize the danger they were in and get out of the way.
If the Amtrak engineer did not apply braking until after striking the two workers, the lawyers will say that was negligence because braking as soon as the engineer saw the two workers would have given them some amount of very precious extra time; in which to possibly recognize the danger they were in and get out of the way.
In one of the statements attributed to her (the engineer)she indicts herself as negligent.
“Walking on active railroad tracks without protection is dangerous and wrong,” said Robert Hall, director of the NTSB’s Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials. “Walking on another company's tracks without protection is even more dangerous.”
From the NTSB final report:
“The operating crews were not prohibited from walking either on or near the Amtrak tracks.”
“The NTSB believes that the crew should have been prohibited from walking near the live tracks of the other railroad.”
243129 Euclid If the Amtrak engineer did not apply braking until after striking the two workers, the lawyers will say that was negligence because braking as soon as the engineer saw the two workers would have given them some amount of very precious extra time; in which to possibly recognize the danger they were in and get out of the way. In one of the statements attributed to her (the engineer)she indicts herself as negligent.
The NTSB report is not a transcript of the Engineers statement; as such it is not 'indicitable'; what it attributed to be the Engineer's actual verbiage was formulated by the report writer.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD 243129 Euclid If the Amtrak engineer did not apply braking until after striking the two workers, the lawyers will say that was negligence because braking as soon as the engineer saw the two workers would have given them some amount of very precious extra time; in which to possibly recognize the danger they were in and get out of the way. In one of the statements attributed to her (the engineer)she indicts herself as negligent. The NTSB report is not a transcript of the Engineers statement; as such it is not 'indicitable'; what it attributed to be the Engineer's actual verbiage was formulated by the report writer.
No one proof reads these documents before release? Which of the engineer's statements is accurate? If she (the engineer) did not place the brake in emergency until after impact that certainly would be indictable.
243129 BaltACD 243129 Euclid If the Amtrak engineer did not apply braking until after striking the two workers, the lawyers will say that was negligence because braking as soon as the engineer saw the two workers would have given them some amount of very precious extra time; in which to possibly recognize the danger they were in and get out of the way. In one of the statements attributed to her (the engineer)she indicts herself as negligent. The NTSB report is not a transcript of the Engineers statement; as such it is not 'indicitable'; what it attributed to be the Engineer's actual verbiage was formulated by the report writer. No one proof reads these documents before release? Which of the engineer's statements is accurate? If she (the engineer) did not place the brake in emergency until after impact that certainly would be indictable.
Obviously not! Report was probably a 'team effort' produced by junior staffers; since neither HAZMAT or mass casualties were involved and to the NTSB point of view there were none of their pet political agendas that could be advanced. Just a couple of railroaders killed by their own lack of situational awareness and probable fixation on the NB Amtrak to the exclusion of the SB Amtrak. Just another day at the agency.
BaltACDObviously not! Report was probably a 'team effort' produced by junior staffers; since neither HAZMAT or mass casualties were involved and to the NTSB point of view there were none of their pet political agendas that could be advanced. Just a couple of railroaders killed by their own lack of situational awareness and probable fixation on the NB Amtrak to the exclusion of the SB Amtrak. Just another day at the agency.
So considering all of that, what is your conclusion? I think some of what you say may be true, but they certainly don't present themselves that way, and they are taken very seriously by most people.
I do think that this report contains a lot of flaws, and they should be asked to account for them as long as we are free to question them. They present their information in writing in a very fromal style. All we can do is present our comments and questions in that same style. At some level, they will listen and respond. But from my experience, I conclude that level cannot be reached by phone or email. Contacting the right people will require a formal business letter directly to the proper offices.
And there are some things that could be advanced to help prevent this type of accident in the future. I think that the peculair cause of this accident needs to be elaborated in employee training. The training needs to go beyond just the admonition to expect train movements on any track, in any direction, at any time. A person can do exactly that and still get killed by this unrealized loss of awareness that was so clearly demonstrated in this accident.
In this location, this type of accident could have just as easily involved a train on the Amtrak track and another on the CSX with the victim being being employed by either railroad and struck by the train on their own employer's railroad.
I returned a few moments ago to study the interview material that I pulled up in the public docket for incident ID DCA17MR010. I now find there is 'no record' of a docket when searching the DMS Web with that ID (as copied directly from the accident report data).
On the other hand, I find I still have the original page in my browser cache:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=62103&CFID=2570225&CFTOKEN=9216ca9c21ceb7df-D1A2CB81-DA36-6E1D-B16F76826B26CE67
Let me know if you can pull up and read the individual items in the 4 pages of indicated results. The detail of the engineer interview for Amtrak 175 runs to an indicated 36 pages and can be downloaded from here:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=470819&docketID=62103&mkey=95451
I also have a copy of the downloaded PDF if anyone has trouble. As a peripheral note for the call-up-to-get-the-scoop private cinder dicks, the interview was transcribed by Free State Reporting, Inc., (410) 974-0947.
As a preliminary account for y'all, this is part of the transcript of the Q&A between Steve Ammon and Sahara Reese; I think it adequately describes what she did:
Q. Steve Ammons, CSX. Can you -- you said you were running on approach limited.A. Yes.Q. And so that requires you to reduce your speed --A. Yes.Q. -- to 45. Had you started braking to do that? Had you started braking your train?A. I put my brake in minimum before I even get to the approach limited section.Q. So you put it in a minimum reduction before --A. Yes. Because I like to feel it. And then once the air stopping on, I put the suppression once I hit the signal.Q. When you noticed the 66 coming to you and then right after that the two employees walking, were you still braking at that point?A. Yes.Q. And had you furthered your braking, or were you in suppression at that point?
A. I was in suppression. But --Q. So you were in suppression --A. -- my first --Q. I' m sorry, go ahead.I was in suppression. When I start seeing them, I start inching to full service.Q. Okay. I'm just taking some notes here, just what you said. So you said you were in suppression when you saw them. And then you started inching towards full service --A. Yes.Q. -- after seeing them and blowing the horn simultaneously.A. Yes.Q. And did you ever place your train in emergency?A. Yes.Q. And did -- when did you do that?A. Once I struck.
[Elsewhere she notes that she was accelerating at about 93mph uphill as she reached the approach limited aspect]
And a little further toward the close of the interview, we get this:
Q. If you had known in advance that there was a stopped trainand possibly some workers, does that change the way you handleyour train?A. Yes.Q. How so?A. I drop down to restricted speed, 15. That' s --Q. Is that by rule, or is that your personal --A. No. That' s me personally.Q. Okay. Why -- can you explain your decision to do that?A. Because potentially I can stop. I'd rather be able to stop than to go by normal speed and I can' t.Q. Okay. So if you just saw a stopped train and didn't know anything else, would you still reduce your speed?A. No.Q. So you would reduce it under what circumstances?A. Yes. Under per rule. But if I knew it was people on thetrack, I go to restricted speed, 15.Q. Okay. And again, that's a personal preference? Did that ever come up in your Amtrak training?A. No, just personal.Q. Okay.A. At training, the engineers do different things. And he -- they told me to do whatever I feel is best. And that's what I feel.Q. How often do you come across those circumstances in your D.C. to New York run, that you see people on the track doing some sort of --A. Oh, my goodness, every day. That's an everyday thing for me. But they normally move.
BY MR. FRIGO:Q. Okay. I've got one final question for you, and then we'll give you a chance to clarify anything. Is there anything that you can think of that could have prevented this accident?A. Don't walk close to the tracks. And we was always told keep your head on a swivel. I know another train was coming, but -- you know the opposite way, maybe. You still got to look both ways, no matter what. I don't know if their engineer saw me. Could have said hot rail. I don't know if he did, because I don't know if we on different channels or not. Maybe when they get in the area we canbe on the same channel and I can get on the radio or something, I guess.
Meanwhile, the engineer of the other train, 66, clearly and repeatedly states he saw the two CSX conductors inside the gauge of Track 3, between the rails, walking side-by-side, at the moment of impact.
He saw the impact and needed to be relieved afterward.
And there is a whole wealth of data in CSX engineer Wiland's interview. I think there are several details in there that may have significant bearing on how this accident developed...
Thanks Overmod. It is amazing to be presented with all of that detail after thinking so much about how this happened. I will study all of it in depth.
The question as to which of the conflicting statements in the NTSB report is true is resolved by the transcript interview of the Amtrak engineer. She made an emergency application after impact rather than upon seeing the two CSX employees about 15-20 seconds before impact.
The engineer stated that it was very common for people to be on the tracks as her train approached, and they usually get out of the way. I think she implies (or possibly stated) that she expected the two CSX employees to get out of the way as well.
She said she “laid on the horn,” but they did not move, look back, or wave an acknowledgement. I think it this would obviously indicate that the two employees did not realize the Amtrak train was coming up behind them. So at that point, one should conclude that there is a good chance that they would not move out of the way.
I am not sure if laying on the horn is the best horn signal for a situation like this. If both engineers were to sound simultaneous prolonged horn blasts, they would somewhat be more likely to seem like one horn sounding, as opposed to if each engineer blew random mixes of long and short blasts, which would not so easily overlap with the other train horn.
As I understand it, there are rules specifying the type of horn signal to be used for an emergency situation, and that is a rapid series of short blasts.
I have not yet had a chance to read the report in it's entirety however the snippet provided by Overmod shows extremely poor judgement on the part of 175's engineer. I would venture to say that she is a 'victim' of Amtrak's hiring,vetting and training regimens.
Until later.
There are more interesting details in the testimony that only surface when you see them being used as leading questions in the interviews. Consider for example whether or not there were lanterns present. Careful reading of all the transcripts together 'more than once' will give you several instances where I think some of the interviewers thought they were smelling problems with the various narratives.
This is, I think, something to consider carefully when evaluating the 'conclusions' about the accident that the NTSB formally reported ... with their own inimitable distortion of reported events.
For starters, the testimony of Sahara Reese (engineer 175):
"Because I don't know what CSX track was called, I just said the west end of my train".
This statement shows that Ms. Reese's qualifications are sketchy at best.
243129For starters, the testimony of Sahara Reese (engineer 175): "Because I don't know what CSX track was called, I just said the west end of my train". This statement shows that Ms. Reese's qualifications are sketchy at best.
BULL - how much of a foreign railroads property that you don't operate on do you know! Your assertions are getting sketchier as time goes on.
BaltACDBULL - how much of a foreign railroads property that you don't operate on do you know! Your assertions are getting sketchier as time goes on
All of which is adjacent to the railroad I operate on. Were you not a desk jockey you would understand why.
I think some people believe that since the emergency application will stop the train, there is no point in making the applcation if it won't stop the train before impact. I don't think the decision is that easy. There are lots of people spotted on or near the track as trains approach, and certainly many of them will clear in time, so you don't want to dump the air every time a person is spotted. I think you have to do more to read the situation of each pedestrian encounter.
One major factor of that read would be whether the pedestrian that is fouling or about to foul the track seems to realise that the train is approaching. If they don't, it is less likely that they will clear in time.
By not responding to the horn signals of Ms. Reese, and never seen looking back, the two CSX employees were giving a very strong indication that they were not aware of the train approaching them from behind. And by their safety vests, they were giving a strong indication that they were not trespassers, but rather there on official railroad business.
So, I think it is a rather poor judgement on the part of Ms. Reese to conclude that since most trespassers get out of the way in time, it was reasonable for her to merely assume that would be the case with this situation.
243129No one proof reads these documents before release? Which of the engineer's statements is accurate? If she (the engineer) did not place the brake in emergency until after impact that certainly would be indictable.
Was that ironic humor?
EuclidI think it is rather poor judgment on the part of Ms. Reese to conclude that since most trespassers get out of the way in time, it was reasonable for her to merely assume that would be the case with this situation.
I in fact would have 'assumed' just the opposite: that railroad personnel would be knowledgeable and aware of the high-speed hazards on the adjacent Amtrak main, and more than usually ready and able to jump, if in danger of being hit, than a great number of likely 'trespassers'.
I think it is also going to work out in the physics that from the moment she saw them, around a sharp curve in dark conditions with another train shining bright lights in her eyes, applying the emergency immediately would not have changed the effective outcome.
Whether she was hoping they'd recognize the danger and jump as she was 'inching toward full service', in which case she wouldn't have to stop her train, she certainly selected emergency once she knew she'd have to stop the train as soon as possible after impact.
Can someone find and post the braking curves for emergency vs. full-service blended for the equipment used on a train like 175, and if possible overlay it on a track diagram? We'll certainly see this as part of the fancy graphics at the trial, but I think most of the 'was this reasonable and proper response' might be addressed fairly early with objective physical understanding.
Overmod Euclid I think it is rather poor judgment on the part of Ms. Reese to conclude that since most trespassers get out of the way in time, it was reasonable for her to merely assume that would be the case with this situation. I in fact would have 'assumed' just the opposite: that railroad personnel would be knowledgeable and aware of the high-speed hazards on the adjacent Amtrak main, and more than usually ready and able to jump, if in danger of being hit, than a great number of likely 'trespassers'. I think it is also going to work out in the physics that from the moment she saw them, around a sharp curve in dark conditions with another train shining bright lights in her eyes, applying the emergency immediately would not have changed the effective outcome.
Euclid I think it is rather poor judgment on the part of Ms. Reese to conclude that since most trespassers get out of the way in time, it was reasonable for her to merely assume that would be the case with this situation.
My point was not whether trespassers are more or less likely to get out of the way than professional railroaders. I only mention trespassers in addition to professional railroaders in order to cite the entire group of people who might be struck by trains while on foot.
My point was that it is unwise to assume anyone will get out of the way in time, and therefore, unwise to assume that the two conductors would get out of the way in time. Instead, each case has to be evaluated for the details of what it presents. A blanket assumption that a person is likely to get out of the way will influence the engineer to not make an emergency application.
A good engineer will look at all the facts objectively and not rely on a generalization that strongly argues against making the emergency application. By her interview responses, I believe Ms. Reese did rely on this generalization assuming that it was likely that the two people would get out of the way in time.
There are three distinct reasons a person will not get out of the way in time:
They are not able to move quickly enough.
They are committing suicide.
They are unaware of the approaching train.
It is mostly item #3 that an engineer must watch for because the engineer has the ability in influence that outcome with the horn and lights.
I agree that an engineer would expect a professional railroader to be out of the way in time. But the obvious fact that the two CSX conductors were not out of the way in such a short distance from impact is a clear sign that they were in category #3, that is, not aware of the approaching train.
The engineer was sounding the horn, and lights were simultaneously turned on bright. However, there is one more thing an engineer can do in this situation aside from making a direct warning to the people on the track. That is to give them more time. The more time they have, the more opportunity they have to assimilate the warning. In this sense, every second of extra time has value beyond measure because it has to potential to prevent a probable fatality.
And yet the engineer in this case decided against this valuable option in favor of not making her job more complicated by making an emergency application and stopping the train.
Of course we don’t know whether the additional seconds provided to the two conductors by the Amtrak engineer immediately dumping the air would have changed the terrible outcome. But we do know that the extra seconds would have been made available. And we most certainly do not know that the extra seconds would have made no difference.
By any measure, the choice to make the emergency application upon seeing the two conductors was clearly the right choice, and the choice not to do that was wrong.
EuclidBy any measure, the choice to make the emergency application upon seeing the two conductors was clearly the right choice, and the choice not to do that was wrong.
Absolutely. To err on the side of caution is better than to not. 175's engineer exercised poor judgement.
EuclidAnd yet the engineer in this case decided against this valuable option in favor of not making her job more complicated by making an emergency application and stopping the train.
I think it is established in her testimony that this was not a reason for her decision.
The problem, in part, here is that we have what Larry Niven noted as the difference between 'sentiment' and 'sentimentality'. The problem is that survival of the CSX conductors in that accident depended completely on their recognizing their peril and getting completely out of the gauge in the few seconds (I think far less than "15 to 20", as you will note the interviewers trying to extract) before 175 ran them down.
To paraphrase what Niven said: 'sentiment' is when you're driving, see a dog in the road, and swerve to avoid it. 'Sentimentality' is when you swerve to avoid it and kill pedestrians. We have discussed the various problems involved with firing a full emergency or 'penalty-brake' style application on a passenger train, specifically with respect to injuries or perhaps deaths to its occupants; it is difficult to imagine how promptly dumping the air vs. progressively going to blended full service would have contributed anything in this particular case.
(I will not take up the issue of her going to emergency on impact, when she 'knew' she would have to stop the train. Personally I'd have kept it in full service, since it wouldn't have mattered to the dead how quickly the train subsequently stopped, but as previously noted I have no operating experience or corresponding responsibility, and won't argue that going to emergency either before or after the impact wasn't "the safest course".)
Well, actually, we do know that. They never reacted, up to the actual moment of impact, and I think this was at least partly confirmed by Baxter's testimony (I personally would hate to have to make him revisit his perception of the moment of impact to confirm it). The only real claim that could be made here is that any noise of the train going into emergency would have 'cut through' the ambient noise or otherwise made the crew break focus on 66 approaching and realize something ominous was right behind them.
That does not change the larger argument, whether it's better to go to prompt emergency rather than full blended as soon as trespassers in the gauge are recognized. But in this particular case it's important to realize an emergency application almost surely wouldn't have helped the two conductors live.
Overmod Euclid Of course we don’t know whether the additional seconds provided to the two conductors by the Amtrak engineer immediately dumping the air would have changed the terrible outcome. But we do know that the extra seconds would have been made available. And we most certainly do not know that the extra seconds would have made no difference. Well, actually, we do know that. They never reacted, up to the actual moment of impact,...
Euclid Of course we don’t know whether the additional seconds provided to the two conductors by the Amtrak engineer immediately dumping the air would have changed the terrible outcome. But we do know that the extra seconds would have been made available. And we most certainly do not know that the extra seconds would have made no difference.
Well, actually, we do know that. They never reacted, up to the actual moment of impact,...
We do know that the conductors did not react up to the point of impact, but how do you know that they would not have reacted if that interval had been extended by a few seconds by making an emergency application as early as possible? How do you know that they would not have reacted during that time extension?
Even without any warning at all, either one of them could have impulsively turned their heads and looked back at any time during their walk. In fact they may have done that more than once before the Amtrak train was in sight. If they would have just looked back once when the Amtrak train was in sight, they would have gotten clear.
So, if their interval were extended just five seconds, they may have simply looked back as a random impulse, during that five second period. Either one of them could have turned his head back, saw the train, told the other, and both of them jump clear within as little as two seconds. That is what I mean when I say every second counts.
You say that dumping the air to provide a few more seconds for the conductors would have posed an injury risk to the train that was a risk not worth taking. I don’t believe the risk to passengers caused by dumping the air is as high as you suggest. Can you cite instances in which passengers on trains have been killed as a result an emergency application? Maybe Joe knows of this sort of fatality.
This issue came up in a past thread in which some argued that an engineer should not dump the air if a grade crossing collision seems imminent; if the train is an oil train; because the emergency application might derail the train, and the oil might have been ignited.
Out of curiosity, I posed this question to an office of Operation Lifesaver and to the FRA. In both cases, I spoke to people who had been railroaders and had a lot of experience in both operation and instruction. Both told me almost the exact same thing.
They said they have heard engineers say they would never do any braking for a possible grade crossing collision until after the collision occurred. Both of these experts told me that even though some people say that, they were not sure that the people who said they would withhold the emergency application would actually do that.
Both experts told me that the risk of derailing the train should never override a need to take action with the brakes. They said you should always make the emergency application if there is any reason to do so. They said that if you don’t, and if someone gets killed, it will haunt you forever because you will never be sure that the reason you held off on the emergency application was justified.
They both said you should not go down the road with the idea that you should refrain from making the emergency application in cases of certain other conditions that might be present because that would interfere with the quick judgement that must be applied to the decision to dump the air. They said to use the emergency application when conditions call for it. That is what it is for.
OvermodBut in this particular case it's important to realize an emergency application almost surely wouldn't have helped the two conductors live.
Perhaps not but in a life or death situation you, in this case the engineer on #175, MUST excercise every option available to you to mitigate the situation. She did not. Milliseconds could be the difference between life or death.
The CSX employees used poor judgement in choosing to inspect their train from a 'live' track. This is attributable to poor vetting and poor training.
The engineer on #175 used poor judgement in not applying the brakes in emergency thereby lessening the chances, no matter how slim, of survival of the CSX crew. This is attributable to poor vetting and poor training.
There are folks being hired who do not possess the acumen to work in railroad operations because they are hired by people (HR) who have no knowledge of railroad operations. We have the unknowing hiring the unknowing followed by the unknowing 'teaching' the unknowing. This all amounts to the RX for a 'perfect storm'. Chatsworth CA, Frankford Jct., Chester PA, Cayce SC, Dupont WA, Ivy city etc. WTF will it take to institute oversight to these railroads before, and there will be, more disasters.
As I recall, the engineer on Amtrak #175 said she begain laying on the horn as soon as she saw the two conductors about 15-20 seconds before impact.
The CSX engineer was in the restroom of the engine and recalls something like gravel or ballast hitting the side if his engine as an Amtrak train went past. He said the Amtrak train caused his engine to rock a little bit, I guess from air displacement. Then only after hearing that sound of gravel or ballast, he heard the horn blow.
He said he thought he heard two trains passing by his engine. I guess #66 would have passed by him before #175 did. I don't know if the sound of gravel was a result of #175 striking the two conductors. I believe that strike would have occurred at least 200 feet back from where the engineer was.
I would have to diagram all of this out in order to get a picture of how this unfolded. But generally, these details suggest to me that the train that rocked the CSX engine as it passed and apparently threw gravel or ballast was #175. If that is true, it had already struck the two conductors. And Ms. Reese said she had been laying on the horn for 15-20 seconds prior to that strike.
Then it was after that point that an Amtrak train passed the CSX engineer, and it was after that passing that the CSX engineer says he heard the horn sound.
Yet if the engineer of #175 was laying on the horn for 15-20 seconds before impact, the CSX engineer should have heard it long before the point where #175's locomotive was past his engine, as he says happened. So these details don't seem to add up.
Is there any information that confirms the information given by Ms. Reese that says she began laying on the horn 10-20 seconds prior to striking the two conductors.
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