Is there any way to force the burden of running passenger trains on private railroads, just like the burden was lifted away back in 1971? This would create a competitive market and lower ticket prices as well as create a cheap, feasable alternative to high gas prices and sucky air travel. Also, this system and nuissance we have called "amcrap" would sort itself out.
I know the private rr's would not like to do this but eventually the demand for a passenger rail system will start to outstrip Amtrak and passenger railroading might even become a profitable business.
Amtrak has never made money, no Commuter Railroad has made money in the last 40 years.
Most large railroads no longer compete with eash other, they form a network. Short of this country turning to Socialism, how do you FORCE a privite stock company to take on a loosing operation. All they could do is cut non-profit service and raise fares to cover costs on the rest of the routes. In 1971 the Railroads were going bankrupt running passenger service that few wanted.
Would you want the Airlines to be Forced to build the Airports. How about banning the Bus Company from the Interstate Highways forcing them to build there own "Busways".
Don U. TCA 73-5735
In a free country founded on individual liberty, why would you want to "Force" the shareholders of the private railroads to do anything that wasn't in their own best interest? It would be literally making them slaves.
If it's in the "Public Interest", then "The Public" has to pay for it through their taxes. Anything else is slavery.
I agree with the above comments. What is proposed is worse than Socialsim, it is truly Fascism. When passenger railroading becomes profitable, the railroads themselves will offer to do what you suggest. Until then, Amtrak probably represents the best way to subsidize the service most economically.
One place that might work now is Kansas City - St. Louis - Chicago. Suppose the UP were to analyze the real costs of making this a 125 mph high-speed passenger corridor with enough capacity for 70 mph freight operations as well. With congestion in St. Louis eliminated. Then figure out what investment would make it UP's advantage to have such a corridor, allowing the UP to become freight competitive with BNSF from Chicago to the Southwest without needing trackage rights on the BNSF through Galesburg. Then propose to Kansas, Missiouri, and Illinois, to share in the total costs of the project. Then provide a real up-to-date UP corridor passenger service, hourly between Chicago and St. Louis, and every other going on to Kansas City. I think such a passenger service would more than cover operating expenses, just as Acela does. On-board coach cleaner, quick turnaround, decent meals efficiently served, high-platform stations, a modern service, probably diesel double-ended trains. Intermediate stops would be rotated among the hourly and two-hourly trains, much as they are for the Acela sercie, so Springfield and Joliet and Independence, etc. would also benefit.
I agree that identifying mutual benefits and partnering with the Union Pacific is important in improving passenger service in Illinois and Missouri.
I am not sure whether the Chicago - Saint Louis and Saint Louis - Kansas City freight corridors are strongly linked or offer a clear alternative for the Los Angeles - Chicago Golden State Route. The UP Spine Line - Transcon Overland Route is 569 miles long by way of Nevada, IA compared to 567 miles by way of Saint Louis. The Golden State Route offers a detour for flooding and a relief for the Transcon; but terminals and connections at Chicago may be problematic. A third Los Angeles - Chicago route via Dallas, TX is another alternative.
Kansas City - Saint Louis is a significant traffic lane to the East and Southeast; and Saint Louis - Chicago is an important Lane from the Gulf Coast and Texas. Most of the latter's traffic goes by way of Gorham and Findlay that offers a more direct routing to the Northeast, avoids Saint Louis terminal congestion, and exposes less population to hazardous materials - important for the substantial chemical traffic from the Gulf Coast.
In the overall cost of high speed improvements, particularly for grade separation and relocation for curve easement, high-level platforms are a relatively small item. High-level platforms are totally incompatible with Amtrak Superliner or present and foreseeable future Metra equipment and need to be a separate boarding area. Proposals I've seen for combined high and low level platforms for proposed ADA rules would not seem to be workable. A high-level platform also needs a separate platform or guantlet track and signals that pose issues for the railroad and represent the greater cost component.
Grade separation and crossing elimination for 125 mph speed for about 150 miles of the Chicago - Saint Louis Corridor was estimated to cost around $350 twenty years ago as I recall. Once total grade separation is achieved for a segment of the route, speed can be increased from 110 mph to as much as 150 mph. If curve easement would be necessary for speeds above 110 mph in conjunction with grade separation, it seems logical that the opportunity for 150 mph for segments over about 16 miles long where a couple minutes can be saved needs to be explored. This would require 0.5-degree, 11,460-foot radius curves. One inch curve superelevation would result in a 0.125 inch over-balance at 50 mph and 0.715 inch underbalance at 70 mph for freight, and an acceptable 6.875 inch underbalance for tilting passenger trains.
Extended second and third main tracks may be needed that would significantly increase costs in upgrading the Kansas City - Saint Louis Corridor. High-speed trackage is of little value if passenger trains need to slow for taking a passing track between stops, much less stopping for meets. Conversely, railroads dislike and try to avoid problems putting freight trains on diverging routes and over facing-point turnouts; and this also applies to platform and gauntlet tracks.
The need for passing or second main tracks for the Kansas City - Saint Louis Corridor cannot be over-emphasized. If there is on average one freight train an hour, a five-hour intercity schedule would result in meeting ten opposing freights. Similarly, each passenger train on a two-hour frequency would meet five opposing passenger trains. Fifteen passing tracks, averaging one every 19 miles, would be needed for passenger service alone. Another 12-16 passing tracks would be needed for freight-freight meets, resulting in a need for passing tracks every 9-11 miles. At $10 million each, $310 million would be needed for passing tracks alone.
Coupling the need for passing tracks with the time lost for taking pssing tracks, the need for a second and third main between Kansas City and Saint Louis for 125-150 mph speeds becomes clearer. A second main track with 10 passing/third tracks may cost $1 billion.
I think investment in capacity and signal improvements and low-floor tilt equipment to achieve frequent service with speeds up to 110 mph is more attainable as an interim goal.
An articulated, low floor version of Acela may be possible. Articulation maximizes the proportion of accessible floor area relative to car length, in this case 57 or 61 feet between truck centers. The design problem is whether disk brake rotors of sufficient braking capacity can be mounted inside the truck frame or on the wheel with an inside truck frame with acceptable width for a lower gangway floor above the axles between articulated cars. Other possibilities are for eddy-current braking as used on the ICE trains with disk brakes and for eddy-current and tread brakes. Worst case would be a 3-step stair from an 18-inch high coach floor to the inter-car gangway. Best case would be to allow passage through the train on an electric chair or other mobility device.
A 57-foot articulated coach section would allow 42 seats, vestibule, and accessible toilet with a low floor. Another 8 seats for a total of 50 seats are possible raised above the trucks at one end, and electrical and mechanical equipment and luggage racks at the other. Seating would be 2+2 with 2 single flip seats opposite the accessible toilet. The 1.14-feet length per seat excluding end units is slightly more effective than the 1.25-feet per seat for the Horizon coaches and for the Talgos. A 61-foot coach section would offer a total of 58 seats, or 1.05 feet per seat.
With weight proportional to length for an Acela-based car, a 57-ft articulated section would weigh 43.6 tones and a 69-ft end unit would weigh 52.8 tons. A 9-section articulated unit would weigh 410.8 tons for a 537-ft unit with 450 seats for an all-coach version. A single 4,300 hp diesel might accelerate such such a train with a push-mode cab coach to 110 mph in about six miles and four minutes.
I very much dislike the idea of rotating, or alternating, intermediate stops at small communities in rural areas. The same time-based demand for travel exists for all such communities to significant markets. Either it's worth having these stops to contribute to an overall increase in use or it isn't. One advantage of a train is that it can make relatively quick stops along the service corridor and be on its way.
An on-board train attendent for clean-ups and management of trash is an interesting idea.
One idea may be to promote bringing on food, frozen dinners and restaurant take-out, for self-service microwaving on board. Alcohol I'm not sure about how to control it; but it's already happening on a small scale and, in some cases, becomes disruptive and dangerous.
Your 410 ton articulated trainset with a 120 ton locomotive with a peak speed of 110 MPH covers a 20 mile segment between station stops (typical of the Swedish train on another thread as well as the Hiawatha Service) according to the schedule
To be more precise, it takes 3.8 minutes and 4.8 miles to reach 110 MPH, and the train averages 91.4 MPH station-to-station factoring in acceleration, a 7-minute cruise interval between mileposts 5 and 18, and about a 1 MPH per second braking rate. IThe train averages 85 MPH factoring in a 1-minute station stop. Or it averages 79.3 MPH with a 2-minute station stop. This of course is without any other speed restriction -- people should see that a high peak speed does not translate into anywhere near that average speed.
It takes 12 gallons of #2 Diesel merely to accelerate this train to the 110 MPH speed -- mind you, there is no electric regenerative braking unless you are invoking a hybrid locomotive. I hope you are boarding a minimum of 12 people, on average, at each of those stops at 20 mile intervals -- otherwise you are better off having each person driving pickup trucks another 20 miles to catch the train at a later stop.
If GM "killed the electric car", what am I doing standing next to an EV-1, a half a block from the WSOR tracks?
Paul,
Many thanks!
Two computers ago I could do this stuff in Basic. Now it's a major hassle. I've started a couple times, got bogged down, and gave up. I hate being at the mercy of consultants and other "experts" fudging numbers to produce the client's desired outcome. Enough.
Actually, I'm proud that I was in the ballpark with a "WAG."
This may not be an Acela; but it seems to me to be a pretty reasonable level of performance. By comparison, I remember an account of how the Morning Hiawatha could accelerate to 100 mph in 7 miles and 7 minutes with two E6 locomotives and maybe 10 cars. At the time it seemed quick.
FWIW, I was on a delayed Hiawatha coming into Glenview hot. We were doing 79 at Lake Avenue when the engineer set the air and came to a stop in front of the station despite my misgivings. Metra trains going 70 mph nb routinely go into dynamic 1/2 mile from the Rogers Park station, blending air as speed falls under 35. I don't know what the cost is for braking hard; but it sure saves some time.
Interesting point about the amount of fuel to recover speed after a stop. Speed recoverery for curve restrictions is a bear too, which is another good reason for tilt equipment.
As I pointed out earlier, gauntlet tracks are NOT necessary for combined high-speed passenger and frieght, assuming passengers are not allowed on the platform until just before arrival and departure of their train. Instead of gauntlet tracks, Metro North and LIRR are adding metal side sills to their door threasholds, effectively making the passenger equipment wider. At important stations like Sprignfield and Bloomington, there might be a generous wide high platfrom between the two mainline tracks and a low platform outside on each side to accomodate the occasional through Amtrak train. I was envisioning double track all the way, with occasional extra sidings, and regular intervales of high-speed movable frog crossovers.
The BNSF KC-Chi route is more direct and hasn't the congestion problems when compared to the UP route via St. Louis. But in the Mellon era, the New Haven faced the same comparison between New Haven and Boston. There was the old New York and New England route through Willimantic and Blackstone, the old "White Train" NY-Boston route, and the route through New London and Providence, the "Shore Line". They elected to go with the Shore Line as the main traffic route. Given the right investment, I believe the UP route can be competitive with the BNSF route, and it does at the same time offer alternate interchange points with CSX and NS as pointed out.
I would definitely prefer high platforms and reasonably conventional technology, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of low-floor equipment as applied extensively to light rail.
The only Amtrak service on the route would be long distance to Texas and the West Coast as determined by Amtrak. The corridor service would all UP.
The reason Amtrak was formed in the first place is because passnger trains became unprofitable after WWII..During the late 40's and into the 50's, every family now had a car, (which wasnt as common before) the government built highways, and passenger rail just died away..the railroads were losing money on it, so they abandoned it..In order for long distance passenger service to exist at all the government had to step in and form Amtrak, and FUND it..
that was 1971..almost 40 years later, nothing has changed. passenger rail is just as unprofitable now as it was in 1971..and I doubt gas prices will have any impact..If I need to get from Rochester to Chicago, im still not going to take Amtrak, because it takes forever, and the schedule is very inconvenient..im still driving.
Passenger rail will never be profitable in America ever again..because very few people want or use it...therefore it can never be private, because no private company will ever want to take it on, because no private company can make any money on it..therefore it has to remain "public"..funded by the government at a loss, if it is going to exist at all.
Scot
It's important to remember that passenger trains were always subsidized by the government (at least indirectly) thru land grants and in particular, postal contracts for carrying the mail. When the Post Office cancelled the mail contracts in the early sixties and quit using RPO's, there was a rush by the railroads to apply to the ICC for permission to discontinue many passenger trains. Without the postal contract, many trains that were making a profit or at least covering their expenses now no longer made money.
In effect what the railroads said to the federal government in the late sixties was 'hey, either you need to subsidize passenger trains or take them off our hands' and the government formed Amtrak to take them off the private railroad's hands.
As fuel prices continue to skyrocket in the future, the need for passenger trains will grow. It would be a shame to lose trains now, and have to go back and start over again in the future when we really will need passenger trains again.
BTW not all pre-Amtrak passenger operations lost money, Northern Pacific consitently made at least a modest profit on it's passenger trains thru the 1960's.
You don't even need to bother with Basic -- these train-schedule calculations can be done up in Excel or other spreadsheet program like the free OpenOffice Calc. You just figure out the tractive effort and train resistance from formulas at each time step, divide tractive effort by train weight in the same units and multiply by the acceleration of gravity, and update the speed at the next cell as time step times acceleration plus speed at the previous row.
No one will look for this discussion here.
I used 5 mph speed increments for calulations of time and distance. Once I tried 1 mph increments for the same train and the cumulative difference was negligible.
Initially, I did calculations on a hand-held which was extremely laborious. Tractive effort and resistance were calculated separately before inputting in time and distance calculations. I no longer have the patience for that; and some rounding error to four places, maybe not significant, was likely.
Maybe I'm wrong; but it seems to me land grants allowed railroads to profit from the sale of land to finance construction in return for encouraging occupation the West to secure the integrity of United States' borders. The reduced rates for government transportation alone, including moving material and troops in both wars, far exceeded the value of the land grants. This was no on-going revenue stream and subsidy, a misconception that will not die.
I join other writers in the judgement that, as long as all transport is subsidized for one justification or another - a chicken for every pot, intercity rail passenger service including the Northeast Corridor would be a ludicrous investment for a positive, can't miss, financial result.
Maybe the Acelas cover direct costs; but the NEC maintenance and station operating costs shared with Regionals, long-distance, and suburban would overwhelm a stand-alone service.
If Amtrak gets more equipment with the recent funding, maybe the increase in demand from high gas prices can be met first with more seats on the existing trains. Additional ridership will reduce the ticket revenue shortfall and be a better deal for everyone.
Beside more cars and locomotives; more parking is needed to get to the trains. It's hard to take the train from some outlying station where parking lots and on-street spaces already are full or non-existant.
Gauntlet tracks at stations may not be necessary for 99.99% of rail traffic, but they are necessary for the 0.01% wide load traffic that cannot be accommodated on roads reasonably for any long distance.
As I recall, public agencies own the Metro North and LIRR tracks; and freight operators can use the facilities within the available clearances.
Dave, this is Missouri and Illinois - kinda like Kansas as compared to Oz. Kansas City - Saint Louis - Joliet is owned by the Union Pacific and Joliet - Chicago by Canadian National which are righteously protective of the industry-established 8-foot structure clearance from the track center line for wide loads. Major North American railroads have gone about meeting this standard with systematic relocation of equipment, rebuilding structures, and single-tracking. This also may involve national defense and commerce issues. For these reasons, high level platforms would not come without either costly gauntlet or separate platform tracks and signals.
The costs for high level platforms just so Midwest States can buy Acela equipment are not affordable or necessary. The money would be better spent, in my opinion, on new and additional compatible equipment and new routes to expand service rather than rebuilding station infrastructure.
On the Illinois side, there are needs for Superliner and Metra compatibility. Joliet has limited space for a new platform along the UP track without tying up BNSF. A high level platform limiting use in Union Station could reduce critical capacity. As it is, track capacity on the Metra Milwaukee North poses an equipment issue for the Amtrak Hiawatha service and a compatibility issue with for the Empire Builder.
I imagine clearances are an issue for expanding services in the Southeast. The two routes out of Washington, DC need to accommodate Virginia Rail Express and the Cardinal.
I'll repeat that freight traffic between Kansas City and Saint Louis may require some third track for overtaking slower freight trains beside the need for additional trackage with high level platforms.
The UP route through Saint Louis may be more of an alternative than a more competitive one with BNSF as I wrote earlier due to heavy traffic on the Transcon. As for Texas traffic, the UP is mostly two main tracks between East Saint Louis - Delta, and Poplar Bluff - Texarkanna. This brings us back to the former C&EI being the principal freight route from Texas to Chicago. The former Katy will need a lot more work to raise capacity and has enough grain and coal traffic from the Plains States to be considered for another lane.
The principal difference between the BNSF and UP and congestion is the former has two main tracks all the way even though more trains are handled.
Sounds like the freight and Amtrak were going in opposite directions to be that close and not impose some delay.
A platform track can double as a passing siding and that is a consideration. It is also short and costs less than the usual 8,500-10,000 foot siding.
A gauntlet track eliminates the need for a frog and takes up less right-of-way.
Either way, railroads have expressed an aversion to facing point switches of any kind.
HarveyK400 wrote: Either way, railroads have expressed an aversion to facing point switches of any kind.
Run that one by me one more time. With a single track railroad half the time you're going over facing points. Could you please explain further?
PASSENGER PROFITABILITY: My understanding is that Acela more than meets its operating and train maintenance expenses, or even all expensis on an avoidable cost basis . If the UP got a super-railroad freight highway out of the deal, they might be willing to run the passenger service on the basis I have suggested. The economics of high platform loading or low platform, gauntlet track or long passegner platform sidings, all of these need comprehensive engineering and economic analysis. I jumped to the conclusion that what you meant by low floor was really low floor, like the low floor buses and light rail cars. Very difficult to provide a really smooth ride in such vehicles. (The best of the modern light rail street loading cars are "70% low-floor, with high floor areas at each end over the power trucks and containing the operator's cabs.) What you really mean is low platform loading, like Superliners and the El Capitan AT&SF cars. (Most other equpment has traps and can load either way.) I don't really have much of a quarrel with that, but the Pennsy did put in a number of high platform stations as part of electrification, and it did handle wide loads (but on bypass tracks around the high platform to be sure!) An economic and engineering analysis is required to answer the question.
I have thought over the question of intermediate stations. Basically there would three classes of service, all with identacle equpment. Limiteds would run non-stop Chcago - St. Louis, possibly some or all stopping at Springfield, and then all major cities to Kansas City, with overall time still about half that of the Southwestern Chief. Expresses would be the basic Chicago - St. Louis service, stopping at such major cities as Joliet, Bloomington, and Springfield. There would also be one overnight local each way. No sleeper service, just a very economical transportation alternative for the many colleges and universities on the route. Obviously, this local would stop at Normal, for example. It would be specially low-fare train, to make up for the inconvenient stop hours, and it would run a schedule comparable with the freight to allow the night-time to be intensively used by freight trains without having to take sidings for the high speed daytime passenger trains. But it would not have special equipment/ Departure times from Chicago might be 5:50 St. Louis Express, 6:30 KC Lim., 6:50 SLE, 7:30 KCL, 7:50 SLE, 8:30 KCL, 10:50 SLE, 11:30 KCL, 12:50 SLE, 1:30 KCL., 2:50 SLE, 3:30 KCL, 3:50 SLE, 4:30 KCL, 4:50 SLE, 5:30 KCL, 5:50 SLE, 6:30 KCL, 6:50 SLE, 7:30 KCL, 8:50 SLE, 9:30 KCL; 10:30, exception, Kansas City express to handle the after theatre, opera, concert, sports crowd, schedule flexible for special events. 11:00 Kansis City overnight local. In addition, morning departures for Kansas City from St. Louis might be added between the overnight local and the first through train from Chicago. Yield management in ticketing would attempt to fill the mid-day trains and avoid overbooking the morning and evening trains. Generally, fixed coonsists would be used to save terminal costs.
I picked a particular travel market, and it may be the only one in the USA where such a service could turn a profit. And where there might be an incentive for a freight railroad to cooperate.
For FY ended 30 September 2007, the Acela covered its Total Attributed Costs and contributed $173.1 million toward other charges, i.e. interest, depreciation, infrastructure management, etc. The NEC, which includes Acela operations, covered its Total Attributed Costs and contributed $258.3 million toward the other charges. This includes the $173.1 million from Acela operations. The results for the first six months of FY 2008 show similar although slightly better outcomes.
The NEC fares would have to be raised an average of 26.14 cents a mile, based on 2007 results, for the NEC to breakeven, assuming that it wears 80 per cent of the other charges. This would raise a typical New York to Washington Acela ticket price by $59.08, which would take it from $151 to $210.08.
Applied to an average regional fare between New York and Washington, the ticket price would have to be raised to $146.58.
The cost of an economy class airline ticket on August 13, 2008, which is the date that I selected for comparison, would be $81.
Of course, the increases could be prorated over different segments of the route. And they could fall differently on different classes of users, i.e. Acela vs. Regional, first class vs. business class vs. coach. But Amtrak would have difficulty competing on the NEC if it had to raise its fares to breakeven.
Airfares will continue increasing, especially after the summer, because of the planned cutbacks announced recently by the major air carriers sans Southwest Airlines. But the fares between New York and Washington would have to increase far more dramatically than is anticipated to give the train between those two cities a cost advantage.
Putting the burden of running passenger trains by private carriers is very old school. Some charters were in fact granted with the idea of moving people rather than goods. Thus you had the likes of public service commissions and interstate commerce commissions, et. al. to uphold the public right to passage. However, as highways and airlines took passengers away from the railraods, it became common to allow private enterprise to not have to carry people. Taking the mail contracts away from the railroads hastened the matter as losses increased in the private sector. Ever hear of Postum? Kraft just stopped manufacturing the product late last year. It was a grain based powder used to make a drink similar to coffee dating back about a hundred years. People weren't buying it anymore, so Kraft stopped making it. Government can't make Kraft to keep manufacturing a product that either costs more than the public is willing to pay or that the public doesn't use anymore. So it was with passsenger trains. Losses by the railroads could not be coverd by what they could charge nor were there that many passengers anymore. Competition, by the way, was not between railroad companies by then, but between the railroads and the private automobile, the bus, and airlines, all heavily subsidized by the various government agencies rather than proffered by private enterprise. Can we reverse the move? Make railroads run passenger trains if they expect to get a charter to run a railroad? Not really, not anymore. However, used as a bargaining chip, as railroads realize they need, and can get, help from government, it might be possible to say to them, "we (government of the people) will help you build that siding, or second track, or bridge, or whatever, if you will run a passenger train to serve us." (That's political negotiating not blackmailing, by the way.)
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henry6,
What you just described is the old "nose of the camel under the tent" strategy used by governments for many years. I doubt you see the railroads falling for it. Short of outright blackmail by the US government, there is no way the railroads ever operate passenger service on their own again. After all, when times are good, the railroads can afford to add the 2nd track themselves; when times are bad, there's not that much of a need for the 2nd track.
Railroads are not falling, they're calling for government help where the need for capital outpaces the availability. And they are willing to work with governments to get what they need. Maybe they won't operate passenger trains themselves but they may be more receptive to the operation of passsenger trains on thier rails. Years ago one eastern railroad president proudly pointed out that by allowing Amtrak on his railroad he got a 55 mile an hour freight railroad in exchange! Private enterprise, especially in croweded areas and over burdened "corridors" (freight and passenger) knows that the future is a consortium or partnership amongst governement, the competition (railroads, trucking companies, the highway lobby), and themselves. Even when times are good, it is difficult to raise the cash and mount the NIMBY fight to get a second track or a new bridge or whatever. Going it alone is not an option anymore, not if they want to see 2025 or 2050.
HarveyK400 wrote: The reduced rates for government transportation alone, including moving material and troops in both wars, far exceeded the value of the land grants. This was no on-going revenue stream and subsidy, a misconception that will not die.
The reduced rates for government transportation alone, including moving material and troops in both wars, far exceeded the value of the land grants. This was no on-going revenue stream and subsidy, a misconception that will not die.
The Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, as well as subsequent acts through 1874, is a little more complex than meets the eye.
To encourage the development of a Trans continental railroad, the U.S. government offered the Union Pacific and Central Pacific the rights-of-way through public lands. It also granted them permission to take from the public lands adjacent to their lines the earth, stone, timber, and other materials required for the construction of the roads.
The UP and CP were also granted every alternate section of public land, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of five sections per mile on each side of the railroad's right-of-way and within ten miles on each side of the road. Subsequently, the Act was modified to increase the size of the land grants and convey the mineral rights under them to the railroads. The mineral rights proved to be the real pay dirt.
The justification for the grants was to aid the construction of the railroads to secure the safe and speedy transportation of mails, troops, munitions of war and public stores.
To finance the roads, the Sectary of the Treasury issued six per cent thirty years bonds to the railroads. They were issued in $1,000 denominations, with 16, 32, or 48 bonds per mile, depending on the difficulty of the terrain being crossed.
The government stipulated that the grants were made with the understanding that the bonds would be paid upon maturity. Furthermore, the legislation required the companies to keep the railroad and parallel telegraph line in good repair and use. It required the railroads to transmit dispatches over the telegraph lines at all time and transport mails, troops, and munitions of war, supplies, and public stores for the government, whenever required to do so by any department, and that the government shall at all times have the preference in the use of the same for all the purposes aforesaid, at fair and reasonable rates of compensation, not to exceed the amounts paid by private parties for the same kind of service.
Other language in the Act stipulated that Congress could require the UP and CP to transport dispatches, as well as goods and people, at below market rates if the net earnings of either road exceeded an agreed upon threshold as determined by a complex accounting formula.
Initially, the land grants were of little value, primarily because much of the land could not be used for farming or ranching. Over time, however, the value of the land grants grew greatly. As settlers moved west, the UP and CP were able to sell their lands at a significant profit. But it was the mineral rights that really rang the cash register bells. Many of the roads are benefiting to this day from their large mineral holdings.
The railroads that received land grants carried government goods and personnel, or transmitted dispatches below fair market rates but not below cost. Determining the present value of the lost revenue due to the rate reductions would be a daunting task. One would have to determine the present value of the reduced government tariffs by year and match them against the present value of the value (sale price) of the grants. It would take an army of accountants to come up with a valid answer.
It is unlikely that the reduced rates provided to the government for the movement of goods and personnel exceeded the value of the land grants and the minerals under them.
The 1940 Transportation Act relieved the railroads from carrying government freight at reduced rates, except for military traffic, which was ended in 1947.
It seems to me that the land, timber, and mineral assets generally were spun off to subsidiaries and independent corporations leaving the railroads with nothing but the freight they can haul.
Also, if you are counting today's present worth of assets, then convert the initial bonds to present value as well. The trickier question is what mineral and timber resources were known at the time the land grants were issued and how much was a gamble or windfall?
I have read the Land Grant Acts. None of them contain any language demanding the grantees provide telegraph and railroad carriage services to the government at below market or below cost rates.
The Acts stipulate as a condition of the grants that the railroads give the government a rate break, but not below cost, if their earnings exceeded a formulated ceiling.
Here is a real life example of how a western railroad is still benefiting from the Act. My employer wanted to build a western coal power plant in west central Texas. The coal was located on lands owned by BNSF. To get to it we would have had to pay for a spur line to the coal face, pay BNSF to transport the coal to the power plant, and pay a subsidiary of BNSF for the mineral rights. The cost would have been hundreds of millions of dollars over the life of the contract.
Whether the benefits of the Act accrued to the parent company or a subsidiary is immaterial. The financial results of a subsidiary company roll up to the parent company.
As an undergraduate student I took several transportation economics courses. It was a long time ago, but as I remember the discussions of the impact of the Land Grant Act, it was agreed that the railroads were a net beneficiary.
Amtrak's supporters talk extensively about the subsidies received by air and highway interests while overlooking the subsidies received by the railroads.
Samantha wrote: Amtrak's supporters talk extensively about the subsidies received by air and highway interests while overlooking the subsidies received by the railroads.
Which is easy to do since railroads, and Amtrak in particular, receive monies counted in single digits while airlines and highways receive monies counted in triple digit billions.
But the real story today is the fact that our transportation future is in bad need of attention from all facets of the transportation industry and all levels of government. No one is advocating nationalization. But private enterprise knows it cannot raise the capital needed for the future on its own. There has to be a partnership, there has to be a rationalized, transportation system in order for the whole country to meet the demands of the future. NYC metropolitan area highways and railroads are ready to choke on the influx of ocean delivered containers expected in the near and distant future. What has to be done has no single mode answer but a bipartisan attack from business and government to meet that demand. And if freight is going to choke the highways and railroads, the movement of people is going to suffer, too, and therefore must be addressed at the same time. And if the roads and railroads are choked in the NY metropolitan area, then so are the roads and railroads all the way to Chicago and further west.
Backpeddling, I believe the whole concept of how the Federal government and land grants to the railroads succeeded in building the economy and infrastructure of the west is well documented and accepted as being the only way it could have been done as quickly and economically as was done. And the fact that rairoads continued to pay(back) through the 20th Century speaks volumes to that conclusion. Plus, it is past. There is more to be addressed for the present and the future than to put down the past.
henry6 wrote: Samantha wrote: Amtrak's supporters talk extensively about the subsidies received by air and highway interests while overlooking the subsidies received by the railroads. Which is easy to do since railroads, and Amtrak in particular, receive monies counted in single digits while airlines and highways receive monies counted in triple digit billions.
As I have pointed out in several posts, the gross amount of the federal subsidy received by the various modes of transport is immaterial. The key number is the amount received per comparative unit, i.e. per passenger, per passenger mile, per vehicle mile traveled, etc.
In 2007 Amtrak's passengers received an average federal operating subsidy of $40.68 per passenger or 18.6 cents per passenger mile. Amtrak's long distance train riders realized an average operating subsidy of $134 per passenger or 20.57 cents a passenger mile.
In most instances commuter and light rail passengers realized an even higher subsidy per passenger and passenger mile.
Airline passengers received an average subsidy of $4.30 per passenger or approximately one half of one cent per passenger mile. Airline passengers travel much further, on average, than rail passengers.
Motorists realized an average federal subsidy of $169.12 per licensed motorists or 1.4 cents per vehicle mile traveled. Motorists on average rack up more miles per year than anyone.
These subsidies do not include state and local subsidies, which would change the numbers somewhat. But no matter how one slices and dices the numbers, rail passengers receive a much larger subsidy per comparative unit than anyone else. Moreover, because of their large base, airline passengers and motorists in effect subsidize themselves through the payment of taxes to the general fund. Only rail passengers require a large subsidy from non-users.
Whether the U.S. is faced with a transport crisis is debatable. Clearly, there are some rough patches that need fixing. However, the U.S. is facing a real financial challenge. The national debt, plus unfunded liabilities, will in the near future saddle the average American household with debt that could reach $175,000 per household. This is the low estimate; the high estimate is $440,000 per household. So those who propose spending government money, as opposed to private money, on fixing our transport system should say how they propose to pay for it.
I just don't see your arguement holding up under everything that has been said and done in the transportation field over the past decade or more. Nor, if you ask transportation planners today what has to be done, you'll find your arguements are gone. I totally disagree with you comment that only rail riders require a large subsidy from non users. There are a lot more people in this country paying for airports, air traffic control, etc. than actually ride airplanes, so your comment about rail users is moot. Since in many parts of the country neither can the land take more concrete lanes nor the air more pollutants, something other than highways has to be considered. So the next question to you is, what do you propose? How can we get all the trucking companies, bus companies, gasoline companies, tire companies and motor vehicle manufacturerers to pay for the highway and road system? How can we get all the airlines to pay directly and entirely for the airports, traffic control, research and devleopment (headline: American Airlines and Southwest Airlines announce the developement of a new supersoninc fighter bomber for sale to the U.S. government?) and whatever else goes into the cost of operating? Simply put: there is no go it alone private enterprise solution.
I totally disagree with you comment that only rail riders require a large subsidy from non users.
The Amtrak subsidy is roughly 1 billion/year to carry .1 percent of total passenger miles. Airline passenger miles are 100 times Amtrak. Where are airlines getting 100 billion/year in subsidies from non users/general revenue?
Auto passenger miles are 1000 times Amtrak. You can disagree all you want, but where is a trillion dollars in general funds being spent on roads every year? More seriously, the high rates of Amtrak subsidy per passenger mile are an impediment to wider adoption of trains as a solution to the transportation crisis. What plan do you have that Amtrak make more work product out of each subsidy dollar? At the high rates of subsidy Amtrak requires, how is Amtrak going to make any difference to congestion-pollution-the fuel crisis without spending hundreds of billions of dollars per year? The Vision Plan wants to up Amtrak spending to 10 billion per year, but this will only increase Amtrak passenger miles to 1 percent from .1 percent of the total. How is this going to make any meaningful impact on congestion-pollution-fuel?
On another thread, I presented data that the Hiawatha train averages about 60 passenger miles per gallon. My Ford Taurus with just me in it averages 30 passenger miles per gallon over the same run, but it has a catalytic converter and other pollution controls not on the Diesel locomotive, and in no way does it give off particulate smoke the way the locomotive Diesel does. How is Amtrak saving on urban pollution?
What is my solution to the transportation crisis? The railroad mode needs high rates of operating subsidy relative to other modes, so I would spend my railroad dollars wisely. I would give priority to commuter trains to serve congested downtown areas, which happens to be an application of trains where train service is booming. I would extend the commuter train concept by focusing on the short end of corridor service -- NY-Philly, the Chi-Milw Hiawatha, the LA-San Diego Surfliner. I argued that runs of this length are the "sweet spot" for cost effectiveness of using trains to alleviate the ills you mentioned, and I got criticized on these pages that what I was advocating was little more than "long commuter lines." So?
I would give up on the Sunset, for which I am going to get flak. What does the Sunset do to alleviate congestion and save fuel and reduce urban pollution? I guess I am told that sleeping car service, subsidized at the rate of hundreds of dollars per trip, is the only way that some people are able or willing to travel long distances. So then the Sunset is an accomodation for the .1 percent of people unable or unwilling to travel in the manner that the remaining 99,9 percent of us do -- I would come up with some solution addressing the accomodation issue but treat this separately from the urban congestion, pollution, and expensive fuel issue.
What about the rest of the transportation system and the crisis of capacity? My answer is signals. For railroads, it is getting some kind of universal signals for both passenger and freight to break the 79 MPH barrier. Or airlines, it is probably some enhancement of onboard systems such as the TCAS collision avoidance system where airliners interrogate each other's transponders and avoid close approaches without support from the ground control. For cars, it is auto and highway automation. This won't come all it once, but it will come gradually in things like the millimeter wave radar cruise control you can get on a Toyota Avalon that maintains a safe distance from the car in front of you. Gradually this will take on more features similar to the airline TCAS system along with the next generation signalling system that will maintain positive separation of railroad traffic.
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