schlimm Sorry. First time I ever posted a reply, and thought I did include the original text, even though it was fairly long and I was focusing on one word. Maybe I got it right this time. A D SIMMONS @Sam1: I have arrived at the point where I automatically discount as meaningful any criticism of passenger rail by someone who uses the term "choo-choo" to describe any train. While you make some valid points worthy of consideration and discussion in the larger context of transportation funding overall, the dismissive use of a childish term suggests that you start with an anti-train bias which brings your observations into serious question. When one refers to another member and refers to a term they have used ("choo-choo") it is customary and polite to include the post above yours so that the reader can put it in context. I may have missed it, but I did not see sam1's use of that term in either a pejorative or affectionate sense anywhere on this thread.
Sorry. First time I ever posted a reply, and thought I did include the original text, even though it was fairly long and I was focusing on one word. Maybe I got it right this time.
A D SIMMONS @Sam1: I have arrived at the point where I automatically discount as meaningful any criticism of passenger rail by someone who uses the term "choo-choo" to describe any train. While you make some valid points worthy of consideration and discussion in the larger context of transportation funding overall, the dismissive use of a childish term suggests that you start with an anti-train bias which brings your observations into serious question.
@Sam1: I have arrived at the point where I automatically discount as meaningful any criticism of passenger rail by someone who uses the term "choo-choo" to describe any train. While you make some valid points worthy of consideration and discussion in the larger context of transportation funding overall, the dismissive use of a childish term suggests that you start with an anti-train bias which brings your observations into serious question.
K4s_PRRAlso, remember that the Flyer is one of the top revenue producers in the Amtrak system.
Hardly. I would suggest you make the effort to look at the Amtrak Monthly Report. The latest for Jan. 2015, shows the "Flyer" is the 2nd worst revenue producer in the Amtrak system, with revenue of only $116,138, and declining compared to Jan. 2014. Only the 3-day per week Hoosier State was worse, with $48,628.
http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/223/904/Amtrak-Monthly-Performance-Report-January%202015.pdf Page A 3.3
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Several writers have cited cost and commuter use. As I remember, the Flyer was designed to be used mostly for tourists just visiting Fort Worth. People I talk to like the train. They cite the comfort and service. In addition Oklahoma it trying out a train between Oklahoma City and Tulsa. The main problem with expanding the service is that the route is a freight route and the track is not good for passenger trains. Also, remember that the Flyer is one of the top revenue producers in the Amtrak system.
If maintenance is concentrated on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, what do you do with the employees involved on Mondays and Fridays?
NPRC as an entity once had a large fleet of HEP equipped cars, the heritage fleet, that was available for peak seasonal use. Mr. Downs decided to dispose of them and they were replaced with many fewer Superliner II and Viewliners. The leadership decided they didn't want the volume and believed many of the silly things borne out in the revenue negative actions of the Mercer report. The post 1990 to 2000 Financial History as Viewed by Congress (seems like you can't link to the board) explores this and provides reference links.
That being said, I have wondered if NRPC could switch to a weekly maintenance cycle. With Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday being concentration days for maintenance with reduced consists on the single night/single day trains on those days, allowing for larger consists over the end and beginning of week periods.
BTW, the capital and heavy maintenance cost for a modern coach would be about $9/ticket for 4 day a week use at about 75% occupancy (60 passengers).
oltmannd The problem isn't that they are full, it's they are only full a couple days a week - and pretty empty the others. Equipment is expensive. You have to keep it busy and useful as much as possible. Weekend only extra cars isn't something OK and TX are willing to pay for, apparently.
dakotafredThe notion that full trains are a signal of marketing failure feels clunky, somehow.
The problem isn't that they are full, it's they are only full a couple days a week - and pretty empty the others. Equipment is expensive. You have to keep it busy and useful as much as possible. Weekend only extra cars isn't something OK and TX are willing to pay for, apparently.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
dakotafredHelp me here: People will respond to higher prices on the weekend by riding more on weekdays?
Yes. All the time. I will often take a day's vacation and stay an extra day to get a better fare.
Retired travellers are often flexible. Students are often flexible. People who HAVE to travel during the peak, will pay the price.
dakotafred oltmannd dakotafred greyhounds Jim200 Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday. If Amtrak is doing regular sell outs on the trains they're obviously not charging enough to ride the trains. You must have a formula. What percentage of ridership would indicate that the price is just right? Greyhounds is right. People vote with their feet. Those that think the price is right, ride. Those that don't, stay home or go another way. Sounds like this train needs demand pricing. That is the job of marketing to figure out. One key to running trains economically is to get the most out of the equipment and people. You can't just have equipment laying around for weekend use - and have it sit the rest of the week. Demand pricing flattens out the demand, minimized costs and maximizes revenue. Help me here: People will respond to higher prices on the weekend by riding more on weekdays? Then who takes their place on the weekend? Is it possible that people ride the Flyer more on the weekend because, in this particular market, they have legitimate business/pleasure requiring their travel on the weekend? Is this to be encouraged or discouraged? Another concept in marketing besides demand pricing is meeting the existing demand with the capacity to accommodate it. The notion that full trains are a signal of marketing failure feels clunky, somehow.
oltmannd dakotafred greyhounds Jim200 Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday. If Amtrak is doing regular sell outs on the trains they're obviously not charging enough to ride the trains. You must have a formula. What percentage of ridership would indicate that the price is just right? Greyhounds is right. People vote with their feet. Those that think the price is right, ride. Those that don't, stay home or go another way. Sounds like this train needs demand pricing. That is the job of marketing to figure out. One key to running trains economically is to get the most out of the equipment and people. You can't just have equipment laying around for weekend use - and have it sit the rest of the week. Demand pricing flattens out the demand, minimized costs and maximizes revenue.
dakotafred greyhounds Jim200 Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday. If Amtrak is doing regular sell outs on the trains they're obviously not charging enough to ride the trains. You must have a formula. What percentage of ridership would indicate that the price is just right?
greyhounds Jim200 Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday. If Amtrak is doing regular sell outs on the trains they're obviously not charging enough to ride the trains.
Jim200 Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday.
If Amtrak is doing regular sell outs on the trains they're obviously not charging enough to ride the trains.
Greyhounds is right. People vote with their feet. Those that think the price is right, ride. Those that don't, stay home or go another way.
Sounds like this train needs demand pricing. That is the job of marketing to figure out.
One key to running trains economically is to get the most out of the equipment and people. You can't just have equipment laying around for weekend use - and have it sit the rest of the week. Demand pricing flattens out the demand, minimized costs and maximizes revenue.
Help me here: People will respond to higher prices on the weekend by riding more on weekdays? Then who takes their place on the weekend?
Is it possible that people ride the Flyer more on the weekend because, in this particular market, they have legitimate business/pleasure requiring their travel on the weekend? Is this to be encouraged or discouraged?
Another concept in marketing besides demand pricing is meeting the existing demand with the capacity to accommodate it.
The notion that full trains are a signal of marketing failure feels clunky, somehow.
"IF" there is more demand on weekends then when equipment availability is present.
Keep an extra car in FTW and place itin consist on high demand days.
On days car not needed have the maintenance forces in FTW do maintenance instead of sitting around.
rotate spare car onto train to work on other cars.
Spare can also be available for a problem car on Eagle.
Does require a stub track with ground HEP source.
Yes, their is no financial incentive for NRPC to concern themselves with the matter unless there is a danger of the plug getting pulled. This is the fault of the legislation. I understand a year to year siege mentality tends to make organizations think this way.
It is interesting that the orignal reason for not just giving the railroads a subsidy equal to 100% of their avoidable loss was there would be no incentive to improve the operation, yet here we are again. Even the concept of giving them a large percentage of the avoidable loss for a national operation was passed over as that had been previously tried with commuter providers and the cost tended to rise in an unexplanable manner, such that the real value of the loss was higher. Hmmm, rising costs for the organization not justified on the ground.
The progression outlined above is the main reason a per-passenger mile subsidy would induce better performance for an operation that experiences decreasing cost (strongly at route level) with increasing volumes. Combine the variable per-passenger mile subsidy with fixed subsidies to pick up the NEC infrastructure and station costs and everthing functions. The operator would always have an incentive to push the envelope on the volume generation to grab just a bit more of the subsidy. Drop the per-mile subsidy every few years as the network grows. The only issue is Congress would loose control if it really would be implemented as outlined above.
blue streak 1The NEC is an example of much surplus equipment on weekends and holidays.
NEC used to have defined Friday afternoon and Sunday peaks. Some Acela sets sit around on weekends, but...
oltmannd So, utilizing suplus equipment, even for weekend only service would seem to make sense. (provided you don't bottom out your extra board staffing it) Even more sense would be to use commuter equipment for the ski train. That would work except Denver's soon-to-be commuter rail network is using EMUs. Nobody thinks outside their feifdom, appartently.
So, utilizing suplus equipment, even for weekend only service would seem to make sense. (provided you don't bottom out your extra board staffing it)
Even more sense would be to use commuter equipment for the ski train. That would work except Denver's soon-to-be commuter rail network is using EMUs. Nobody thinks outside their feifdom, appartently.
Jim200 Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday. Tina was able to find superliners for the recent Denver ski train excursion, but apparently nobody cares what is happening here. If there isn't enough coaches in the system, then you go out and buy some, even secondhand will do.
Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday. Tina was able to find superliners for the recent Denver ski train excursion, but apparently nobody cares what is happening here. If there isn't enough coaches in the system, then you go out and buy some, even secondhand will do.
Amtrak DOESN'T care. They get paid for the train by the states. The states have to care. Maybe they don't?
On to the ski train. It apparently worked because Amtrak has a surplus of Superliner coaches in the winter. (this opens a whole 'nother line of inquiry!) So, utilizing suplus equipment, even for weekend only service would seem to make sense. (provided you don't bottom out your extra board staffing it)
Jim200Here we go again, the Heartland Flyer is sold out going north on friday, saturday, and sunday, and going south on friday.
And just where would you find said coaches for purchase on short notice? Most secondhand coaches would need rebuilding from a suburban configuration and the lead time for new construction would be at least a year.
Simply because Marginal Cost was mentioned does not mean that the statement was advocating for pricing to be set there. However understanding MC at the route level does allow you to know which side of the Average Total Cost curve dip you are at. The point is to explore the possibility of increased efficiency on a per passenger mile basis.
Small fleets of machines operate at a point on the marginal cost curve where it is still declining. This is why companies standardize fleets for example. When one sees a straight line horizontal MC curve as in the link, that is due to a simplification of the machine by an economist or a very large operating base. Amtrak does not have a large operating base in regard to railcars, and each maintenance base serves to further divide the numbers of cars to small effective pools.
I understand your arguement about infrastructure marginal cost pricing not being workable as fixed costs predominate. Most of the European versions of this use Marginal Cost + Per Train Mile Congestion Charging + a bit of Discriminatory Pricing by user type to make the infrastructure provider close to whole as per Page 18 of CERRE (shows typical access charges in EU) and WB. My observation is that an infrastructure subsidy on the mixed use lines is used to provide extra passenger commuting infrastructure. I have suggested Amtrak should pay Average Cost for infrastructure, but the question is always the denominator used (Trainmile vs. Ton-Mile) in the calculation. DB-Netz for example has three broad variable factors to determine fees.
The primary issue with the Heartland Flyer from a revenue standpoint is the route is shorter than the average national system Amtrak trip length of 500+ miles.
V.Payne Isn't that what we have been talking about here? No you can't run additional trainmiles for the same total cost, but you can get much more efficient per passenger mile under the NA operating rules and market conditions if you extend the route, and the way to capture that is to increase the consist sizes. As to marginal cost curves. I still contend the point Amtrak operates on the MC curve is the point where it is still declining, say two Output units over from the left in the normalized example chart below. I believe we would all admit that Amtrak is operating at the point on the curve where the Average Cost Curve is declining. Why would I say it is operating at the point on the Marginal Cost Curve where it is still declining? First, think of things such as maintenance reserves of cars, when the fleet size increases your marginal cost declines as statisctially you need less actual cars to cover breakdowns of a particular type of car. For each additional unit used in scheduled revenue service you get cheaper unit costs as the non-revenue producing reserve fleet ratio drops which is a large issue when a grade crossing accident could take out enough of your fleet to almost sideline a route. In the case above the MC curve with respect to (WRT) system wide passenger miles was used. You can also consider the MC curve WRT train capacity. I will have to dig up a KTH study that graphs a few variables on train makeup from an engineering economics study detailed enough to consider EMU vs Locomotive and extra wide cars. I think the group would be interested. Now, this is an arguement for the efficiency that could be had in costs. The arguement about enlarging the addressible market size of course interfaces to determine the production point. Some may think it is irrelevant, but if you are not considering the way that highway costs are largely not priced (variably per mile or at all) to the user you are missing a large part of the equation. This ultimately ties to the answer of why Amtrak is different as say for example it has to cover its accident cost in the budget (Revenue + Subsidy), whereas the user of say ye old GM products do not as those costs are covered by (Auto Premium + Health Premium + Medicaid + uncompensated loss). I do hope some of the posters realize that even motorcoaches operating over the financially leverage road are on the dole, as they are allowed a Federal and in many states a State rebate of portions or the whole of the fuel tax paid at the pump and have used USDOT grants for terminals. Shall we even start into Railroad Retirement vs. the coming bailout of Social Security? Quite honestly, the biggest issue with this route is relative access cost. I typically don't consider rail or any common carrier, except for trips longer than about 200 miles and I suspect that is true of a good portion of the market. Extend it and they will come. The arguement of Amtrak has always been does the US actually want to fund it to the extent that it could gain some cost efficiency. The other recent post about Congress' view of Amtrak's Financial situaiton notes some Legislative history behind the capital versus operational efficiency arguement (spolier alert -they just didn't invest near enough capital as Volpe postulated for Amtrak to become self sufficient operationally)
Isn't that what we have been talking about here? No you can't run additional trainmiles for the same total cost, but you can get much more efficient per passenger mile under the NA operating rules and market conditions if you extend the route, and the way to capture that is to increase the consist sizes.
As to marginal cost curves. I still contend the point Amtrak operates on the MC curve is the point where it is still declining, say two Output units over from the left in the normalized example chart below.
I believe we would all admit that Amtrak is operating at the point on the curve where the Average Cost Curve is declining.
Why would I say it is operating at the point on the Marginal Cost Curve where it is still declining? First, think of things such as maintenance reserves of cars, when the fleet size increases your marginal cost declines as statisctially you need less actual cars to cover breakdowns of a particular type of car. For each additional unit used in scheduled revenue service you get cheaper unit costs as the non-revenue producing reserve fleet ratio drops which is a large issue when a grade crossing accident could take out enough of your fleet to almost sideline a route.
In the case above the MC curve with respect to (WRT) system wide passenger miles was used. You can also consider the MC curve WRT train capacity. I will have to dig up a KTH study that graphs a few variables on train makeup from an engineering economics study detailed enough to consider EMU vs Locomotive and extra wide cars. I think the group would be interested.
Now, this is an arguement for the efficiency that could be had in costs. The arguement about enlarging the addressible market size of course interfaces to determine the production point. Some may think it is irrelevant, but if you are not considering the way that highway costs are largely not priced (variably per mile or at all) to the user you are missing a large part of the equation.
This ultimately ties to the answer of why Amtrak is different as say for example it has to cover its accident cost in the budget (Revenue + Subsidy), whereas the user of say ye old GM products do not as those costs are covered by (Auto Premium + Health Premium + Medicaid + uncompensated loss).
I do hope some of the posters realize that even motorcoaches operating over the financially leverage road are on the dole, as they are allowed a Federal and in many states a State rebate of portions or the whole of the fuel tax paid at the pump and have used USDOT grants for terminals. Shall we even start into Railroad Retirement vs. the coming bailout of Social Security?
Quite honestly, the biggest issue with this route is relative access cost. I typically don't consider rail or any common carrier, except for trips longer than about 200 miles and I suspect that is true of a good portion of the market. Extend it and they will come.
The arguement of Amtrak has always been does the US actually want to fund it to the extent that it could gain some cost efficiency. The other recent post about Congress' view of Amtrak's Financial situaiton notes some Legislative history behind the capital versus operational efficiency arguement (spolier alert -they just didn't invest near enough capital as Volpe postulated for Amtrak to become self sufficient operationally)
You've got the wrong graph.
Railroads have the cost structure of a "Natural Monopoly". But, unlike enterprises with similar cost structures (i.e. natual gas neighborhood distribution) they cannot be geographically isolated from competition by legislation. For about 60 years the government types did not understand this and tried to regulate railroad pricing in a manner similar to a regulated "natural monopoly". The result was disaster.
Your example graph depicts the cost structure of an enterprise such as a cereal factory. It, in no way, depicts the reality of railroad operation. Here's the cost structure of a railroad:
http://econpage.com/201/handouts/natmonop.html
Note that the marginal cost is a constant amount (straight line) and is always below the average cost. That's why railroads can't price "at the margin" as cereal manufacturers do.
You're using non applicable data to support your position.
If we just give some more money, above that provided for adequate nutrition and minimal housing, poverty will ease? On the social science side of things, one of the better things to reduce automobile accidents (an equally as large draw on public resources) was when gasoline rose in price as it tended to cut out a lot of inexperienced drivers joyriding (article in journal I can't recall now).
Now lets ask a question related to the Heartland Flyer. What is the average trip length at which you first consider taking either a train or a commercial flight?
Unless I am making a weekly trip of some kind, the minimum is 200 miles for me, and even then it has to be if the destination is downtown. Around 300-400 miles if I would have to rent a car with either mode (though high airport parking costs can affect this). At about 600 miles a switch to non-stop air depending on pricing and by 1000 miles most likely air, though if the connections are bad and the train is a through route, the train might still win if it is an overnight schedule and I have a sleeping car room.
In play in my example above, are modifiers to the trip length decision known as access costs that sway a decision one way or the other. Amtrak's average trip length is a bit above 500 miles in coach, it sure seems running at least a 400 mile route, centered on Dallas- Ft. Worth, with suburban stations would help the financial performance.
What is the trip length cutoff that most of the board senses is the market?
I suppose one can see that a 200 mile route is hindered in potential market volume attraction and trains peform well WRT other modes when passenger miles per trainmiles rise over about 250 or so.
Sam1 The Heartland Flyer cost taxpayers approximately $7.2 million last year. Approximately 20 per cent of the children in Oklahoma and Texas live in poverty. The money wasted on the Heartland Flyer would be better spent on helping them deal with poverty, i.e. nutrition, medical care, education.
The Heartland Flyer cost taxpayers approximately $7.2 million last year. Approximately 20 per cent of the children in Oklahoma and Texas live in poverty. The money wasted on the Heartland Flyer would be better spent on helping them deal with poverty, i.e. nutrition, medical care, education.
Irrespective of whatever cost scenario is perceived for the Heartland Flyer, it does not come close to covering any of them and, moreover, it is not likely to cover any future cost scenarios.
In FY14 ticket reveunes covered just 21 cents of every dollar of Heartland Flyer expenses before depreciation and interest. Ridership was down approximately 11 per cent from FY12.
There is nothing in the history of this train to indicate that extending its endpoints or its frequency will attract more riders. Or at least a sufficient number of riders to come even close to cover its costs.
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