EVEN A PANCAKE HAS TWO SIDES

[wabash1]

When i posted this yesterday i Looked and you did not have a email. i was going to send you the answer that way. Ed knows as i have been filling him in on things going on with this. due to the law suits and the tense nature of the officials i reluctantly wont say much about it openly.

[csxengineer98]

then what was the reason then.... if joint responsibilty was not the reason for the companys actions...
csx engineer

[wabash1]

QUOTE: Originally posted by csxengineer98

the one question that this person asked but no one has yet to give a responce for was...
is eveyone on a crew held responsable for the actions of just 1 crewman.... and the awnser is...YES.....its called joint responsibilty....if the enigneer of a train should go by a signal displaying stop without permistion of the dispatcher...both the engineer and conductor are fired.... as well as anyone else that is part of that crew.... so with what happend with the NS crash... they fired the whole crew becouse thier were 3 people that if 1 of them forgot to do something..2 others should have reminded that 1.....so becouse the 2 failed to remind the 1 that left the switch open..they are just as guilty as the crewman that left it open in the first place....
csx engineer

csxengineer

this is not the case here. it is true that all are resposible for the actions of 1 but this is not the real reason why the engineer was fired.

[csxengineer98]

the one question that this person asked but no one has yet to give a responce for was...
is eveyone on a crew held responsable for the actions of just 1 crewman.... and the awnser is...YES.....its called joint responsibilty....if the enigneer of a train should go by a signal displaying stop without permistion of the dispatcher...both the engineer and conductor are fired.... as well as anyone else that is part of that crew.... so with what happend with the NS crash... they fired the whole crew becouse thier were 3 people that if 1 of them forgot to do something..2 others should have reminded that 1.....so becouse the 2 failed to remind the 1 that left the switch open..they are just as guilty as the crewman that left it open in the first place....
csx engineer

[arbfbe]

There are lots of questions here that will be dealt with over the next couple of years, quietly and based upon years of proceedure and precedents. I would wager at least on of the crew will be back to work after a year or maybe before. One may never get back.

If the FRA had wanted to make mainline switches in dark territory almost fail safe they would have issued a directive to railroads to establish yard limits at each and every location where there was a mainline switch uprotected by signal indication. That would mean every train would have to approach such switches as if they were improperly lined at such a speed so the crews could stop the train before being lined into the siding. Note they did not do that and neither will the railroads do that themselves. Safety First only goes so far and when trains slow down frequently and crews may get dog caught account of all these delays then there is pressure by the railroads to take the easy way out and suggest the FRA issue yet another paper solution to the problem. That is what happened here.

The Milwaukee Road used a switch point lock on their hand throw mainline switches that was set by lifting a lever to the vertical position. The chain that held the switch lock was attached to this lever. The switch lock could not be placed into the switch handle until this lever was raised and it could not be raised until the switch was closed as in lined for the mainline. It was physically impossible to line and lock a mainline switch for the siding or industry track. An employee could still forget to relign the switch entirely but it was not possible to lock the switch unless it was lined for the mainline. Note there was no effort by the FRA to mandate this safety appliance to the railroad industry even though it worked for the MILW for at least 50 years.

Each unprotected mainline could be equipped with a transponder hooked into the radio relay system to alert the dispatcher when the switch is not lined for the mainline. You will note the FRA did not mandate that safety system and you will not see any of the railroads doing such an installation without such a mandate. It would require capital and would prove to be an annoyance to the DS under normal switching operations.

Just when you think the safety agencies of the Federal Government are doing their job for you something like this shows they only go so far as the railroads will let them go.

Alan

[Anonymous]

cabforward: I think I'll limit this to the dispatcher's point of view only. And this is a bit simplified so I don't have to write all the exceptions (which would take a while).

Opening a switch in signaled territory will set the nearest signals on the main track to red. If the territory is under Centralized Traffic Control, it will also show what's called a "track light" on the dispatcher's console. Today, that means the graphic representation on the dispatcher's screen for that piece of track will turn red, or flashing red. All that tells the dispatcher is that there is something interrupting the track circuit in that block, which could be anything from a broken rail to a open switch to a piece of equipment on the track. The dispatcher cannot line a signal into that track segment, but he can "block clear" a train into it. That means he can authorize a train to proceed past the red signal at restricted speed (able to stop in 1/2 the limit of vision short of train, engine, open switch, men and equipment, etc., and on Western roads, not more than 20 mph in any case). Restricted speed protects the train; because it's 1/2 the limit of vision, no collision or accident should occur. If the track light appears on a switch, the dispatcher will notify the signal desk and a signal maintainer will be called out to inspect the switch and signal. If the track light appears behind a train, particularly a heavy train such as unit coal or grain, the dispatcher will suspect a broken rail, and will usually not block-clear any train into that block until the track is inspected by the roadmaster or track inspector.

In ABS (automatic block signal) territory, without CTC, the dispatcher has no electronic or visual information on that track. The signaling system is automatic, and it is the sole protection to the train against an open switch. The dispatcher won't know about the red signal until a train or maintainer comes upon it and reports it.

There are many switches off the main track in territories that aren't signaled. The dispatcher has no way of knowing if these are open or closed unless a train or maintainer tells him about it. By rule, switches on the main track may only be opened when in possession of a train or maintainer. When they leave, by rule they switch must be closed unless the dispatcher is informed it is open. Then it becomes the dispatcher's responsibility to protect the open switch by giving appropriate instruction to the next train to come upon it, before it gets there, of course.

Siding switches are often left open in caboose-less, single-track territory if that territory is not not equipped with spring switches on at least one end of each siding, because otherwise the conductor will have to walk the length of the train to the engines after closing the switch behind the train. In many areas, that's patently unsafe because the train is on bridges, sidehills, etc. There is almost no reason to leave a switch open to an industrial track -- that situation is very rare, and I can't recall ever seeing it on any line that was operated at anything better than restricted speed.

Train movements to industrial tracks are not covered by track warrants or DTC authorities, or for that matter in CTC territory they have no signal protection into the industrial track, because an industrial track is not a main track or controlled siding. The industrial track by rule is operated at restricted speed. In effect, a train on the main track "owns" the switch to any industrial spurs springing from that main track, and because the spur is operated at restricted speed, there could be something there and you have to watch out for it. A train cannot emerge from an industrial track onto the main track without authority on the main track, ever. Trains cannot tie up in industrial tracks without giving up their authority on the main track.

If that's not clear in any part, let me know, I'll try again. This is covering a huge part of the rule book in very abbreviated fashion (and it's just the dispatcher's part, too).

OS

[cabforward]

i have discussion questions about the graniteville tragedy..

from the crws' viewpoint, and from what is mentioned in the media about the case:
>> what would be the crews' basis for appealing the termination? would it be due process in the firing procedure or that they were not at fault?
>> what would be an argument for leaving the switch open?
>> what would be an argument for not advising a dispatcher or other centralized authority, of the switch's status or intentions to secure in the open postion for several hours?

other ??:
>> are all crewmembers typically responsible for the actions of a single member?
>> are many mainline switches equipped to alert dispatchers or other authorities as to their status (schematic board lights, computer message, etc.)?
>> are train movements to private spurs covered by track warrants or other systems to protect mainline supremacy?

i would be interested to hear the experiences of r.r. professionals as to 'close-calls' similar to this situation or other circumstances, if they are comfortable in discussing them..