RME This is, in fact, one of the four mandates that was put into the 2008 PTC law, and is in fact technologically one of the easiest to implement. The problem I keep coming back to, in terrible sorrow, is that one of the oldest and first rules of railroading is not just 'don't walk in the gauge' -- don't walk where you'll foul traffic.. Combined with the other oldest rule 'expect a train on any track in any direction at any time'. Written in blood. Again.
This is, in fact, one of the four mandates that was put into the 2008 PTC law, and is in fact technologically one of the easiest to implement.
The problem I keep coming back to, in terrible sorrow, is that one of the oldest and first rules of railroading is not just 'don't walk in the gauge' -- don't walk where you'll foul traffic.. Combined with the other oldest rule 'expect a train on any track in any direction at any time'.
Written in blood. Again.
"PTC systems required to comply with the requirements of Subpart I must reliably and functionally prevent:
PTC systems must also provide for interoperability in a manner that allows for equipped locomotives traversing other railroad’s PTC-equipped territories to communicate with and respond to that railroad’s PTC system, including uninterrupted movements over property boundaries."
Not sure I see that requirement for protection from trains on adjacent railroads. In fact I'm not sure I see protection for train crews from movements on adjacent tracks of their own railroad.
RMEThe problem I keep coming back to, in terrible sorrow, is that one of the oldest and first rules of railroading is not just 'don't walk in the gauge' -- don't walk where you'll foul traffic.. Combined with the other oldest rule 'expect a train on any track in any direction at any time'. Written in blood. Again.
Amtrak outward facing video, if it exists, will be the definative visual proof of what actually happened. Knowing one of the individuals involved, I'm reasonably sure they were not in the gauge of the Amtrak track, however the aerodynamics of a train passing at 73 MPH and its effects on individuals in the space between the two trains is the great unknown.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
daveklepperFreight crews should receive special warnings to say off the "other railroad's" RoW, since the freight railroads' dispatchers have no knowledge to transmit about movements on these "other railroads," and some of their trains can be both quiet and fast.
This is, in fact, one of the four mandates that was put into the 2008 PTC law, and is in fact technologically one of the easiest to implement. One approach that would work for a case like this is to have the locomotive 'beacon' similar to the approach on the QNS&L, ideally with some GPS data embedded in the beacon; other engines equipped with PTC then know where any approaching trains will be (and inform their crews accordingly) but more to the point a comparatively simple handheld receiver can provide appropriate warnings right down to individuals walking the ballast. In practice some repeater coverage for the freqs involved may need to be done to prevent dead reception areas, but there are ways to assure that if coverage is lost the walkers will know that, too.
ORNHOO Deggesty It looks like you are sitting.Smile But not sitting still.
Deggesty It looks like you are sitting.Smile
But not sitting still.
I am reclining - about 30 degrees - and at that point on that track doing a little over 100 MPH
DeggestyIt looks like you are sitting.Smile
BaltACD ORNHOO BaltACD In my hobby of road racing, corner stations are staffed with a minimum of two people standing back to back. The one looking toward the oncoming traffic holds the yellow flag to warn of a incident beyond the flag station. The person facing away from the oncoming traffic is the one that 'spots' the incident and communicates instructions to the one holding the flag. Each person is a lookout for the other and communicate any impending danger to their combined safety. As a former corner worker with the Oregon Region of the Sports Car Club of America, let me clarify that the flaggers stand facing each other and looking over each others shoulders. The blue flagger (responsible for alerting drivers that they are about to be overtaken by a faster car) faces the oncoming traffic ("uptrack" in corner worker parlance), the yellow flagger (responsible for alerting drivers to possible track obstructions beyond the corner station) faces "downtrack". When the yellow flag needs to be displayed the yellow flagger pivots 180 degrees and the blue flagger runs around him to retain the over the shoulder positioning. At no time should the flaggers be "back to back". I stand corrected - I only view them when I drive past.
ORNHOO BaltACD In my hobby of road racing, corner stations are staffed with a minimum of two people standing back to back. The one looking toward the oncoming traffic holds the yellow flag to warn of a incident beyond the flag station. The person facing away from the oncoming traffic is the one that 'spots' the incident and communicates instructions to the one holding the flag. Each person is a lookout for the other and communicate any impending danger to their combined safety. As a former corner worker with the Oregon Region of the Sports Car Club of America, let me clarify that the flaggers stand facing each other and looking over each others shoulders. The blue flagger (responsible for alerting drivers that they are about to be overtaken by a faster car) faces the oncoming traffic ("uptrack" in corner worker parlance), the yellow flagger (responsible for alerting drivers to possible track obstructions beyond the corner station) faces "downtrack". When the yellow flag needs to be displayed the yellow flagger pivots 180 degrees and the blue flagger runs around him to retain the over the shoulder positioning. At no time should the flaggers be "back to back".
BaltACD In my hobby of road racing, corner stations are staffed with a minimum of two people standing back to back. The one looking toward the oncoming traffic holds the yellow flag to warn of a incident beyond the flag station. The person facing away from the oncoming traffic is the one that 'spots' the incident and communicates instructions to the one holding the flag. Each person is a lookout for the other and communicate any impending danger to their combined safety.
As a former corner worker with the Oregon Region of the Sports Car Club of America, let me clarify that the flaggers stand facing each other and looking over each others shoulders. The blue flagger (responsible for alerting drivers that they are about to be overtaken by a faster car) faces the oncoming traffic ("uptrack" in corner worker parlance), the yellow flagger (responsible for alerting drivers to possible track obstructions beyond the corner station) faces "downtrack". When the yellow flag needs to be displayed the yellow flagger pivots 180 degrees and the blue flagger runs around him to retain the over the shoulder positioning. At no time should the flaggers be "back to back".
I stand corrected - I only view them when I drive past.
Johnny
BaltACDI stand corrected - I only view them when I drive past.
Just as long as you see the flags you'll be o.k.
A McIntoshWhen I looked at plans for the Richmond to Raleigh part of the SEHSR, I notice that the segment between Centralia and Petersburg has the passenger track laid with 30 feet between it and the CSX A line. I can now see the wisdom of this move, and wonder if there will be a recommendation for the same thing regarding CSX and Amtrak's NEC tracks.
In the area this incident happend - there is no room to provide track separation what with commercial development along New York Avenue (US 50) on one side and the Ivy City service facility on the other side. While my knowledge is no encyclopedic - to my knowledge this is the first time one company's employees were struck by another company's train. Track structure has been relatively the same since Washington Union Station was opened in 1907.
BaltACDIn my hobby of road racing, corner stations are staffed with a minimum of two people standing back to back. The one looking toward the oncoming traffic holds the yellow flag to warn of a incident beyond the flag station. The person facing away from the oncoming traffic is the one that 'spots' the incident and communicates instructions to the one holding the flag. Each person is a lookout for the other and communicate any impending danger to their combined safety.
When I looked at plans for the Richmond to Raleigh part of the SEHSR, I notice that the segment between Centralia and Petersburg has the passenger track laid with 30 feet between it and the CSX A line. I can now see the wisdom of this move, and wonder if there will be a recommendation for the same thing regarding CSX and Amtrak's NEC tracks.
Knowing the territory, I am at a loss as to why the CSX conductors head was not on a continuous 180 degree swivel - forward looking for Amtrack and rearward looking for Amtrak.
I suspect Amtrak engines are equipped with forward facing cameras (most CSX engines are). If and when that video is released it should be illuminating as to what actions and/or inactions the CSX personnel were taking.
In my hobby of road racing, corner stations are staffed with a minimum of two people standing back to back. The one looking toward the oncoming traffic holds the yellow flag to warn of a incident beyond the flag station. The person facing away from the oncoming traffic is the one that 'spots' the incident and communicates instructions to the one holding the flag. Each person is a lookout for the other and communicate any impending danger to their combined safety.
RME: We then have a more general problem. There are more and more locations where freight railroads have tracks parallel to Amtrak, commuter railroads, high-speed heavy rapid-transit, and light railroads. Freight crews should receive special warnings to say off the "other railroad's" RoW, since the freight railroads' dispatchers have no knowledge to transmit about movements on these "other railroads," and some of their trains can be both quiet and fast. I think that lesson has been taught by this tragedy, and I hope it is learned.
BaltACD Wish it had not involved the son of one of my supervisors from my working days.
Wish it had not involved the son of one of my supervisors from my working days.
Sorry to hear that it was "close to home".
- Erik
daveklepperDoes not CSX have special instructions (NS, P&W, CP, all who run freight on Amtrak-owned property dispatched by Amtrak, for that matter on Metro North as well) that would have prevented this accident?
Dave, it would not have mattered here. The two CSX tracks here happened to be parallel to the Amtrak ROW; this was not CSX operating in Corridor trackage. From what I can tell, the CSX employees were only incidentally and accidentally on "Amtrak property", perhaps thinking they were watching out for one approaching Amtrak train without recognizing there was a second one behind them. If you look at the picture on p.2 of the interim report, you can get an idea of the kind of ballast-prism structure the crew would have been walking on. As noted, they were by the first platform adjacent to the power and might have been somewhat distracted both by the idling engine noise and by moving out to where they could climb up on the locomotive for what I believe would have been the next 'act' of setting out the detected bad car(s).
CSX WAS NOT operating on Amtrak property! Google Earth view of the area
Does not CSX have special instructions (NS, P&W, CP, all who run freight on Amtrak-owned property dispatched by Amtrak, for that matter on Metro North as well) that would have prevented this accident? Something about checking with the Amtrak dispatcher before demounting from a train on Amtrak RoW? (Or Metro North dispatcher on MN RoW?)
An accident like this just should not happen.
erikemBalt, Nice background information on the accident, gives a lot of insight on why it happened. Wish it hadn't involved the loss of the two CSX crewmembers. - Erik
Nice background information on the accident, gives a lot of insight on why it happened. Wish it hadn't involved the loss of the two CSX crewmembers.
Balt,
The NTSB report interjects an aspect of this incident that I had not been aware of. The crew was in the act of setting off a bad order that had been identified by the CSX Mechanical Depts. 'early warning system' that goes above and beyond the normal defect reports that the detectors radio the crew themselves. Additionally there was a 'outbound' Amtrak train that was in the area at the same time as the inbound train struck the CSX employees.
The early reports that I saw said the train had activated the Laurel DD which is located at mile post BAA 21.7. The incident happened in the interlocking limits of control point F Tower mile post BAA 37.0 - over 15 miles beyond Laurel.
The Mechanical Department in Jacksonville recieves additional data from Defect Detectors over and above the data that gets communicated to crews by the DD's own radios. The Mechanical Dept. will contact Chief Dispatcher and territory Dispatcher via a CADS message that must be acknowledged by each party so they can regain their ability to use the CADS System. With the distance between the DD that caused the warning and where the train stopped to inspect the defect; it is obvious to me that the DD's message to the train took no exceptions to the cars. The Mechanical Dept. with its 'back channel' data did take exception. Truthfully, this was not a uncommon happening when I was working - frustrating, but not uncommon.
F Tower, where the incident happened, is not the location one wants to be making switching movements - there is Amtrak's Mains on one side and the Ivy City yard tracks on the other. On the ground it is considered a high crime area, despite having a high level of background lighting, both from the street and Ivy City yard.
Trains can be surprisingly quiet. Electric powered trains are even quieter. With the high level of background lighting in the area, a passing trains headlight does not create the impact it would in a 'dark' area. Additionally the employee's proximity to their own train's power would have the noise of those idling engines overriding the other noises in their hearing range.
Sadly a 'perfect storm' of issues from the aspects of trains, speeds, sight lines, lighting, noise and track proximity ends in the deaths of two young employees - the Conductor was 25 and the Conductor Trainee was 20.
The regrettable thing here is that it would appear the two conductors were watching the oncoming train, which was blowing its horn to alert them, without realizing there was another train approaching doing the same thing from behind them. And, apparently, not realizing that the distance between tracks was lessening as they were just getting back to the locomotive...
Not sure radioing from CSX to Amtrak would have precluded either factor of this accident, except circumstantially by changing the relative timing of 'arrival' of the two Amtrak trains at the CSX head end. I wonder if engine noise from the CSX consist also had some effect on the conductors' not recognizing there was also a train behind them.
Preliminary NTSB Report
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/DCA17MR010-prelim.pdf
BaltACD My mistake conflating FRA and AAR.
My mistake conflating FRA and AAR.
confusing the two is fighting words in some quarters
BaltACD CandOforprogress2 http://wtop.com/dc-transit/2017/06/no-way-csx-crew-directly-contact-amtrak-train-struck-union-rep-says/ Semi misnomer - Amtrak and CSX both use FRA designated channels in the conduct of their business in this area. Amtrak's channels are not listed in the CSX ETT, likewise CSX's channels are not listed in Amtrak's ETT. Railroads have to have separate channels in the same territory so as to keep the conversations understandable between the company parties holding the conversation. However, radios used in the field have access to all FRA channels. Had the appropriate Amtrak Road Radio channel been known to the CSX crew they could have notified Amtrak of their situation.
CandOforprogress2 http://wtop.com/dc-transit/2017/06/no-way-csx-crew-directly-contact-amtrak-train-struck-union-rep-says/
Semi misnomer - Amtrak and CSX both use FRA designated channels in the conduct of their business in this area. Amtrak's channels are not listed in the CSX ETT, likewise CSX's channels are not listed in Amtrak's ETT. Railroads have to have separate channels in the same territory so as to keep the conversations understandable between the company parties holding the conversation. However, radios used in the field have access to all FRA channels.
Had the appropriate Amtrak Road Radio channel been known to the CSX crew they could have notified Amtrak of their situation.
AAR designates the channels from an office in Pueblo.
CandOforprogress2http://wtop.com/dc-transit/2017/06/no-way-csx-crew-directly-contact-amtrak-train-struck-union-rep-says/
http://wtop.com/dc-transit/2017/06/no-way-csx-crew-directly-contact-amtrak-train-struck-union-rep-says/
The NEC was shut down for hours WASH <> PHL due to Regional 175 (due WASH 1110 PM ) hitting two freight T&E employees near "F" tower. No Amtrak or MARC Penn and Camden line service. Service restored about 09:00 AM.
EDIT Unconfirmed reports that train tripped a defect detector and conductor and conductor trainee were walking back to head end after inspecting train ?? later.
http://www.fox5dc.com/news/264318370-story
http://wtop.com/dc/2017/06/amtrak-marc-delays-after-train-fatality/
June 28, 2017
9 a.m. ET
Amtrak service between Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia is resuming. Some trains in and out of Washington, D.C., will be operating on restricted speeds. Residual delays are expected as trains return to normal service levels. Service was disrupted due to temporary track closure for an investigation north of Washington, D.C.
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